JUDGMENT B. L Yadav, J. 1. By present revision under section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the Code) order dated 24-2-87 passed by IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge Ballia allowing the revision and setting aside the order dated 6-9-86 passed by the Magistrate, is sought to be quashed. 2. The facts of the case in brief are these. The opposite party no. 2 has lodged a report at the police station Kotwali Ballia that the husband of the present applicant has taken possession of the vehicle (No. B.R.A. 9448), by playing mischief with him and the same be delivered to him. On this report the police Kotwali obtained the possession of the said vehicle from applicant, but kept it at the police station. The applicant as a vendee also claimed the said vehicle. The said report was sent to the Superintendent of Police. A complaint was filed by the opposite party no. 2 on 29-7-85 against the applicant and the same is still pending. On 29-11-85 the applicant moved an application before the Magistrate to obtain the possession of the said vehicle, and notice was given to the opposite party no. 2 who appeared and himself claimed the possession. The Magistrate by order dated 6-9-86 directed the vehicle to be given in possession of the applicant on her executing the personal bond for a sum of Rs. 50,000/- Against that order revision was filed by the opposite party no. 2 which has been allowed by the impugned order. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant urged that the order passed by the Magistrate was an interlocutory order and the revision was not maintainable against that order, in view of section 397 (2) of the Code. The order of the Magistrate was quite legal as it was passed under section 451 of the Code, and there was no illegality or irregularity in it, nor there was any justification for interference. The reliance was placed on Ajai Singh v. Nathi Lal, 1978 ACrR 140, N. Madhavan v. State of Kerala, 1979 ACrR 432 and Kalpnath Singh v. Sheo Nath Rai, 1979 ACrR 311. 4. Learned counsel for the opposite party no. The reliance was placed on Ajai Singh v. Nathi Lal, 1978 ACrR 140, N. Madhavan v. State of Kerala, 1979 ACrR 432 and Kalpnath Singh v. Sheo Nath Rai, 1979 ACrR 311. 4. Learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2, on the other hand, urged that the order passed by the Magistrate was not interlocutory order hence the revision before the Sessions Judge was maintainable and as the registration of the vehicle was in the name of opposite party no. 2 hence he was entitled to the possession. The reliance was placed on R. K. Jaiswal v. State of U. P., 1984 ACrR 290. Having heard learned counsel for the parties points for determination are as to whether the order under section 451 of the Code was an interlocutory order, and in case it is assumed not an interlocutory order, whether Sessions Judge was justified in setting aside that order, keeping in view the provisions of section 31 of the Motor Vehicles Act (for short the Act). 5. The order of the Magistrate was undoubtedly passed under section 451 of the Code. The complaint filed by the opposite party no. 2 against the applicant is still pending. Sections 451, 452 and 457 of the Code being connected, but being operative in well defined fields, have to be read together. Sections 451 to 459 have been placed under Chapter XXXIV (thirty four) "disposal of property". Section 451 opens with the words, 'order for custody and disposal of property pending trial in certain cases'. It is for the delivery of possession of the property during pendency of the enquiry or trial. Section 452 opens with the words, 'order for disposal of property at conclusion of trial'. 6. Whenever a property is seized in connection with any offence, the Chapter XXXIV (thirty four), immediately comes into operation. These sections 451, 452 and 457 are operative for different stages of the case. In other words in particular circumstances an order can be passed under any of these sections depending upon the mode of seizure of property and stage of the case. Section 451 deals with interim custody of the property during pendency of seizure or trial, whereas section 452 enables the Magistrate to pass an order after trial or enquiry comes to an end. The Magistrate has no power to decide title or to investigate into the same. Section 451 deals with interim custody of the property during pendency of seizure or trial, whereas section 452 enables the Magistrate to pass an order after trial or enquiry comes to an end. The Magistrate has no power to decide title or to investigate into the same. It is to be emphasized that section 451 does not deal with the rights of the parties in connection with the property or vehicle seized during enquiry or trial. It only operates in connection with proper, but interim custody of the property. This section applies not only in respect of the property produced before the Court but also property involved in crime. The object of section 451 is to pass an order for interim custody of property pending enquiry or trial. The power under section 451 is summary in nature and analogous to a power, for issuing temporary injunction by a Civil Court till disposal of the suit, under Order 39 (thirty nine) Rules 1 and 2 or the appointment of a receiver before decision of the suit, in view of Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The intendment of the law givers is that just a temporary arrangement may be made about custody of the vehicle or the property. The main consideration is to protect and preserve the property pending trial. The possession of the person entrusted with the interim custody is on behalf of and as a representative of the Court. He or she is bound by the terms of entrustment or the bond executed. The entrustment will not invest him or her with any preferential right to ownership. The order under section 451 is accordingly interlocutory and no revision would lie .against it and consequently the order of the third Additional Sessions Judge Ballia was without jurisdiction. -See V. Prakashan v. K. P. Pankajak Shen, 1985 (2) Crimes 74. The nature of an order in respect of interim arrangement cannot be in the form of a final order. It is certainly an interlocutory order. On similar facts this court in Kalpnath Singh v. Shiv Nath Rai (supra) held the order under section 451 to be an interlocutory. -See V. Prakashan v. K. P. Pankajak Shen, 1985 (2) Crimes 74. The nature of an order in respect of interim arrangement cannot be in the form of a final order. It is certainly an interlocutory order. On similar facts this court in Kalpnath Singh v. Shiv Nath Rai (supra) held the order under section 451 to be an interlocutory. A Division Bench of this Court in Ajai Singh v. Nathi Lal (supra), gave guidelines for interpretation of sections 451 and 452 rather enlarged the scope of section 452 to the extent that it applies to the stage of investigation also. N. Madhavan v. State of Kerala, 1979 ACrR 432 (supra) is a case laying down the guiding principles for an order under section 457 of the Code (section 517 of old Code) for return of the article used in the commission of an offence. I am of the view that against the order under section 451, no revision would lie. In the alternative, assuming the order under section 451 not to be an interlocutory, in that case it has to be decided as to whether there was any illegality in the order of the Magistrate warranting interference in revision by the Sessions Judge. The applicant's case is that she has purchased the vehicle from the opposite party no. 2 in whose name it was registered. Under these circumstances whether the applicant can be given possession of the vehicle keeping in view the provisions of section 31 of the Act. The recovery of the vehicle was made by the police from the house of the applicant as she was in the possession of the vehicle. FIR was lodged by the opposite party no. 2 and the complaint was filed against the applicant and the same is pending. As the applicant was in possession of the vehicle and the enquiry or trial has not as yet concluded hence the Magistrate in the exercise of his power under section 451 passed an order directing the vehicle to be delivered to the applicant provided she executed personal bond for a sum of Rs. 50,000/-. 7. About the interpretation of section 451 it is stated that the Legislature was cautious in not placing any restriction on the power of the Magistrate under section 451. 50,000/-. 7. About the interpretation of section 451 it is stated that the Legislature was cautious in not placing any restriction on the power of the Magistrate under section 451. The words employed by the Legislature to convey its meaning are "The Court may make such order as it thinks fit for the proper custody of such property pending the conclusion of the enquiry or trial." These words in my opinion, vest the Magistrate with very wide discretion to pass any order as he thinks fit. This Court would not be justified in imposing any condition or curtailing the wide discretion on the Magistrate by placing a narrow construction on these words. It is to be remembered that a particular statute is enacted sometimes in the past but it controls the problems arising in present or in future. The words of a statute are accordingly in broad terms. The statutes are men made and there are bound to be some Casusomissi, when applied to present and future. A wide discretion has to be applied. It would not be proper to impose any rider that in case a vehicle is registered in the name of a person its possession has to be given in his name alone and not in the name of a person who alleges to have obtained a sale deed from the owner having a registration certificate. 8. To add any condition in case of a Registered owner, would amount to add a proviso to section 451, which only Legislature could do. On the basis of evidence led in a particular case, the possession of vehicle may be given to a person alleging to be a registered owner, but this is not to be done in every case. The prima facie evidence of ownership can be looked into. The vehicle was recovered from the applicant who alleged to have purchased it from registered owner. It is the proper custody of the vehicle or property which is to be kept in mind and that alone is the paramount consideration. This appears to be the intendment of the Legislature. The applicant alleged to have purchased the vehicle from opposite party no. 2 on 8-7-85 for a sum of Rs. 15,000/-. In the sale deed it was provided that the vendee would be entitled to have the vehicle registered in her name. This appears to be the intendment of the Legislature. The applicant alleged to have purchased the vehicle from opposite party no. 2 on 8-7-85 for a sum of Rs. 15,000/-. In the sale deed it was provided that the vendee would be entitled to have the vehicle registered in her name. There was a prima facie case in favour of the applicant in respect of 'proper custody of the vehicle'. The Magistrate under the circumstances of the present case was justified in directing possession of the vehicle to the applicant, who was even though, not a registered owner. There was no irregularity in that order justifying interference by the Illrd Additional Sessions Judge. N. Madhavan v. State of Kerala (supra) relied upon by the applicant was a case dealing with the principles under section 517 of the Code and not section 451 hence it is of very little assistance. Reverting to the case relied upon by the opposite party -Dr. R. K.Jaiswal v. State of U. P. (supra) was not a case under section 451 and was a case distinguishable on facts. There the Truck No. U. T. V. 786 belonged to Mohd. Moesa who sold it to Govind Das and Raghunandan Singh on October 1, 1982. The names of these vendees were entered in the office of Regional Transport Officer and registration papers were issued in their favour. Raghunandan Singh (one of the vendee) transferred his share to Govind Das (another vendee of remaining half share) who alone was registered. Dr. R. K. Jaiswal alleged to have purchased the truck from Govind Das, whereas Dhan Singh and Daulat Ram, on the other hand alleged to have purchased from Govind Das. In this way there was dispute between two set of purchasers. The possession was taken by Dhan Singh and Daulat Ram, the latter being brother and former being father of Govind Das. The names of their purchasers (Dhan Singh and Daulat Ram) were entered in the office of Regional Transport Officer. The Chief Judicial Magistrate instead of releasing the vehicle in favour of either claimant i. e. 1st Dr. R. K. Jaiswal and 2nd Dhan Singh and Daulat Ram, directed it to be kept in the custody of police and the vehicle was to be given to the possession of the person who gets an order from Civil Court. The Chief Judicial Magistrate instead of releasing the vehicle in favour of either claimant i. e. 1st Dr. R. K. Jaiswal and 2nd Dhan Singh and Daulat Ram, directed it to be kept in the custody of police and the vehicle was to be given to the possession of the person who gets an order from Civil Court. The Sessions Judge set aside the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate and directed the vehicle to be given to the custody of Dhan Singh and Daulat Ram. Against that order the revision and an application under section 482 were filed before this Court. It was found by this Court that enquiry or trial was not pending when the Chief Judicial Magistrate passed the order and hence section 451 was not applicable (as observed by this Court). In case section 451 was not applicable in that event that case of Dr. Jaiswal cannot be of any assistance to the present case, inasmuch as the section 457 was applied in that case. The provisions of sections 452 and 457 are applicable at subsequent stages. 9. Section 452 (sections 517 and 518 of Old Code) comes into effect only after conclusion of enquiry or trial. It refers to four classes of properties or documents i.e. (i) produced before the Court or (ii) in its custody, or (iii) regarding which an offence is committed, or (iv) which is used in commission of an offence. There are four modes provided under this section 452 for disposal of these properties (i) by destruction, (ii) confiscation (iii) delivery to a person entitled to its possession or (iv) otherwise. SECTION 457 comes into operation when a property is seized by a police and is reported to a Magistrate under the provisions of the Code, but such property is not produced before a criminal court during an enquiry or trial. 10. In the instant case the Sessions Judge appears to have been swayed with the consideration of the registration of the vehicle in the name of the opposite party no. 2 but that is not the principal factor to be taken into account while passing an order under section 451. An order under section 452 is passed after the conclusion of the trial or an order under section 457 is passed after the seizure of the property when the same was not produced before the Court during enquiry or trial. 2 but that is not the principal factor to be taken into account while passing an order under section 451. An order under section 452 is passed after the conclusion of the trial or an order under section 457 is passed after the seizure of the property when the same was not produced before the Court during enquiry or trial. 11. In the result the revision succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 24-2-87 passed by IIIrd Additional Sesssions Judge Ballia is set aside and that of the Magistrate dated 6-9-86 is restored. The interim stay order dated 10-3-87 and 25-3-87 are hereby vacated. 12. The office would send back the record of the courts below forthwith. Revision allowed.