JUDGMENT A.P. Misra, J. - The petitioners by means of this writ petition sought for quashing the orders dated 24-12-1977, 29-8-1972 and 27-2-1971 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and Consolidation Officer respectively. By means of the impugned orders of consolidation authorities held separation of the family of the petitioners and respondent no. 4 in 1912 and that the parties are entitled to the land in dispute in accordance with the share entered in the Khewat of the respective parties. 2. The dispute relates to the consolidation khata No. 118 of village Basdiila, consolidation Khata Nos. 56 and 120 of village Samrahna, Consolidation khatas nos. 35 and 105 of village parsa Buzurg, and consolidation khata 5 of village Gainda Khor. The dispute regarding these are only in respect of the shares of the parties. The aforesaid khatas fall in list I. In respect of consolidation khatas nos. 57 and 118 of village Semrahna the petitioner no. I claimed co-tenancy rights while the respondent no. 4 claimed it exclusively his own. This falls under List II. It is not in dispute that in the various khatas both the petitioner no. 1 and the respondent no. 4 are jointly recorded in List I while in List II only respondent no. 4 is exclusively recorded. The respondent no. 4 filed objection before the consolidation authorities claiming that his share and that of the petitioners in the joint khata in List I is according to the shares given in the Khewat. The objection of the petitioner no. 1 in respect of List II was that he along with the petitioners nos. 2, 3 and 4 have half share in khatas nos. 57 and 118 which is wrongly recorded exclusively in the name of the respondent no. 4. Further, the objection of petitioners nos. 2, 3 and 4 was that the land in dispute was ancestral Sir and Khudkast in which they had an interest by birth and, therefore, their names should be entered along with the name of petitioner no. 1 over the said khatas. 3. In order to appreciate the controversy in this case it is relevant to reproduce the undisputed pedigree of the parties : The petitioner no. 2 is the son-and petitioners nos. 3 and 4 are grand-sons of petitioner no. 1. It is thus clear that both the respondent no. 1 over the said khatas. 3. In order to appreciate the controversy in this case it is relevant to reproduce the undisputed pedigree of the parties : The petitioner no. 2 is the son-and petitioners nos. 3 and 4 are grand-sons of petitioner no. 1. It is thus clear that both the respondent no. 4 and petitioners had common ancestor Ayodhya Rai. 4. The Consolidation Officer dismissed the objection of the petitioner no. 1 so far as khata nos. 57 and 118 of Semrahna village were concerned, allowed objection of the respondent no. 4 and held that the shares in the joint khatas whether they were Sir or Khudkast (List I) should be calculated according to the share given in the Khewat. The objections of the petitioners nos. 2, 3 and 4 were rejected. The petitioners filed appeals, which were consolidated and the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dismissed those appeals. Aggrieved against the same, revisions were filed and the Deputy Director of Consolidation dismissed those revisions also. 5. The consolidation authorities have held half share of the petitioner no. 1 and the other half to the respondent no. 4 in the Sirdari Khatas nos. 79,101, 103B, 109 and 131 which has not been disputed by the petitioners. 6. The ground of attack of the petitioners in the present writ petition is that the consolidation authorities decided the objection of the petitioners on conjectures, surmises and without any evidence on the record. According to the petitioners, the Bhumidhari plots were joint Sir and Khudkast of the two branches of the parties before the date of vesting. The bulk of these plots have been inherited from Ayodhya, common ancestor in which the two branches had half share each. The few remaining plots became joint Sir and Khudkast later on of the two branches in khewats in which there were other co-sharers also. The land was never Sir or khudkast of all the proprietors, nor was it ever recorded as Sir or Khudkast. It was further urged that the shares of the two branches in the proprietary rights came to be recorded in the khewats due to subsequent purchases in the name of one or the others and thus they were irrelevant and could not increase the share of anyone in the joint cultivatory holding. The shares of the two branches was half and half each in all the Bhumidhari holdings. The shares of the two branches was half and half each in all the Bhumidhari holdings. It was further argued that the respondent did not adduce any evidence to show that the shares of the two branches in the cultivatory was in the same proportion as their share in the khewat bear to each other. The main bone of contention was that the consolidation authorities committed illegality in the calculating the shares of the two branches in the holding on the basis of entry in the Khewat and not on the basis of right inherited in accordance with the pedigree especially when the bulk of the property had been inherited from the common ancestor. It was also urged that the, Deputy Director of Consolidation wrongly assumed khata no. 120 and Khata no. 105 of List I was Sir and Khudkast of both the parties. In fact, they were tenancy holding of both the parties and became Sirdari holding on the date of vesting. The consolidation authorities thus have illegally directed partition of, Sirdari holding on the basis of some imaginary khewats. The partition as held by the consolidation authorities is also illegal as there was no evidence on the record of the family partition. No details of partition was ever led in evidence by the respondent. The finding that partition took place in the year 1912 is misconceived as the said partition was not inter se amongst the members of the family of petitioners and respondent no. 4 but was partition of the Mahal under Chapter VII of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901., It was also argued that petitioners nos. 2, 3 and 4 in their objection clearly state that they were born before the date of vesting and, therefore, they had an interest in the ancestral Sir and Khudkast recorded in the name of petitioner no. 1 and in the proceedings under U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act against petitioner no. 1. The Prescribed Authority found petitioners nos. 2, 3 and 4 having half share in the share of petitioner no. 1. 7. The respondent no. 4 contested the claim of the petitioners regarding khatas nos. 57 and 118 of List II. Their claim is that the said plot exclusively belonged to him and none of the petitioners have any right or concern. 2, 3 and 4 having half share in the share of petitioner no. 1. 7. The respondent no. 4 contested the claim of the petitioners regarding khatas nos. 57 and 118 of List II. Their claim is that the said plot exclusively belonged to him and none of the petitioners have any right or concern. He is alone recorded in the revenue papers in his own right and entries in the revenue papers have not been challenged by the petitioners or their predecessor-in-interest. The respondent denied the claim of the petitioners of having half share. According to the respondents partition was effected in the life time of Ayodhya between him and his two sons and that the joint Hindu family common ancestor came to an end since 1912 and after that separate acquisitions were made by the parties. The argument was that the share of the parties was rightly decided by the consolidation authorities in accordance with the entries in the khewats. It was further urged that since petitioners and respondent no. 4 separated from the joint family in the life time of Ayodhya Rai and thus the entries in the papers even if recorded as joint cannot be half and half but the share should be according to the share mentioned in the Khewat and thus the consolidation authorities rightly held to be so. The case of the petitioners that Ayodhya Rai since became blind and Achhaibar Rai acted as Karta of the joint Hindu family were denied. Regarding Khata no. 57 it was urged that this was acquired by Achhaibar Rai separately and the petitioners' branch have no concern. The land revenue of Khatas nos. 57 and 118 (list II) was paid by the respondent no. 4 and were exclusively recorded in the name of the respondent no. 4 and thus the petitioners have no right over the same. 8. I have perused the judgment passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and I find both the findings about partition of the Joint Hindu family of petitioners and respondent no. 4 taking place in 1912 and the declaration of right inter se between the parties according to the share in the Khewat are very sketchy without giving any sound reasoning. I have perused the judgment passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and I find both the findings about partition of the Joint Hindu family of petitioners and respondent no. 4 taking place in 1912 and the declaration of right inter se between the parties according to the share in the Khewat are very sketchy without giving any sound reasoning. The only reason as disclosed in his order is that since in the sale deed of 1927 both Mangal Rai and Sarvjeet paid separate amount for the said sale consideration coupled with the fact that Mangal Rai was not an idiot, held partition in the year 1912. Even where there is no separation in the family and parties continued to enjoy joint family properties on the basis of actual possession may in future acquisitions pay separate amounts for the joint ownership of the fresh properties, but this by itself in all eases cannot lead to the inference that parties have separated. It is always possible even where joint Hindu family property continues to acquire separate property by each branch or even jointly by the said branch only if it could be proved that the said acquisition was not out of the nucleus of the joint Hindu family property but was from separate income of the individuals constituting joint Hindu family. Thus, by mere subsequent acquisition and by making separate payment by the two branches could not by itself lead to the inference that there was partition of the Joint Hindu family. 9. Under the Hindu Law a joint Hindu family continues to be joint unless a partition is proved by the party alleging separation. The heavy burden lay on the party alleging partition. The mere fact of purchase of land subsequent to the date of alleged partition by making separate payment may only be a circumstance. Unless that is further corroborated by other evidence on the record the inference of partition cannot be justified. Primarily, a party pleads date and time of partition but even in its absence a heavy burden lay on him to prove by specific evidence of the separation of the parties. Mere separate living of joint Hindu family cannot constitute a ground for separation of the joint Hindu family property. 10. Primarily, a party pleads date and time of partition but even in its absence a heavy burden lay on him to prove by specific evidence of the separation of the parties. Mere separate living of joint Hindu family cannot constitute a ground for separation of the joint Hindu family property. 10. It was further alleged on behalf of the respondent that since the finding recorded by the revisional authority was the order of concurrence with other consolidation authorities even in the absence of reasons in its order the same could be seen in the other orders in order to sustain its finding. I have perused the orders passed both by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). The only reason given by the Consolidation Officer was that in each Khata shares have been given separately. It was said that if the family were joint there was no need of showing different shares. It is not in dispute in this case that in List I names both of the petitioners and respondent no. 4 have been recorded separately. Recording of names in the Khewat only shows proprietary right, which I shall be dealing subsequently. Suffice it to say that the shares in the khewat only indicates proprietary right and not tenancy rights. The other reason is the same which has been mentioned by the revisional authority about which I have already held that by the mere paying separately the consideration for a sale could not by itself be a ground of actual partition between the parties. 11. The next reason was that in each Khewat separate shares have been mentioned. It was held if the family was joint there was no reason for giving separate shares of the members of the family. This reason is unsustainable. The shares in the Khewat does not prove any separateness of the joint family property. 12. It has been held in the case Mt. Khushal Kunwar v. Zauki Ram, (AIR 1947 Alld. p. 57) "the fact that there are separate shares mentioned in the Khewat does not prove that family has been disrupted or that property is no longer joint family property." In the case Mt. 12. It has been held in the case Mt. Khushal Kunwar v. Zauki Ram, (AIR 1947 Alld. p. 57) "the fact that there are separate shares mentioned in the Khewat does not prove that family has been disrupted or that property is no longer joint family property." In the case Mt. Bhagwant Kunwar and another v. Mohan Singh and others, (AIR 1925 PC p. 132) it has been held : "A definition of shares in revenue and village papers, by itself, affords a very slight indication of an actual separation in a Hindu family, and is insufficient to prove, contrary to the presumption of law, that the family to which the entries refer had separated." In the case Durga Prasad and another v. Ghanshiam Das, (AIR 1948 PC p. 210) it has been held :- "A definition of shares in Khewats or other Revenue papers can be regarded as only a very slight indication of title ; it is not the officer who compiles such papers to decide questions of title. In particular the nice distinctions which arise upon an issue whether or not there has been a separation are not for their determination." In the case Bharat Singh and others v. Mst. Bhagirathi, (AIR 1965 SC p. 405) it has been held : - "There is a strong presumption in favour of Hindu brothers constituting a joint family. It is for the person alleging severence of the joint Hindu family to prove it. The mere fact that after the death of the father mutation entry was made in favour of three brothers and indicated the share of each to one-third, by itself could be no evidence of the severence of the joint family....." The above authorities are a clear proposition that mere recording of separate shares in the revenue papers could not constitute for holding separateness of the joint Hindu family property. 13. Even under Section 32 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, it is stated, mere mutation of names confers no title. 14. The only other ground considered by the consolidation authorities was that since Bishunjeet stated that he cannot tell anything which happened 35 years back means he is concealing about the partition and thus held that oral evidence is also against Bishunjeet. The finding is clearly a perverse finding. 14. The only other ground considered by the consolidation authorities was that since Bishunjeet stated that he cannot tell anything which happened 35 years back means he is concealing about the partition and thus held that oral evidence is also against Bishunjeet. The finding is clearly a perverse finding. Merely because the witness is notable to depose orally what happened 35 years back cannot lead to the conclusion that partition has taken place. The burden heavily lay on respondent no. 4 who alleged separation and the finding should not be based on mere failure of petitioners' witnesses. Thus, it is clear that sketchy finding of the Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot be sustained even on the reasons of the aforesaid two consolidation authorities. The Deputy Director of Consolidation being the last fact finding authority should have given good reasons for coming to the said conclusion. This has resulted into failure of justice to the petitioners and thus the same cannot be sustained. 15. The next ground of attack is that the finding recorded by the consolidation authorities only on the basis of shares mentioned in the Khewat is not sustainable as the Khewat merely is regarding the proprietary ship right and not the tenancy right. 16. It cannot be disputed, a proprietor has both the cultivatory and the proprietary right. A proprietor is not entitled to a share in the cultivatory right merely by reason of his being a proprietor. 17. In the case of Prabhu Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, (1979 Revenue Decisions p. 158) it has been held :- "A proprietor does not become entitled to share cultivatory rights merely by reason of his being a proprietor. It is different thing that he may be entitled to a declaration of ownership or compensation but unless the title to the Khudkasht is established a co-proprietor cannot claim co-khudkasht rights. Even under Section 18 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act I of 1951 Bhumidhari rights had been conferred on a person who was in possession or held or deemed to be held as Sir or Khudkasht ....A proprietor cannot claim to be co-Bhumidhar of Sir or Khudkasht unless he was in possession or held it as Sir or Khudkasht on the date of vesting. A proprietor cannot be said to hold Sir or Khudkasht belonging to another proprietor. A proprietor cannot be said to hold Sir or Khudkasht belonging to another proprietor. To claim such rights he must be co-sharer in Sir and Khudkasht and not a co-sharer in proprietary right only." 18. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on the case Kailash Rai v. Jai Jai Ram and others, ( AIR 1973 SC 893 ). This case was also considered by our Court in the aforementioned Prabhu Singh's case. This Court held that mere proprietary right cannot be a foundation of holding the cultivatory right. Learned counsel for the respondent further urged in this case both the parties are in cultivatory possession which is not in dispute and the said holding are Sir and Khudkasht. This fact has been disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. However, I am not entering into this dispute in the present writ petition, in the present case, I find that none of the three authorities have taken into consideration the aforementioned factors. It may be in a given case proprietary right may be equated with cultivatory right where title to the Khudkasht is established. In the present case, the Deputy Director of Consolidation apart from not giving any reasons for holding the right of the parties on the basis of shares in the Khewat has not adverted to the fact of the cultivatory right of the parties for deciding the shares inter se between the petitioners and respondent no. 4. Thus, even the second finding recorded by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is not sustainable. 19. For the reasons given above, this writ petition is allowed, the order dated 24th December, 1977 (Annexure 4 to the writ petition) passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation is hereby quashed, and the case is remanded back before him for deciding afresh both the points in accordance with law after giving opportunity to the parties. The parties shall bear their own costs.