JUDGMENT S. K. Dhaon, J. 1. This is a tenant's petition. It stems from proceedings initiated by Sri Ramesh Chandra Agarwal, respondent No. 3, hereinafter referred to as 'landlord' under section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for the release of a non-residential accommodation (the shop) in his favour. The Prescribed Authority rejected the application of the landlord. In appeal the VIth Additional District Judge (Appellate Authority) reversed the order of the Prescribed Authority and accepted the application of the landlord. 2. The averments in the application of the landlord were these. Smt. Dulari Devi, the mother of the landlord and Sri Krishna Kumar Agarwal, the respondent No. 2, hereinafter referred to as 'Agarwal', was the owner of house No. 81/111, Zero Road, Allahabad. This house had two shops in the ground-floor. One Smt. Shanti Devi was the tenant of one of the shops. Smt. Dulari Devi got the said shop released to set up in business Agarwal. Since 31st January, 1979 the said shop came in exclusive occupation of Agarwal, who is carrying on his wholesale business therein. On 5th February, 1971 Smt. Dulari Devi let out the shop to the petitioner by means of a rent note which was executed by Smt. Dulari Devi, Sri Jagdish Prasad Agarwal, the eldest brother of the petitioner and the petitioner. Sri Jagdish Prasad Agarwal and the petitioner joined the rent note merely for the purpose of realising rent and other purposes. On 4th October, 1979 Smt. Dulari Devi executed a registered Will whereby she bequeathed the aforesaid house in favour of the petitioner and Agarwal. She died on 25th May, 1980 and after her death the petitioner and Agarwal became the owner of the aforesaid house. On the basis of mutual settlement between the petitioner and Agarwal the shop fell in the ownership of the petitioner and he (the petitioner) was entitled to realise rent to the exclusion of Agarwal. The landlord was engaged in business in partnership with his elder brother and one Smt. Vidya Gupta. Differences cropped up between the landlord and his brother and eventually the landlord withdrew himself from the partnership business with effect from 31st December, 1981. The landlord had been rendered unemployed without any business. He had urgent and bonafide need of the shop. The landlord was engaged in business in partnership with his elder brother and one Smt. Vidya Gupta. Differences cropped up between the landlord and his brother and eventually the landlord withdrew himself from the partnership business with effect from 31st December, 1981. The landlord had been rendered unemployed without any business. He had urgent and bonafide need of the shop. Agarwal has no objection to the shop being released for the exclusive use of the landlord. The petitioner was essentially engaged in a wholesale business in the shop. He had another two door shop and a godown. He had also purchased a palatial building which consisted of 12 rooms and a big hall on the ground-floor for business purposes and this building was situate in the same business locality as the shop. Therefore, the petitioner had an alternative accommodation of his own. The petitioner will not suffer any hardship if the shop was released in favour of the landlord. Agarwal had been arrayed as one of the opposite parties to the application for release by way of abundant caution. The petitioner filed a counter affidavit before the prescribed authority with these averments The need of the landlord was neither genuine nor bonafide. He carried on business in the shop both on the retail as well as wholesale basis. The terms of letting of the shop were reduced into writing. One of the terms was that the petitioner would continue to be the tenant of the shop as long as he wanted to and the landlord could not evict him even on the ground of personal need. All the three executants of the rent note were the landlords of the shop. The alleged mutual settlement between the landlord and Agarwal was a collusive transaction which was entered into with a malafide intention of compelling the petitioner to enhance the rent exorbitantly. The landlord had not withdrawn from the cold storage business and he continued to be a partner thereof. The petitioner would suffer a greater hardship if he was evicted from the shop. 3. Agarwal filed an affidavit before the Prescribed Authority supporting the case of the landlord and stating therein that he has no concern with the shop. 4. The landlord had not withdrawn from the cold storage business and he continued to be a partner thereof. The petitioner would suffer a greater hardship if he was evicted from the shop. 3. Agarwal filed an affidavit before the Prescribed Authority supporting the case of the landlord and stating therein that he has no concern with the shop. 4. The Prescribed Authority held that the landlord alone could not file the application for release, that the landlord, in view of the stipulation in the rent note, was estopped from evicting the petitioner from the shop, even on ground of personal need, that the need of the landlord was not bonafide as the alleged dissolution of partnership was a sham transaction and that the petitioner will suffer hardship in the event he was evicted from the shop. The appellate authority disagreed with the findings of the Prescribed Authority on all counts. It held that the terms of the rent note relied upon by the petitioner could not be looked into as the document was not a registered one, that the landlord alone could maintain the application for release, that the dissolution of partnership stood proved, that the need of the landlord was genuine and bonafide and that the landlord will suffer greater hardship in case the shop was not released in his favour. 5. The petitioner has described the rent note as an agreement of tenancy. This document bears the signatures of the petitioner as well as the three persons already referred to. In it, the petitioner is described as the first party and the three aforementioned executants are described as second party. It is in Hindi. Paragraph 7 therein is relevant. The English rendering of this paragraph is like this. The first party will continue to be a tenant of the shop as long as he liked. He will continue to pay the rent specified month by month to the second party. So long as the first party continues to pay rent to the second party neither the second party not their heirs nor their legal representatives would have any right to get the shop vacated even on the ground of their personal need. 6. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act defines a lease. So long as the first party continues to pay rent to the second party neither the second party not their heirs nor their legal representatives would have any right to get the shop vacated even on the ground of their personal need. 6. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act defines a lease. One of the ingredients of a lease is that a transfer of right to enjoy immovable property is for a certain time (express or implied) or in perpetuity. The factor of time is the document is to be found in paragraph 7 alone. There are three possible ways of interpreting that paragraph. First, in the stipulation that the first party will continue as a tenant of the shop as long as he continued to pay rent month by month to the second party, the condition that so long as the rent is continued to be paid, the second party will have no right to get the shop vacated even on the ground of their personal need is implicit. Therefore, the second party merely examplifies the first part. To put it in another way, the second part merely makes explicit what is implicit in the first part. Secondly, the first and second parts are inextricably woven up with each other and are not severable. Thirdly the first party in the first part severed its right to terminate the agreement whenever it liked and the intention on the part of the first party to do so will be signified by the non-payment of rent. If that be so, the second part (the part in controversy) alone fulfils the requirements of the ingredients of a certain time in the lease. Thus, paragraph 7 of the agreement and particularly its second part contains a term of the lease. In view of the provisions of the second paragraph of section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act the agreement of tenancy requires registration. Indeed, the learned counsel for the petitioner has based his submission on the assumption that the document should have been registered. Section 49 of the Registration Act deals with the effect of non-registration of the documents required to be registered. Indeed, the learned counsel for the petitioner has based his submission on the assumption that the document should have been registered. Section 49 of the Registration Act deals with the effect of non-registration of the documents required to be registered. It, inter alia, provides that no document required by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered shall either affect any immovable property comprised therein or be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property unless it has been registered. The enacting part of section 49 of the Registration Act totally prohibits the petitioner from using the terms of paragraph 7 of the agreement of tenancy as a shield to ward off the attack on his tenancy rights in the shop in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has confined his contention on the proviso to section 49 which, insofar as the present document affecting immovable property and required by the Transfer of Property Act to be registered may be received as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by a registered instrument. The argument is that the second part of paragraph 7 of the agreement merely evidences a collateral transaction. And the same in not required to be effected by a registered instrument. The submission is not sound. 8. To repeat, paragraph 7 in its entirety is an integral part of the instrument whether called rent note or an agreement of tenancy or a lease. The expression 'transaction' is not a term of art. In Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary (II Edition) one of the meanings ascribed to it is a completion : an agreement. Osborn in A Concise Law Dictionary says that a collateral assurance, agreement, etc., is one which is independent of, but subordinate to, an assurance or agreement effecting the same subject-matter. The subject matter here is the shop. The second part of paragraph 7 is not independent of the agreement of tenancy. For, in the absence of the contents of paragraph 7 a valid agreement of tenancy or lease within section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act could not have come into existence. The petitioner, therefore, cannot take any advantage of the proviso to section 49. Section 49 has to be read in the light of section 17 of the Registration Act. The petitioner, therefore, cannot take any advantage of the proviso to section 49. Section 49 has to be read in the light of section 17 of the Registration Act. The Legislature has used the word 'affecting' as a compendious term for expressing the phrase of "purporting or operating to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in past or in future, any right, title or interest whether vested or contingent." To put it differently, 'affect' in an indirect sense upon the immovable property is excluded from the rigor of section 49. Therefore, a collateral purpose will be any purpose other than that of creating, declaring, assigning, limiting or extinguishing a right to immovable property. It follows that an integral part of term of a document creating an interest in immovable property cannot be used in any legal proceedings without the document being registered. Such a document cannot be allowed to bring about indirectly the effect which it would have had, if registered. Such a course, if permitted, will defeat the object of the Legislature in enacting section 49. The conclusion therefore, is inevitable that the terms of paragraph 7 cannot be pressed into service by the petitioner even for collateral purposes. 9. In Satish Chand Makhan v. Goverdhan Das Byas, AIR 1984 SC 143 the material facts were these. By a registered lease deed a piece of open land had been demised for a period of five years on stipulated rate. The lessee put up a super structure on the demised premises. After the expiry of the period of five years, the parties entered into a written agreement to renew the monthly lease for a further period of nine years. The draft lease agreement was marked as Ext. B-2 and the same remained unregistered. Clause 9 of the agreement provided that the lessee shall restore possession of the demised premises to the lessor after removing all the super-structures built upon the land. It further stipulated that on the failure of the lessee to comply with the said condition, the lessor would be entitled to recover possession of the plot of land. The lessor by a notice determined the tenancy on ground of forfeiture under section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act complaining of breach of the term of the lease. A suit was brought for ejectment. The lessor by a notice determined the tenancy on ground of forfeiture under section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act complaining of breach of the term of the lease. A suit was brought for ejectment. The lessee pleaded that in the absence of a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act the suit was not maintainable. The lessee further pleaded that the unregistered draft lease agreement, Ext B-2, was inadmissible for want of registration under section 49 of the Registration Act and that, in any event, the period of the lease as stipulated between the parties was for a further period of nine years with an option for further extension of the same by three years and, therefore, he was entitled to continue in possession of the demised premises. During the pendency of the suit the period of nine years elapsed. The High Court as well as the courts below held that upon the expiry of the period of nine years the lease stood determined by efflux of time under section 111 (a) of the Transfer of Property Act and no notice was required under section 106 of the said Act for determination of the lease. The matter went to the Supreme Court. The lessee contended there that Ext B-2 was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration. The lessor contended that in any view of the matter the document could be used for collateral purpose. The Supreme Court held that the unregistered draft deed Ext B-2 was clearly inadmissible in evidence under section 49 of the Registration Act, except for the collateral purpose of proving the nature and character of possession of the defendants. The proviso to section 49 was, however, not applicable, inasmuch as the terms of a lease are not a ' collateral purpose ' within its meaning. We have already emphasised that the contents of paragraph 7 of the agreement contain an important term of lease, namely, the time. A similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Zahir Ahmad v. Satish Kumar, AIR 1983 Allahabad 164 wherein it has been held that an unregistered lease deed cannot be admitted for proving either the duration of the lease or the rate of rent as they constitute the terms of the contract. A similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Zahir Ahmad v. Satish Kumar, AIR 1983 Allahabad 164 wherein it has been held that an unregistered lease deed cannot be admitted for proving either the duration of the lease or the rate of rent as they constitute the terms of the contract. Permitting an unregistered lease deed to be admitted in evidence for the said twin purpose would directly conflict with the mandate of section 49 of the Registration Act and section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. This Court has drawn a distinction between the secondary or supplemental purpose of a deed and the main purposes For the main purpose the law requires registration of documents. To hold that even for those purposes an unregistered document can be admissible would mean to defeat the provisions of the afore-mentioned two Acts. The Appellate Authority is, therefore, right in taking the view that the landlord is not estopped from making an application for the release of the shop on ground of personal need 10. The agreement of tenancy, being an unregistered document, cannot be admitted in evidence establishing the relationship of landlord and tenant. Afortiori the document cannot be used for the purpose of establishing that apart from the landlord his other brothers either in their individual capacity or in their capacity as the legal heirs of Smt. Dulari Devi are the landlords of the shop. The Lower Appellate Court has, therefore, rightly taken the view that the lease deed cannot be looked into for determining as to who is the landlord of the shop. The lower Appellate Court has relied upon an application made under Section 30 of the Act by the petitioner before the Munsif West, Allahabad and which was registered as Misc. Case No. 200 of 1982. A certified copy of the said application has been filed in this Court as Annexure 3 to the counter affidavit of the landlord. In this application, the landlord alone is arrayed as the opposite party. Column No. 7 relates to. the name and address of the landlord. Against this column the landlord alone is shown. It is mentioned in the application that the rent was personally offered and tendered to the landlord and on his refusal the same was sent to him by money order. Column No. 7 relates to. the name and address of the landlord. Against this column the landlord alone is shown. It is mentioned in the application that the rent was personally offered and tendered to the landlord and on his refusal the same was sent to him by money order. Further more, the Appellate Court has relied upon the receipts issued by the landlord to the petitioner (papers No. 21/1 to 21/6). These receipts go to show that the petitioner allowed (?) to the landlord and recognised him as the exclusive landlord of the shop. In addition to this, there was the affidavit of Agarwal before the Appellate Authority wherein he disclaimed his rights over the shop and recognised the landlord as the exclusive owner of the shop. It, therefore, cannot be said that the finding of the Appellate Authority that the landlord alone can maintain the application for release of the shop is either perverse or irrational or is based on any extraneous consideration so as to entitle this Court to disturb it in these proceedings. 11. The Appellate Authority has taken the view that the case set up by the landlord that his partnership in Bharat Cold Storage came to an end is corroborated by the deed of withdrawal of the landlord from the firm. It has negatived the case of the petitioner that the said deed was a sham transaction. It has also held that even if the landlord is a person of means he can augment his income by starting a business of his own in the shop. It has taken the view that the need of the landlord is bonafide. It is to be remembered that the case set up by the petitioner before the Prescribed Authority was that the landlord had initiated proceedings for the release of the shop as a device to extract an enhanced rent from him (the petitioner). Curiously enough, the petitioner at no stage came out with the quantum of the enhanced rent claimed by the landlord. The petitioner, therefore, failed to establish the malafide or aoy ulterior motive or lack of bonafide in the action taken by the landlord for getting the shop released in his favour. Curiously enough, the petitioner at no stage came out with the quantum of the enhanced rent claimed by the landlord. The petitioner, therefore, failed to establish the malafide or aoy ulterior motive or lack of bonafide in the action taken by the landlord for getting the shop released in his favour. The finding of the Appellate Authority that the shop is required by the landlord for his bonafide need does not suffer from any legal infirmity so as to call for any interference by this Court. 12. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the fact that the landlord failed to establish that any public notice as 'envisaged in subsection (3) of section 32 of the Partnership Act, was given goes to show that the landlord did not retire from the partnership of Bharat Cold Storage. In the absence of such a notice a retired partner and the other partner of a firm could continue to be liable as partners to third parties for any act done by any of them, which would have been the act of the firm if done before the retirement. This provision has, therefore, no bearing on the retirement of the landlord from the partnership firm. The absence of a public notice will not destroy the efficacy of the deed of withdrawal from partnership. We are now left with the question of comparative hardship. Paragraph 11 of the application for the release of the shop made by the landlord is relevant. In it the averments are these. The petitioner is essentially engaged in wholesale business of stationery goods in the shop as also in another two door shop and a godown at 29, Mahajani Tola, Allahabad. The petitioner has purchased a palatial building bearing Municipal No. 25 Mahajani Tola, Allahabad, which consists of about 12 rooms and a big hall on the ground floor for business purposes and the same is situate in the same business locality as the shop, at a distance of about 50 feet from the shop. The petitioner has thus an alternative accommodation of his own which lies in the vicinity of the shop. Consequently, if the shop is released in favour of the landlord, the petitioner shall not suffer any loss, hardship or inconvenience at all. This paragraph was replied to in paragraph 14 of the counter affidavit filed by the petitioner before the prescribed Authority. Consequently, if the shop is released in favour of the landlord, the petitioner shall not suffer any loss, hardship or inconvenience at all. This paragraph was replied to in paragraph 14 of the counter affidavit filed by the petitioner before the prescribed Authority. The same may be extracted : "That the contents of paragraph 11 of the affidavit are absolutely wrong and emphatically denied. It is reiterated that the need of the applicant is neither bonafide nor genuine nor he requires the disputed shop urgently as alleged." 13. It will be immediately seen that the specific averments made by the landlord in paragraph 11 of his application that the petitioner was essentially engaged in a wholesale business in the shop, that the shop and the alternative accommodation available to the petitioner was situate in the same business locality at the distance between the shop and the shop owned by the petitioner is only 50 feet remained uncontroverted. It is also to be remembered that in paragraph 23 of the said affidavit the petitioner admitted that he carried on business in the shop on wholesale basis. Of course, the petitioner added a rider that he also carries retail business therein. The Appellate Authority has emphasised that the landlord has no other shop in the town of Allahabad, that the petitioner purchasad a house with a hall on the ground floor, that the house purchased by the petitioner is situate in the business locality and, therefore, the good-will earned by the petitioner by carrying on business in the shop is not likely to be impaired. Further more, the Appellate Authority has taken note of the fact that the landlord is prepared to pay compensation to the petitioner, as required by law. Thus the Appellate Authority, after taking into consideration the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, has come to the conclusion that the landlord will suffer greater hardship in the event the shop is not released in his favour. This finding is based on relevant considerations and the same cannot be quashed by means of a writ in the nature of certiorari. 14. This petition lacks merit. It is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.