A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) EVEN in an appeal filed by a land-holder will it or will it not be open to the Appellate Authority exercising powers under Sec. 33 (2) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 thereinafter referred to as the Act) to remand a matter to the Competent Authority for deciding the same in accordance with law ? Petitioners contend phrase as it deems fit will not take within its sweep the power to remand. The contention needs to be examined in the background of the relevant statutory provisions and the facts that follows. ( 2 ) IN all these petitions common questions of law and facts arise. The petitioners are holders of vacant land situated within the urban agglomeration area of Rajkot to which the provisions of the Act are applicable. ( 3 ) THE petitioners had filled in forms under Sec. 6 of the Act. In response to the notice served together with the draft statement as provided under Sec 8 (3) of the Act they submitted objections against the draft statement. Their forms were decided by the competent authority. However it appears that all the objections submitted by the petitioners were not accepted by the competent authority. After following the necessary procedure the competent authority passed final order as provided under Sec. 9 of the Act. The petitioners felt aggrieved by the order passed by the competent authority and therefore they preferred appeal under Sec. 33 of the Act before the appellate authority. The appellate authorities after hearing the parties set aside the entire judgment and order passed by the competent authority and ordered to remand the matter to the competent authority for deciding the case in accordance with law. In each of the petitions the order passed by the appellate authority is challenged by the petitioners by invoking the provisions under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 4 ) THE petitioners contend that in an appeal filed by an aggrieved person before the appellate authority no order except that of allowing the appeal or confirming the order passed by the competent authority and dismissing the appeal can be passed by the appellate authority. Thus in all these four petitions the common question agitated is as regards the powers of the appellate authority under Sec 33 of the Act. Thus in all these four petitions the common question agitated is as regards the powers of the appellate authority under Sec 33 of the Act. The petitioners contend that in the matter is remanded to the competent authority the entire case would be reopened; such power cannot be exercised by the appellate authority exercising powers under Sec. 33 of the Act. ( 5 ) IT is necessary to have a look at certain provisions of the Act. The Act has been enacted with a view to preventing concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering in urban land. The ultimate purpose sought to be served by the Act is to bring out an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations so as to subserve the common good. For this purpose in urban agglomeration area ceiling of holding of vacant land is imposed under the Act and provision for acquisition of the land in excess of the ceiling limit is made. There is provision for regulation of construction of buildings on vacant land and such other connected matters. ( 6 ) AS provided under Sec. 3 of the Act no person is entitled to hold vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit except otherwise provided under the Act. Sec. 4 prescribes ceiling limit in respect of different urban agglomeration areas. Sec. 5 provides that transfer of vacant land after the commencement of the Act shall be void if the same is effected otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act. A person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit is required to fill in form under Sec. 6 of the Act and after necessary procedure as laid down under the Act is complied with the final order is to be passed by the competent authority under Sec. 9. Section 10 provides for acquisition of vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. In order to appreciate the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners it is necessary to have a look at the provisions made in the Act with regard to appeals. Section 12 (1) provides for constitution of an urban land tribunal. Section 10 provides for acquisition of vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit. In order to appreciate the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioners it is necessary to have a look at the provisions made in the Act with regard to appeals. Section 12 (1) provides for constitution of an urban land tribunal. The Tribunal so constituted is empowered to hear appeals against orders passed by the competent authority under Sec. 11 (8) determining the amount of compensation to be paid in respect of the land acquired under the Act. The appellate powers of the Tribunal was defined under Sec. 12 (5) of the Act which reads as follows:"12 (5 ). In deciding appeals the Tribunal shall exercise all the powers which a Civil Court has and follow the same procedure which a Civil Court follows in deciding appeals against the decree of an original Court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (5 of 1908 ). "under Sec. 13 of the Act a second appeal is provided to the High Court against an order passed by the Tribunal under Sec. 12 of the Act. Under Sec. 30 (2) an appeal is provided to the Tribunal against any order passed by the competent authority under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 30 of the Act in respect of demolition either wholly or partly of any building or with respect to direction for modification of the construction or stopping the same. The powers of the Tribunal while deciding appeal under Sec. 30 are the same as that of the Tribunal deciding appeal under Sec. 12 of the Act. This is clear from the provisions of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 30. Thus as far as appeals under Sec 12 and Sec. 30 are concerned the powers of the Tribunal and the procedure to be followed are the same as that of a Civil Court deciding appeals against the decree of an original Court under the Civil Procedure Code 1908 ( 7 ) SECTION 33 of the Act provides for appeal against certain orders passed by the competent authority. No appeal lies to the appellate authority under Sec. 33 of the Act against an order passed under Sec. 11 or under Sec. 30 (1) of the Act. All other orders passed by the competent authority are appealable under Sec. 33. No appeal lies to the appellate authority under Sec. 33 of the Act against an order passed under Sec. 11 or under Sec. 30 (1) of the Act. All other orders passed by the competent authority are appealable under Sec. 33. It appears that the orders passed under Sec. 10 (2) Sec. 18 Sec. 21 Sec. 26 and Sec. 27 of the Act are appealable under Sec. 33. The relevant provisions of Sec. 33 of the Act are as follows:"sec. 33. Appeal. (1 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (2) On receipt of an appeal under sub-sec. (1) the appellate authority shall after giving the appellant an opportunity of being beard pass such orders there on as it deems fit as expeditiously as possible. (3) Every order passed by the appellate authority under this section shall be final. ( 8 ) SECTION 34 of the Act provides for revision by the State Government. It inter alia provides that orders in which appeal has been preferred under Sec. 12 or Sec. 30 or Sec. 33 shall not be subject to revision by the Governments. The Government mat under suo motu powers call for e xamination of the records of any other order passed by the competent authority. Thus the proceedings which have reached at the appellate stage either under Sec. 12 Sec. 30 or Sec. 33 of the Act have been excluded from the revisional jurisdiction of the Government. ( 9 ) THUS it would be clear that revisional powers of the Government are very wide. But they are confined to the orders and proceedings in which appeal has not been preferred or in which appeal is not maintainable. Orders passed bar the Tribunal hearing appeals under Sec. 12 and under Sec. 30 and orders passed by the appellate authority under Sec. 33 of the Act are not subject to revisional jurisdiction of the Government. Moreover orders passed by the appellate authority under Sec. 33 of the Act are made final as provided under Sec. 33 (3) of the Act. ( 10 ) IN the aforesaid background of the statutory provisions the phrase pass such orders as it deems fit occurring in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 33 of the Act is required to be interpreted. This phrase determines the scope of power of the appellate authority under Sec. 33 of the Act. ( 10 ) IN the aforesaid background of the statutory provisions the phrase pass such orders as it deems fit occurring in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 33 of the Act is required to be interpreted. This phrase determines the scope of power of the appellate authority under Sec. 33 of the Act. This may be compared with the phrase pass such order with respect thereto as it may think fit occurring in Sec. 34 of the Act. This again determines the scope of revisional powers of the Government under Sec. 34 of the Act. ( 11 ) AS provided under Sec. 1 (57 of the Civil Procedure Code an appellate Court shall have power subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed (a) to determine a case finally; (b) to remand a case; (c) to frame issues and refer them for trial and (d) to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to he taken specific powers of remand are to be found in Order XLI Rule 23 and 23 Referring to the aforesaid provisions of the Civil Procedure Code it is contended that there is no such power conferred upon an appellate authority under Sec. 33 of the Act and therefore the appellate authority exercising powers under Sec. 33 of the Act cannot order that the case be remanded to the competent authority. The argument cannot be accepted. Provisions of Sec. 33 of the Act are not required to be interpreted by having recourse to the provisions of Civil Procedure Code. The Act together with the rules framed thereunder provides for its own machinery. It is a piece of legislation which deals with substantive rights of the parties and it also provides as to how the proceedings under the Act will be regulated. Unless specifically provided for in the Act or the rules framed thereunder provisions of Civil Procedure Code cannot be invoked while dealing with matters under the Act. In fact it the case of the petitioners that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to the proceedings under the Act. In this connection the learned Counsel for the petitioners had drawn my attention to a decision of this High Court in the case of Shivalal Thakershi Gotecha and Ors. v. The Competent Authority and Anr. 27 GLR 267. In this connection the learned Counsel for the petitioners had drawn my attention to a decision of this High Court in the case of Shivalal Thakershi Gotecha and Ors. v. The Competent Authority and Anr. 27 GLR 267. My learned brother M. B. Shah J. has in para 9 of the judgment in terms held that provisions of Civil Procedure Code do not apply to the proceedings of appeal under Sec. 33 of the Act. I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid decision. In above view of the matter the scope of powers of the appellate authority under Sec. 33 of the Act will have to be decided on the basis of the provisions of Sec. 33 itself read with other provisions of the Act and the Rules. ( 12 ) IN the Act there are three different provisions by which appeal against original order is provided for. Section 12 (5) provides for appeal against orders passed by the competent authority under Sec. 11 (8) as regards the determination of amount of compensation. Similarly Sec. 30 (2) of the Act provides for appeal against an order passed by the competent authority under Sec. 30 (1) of the Act. The aforesaid appeals are to be filed before the Tribunal constituted under the provisions of Sec. 12 of the Act. Section 12 (5) in terms provides that the Tribunal shall exercise all the powers of a Civil Court and shall follow the same procedure which a Civil Court follows while deciding appeals against decree of an original Court under the Civil Procedure Code 1908 Thus in case of appeals under Sec. 12 and under See. 30 of the Act the power of the Tribunal while deciding the appeals before it is as provided under the Civil Procedure Code. There the provisions of Sec. 107 and relevant provisions of Order XLI of the Civil Procedure Code will be applicable. However in cases of appeal under Sec 33 the Legislature has conspicuously omitted to apply the same provisions as provided in Sec. 12 (5) of the Act. There is not only conspicuous omission but it has made a deliberate distinct provision under Sec. 33 (2) of the Act which empowers the appellate authority to pass such orders thereon as it deems fit as expeditiously as possible. There is not only conspicuous omission but it has made a deliberate distinct provision under Sec. 33 (2) of the Act which empowers the appellate authority to pass such orders thereon as it deems fit as expeditiously as possible. When the Legislature has deliberately made two separate provisions and has conspicuously omitted to refer to the provisions of Civil Procedure Code while providing for appeals under Sec 33 of the Act the only course left open to the Court is to determine the width of powers of the appellate authority by reading the Section itself. ( 13 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion the question is whether the phrase pass such orders thereon as it deems fit would also include power to remand or not ? In the case of Babulal Nagar v. Shree Synthetics Ltd. AIR 1984 SC 1164 the phrase as it thinks fit came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. the phrase has it thinks fit occurred in Sec. 61 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act. While interpreting this phrase the Supreme Court has in para 16-17 of the judgment observed as follows:"the main part of Sec 61 clearly spells out the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court to pass any order in reference to the case brought before it as it thinks fit. The expression as it thinks fit confers very wide jurisdiction enabling it to take an entirely different view on the same set of facts. The expression as it thinks fit has the same connotation as unless context otherwise indicates as he deems fit. "in the case of Raja Ram Mahadev Paranjype v. Aba Maruti Mali and Others AIR 1962 SC 753 the phrase as he deems fit occurring in Sec. 29 (3) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 came up for consideration and in para 14 of the judgment the Supreme Court has observed as follows:"the words as he deems fits do not bestow a power to make any order on considerations de hors the statues which the authorities consider best according to their notions of justice. Obviously this provision has been framed in general terms because it covers a variety of cases namely applications by landlords and tenants in different circumstances each of which circumstance may call for a different order under the Act. Obviously this provision has been framed in general terms because it covers a variety of cases namely applications by landlords and tenants in different circumstances each of which circumstance may call for a different order under the Act. "same appears to be the reason why the Legislature has used identical language while enacting the provisions of Sec. 33 of the Act. As pointed out hereinabove various types of orders passed by the competent authority are made appealable under the provisions of Sec. 33 of the Act. The very nature of the orders which are made appealable under Sec. 33 of the Act may in each case require a different order under the provisions of Sec. 33 of the Act. That is the reason shy the appellate authority is given wide jurisdiction enabling it to take an entirely different view on the same set of facts which should be consistent with the object and spirit of the Act. ( 14 ) IN the case of V. C7. Rangadurai v. D. Gopalan and Others AIR 19 SC 281 the Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase as it deems fit. occurring in Sec. 37 of the Advocates Act (25 of 1961 ). It is observed by the Supreme Court as follows:" Wide as the power may be the order must be germane to the Act and its purposes and latitude cannot transcend those limits. "thus having regard to the provisions of Sec 33 of the Act the only limit on the powers of the appellate authority is that the order must be gumminess to the Act and its purposes. The appellate authority cannot pass an order de hors the provisions of the statute under which it exercises the powers. The provision of the statute which confers power itself determines the limit of its power through couched in a very wide language. In above view of the matter if the order of remand of a matter is germane to the Act and its purposes the order would be both within the powers of the appellate authority as well as perfectly legal and valid. It is not argued before me nor do I find from the record of the cases that the orders passed by the appellate authority are not germane to the Act and its purposes. It is not argued before me nor do I find from the record of the cases that the orders passed by the appellate authority are not germane to the Act and its purposes. As per the well established canons of interpretation of statute first and the foremost rule of construction is the literary construction. All that the Court has to see at the very outset is as to what does that provision say ? If the provision is unambiguous and if from that provision the Legislative intent is clear other rules of construction of statutes need not be called into aid (see: Hiralal v. State of U. P. AIR 1973 SC 1034 para 21 ). As a general principle of interpretation when the words of a statute are plain precise and unambiguous the intention of the Legislature is to be gathered from the language of the statute itself and no external aid is necessary. However in the instant case when one reads the other provisions made by the legislature in Secs. 12 and 30 regarding appeal to the Tribunal wherein provisions of Civil Procedure Code have been specifically mentioned it becomes abundantly clear that the Legislature intended to confer wide powers on the appellate authority while it used the language pass such orders therein as it deems fit in Sec. 33 (2) of the Act. Conferment of such wide power is in conformity with the spirit and object of the Act. The mischief sought to be prevented by the Act is the concentration of urban land in the hands of few persons and speculation and profiteering in urban land. The object is equitable distribution of land in the urban agglomerations to as to subserve the common good. Thus society at large has stake in the proper implementation of the Act. If history and realities of life provide any guide it would be axiomatic to say that human ingenuity has no limits in finding out the ways of avoiding and circumventing the provisions of law much more so in cases where rights in respect of private property and profit making are sought to be regulated. Therefore the Legislature has wisely thought it fit to confer very wide powers on the appellate authority exercising powers under Sec. 33 of the Act and also on the Government exercising revisional powers under Sec. 34 of the Act. Therefore the Legislature has wisely thought it fit to confer very wide powers on the appellate authority exercising powers under Sec. 33 of the Act and also on the Government exercising revisional powers under Sec. 34 of the Act. Just as human ingenuity had no limits for inventing and adopting devise for avoiding and circumventing the provisions of law the appellate authority and the revisional authority exercising powers under the Act also are not fettered with any limitation on their power except the limitations which are germane to the Act and its purposes. ( 15 ) THE argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners may be examined from another angle. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioners the appellate authority exercising powers under Sec. 33 of the Act can either confirm the order passed by the competent authority or allow the appeal and set aside the order passed by the competent authority but it cannot remand the matter to the competent authority. It may be noted that under the provisions of Sec. 34 of the Act the orders against which an appeal is preferred under the provisions of Sec. 12 Sec. 30 and Sec. 33 of the Act are taken out of the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the Government. Therefore all that a land-holder is required to do is to obtain an erroneous order from the competent authority which may be largely in his favour prefer an appeal under Sec. 33 of the Act to the appellate authority as far as that part of the order which is against him. Then sit silent. Ultimately lose the appeal. That order will be final as provided Sec. 33 (3) of the Act. This erroneous order can be bona fide and can be managed also. The term managed connote everything that commonsense should dictate having regard to the realities of the life prevailing in urban land market. Once an appeal is preferred under Sec. 33 of the Act the Government cannot take the matter in revision under Sec. 34 of the Act. The appellate authority while going through the papers of the appeal finds that a grossly erroneous and improper order is passed by the competent authority in favour of the land-holder That part of the order would naturally be not appealed against by the land-holder. The appellate authority while going through the papers of the appeal finds that a grossly erroneous and improper order is passed by the competent authority in favour of the land-holder That part of the order would naturally be not appealed against by the land-holder. Even in such cases the appellate authority will have to remain silent spectator and allow the illegality and/or impropriety to perpetuate. To avoid such a situation the provisions of Sec. 33 have been made wherein wide powers are conferred on the appellate authority so that the appellate authority itself can take stock of the situation and prevent the damage being done to the society at large. ( 16 ) THE scheme of the Act appears to be that the orders passed by the competent authority may not become final at the level of competent authority only. Even the orders which are appealable under Secs. 12 30 and 33 and against which appeal is not preferred are subject to revision by the Government under Sec. 34. Moreover all other orders except the orders passed under Sec. 11 and Sec. 30 (1) of the Act can be challenged in appeal under Sec. 33 of the Act by any person aggrieved by such order. These orders would be examined by the appellate authority in appeal. Thus as per the scheme of the Act each and every order passed by the competent authority will come up for scrutiny either at the level of the appellate authority under Sec. 33 of the Act or at the level of the Government under Sec. 34 of the Act. By it noted that appellate authority exercising powers under Sec. 33 and revisional authority exercising powers under Sec. 34 of the Act are conferred with almost the same width of powers. Under Sec. 34 of the Act the Government has powers to pass orders as it may think fit. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Babulal Nagar (supra) the two phrases as it may think fit and has it deems fit have same connotation unless the context otherwise indicates. Thus the revisional powers conferred upon the State Government under Sec. 34 of the Act and the appellate powers conferred upon the appellate authority under Sec. 33 of the Act are almost equal as far as the nature of the order to be passed by the respective authority is concerned. Thus the revisional powers conferred upon the State Government under Sec. 34 of the Act and the appellate powers conferred upon the appellate authority under Sec. 33 of the Act are almost equal as far as the nature of the order to be passed by the respective authority is concerned. The intention of the Legislature appears to be that the order passed by the competent authority is not to be treated as final. Wherever the land-holder prefers an appeal the appellate authority exercises powers under Sec. 33 of the Act. In other cases the Government may suo motu take up proceedings in revision under Sec. 34 of the Act and may pass the same or similar orders as may be passed by the appellate authority under the Act. The object of keeping check on the powers exercised by the competent authority is thus achieved by making almost similar provisions under Sec. 33 and Sec. 34 of the Act. ( 17 ) IT is contended that the Government alone can exercise powers of remand and not the appellate authority. The contention cannot be accepted. When the Government exercises powers under Sec. 34 of the Act it has undoubtedly power to remand the matter to the competent authority. As shown hereinabove the phrase as it deems fit occurring in Sec. 33 (2) of the Act takes within its sweep the power to remand the matter to the competent authority. Thus this power is definitely conferred upon the appellate authority also. 18 The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that on the one hand the Government may exercise powers under Sec. 34 of the Act and remand the matter to the competent authority and on the other hand if these powers of remand are conferred on the appellate authority then there will be conflict between the two provisions. There is no such conflict. The matters which go before the appellate authority under Sec. 33 of the Act are not to go before the Government at all. The revisional powers of the Government are circumscribed by the phrase and against which no appeal has been preferred under Sec. 12 30 or 33 of the Act. The matters in which appeal is preferred the Government is precluded from exercising revisional jurisdiction under Sec. 34 of the Act. The revisional powers of the Government are circumscribed by the phrase and against which no appeal has been preferred under Sec. 12 30 or 33 of the Act. The matters in which appeal is preferred the Government is precluded from exercising revisional jurisdiction under Sec. 34 of the Act. Moreover orders passed under Sec. 33 by the appellate authority are final provided under Sec. 33 (3) of the Act. Therefore there is no conflict whatsoever between the two provisions as is sought to be projected. ( 18 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners has referred to a decision rendered by me in the case of Minish K. Sheth and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and Others 26 GLR 202 Therein it has been observed that the question as to whether an order passed by the appellate authority under Sec. 33 of the Act is revisable by the Government under Sec. 34 of the Act did not arise and therefore the same was kept open. That question incidently does arise in these petitions. As provided under the provisions of Sec. 33 (3) of the Act it does appear that the orders passed by the appellate authority under Sec. 33 (2) of the Act shall be final as far as the provisions of the Act is concerned. ( 19 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 6014 of 1986 has adopted all the arguments submitted by the learned Counsel in Spl. C. A. No. 5715 of 1986. In additional the submitted that an appeal under Sec. 33 of the Act can be preferred only by a person aggrieved by an order made by the competent authority. In his submission if the appellate authority can set aside the order passed by the competent authority which was in favour of the land-holder and then if the matter is ordered to be remanded to the competent authority. it would amount to treating the appeal as if the same is preferred by the competent authority. In order to show as to who can be said to be an aggrieved person the learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the decision in the case of Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar AIR 1975 SC 2092 . It is not necessary to consider in these petitions as to who is aggrieved person. In order to show as to who can be said to be an aggrieved person the learned Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the decision in the case of Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar AIR 1975 SC 2092 . It is not necessary to consider in these petitions as to who is aggrieved person. The question is not as to who prefers appeal before the appellate authority. The question which is required to be decided is as to the width of power of the appellate authority exercising powers under Sec. 33 of the Act. ( 20 ) IT is submitted that if the appellate authority sets aside an order passed by the competent authority which may be in favour of the land-bolder at whose instance the appeal is preferred it would amount to suo motu exercise of powers. This is not correct. The appellate authority exercises powers only after an appeal is preferred before it. The appellate authority gets power to decide the appeal only after the appeal is received by it. This is clear from the following words occurring in sub-sec. (2) of See. 33 of the Act. "on receipt of an appeal under sub-sec (1) the appellate authority shall after giving the appellant an opportunity of being heard pass such orders thereon as it deems fit as expeditiously as possible. (Emphasis supplied)IF the land-holder or any other person aggrieved by the order passed by the competent authority does not prefer appeal against an order passed by the competent authority and if the appellate authority does not receive an appeal it has no power to call for the papers suo motu. These powers are conferred upon the Government under Sec. 34 of the Act. While exercising powers under Sec. 33 of the Act the appellate authority does not exercise suo motu powers but it exercises powers in appeals which have been received by it Therefore to say that the appellate authority exercises suo motu powers which are conferred upon the Government is not correct. It may be that ultimately the order that may be passed by the appellate authority be the same as that may be passed by the Government under Sec. 34 of the Act. It may be that ultimately the order that may be passed by the appellate authority be the same as that may be passed by the Government under Sec. 34 of the Act. But that does not mean that the appellate authority exercise suo motu powers when it sets aside an order passed by the competent authority and remands the matter to the competent authority for deciding the same in accordance with law. . ( 21 ) REST of the points urged by the learned Counsels for the petitioners pertain to the individual facts of each case. I do not find any error much less an error apparent on the face of the record as far as the finding on merits arrived at by the appellate authority is concerned. Be it noted that these are petitions under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India and it is not open to me to go into the finding of facts arrived at by the appellate authority. Moreover in order to see that no prejudice is caused to the petitioners in the proceedings before the competent authority it would be just and proper to refrain from discussing the points having bearing on facts of each case. It is clarified that it will be open to the petitioners to make necessary submissions before the competent authority on facts as well as on law points. ( 22 ) IN above view of the matter I do not find any error much less an error apparent on the faces of the record. In the result all the four petitions fail and they are hereby rejected. Rule discharged with no order as to costs. Interim relief granted earlier in each petition stands vacated rule discharged. .