K. N. SHUKIA, J. ( 1 ) APPELLANT bas been convicted under sections 326, 392 and 397 I. P. C. He has been sentenced to seven years rigorous imprisonment under section 392 read with section 397 I. P. C. No separate sentence, has been passed under section 326 I. P. C. Before proceeding ahead I must remark that the Court below committed an error in not passing a separate sentence under section 326 I. P. C. Offences under sections 326 and 397 I. P. C. are different in character and separate sentence has to be passed for each of them before they would be directed to run concurrently. ( 2 ) THE incident took place in a running train. Complainant Ramprasad was traveling from Khidkiya to Khandwa. The accused who was known to the complainant from before as he belonged to the same village, also traveled with him. At Station Singaji the accused came close to the complainant and demanded money. On complainants refusal he whipped out a knife and inflicted Ii blow in the abdomen causing a deep stab wound. The accused forcibly snatched Rs. 6/- from the Paijama pocket of the complainant. As soon as the train halted at Khandwa, report of the incident was lodged by Ramprasad (Ex. p. 1 ). Name of the accused was mentioned in the said report. The accused was apprehended the same day and a knife was seized from his possession. ( 3 ) THE defence was that the complainant had falsely implicated the accused because there were some differences between them for sharing the spoils of stolen goods. ( 4 ) THE Court below placed complete reliance on the statement of Ramprasad as corroborated by the promptly lodged F. I. R. and the medical evidence and convicted the appellant under sections 326 and 392 read with section 397 I. P. C. ( 5 ) STATEMENT of Ramprasad was perused. As rightly noted by the learned trial Court, full details had been narrated by Ramprasad giving a complete and convincing picture of the incident wherein he received a stab injury. It is true that several persons must have been traveling in the same compartment but as observed by the learned Judge few people particularly Passengers traveling in the train volunteer to give evidence in such cases. It is true that several persons must have been traveling in the same compartment but as observed by the learned Judge few people particularly Passengers traveling in the train volunteer to give evidence in such cases. Laxminarayan (P. W. 4) who was also traveling in the same compartment stated that the incident of stabbing had taken place but he was unable to identify the victim or the assailant. The F. I. R. referred to the accused as the person who had caused a stab injury. In fact, the test identification parade was redundant. ( 6 ) THE offence under section 326 I. P. C. was thus fully established. The question now which remains for consideration is whether the appellant had committed robbery and bad caused grievous hurt at the time of committing robbery. According to the complainant the appellant removed Rs. 6/- in currency notes from his Paijama pocket. Though this has been mentioned in the P. I. R. there is no material to indicate that this amount was recovered from the possession of the appellant when he was arrested the same day. The currency notes obviously could not be identified as stolen property. Besides, there is some discrepancies about the place from where the amount had been removed. In the case diary statement and the F. I. R. the complainant stated that Rs. 6/- were removed from his Paijama pocket while in Court he stated that they had been removed from his shirt pocket. In view of this discrepancy, the story about robbery becomes doubtful. ( 7 ) FOR reasons aforesaid appellants conviction under section 392 read with section 397 I. P. C. is set aside and he is acquitted of these charges. His conviction under section 326 I. P. C. is confirmed. Appellant has been in jail ever since his arrest on 22. 3. 1982 i. e. for the last about five years. The sentence of imprisonment therefore, is modified and reduced to the period already undergone. It is directed that the appellant be released unless is required otherwise. Appeal partly allowed. MOTHERS RIGHT v. DAUGHTERS DUTY -A case of Maintenance By Mool Singh* Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is a measure of social justice. It is founded on individuals obligation to the society. The object is to prevant vagrancy and destitution. The language of the section is clear. It has a wide range. Appeal partly allowed. MOTHERS RIGHT v. DAUGHTERS DUTY -A case of Maintenance By Mool Singh* Section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, is a measure of social justice. It is founded on individuals obligation to the society. The object is to prevant vagrancy and destitution. The language of the section is clear. It has a wide range. It is applicable to all spouses-Hindus, Muslims, Christians or Parsis, having overriding effect over personal laws. The husband is under obligation to provide maintenance even to his divorced wife in case she is unable to maintain herself and has not remarried. In Shah Bano's case1, it was held by a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court including the then Chief Justice, Y. V. Chandrachud that a Mustim husband is under obligation to provide maintenance to his divorced wife who is unable to maintain herself. The plea of non-application of this provision to Muslims was rejected by the Supreme Court. The learned judges stated that religion professed by a spouse or the spouses has no place in the scheme of section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Although this position has now been changed by the enactment of a new legislation2 for Muslim women, despite un favourable public opinion, but the constitutional validity of this enactment has been challenged which is pending before the Supreme Court. The present paper is confined to pinpoint an important issue-whether a mother can claim maintenance from her married daughter. On this point there is a recent case decided by a two- judge bench of the Supreme * LL M. , Leeturer in Law, Government College. Ajmer. 1. Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, 1985 Cr. L. J. 875. 2. Muslim Women (Prorection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. Court consisting Justice G. L. Oza and Justice Murari Mohan Dutta on 18. 2. 1987. Though in this case, the maintenance is claimed by the father from his daughter but it is applicable for a mother too. In Dr. Mrs. Vijaya Manohar Arbat v. Kashirao Rajaram Sawai and another3, the respondent, a father, claimed maintenance from his married daughter, a medical practitioner in district Thane in Maharashtra. Initially, the respondent filed an application before the Judicial Magistrate claiming maintenance at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month, which was granted by him, because the father was unable to maintain himself in his old age. Initially, the respondent filed an application before the Judicial Magistrate claiming maintenance at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month, which was granted by him, because the father was unable to maintain himself in his old age. A preliminary objection was raised by the petitioner that a father cannot claim maintenance from his daughter under section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which was overruled by the Judicial Magistrate. A revision application was moved in the Bombay High Court. The High Court affirmed the order of the Judicial Magistrate. Hence, the present appeal by way of special leave, was filed before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court considered the relevant provisions in detail, keeping in view the object of the legislation and the intent of the legislature. Sub-section (1) of section 12. 5, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides as under: If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain (a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or (b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain Itself, or (c) his legitimate or illegitimate child 3. (1987) Crimes 713. (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself, or (d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Magistrate of first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees in the whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistratemay from time to time direct. The object of the above section is to provide a summary remedy to save dependents from destitution and vagrancy. In this way it serves a social purpose. The counsel for the appellant pleaded that a father is not entitled to claim maintenance from his daughter because the pronoun his in clause (d) of sub section (J) of the said section indicates only son. The contention was rejected by the Supreme Court. In this context, the relevant provisions, viz: section 2 (y), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, section 8 of Indian Penal Code and section 13 (1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 were considered. The contention was rejected by the Supreme Court. In this context, the relevant provisions, viz: section 2 (y), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, section 8 of Indian Penal Code and section 13 (1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 were considered. Section 2 (y), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides that the words not defined in this Code but defined in the Indian Penal Code would have meaning as assigned to them there. Section 8, Indian Penal Code read with section 2 (y), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 indicates that his includes her also. Moreover, section 13 (1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 lays down that unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, words importing masculine gender shall include females. Therefore, the pronoun hist as appeared in section 125 (l) (d), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 represents both males and females. It was further said that apart from the social obligation upon the son or daughter, there is a legal duty upon them to maintain their parents in old age. The Supreme Court, as a precautionary measure, suggested that before ordering maintenance against married daughter the court must be satisfied that she has sufficient means of her own independent from her husband the father or mother, as the case may be, is unable to maintain himself or herself. While dismissing the appeal of the appellant, it was said that it is clear from the provisions of section 125, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 that it imposes duty not only upon the son but on daughter also to maintain parents who are unable to maintain themselves, keeping in view the object of the protective legislation. The primary function of the court is to dispense justice to the parties. The most important base for the same is available in the intention of the legislature and the object of the legislation. Consequently, the courts should always try to find out the same. There is no doubt that incorporation of section 125 (1) in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was basically with the purpose of achieving social justice for the old. The legislature could never wish that the parents who have done their best while bringing up their children, should be left helpless when they become old. There is no doubt that incorporation of section 125 (1) in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was basically with the purpose of achieving social justice for the old. The legislature could never wish that the parents who have done their best while bringing up their children, should be left helpless when they become old. Naturally, what the children got from their parents when they needed protection, has to be given by them also at the time of need of the parents and there is no more need than when the parents become old and are unable to maintain themselves. It is clear that so far as legal status and rights of daughters are concerned, law makes no distinction on the ground of their gender. It, therefore, seems equitable to impose legal obligation on them to maintain mother as well as father in old age. In the present case, if the plea of the appellant had been accepted the respondent would go destitute because of the fact that he had no son. To accelerate the train of thoughts in this direction an important question arises whet-her a mother can claim maintenance from her illegitimate daughter. Keeping in view the modern criminal jurisprudential thoughts, the court should extend the liability to maintain mother even upon illegitimate daughter in her old age to save her from destitution. .