JUDGMENT A. P. Mishra, J. - Heared learned counsel for the parties. The petitioner by means of this writ petition sought for quashing of the order, dated 28th November, 1980 passed by the U.P. Public Services Tribunal by virtue of which the petition of the petitioner for direction for quashing the dismissal order was dismissed. 2. According to the petitioner he was appointed as Tax Clerk in the Notified Area Nataur on 1st May, 1965 and was promoted as Tax Inspector of 1st June, 1969. The Notified Area was thereafter raised to the status of Nagar Palika and the petitioner was confirmed as Tax Inspector with effect from April 1,1971. One of the allegations of respondent No. 3 is that he bore grudge as against the petitioner on account of his not accepting the request of appointment of his son as Toll Peon. This led into filing a suit against the petitioner which was dismissed and then he also made certain false allegations. In these paragraphs it is stated that respondent No. 3 illegally suspended him on 1st June, 1973. The petitioner being aggrieved as against the said suspension order first filed a suit in the court of Munsif Nagina restraining the president, Nagar Palika from taking charge from the post of Tax Inspector and also from interfering with the work of the petitioner on the said post. It is further alleged that the said suspension order was revoked and a fresh suspension order, dated 30th June, 1973 was passed. Thereafter in the said suit an amendment application was moved by the petitioner and thereafter and interim injunction staying the suspension order of the petitioner was granted by the learned Musif Nagina. It is further alleged that in spite of the said injunction order, the Board did not pay the salary of the petitioner, on fact, on 23rd July, 1977, the then President Nagar Palika, respondent No. 3 passed another suspension order on the basis of fresh charges which led into filing of another suit (Suit No. 507 of 1977). However, after commencement of U.P. public Services Tribunal Act, 1976 the aforesaid suits were transferred to the said Tribunal under Section 6 of the aforesaid Act. However, after commencement of U.P. public Services Tribunal Act, 1976 the aforesaid suits were transferred to the said Tribunal under Section 6 of the aforesaid Act. It is further urged that during pendency of the said matter before the Tribunal on 24th May, 1978 an application was made on behalf of respondent No. 3 stating that the petitioner had been dismissed from service since 21st January, 1978. He also filed order of dismissal stating that now the suspension order had been merged into dismissal order. Immediately thereafter the petitioner filed an affidavit before the Tribunal and also moved an application for amendment of the plaint challenging the said order of dismissal as illegal on various grounds. However, the Tribunal by means of the impugned order, dated. 28th November, 1980 dismissed the claim petition so far as the dismissal of the petitioner was concerned but held that the suspension order, dated 1st June, 1973 and 30th June, 1973, were illegal. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the order passed by the Tribunal that his claim petition for relief for holding the dismissal order to be illegal, cannot be entertained since he has not exhausted his departmental remedy permissible to him under law in view of the 2nd proviso of Section 4 of the U.P. Public Services Tribunal Act, 1976 in erroneous. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents very vehemently urged that the provisions are very clear and no Government servant should be permitted to file claim petition without exhausting the departmental remedy. 4. It is not in dispute that the Tribunal dismissed the claim petition of the petitioner so far as the order of dismissal is concerned only on the ground that he has to exhaust the departmental remedy by filing appeal under Section 3 and Regulation 22 of the U.P. Municipal Servants Appeals Rules, 1967 and U.P. Municipal Servants Conduct Regulations. 5. The main contention therefore, in the present petition before me is whether the Tribunal is justified in not entertaining the claim petition of the petitioner on merits on account of his not preferring an appeal as permissible to him under the aforesaid Rules and Regulation 22. 6. 5. The main contention therefore, in the present petition before me is whether the Tribunal is justified in not entertaining the claim petition of the petitioner on merits on account of his not preferring an appeal as permissible to him under the aforesaid Rules and Regulation 22. 6. It is significant that under the second proviso of Section 4 of the aforesaid Act the language used is as under : "No reference shall ordinarily be entertained by the Tribunal until the claimant has exhausted his departmental remedies under the rules as applicable to him." The language used is very clear. Normally the Tribunal should not interfere or entertain the claim petition unless the claimant has exhausted his remedies permissible to him under law but using word ordinarily is very significant In normal circumstances the said rule should be made applicable. However, in the present case the relief sought earlier through two different suits were confined to suspension order stood transferred to the Tribunal. Then during the pendency of the claim petition the order of dismissal came into existence. This fact was brought to the notice of the Tribunal by the respondents themselves. The petitioner thereafter moved amendment application for amendment to the relief which after contest was finally allowed by the Tribunal. In fact after the amendment the respondent even filed written statement and contested the matter. In view-of the special circumstances after the litigation being pending for a number of years and the litigant having come to know that during pendency of such litigation the subsequent order has come into existence, he applied for amendment and that having been allowed after contest, it was not appropriate for the Tribunal to have rejected the claim petition on the ground that the claimant has not exhausted the departmental remedy. The word ordinarily in the aforesaid section would be fully applicable to the facts of the present case. Learned counsel for the respondents relied on the decision reported in Shafqat Husain v. Municipal Board Sambhal and another, 1967 ALJ 17. The relevant portion is quoted hereinunder : "if a suit is filed without exhausting the departmental remedy, such a suit would be premature. After 31-1-1959 the cause of action consists of two parts (i) the order of dismissal from service, (ii) the order dismissing the departmental appeal. The relevant portion is quoted hereinunder : "if a suit is filed without exhausting the departmental remedy, such a suit would be premature. After 31-1-1959 the cause of action consists of two parts (i) the order of dismissal from service, (ii) the order dismissing the departmental appeal. Cause of action is complete when both the stages are over." On the basis of this decision it is said that in that case it was held that the suit was barred in view of Regulation 22 which is also referred in that judgment. I. have perused the said judgment, it is true that in the said judgment Regulation 22 was relied. The cases of Sita Ram Goel v. The Municipal Board, Kanpur, 1959 ALJ 106 was distinguished by holding that since thereafter here has been amendment by virtue of publication of the said regulation which did not exist when and, therefore after coming into force this regulation, the suit was not proper remedy without exhausting the departmental remedy. 7. It is significant which his also Hon'ble Court has held in this case to quote : "That contention would perhaps be valid, if the plaintiff took up the position that the dismissal is valid, but the punishment is harsh. But that is not the plaintiffs stand in the present case. He seeks a declaration that the order, dated 22-12-1958 is illegal and void and the plaintiff is still in the service of the defendant-Municipal Board. If the plaintiff's stand on merits is correct, it would mean that he is still a servant of the Municipal. Board, Regulation No. 22 lays down that no servant shall attempt to seek in a court of law a decision on grievance arising out of his employment without first exhausting the normal orificial channels of redress." In this case the learned Single Judge distinguished the fact that since the employee sought for a declaration that he is still continuing in service he could be squarely covered within Regulation 22 as he is still in service. The fact of that case is distinguishable. Here is petitioner has not sought any declaration that he is still in service but sought for relief that the dismissal -was illegal and invalid. Therefore, the decision cited on behalf of the respondents would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 8. The fact of that case is distinguishable. Here is petitioner has not sought any declaration that he is still in service but sought for relief that the dismissal -was illegal and invalid. Therefore, the decision cited on behalf of the respondents would not be applicable to the facts of the present case. 8. Apart from the above when the said decision was given, the U. P. Public Services Tribunal Act (Act No. 1 of 1976) had not come into existence. By using the words "ordinarily be entertained by the Tribunal "in the second proviso of Section 4 is a rule of exigence so what the employee may approach first the departmental remedy but the second proviso does not debar the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for entertaining such claim. la view of his coupled with the special circumstances of this case i.e. , to say that the litigation being pending for a long number of years initially by way of filing suit, later on, the same being transferred to the Tribunal after coming into force of the aforesaid Act and finally during the pendency the order of termination coming into existence to which the petitioner applied for an amendment and the same was finally allowed clearly go to show that this was fit case in which the Tribunal should have exercised the power instead of throwing the petitioner back to the departmental remedy for approaching the Tribunal again. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on the case of M/s. M. Laxmi and Co. v. Dr. An ant R. Deshpande and another, AIR 1973 SC 171 . The relevant portion is quoted hereinunder : "Court can take notice of subsequent events to shorten litigation, to preserve rights of both the parties and to subserve the ends of justice." There cannot be better case then to exercise of powers on the facts of the present case. Therefore, I am of opinion that the finding of the Tribunal that the petitioner should first approach the departmental remedy and then file a fresh claim petition, is not justified on the facts of the present case. It is significant that the Tribunal has further recorded a finding which is as under : "Moreover, in this case the petitioner did not file a fresh petition but only sought an amendment in pending petition after final order was passed. It is significant that the Tribunal has further recorded a finding which is as under : "Moreover, in this case the petitioner did not file a fresh petition but only sought an amendment in pending petition after final order was passed. It was, in fact a fresh cause of action and the petitioner could wait for filing appeal against the order of punishment and then to file a fresh petition or got this reference petition amended." It seems that the Tribunal has completely misdirected itself. In fact, in this case the amendment was allowed on 20th July, 1978 and the final order of Tribunal was passed on 28th November, 1980. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that no useful purpose will be served in remanding this case in view of the clear cut finding recorded by the Tribunal in para 10 of its judgment. I have perused the order passed by the Tribunal wherein the Tribunal has clearly recorded which is quoted as under : "It is evident from the original file produced by the learned counsel for the opposite party that no enquiry was at all held in this case according to ruled and no opportunity to inspect the records as is evident from a large number of papers filed by the petitioner himself. It is also apparent from the show cause notice that no copy of the enquiry report was sent alongwith the show cause notice. In fact, there was no enquiry at all as there was no proper enquiry though there were so many lengthy charges. Thus, it appears that presumption was raised against the petitioner and a finding recorded against him simply because he did not appear on the date fixed and did not submit the reply in time .. that even after the show cause notice there was some note by the Enquiry Officer on 21-1-1978 on the basis of which the President passed the order of dismissal on the next date i.e., 21-1-1978. This final order does not give any finding on the charges or the reason for dismissal. In fact this order is actually a non-speaking order." 11. In view of the categorical finding cited there no useful purpose would be served by sending the case back to be decided afresh again. 12. In view of the aforesaid observations the present writ petition is liable to succeed. In fact this order is actually a non-speaking order." 11. In view of the categorical finding cited there no useful purpose would be served by sending the case back to be decided afresh again. 12. In view of the aforesaid observations the present writ petition is liable to succeed. The present petition, is therefore, allowed and the impugned order dated 28th November, 1980 to the extent the Tribunal has directed to the petitioner to approach to the department by way of appeal is hereby quashed, the order of Tribunal so far it has held that the dismissal order is illegal in para 10 of its judgment, is upheld. There is no order as to costs.