JUDGMENT S. Saghir Ahmad, J. - The facts giving rise to this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution are that opposite-party No. 2 was a driver employed by the petitioner in their Branch Office at Lucknow He was retrenched from service. Thereafter a reference was made by the State Government to the Labour Court on the basis of which Adjudication Case No. 57/82 was registered. 2. opposite-party No. 2 submitted his written statement in July, 1982 which was also accompanied by an affidavit. The petitioner filed his written statement on 6-8-1982 which was also accompanied by an affidavit. The petitioner filed a rejoinder dated 30-9-1982 (Annexure - 3) to the written statement filed by opposite-party No. 2 who also filed a rejoinder dated 8-11-1982 (Annexure - 4) to the written statement of the petitioner. On 11-5-1984 issues were framed by the labour court and an order was passed that the employer (petitioner) shall lead the evidence on 19-10-1984 an applicant (Annexure - 6) was filed by the petitioner that burden of proof has been wrongly placed on it and that the workman be required to produce his evidence first. This application was rejected by the following order which is written on the margin of Annexure-6. It reads as under ; "Heard parties. The order passed on 11-5-1984 is clear and specific and this court has no jurisdiction to revise the order then passed. The application therefore fails. Sd/- Saran Prasad P. O. 19-10-1984. 3. Another application was filed by the petitioner in December, 1984 of which a copy has been filed as Annexure-9. The prayer in this application was that the order dated 11-5-1984 and 19-10-1984 may be recalled and the workman may be directed to lead his evidence, first. This application was also rejected by the Labour Court by its order dated 10-12-1984 which is contained in Annexure-10. It is against this order that the present writ petition has been filed. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. On 11-5-1984 the Labour Court had framed the following issues : "1. Whether the concerned workman was retrenched by the Com - pay as stated in the written Statement of the Management in para 24, if so what is its effect ? 2. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. On 11-5-1984 the Labour Court had framed the following issues : "1. Whether the concerned workman was retrenched by the Com - pay as stated in the written Statement of the Management in para 24, if so what is its effect ? 2. Whether the concerned workman resigned his employment of his own free will as stated by the management in para 3 and following paragraph of the written statement ? If so its effect ? 3. Whether the concerned workman accepted Rs. 5000/-As ex - gratia payment and if so what is its effect ? 4. Whether the concerned workman is a workman within the definition given in the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act in view of the intermittent nature of his duties as a Driver ? 5. Whether since the termination of his service the concerned workman is gainfully employed. 6. To what relief, if any, is the workman entitled ? 5. It appears from the pleadings of the parties that opposite-party No. 2 had set up a case of illegal retrenchment was controverted by the petitioner by pleading that the workman, namely, opposite-party No. 2 had resigned of his own free will and had accepted Rs. 5000/- As ex gratia payment. Issues 2 and 3 relate to the question of resignation of opposite-party No. 2 and acceptance by him of Rs. 5000/- As ex gratia payment. Issue No. 4 is related to usual question which is raised by the employer, namely, whether the concerned workman was a "workman" within the meaning of the definition given in the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. 6. Issue No. 5 also appears to have been framed on the basis of the pleading of the petitioner who had stated that opposite-party No. 2 had taken up employment elsewhere, namely, that he was driving a taxi inasmuch he had purchased a motor car No. UPH - 3135 which he was plying as a taxi. The burden of proof in respect of issues 2, 3, 4 and 5 was, therefore, clearly upon the petitioner. 7. As regards issue No. 1, it may be stated that in the present petition the petitioner has itself pleaded that opposite-party No. 2 was retrenched from service. The burden of proof in respect of issues 2, 3, 4 and 5 was, therefore, clearly upon the petitioner. 7. As regards issue No. 1, it may be stated that in the present petition the petitioner has itself pleaded that opposite-party No. 2 was retrenched from service. This was also the case of the petitioner in their written statement vide para 24 which is reproduced below : "That in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances the management of the Company decided to retrench the concerned workman." 8. The circumstances in which opposite-party No. 2 was retrenched from service have been set out by the petitioner in the earlier paras of the written statement. 9. On facts, therefore, the Tribunal was justified in requiring the petitioner to lead his evidence first. 10. This writ petition was filed in 1985 and by an interim order dated 28-1-1985 the proceedings before the Labour Court were stayed. 11. The opposite-party No. 2 was a driver in the petitioners firm and on being retrenched from service he invoked the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and took the dispute to the Labour Court through a reference made by the State Government. The employer took to the usual course of prolonging the decision of the dispute by raising pleas. The plea that the burden of proof was wrongly placed upon them and that opposite-party No. 2 should have been called upon to lead his evidence first was a part of the attempt to prolong the proceeding. Such an attitude has been deprecated by the Supreme Court in several of its decisions. In D. P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration and others, (1983)2 SCC 293 : Court as under : "There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. We think it is better that tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Court in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Nor should High Court in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this court under Article 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill-Afford to wait by dragging the latter from court to court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Article 226 and Article 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion Tribunals and courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must therefore ask themselves whether such threshold part adjudication is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences. After all tribunals like industrial tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections and journeying up and down. It is also worthwhile remembering that the nature of the jurisdiction under Article 226 is supervisory but the court may exercise all necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be too astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by special tribunal at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues." 12. In S. K. Varma v. Mahesh Chandra and another, (1983) 4 SCC 214 ; 1983 SCC (L & S) 510 the Supreme Court speaking through O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. has observed as under : "It is a pity that when the Central Government, in all solemnity, refers an industrial dispute for adjudication, a public sector corporation which is an instrumentality of the State instead of welcoming a decision by the Tribunal on merits so as to absolve itself of any charge of being a bad employer or of victimisation etc. should attempt to evade decision on merits by raising such objections and never thereby satisfied, carry the matter often times to the High Court and to the Supreme Court, wasting public time and money. We expect public sector corporations to be model employers and model litigants. should attempt to evade decision on merits by raising such objections and never thereby satisfied, carry the matter often times to the High Court and to the Supreme Court, wasting public time and money. We expect public sector corporations to be model employers and model litigants. We do not expect them to attempt to avoid adjudication or to indulge in luxurious litigation and drag workmen from court to court merely to vindicate, no justice, but some rigid technical stand taken up by them. We hope that public sector corporations will henceforth refrain from raising needless objections, fighting needless litigation's and adopting needless postures." 13. The view expressed above was again reiterated by the Supreme Court in Workmen Employed by Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd., (1984) 4 SCC 392 : 1985 SCC (L & S) 6 wherein the Supreme Court has laid down as under ; "It is most unfortunate that all those unhealthy and in judicious practices resorted to for unduly delaying the culmination of civil proceedings stealthily crept in, for reasons not unknown, in the adjudication of industrial disputes for the resolution of which an informal forum and simple procedure were devised with the avowed object of keeping them free from the dilatory practices of civil courts. Times without number this Court to quote only two D. P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration and S.K. Varma v. Mahesh Chandra disapproved the practice of raising frivolous preliminary objections at the instance of the employer to delay and defeat by exhausting the workmen the outcome of the dispute yet we have to deal with the same situation in this appeal by special leave." 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has invited my attention to a decision of this court in M/s. Airtake Pvt. Ltd. Ghaziabad v. State of U.P. and others, 1984 UPLBEC 821 in which on a consideration of provisions contained in Section 5 - C(l) of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Rule 12 of the Rules made thereunder it was laid down that burden of proving the case referred to the Labour Court for adjudication by the State Government lies on the workman. Paras 4 and 5 which contain the relevant portion of the judgment may be referred to. Paras 4 and 5 which contain the relevant portion of the judgment may be referred to. In para 4 of the report it has been laid down that from a combined reading of Section 5 - C(l) and Rules 12 it becomes apparent that it is imperative upon the workman to file an affidavit in support of his written statement. This affidavit, according to the judgment, constitutes the preliminary evidence The judgment further reads that if the employer does not care to controvert the averments made in the affidavit nothing further need to be proved. It appears that the dispute was decided in that case merely on the basis of the terms of reference made by the State Government. The case, is therefore, clearly distinguishable inasmuch as in the instant case I have already held that initial burden of proof clearly lay upon the employer and they were rightly called upon by the tribunal to lead their evidence. 15. For the reasons stated above, I see no merit in the petition which is dismissed with costs and the interim order of stay is hereby vacated. The Labour Court shall proceed to dispose of the reference as expeditiously as possible.