JUDGMENT S.K. Lakhtakia, M. - This is a second appeal under Section 331 Act I of 1931 against the judgment and decree dated 21.9.1981 passed by Addl. Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut confirming the judgment and decree dated 18.4.1979 passed by Assistant Collector 1st Class, Roorkee, Hardwar in suit, under Section 229-B of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. The facts of this case in brief that the respondent Raj Narain filed a suit under Section 229-B of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act on the ground that he has been continuing in possession from prior to Zamindari Abolition and has acquired bhumidhari rights but the name of the defendant No. 1 is wrongly recorded as bhumidhar and plaintiff is recorded only in Zeman 9 from 1377 fasli, hence he prayed for declaration of bhumidhari rights. In the alternative dispossession of the plaintiff was also sought. 3. The appellant i.e. the defendant No. 1 contested the suit on the ground that the plaintiff has never been in possession of the land and he got his name fictitiously recorded under Zeman 9 with the collusion of the lekhpal, hence this suit is liable to be dismissed. The trial court found that the plaintiff has been continuing in possession from more than 12 years and, therefore, decreed the suit. The appeal filed against the said decree was also dismissed, hence the second appeal. 4. Heard the learned counsel for both the parties. Perused the impugned judgment and the record. 5. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that the factum of possession is a question of fact and it has been determined concurrently by both the courts below, hence this court at this stage cannot interfere in that finding and hence this appeal is liable to be dismissed because the plaintiff has perfected his title by adverse possession. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the finding about the factum of possession recorded by both the courts below is perverse because it is not based on any cogent evidence, hence this court has full jurisdiction to disagree with the finding of the courts below and can arrive at its independent conclusion. 7. I find force in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. 7. I find force in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant. It appears that oral evidence was produced from both the sides but' none of the court has given any reason as to why the oral evidence of plaintiff should have been preferred to that of the defendant. In such circumstances, the finding of possession recorded by both the courts below cannot be said to be based on oral evidence. I have myself also gone through the oral evidence of both sides and I find that it is of no use to any party and cannot form the basis of any finding. 8. As regards the documentary evidence the trial court has clearly held that the plaintiff has failed to prove his possession in any year prior to zamindari abolition. It has placed reliance only on a Khatauni of 1374 to 1376 fasli in which during of possession of a plaintiff in part ii of the Khatauni is recorded as 8 years in Zeman 9. This is the solitary piece of documentary evidence on which the trial court has based its finding of possession and has held that the plaintiff has been continuing in possession from 1366 fasli. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that the plaintiff did not file copy of the Khatauni of 1366 fasli so as to prove that the entry of possession was legally recorded. No P.A. 10 etc. has also been filed by the plaintiff for any year in order to establish that due notice of the entry of possession had been given to the tenure-holder. He, therefore, contended that such entry of 1376 to 1376 fasli could not be relied upon by the trial court or by the appellate court, hence the finding recorded by them is perverse and is liable to be annulled. 9. I must agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant about the valuation of the evidence attached to the aforesaid Khatun of 1376 to 1376 fasli. The onus of proof lay heavily on the plaintiff specially in a case where the trial court has held the plaintiff to be in adverse possession. It was, therefore, the duty of the trial court to have shifted the evidence of the parties in order to give a clear finding as to why and when the adverse possession of the plaintiff started. It was, therefore, the duty of the trial court to have shifted the evidence of the parties in order to give a clear finding as to why and when the adverse possession of the plaintiff started. I am afraid that the finding of both the courts below is absolutely silent on such point which was material to be determined in the present case. As a matter of fact the plaintiff miserably failed to prove his case, hence his suit was liable to be thrown out but was wrongly decreed and the appeal was also wrongly dismissed. The plaintiff has failed to prove his possession or title, hence he does not deserve to be granted any relief. 10. In view of the above discussion the appeal is allowed and the judgments and decrees passed by both the courts below are set aside with costs throughout with the counsel's fee at Rs. 50.