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1987 DIGILAW 1041 (ALL)

Kamod Singh Sharma v. State Bank of India, Agra

1987-11-04

A.BANERJI, B.L.YADAV

body1987
JUDGMENT B.L. Yadav, J. - The petitioner obtained a sum of Rs. 42,500/- as loan on 30th April, 1971 for the purchase of a Tractor, from the State Bank of India, Samsabad Branch, Agra (for short the Bank), the respondent No. 1 under the provisions of Q. P. Agricultural Credit Act, 1973, U.P. Act No. XIX (Ninteen) of 1973 (for short the Act). The instalments were fixed for repayment of the loan along with interest. It appears that about Rs. 48,000/- was paid but in 1982-83 the petitioner did not make any deposit. His case was that on account of natural calamities the crops were damaged and he was not in a position to pay the instalments and that his son was also murdered. The petitioner received a notice wherein it was indicated that a sum of Rs. 40,702,35 p. was due to be paid by the petitioner and that he should appear before the Bank and make payment of the same. The petitioner replied to the said notice and thereafter a final notice was given to him that a sum of Rs. 42,500/- was due and he should appear before the Bank and make payment of the same. Ultimately recovery certificate dated 18-10-85 (Annexure 4 to the writ petition) was issued indicating April, 1985 as the date when the amount sought to be recovered fell due. The said recovery certificate however was issued on 30-11-85 and served on petitioner on 1-12-85 as stated in para 16 of the writ petition. Present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed with the prayer to quash the said recovery certificate and direct the respondents not to recover the amount shown in the recovery certificate from the petitioner. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner made three submissions, Ist that the recovery certificate was time barred, IInd, that the provisions of S. 11-A of the Act would not be applicable in the present case as it was captioned with the words, 'recovery in the case of personal security' whereas the present was not the case of personal security, and IIIrd, that S. 11-A of the Act was invalid and unconstitutional. 3. 3. Learned counsel for: the Bank urged that the recovery certificate was issued within time as it was issued within a period of 3 years from the date when the amount specified in the recovery certificate fell due, as prescribed under S. 11-A(2) of the Act. It was further urged that S. 11-A was applicable even though it opens with the words 'recovery in the case of personal security' but the heading of the section cannot control the substance of the section, and the S. 11-A was not invalid or unconstitutional, nor the same is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 4. Learned Standing Counsel also supported the recovery certificate and urged that the recovery certificate was not time barred nor the heading of the section can control the substance of whole section and that section 11-A was not invalid or unconstitutional. 5. As regards the first submission as to whether the recovery certificate was within time. Suffice it to say that the petitioner himself has filed recovery certificate vide Annexure 4 to the writ petition. Even though it appears bereft of the details but this much is evident that under column 5 it has been indicated that April, 1985 was the date when the amount claimed fell due and the recovery certificate was dated 18-10-1985. Section 11- A(2) is to the following effect. "The certificate referred to in sub-sec.(i) may be forwarded to the Collector within 3 years from the date when the amount specified in the certificate fell due." 6. In view of the provisions of S. 11-A(2) the period of limitation was 3 years from the date when the amount fell due. In other words the recovery certificate referred to in sub- sec. (1) of S. 11-A was to be forwarded to the Collector within 3 years from the date when the amount specified to be recovered from the petitioner in the recovery certificate fell due. From Annexure 4,to the writ petition it is clear that April, 1985 was the date when the amount claimed from the petitioner fell due. The recovery certificate was dated 18th Oct., 1985 (as per Annexure 4 to the writ petition) and the same was received by the petitioner on 14th Nov., 1985. On behalf of Bank Sri R. K. Kapoor, Field Officer, State Bank -of India has filed a counter affidavit. The recovery certificate was dated 18th Oct., 1985 (as per Annexure 4 to the writ petition) and the same was received by the petitioner on 14th Nov., 1985. On behalf of Bank Sri R. K. Kapoor, Field Officer, State Bank -of India has filed a counter affidavit. Under para 13 of the same it has been stated that the amount fell due in April, 1985 and the recovery certificate was issued on 18th Oct., 1985. In this view of the matter the recovery certificate has been issued well within 3 years from the date the amount fell due. Accordingly we are of the view that the recovery certificate is well within time. 7. Adverting to the second submission as to whether the heading of S. 11-A can control the effect of the section itself. It has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that the present is not the recovery in the case of personal security hence recovery certificate could not be issued in view of the provisions of S. 11-A of the Act. In this connection it has to be remembered that the elementary rule of interpretation of the statute is that the marginal notes or heading of a particular section are some time taken as an aid to the construction but it is not to control the effect of the section itself nor the same can be taken to be part of the statute. To put it differently the heading or the marginal notes of a section are not added by the Parliament whenever an amendment to the section is made, nor they can be deemed to obstruct wide words or connotations and the meaning of a particular section. The marginal notes or the heading of a section cannot be said to be enacted in the same sense in which a particular Statute or a particular Section is enacted by the Legislature. The marginal notes or the heading of a section cannot be said to be enacted in the same sense in which a particular Statute or a particular Section is enacted by the Legislature. In R. v. Hare, (1934) 1 KB 354, Hon'ble Avorsy, J. observed as follows : "The heading like marginal notes are not voted on or passed by the Parliament but are inserted after the Bill has become law." In R. v. Surrey (N.E. Area) Assessment Committee, (1948) 1 KB 29 it was observed as follows : "But while the court is entitled to look at the heading in an Act of Parliament to resolve any doubt they may have as to ambiguous words, the law is quite clear that you cannot use such heading to give a different effect to clear words of the section where there cannot be any doubt as to their ordinary meaning." 8. Recently in Dr. Aziz Haider v. State of U.P., 1987 All WC 750 : 1987 All LJ 773 a Division Bench of this Court held at page 753 (of All WC): (atp. 775 of AIILJ) as follows : "Learned counsel contends that S. 11-A could not be made applicable to the facts hereof since it is submitted, S. 11-A applies to recovery in the case of .personal security. The submission is devoid of merits. The heading which S. 11-A bears is no doubt, 'recovery in the case of personal security but a perusal of the contents shows that there is nothing at least to confine the same to a case of personal security." 9. We are of the opinion that the second submission is also devoid of merits. 10. The last submission as to whether S. 11-A was invalid or unconstitutional, even though urged half heartedly, but the same has only to be stated to be rejected. The pith s and substance of 'this submission is that remedy by suit has been provided along with remedy by summary procedure i.e. by issuing recovery certificates has been provided. Nothing substantial has been indicated as to how S. 11-A of the Act could be said to be invalid or unconstitutional. The pith s and substance of 'this submission is that remedy by suit has been provided along with remedy by summary procedure i.e. by issuing recovery certificates has been provided. Nothing substantial has been indicated as to how S. 11-A of the Act could be said to be invalid or unconstitutional. It may be that S. 11-A provides a speedier and summary remedy for recovery of the dues against the particular defaulter and the regular suit for recovery of the said dues may also be filed but the policy of the law has to be laid down by the Legislature. In case the Legislature chooses to provide a remedy by a regular suit and also by a summary procedure by making provision to send recovery certificate in respect of the amount due to the Collector for recovery as arrears of land revenue, the said provision could neither be said to be arbitrary or invalid or. unconstitutional. Undoubtedly interpretation of a particular section has to be made keeping in view the Legislative policy envisaged under S. 11-A of the Act. The preamble to the Act itself is as follows : "To make provision to facilitate adequate flow of credit for agricultural production and development through banks and other institutional credit agencies and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto." It is abundantly clear in view of the aforesaid preamble to the Act that the provisions have been made to facilitate the advancement of the loan from the Bank and it is for the Legislature to provide the mode of the recovery of the loan advanced by the Bank. Section 11-A was inserted in view of the amendment made effective on 25-1-75 with a view to avoid a prolonged litigation by filing a civil suit. This cannot be therefore said that S. 11-A was in any way ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. 11. Section 11-A was inserted in view of the amendment made effective on 25-1-75 with a view to avoid a prolonged litigation by filing a civil suit. This cannot be therefore said that S. 11-A was in any way ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution. 11. In Trijugi Narain Tiwari v. Gorakhpur Kshetriya Gramin Bank, AIR 1986 All 115 : 1986 All LJ 224 the similar provision after detailed discussions and consideration of relevant case law was held to be valid and constitutional, by a Division Bench of this Court, at page 120 para 21 with the following observations, "The procedure for recovery of loan by sending recovery certificate to the Collector for recovery as arrears of land Revenues provided by S. 11-A cannot be said to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution on ground that it is harsh as compared toy provisions for recovery in S. 11 and Sections 10-A, 10-B. The object of the Act is to help the agriculturist by giving them financial assistance. Experience showed that the advances made by the banks were not being returned in time and a number of difficulties were being created. It was with the object of .avoiding the usual delay in recovering the amount that the machinery of realisation of the amount due under the mortgage deed of a particular transaction, as it were an arrear of land revenue was provided. In view of the object sought to be achieved the procedure provided by S. 11-A cannot be said to be ultra vires Art: 14 of the Constitution." 12. It is our considered opinion that S. 11 A of the Act is neither invalid, nor hit by Article 14 of the Constitution. In view of the premises aforesaid none of the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner has any substance. In the result the present writ petition fails and is dismissed. But under the circumstances of the case we refrain from making any order as to costs.