K. L. SHRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition is directed against the order dated 2. 6. 86 passed by the Addi. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Indore in Criminal Case No. 1589 of 1985 whereby he has rejected the petitioners contention that the complaint against his under section 18 (2) read with section 27 (a) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 (for short die Act) has been filed beyond the period of limitation as provided under section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for snort the Code) and the Court could not take cognizance. ( 2 ) IT is not in dispute that the petitioner manufactures vitamin B complex and the Drug Inspector, Indore had on 19. 281 obtained sample of the same from him. On analysis the Government Analyst found it to be substandard and submitted his report dated 19. 9. 81 as required by section 25 (2) of the Act. A copy of the report was given to the petitioner on 27. 11. 81. He submitted his reply dated 23. 1281 but nowhere notified therein as required by sub-section (3) of Section 25 that he intends to adduce evidence in controversion of the report. ( 3 ) IN the report it has been expressly mentioned that expiry date of the drug in question was 25. 9. 82. The Drug Inspector filed the complaint in the Court on 6. 9. 85 after be had received on 23. 4. 85 instructions dated 16. 4. 85 from the Drug Controller in this regard. ( 4 ) THE contention of the petitioners learned counsel is that the law does not contemplate any sanction for launching prosecution of the sort and complaint having been filed beyond three years of 18. 9. 81 on which date the Drug-Inspector came to know about the offence, in view of section 468 of the Code the Court was debarred from taking cognizance of the offence. Reliance was placed on the decision in Asandass case1. 9. 81 on which date the Drug-Inspector came to know about the offence, in view of section 468 of the Code the Court was debarred from taking cognizance of the offence. Reliance was placed on the decision in Asandass case1. ( 5 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the State is that a combined reading of the provision embodied in sections 32, 33 (2) (n) and Rule 52 (5) of the Drug and Cosmetic Rules, 1945 (for short the Rules) instruction in regard to prosecution has to be awaited by the Drug Inspector and in determining the period of limitation the time taken in receiving instruction has to be excluded as provided under section 470 (3) of the Code. It has further been contended that looking to the nature of the offence, provisions embodied in section 473 of the Code authorise the court to take cognizance even assuming that the period of limitation has expired. ( 6 ) THE point fur consideration is whether the revision petition deserves to be admitted. ( 7 ) SECTION 32 of the Act lays down that no prosecution under Chapter IV (Sections 16 to 33) shall be instituted except by an Inspector. Section 33 embodies the rule making power of the Central Government. Section 33 (1) (n) reads as under: - Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules may: (n) prescribe the powers and duties of inspector and specify the drugs or classes of drugs or cosmetics or classes of cosmetics in relation to which and the conditions, limitations or restrictions subject to which such powers and duties may be exercised or performed. Rule 52 (2) is in these terms: Duties of Inspector specially authorised to inspect the manufacture of drugs: Subject to the instructions of the Controlling Authority it shall be the duty of an Inspector authorised to inspect the manufacture of drugs: 1. 2. 3. 4. (5) to institute proceedings in respect of breaches of the Act and Rules there under. (Emphasis supplied) ( 8 ) AT this stage it is pertinent to advert to the provisions in sub-section (3) of Section 470 of the Cr. P. C. 1973 (for short the Code) regarding exclusion of time. 2. 3. 4. (5) to institute proceedings in respect of breaches of the Act and Rules there under. (Emphasis supplied) ( 8 ) AT this stage it is pertinent to advert to the provisions in sub-section (3) of Section 470 of the Cr. P. C. 1973 (for short the Code) regarding exclusion of time. It reads thus: Section 470 (3): Where notice or prosecution for an offence has been given, or where, under any law for the time being in force, the previous consent or sanction of the Government or any other Authority is required for the institution of any prosecution for an offence, then in computing the period of limitation, the period of such notice or, as the case may be, the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction shall be excluded. Explanation: In computing the time required for obtaining the consent or sanction of the Government or any other Authority, the date on which the application was made for obtaining the consent or sanction and the date of receipt, of the order of the Government or other Authority shall both be excluded. ( 9 ) REFERENCE may also usefully made to the provisions embodied in section 473 of the Code. It is in these terms: Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this chapter, any court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary to do in the interest of justice. (Emphasis supplied) ( 10 ) I shall first deal with the question of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, to the case in hand, which does not provide for any limitation in respect of offence. The Code, it has, therefore, to be held, prescribes a different limitation. According to Section 29 ibid Sections 4 to 24 thereof are applicable in all cases unless their application is expressly excluded by the Special or Local law prescribing a different limitation than the one under the Limitation Act. The Code, it has, therefore, to be held, prescribes a different limitation. According to Section 29 ibid Sections 4 to 24 thereof are applicable in all cases unless their application is expressly excluded by the Special or Local law prescribing a different limitation than the one under the Limitation Act. The Code does not expressly exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act but as pointed out in the D. B. decision in Kantibai v. Kamalsingh2 the nature of the right and the scheme of the special law may reveal inconsistency with the provisions in sections 4 to 24 to support the conclusion that they are necessarily excluded. In the D B. decision in M. P. S. R. T. C. v. Munibai3 in view of the proviso to section 110-A (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 it was held that exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be inferred. In the instant case, in view of the provision embodied in Section 470 (3) of the Code, it has also to be held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded and the question of limitation has to be determined with reference to the relevant provision in the Code itself. ( 11 ) IT may be remembered that limitation for criminal prosecution has, for the first time been introduced by the Code. By lapse of time prescribed for prosecution, a valuable right accrues to the offender. But the courts exist to dispense justice. Laws are only the handmaids of justice. In order that there is no failure of Justice the legislature has enacted section 473 of the Code investing the Court with discretion which has a sweep wider than that of section 5 of the Limitation Act, to extend the period of limitation prescribed by the Code for taking cognizance of offences. Under the provision of the section aforesaid limitation can be extended where (i) delay has been properly explained (ii) it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice. It must, however, be remembered that discretion vested in the courts under the said provision like discretion vested elsewhere has to be judicially exercised, on a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of a given case. ( 12 ) AS I read the relevant provisions of the Act, I find that the person authorised to institute prosecution is the Inspector. ( 12 ) AS I read the relevant provisions of the Act, I find that the person authorised to institute prosecution is the Inspector. As pointed out in the decision in Shri Synthetics Ujjain Ltd. v. Union of India4 the rules cannot over ride the statute under which they are made. Under Rule 52 (5) of the Rules the Inspector has to perform this duty of instituting prosecution subject to the instructions of the Controlling Authority. ( 13 ) AN analysis of the provisions contained in the Rule referred to above makes it clear that it does not inhibit institution of prosecution under the Act except on condition of prior instructions In this regard from the Controlling Authority. It may be noted that unlike Section 197 (1) of the Code it does not lay down in the negative that no court shall take cognizance of the offence except when complaint by the Inspector is filed under previous instructions of the Controlling Authority. Similarly unlike section 20 (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 1954 it does not employ negative words to the effect that no prosecution for an offence under the Act shall be instituted except with the prior instructions of the Controlling Authority thereby invalidating any other mode of exercise of this power of instituting prosecution. In this connection the S C; decision in A. K. Rai v. State of Punjab5 may usefully be perused. Therein interpreting the negative words in section 20 (1) ibid. it has been pointed out that power of instituting prosecution delegated to one Authority cannot be sub-delegated by that Authority. The expression subject to the instructions of the Controlling Authority appearing in rule 52 is clearly not intended to make instructions of the Controlling Authority a condition precedent to the institution of prosecution and I am clear in my view that the instructions referred to are merely these relating to the regulation of the Inspectors powers so that they do not remain unbridled. Such instructions cannot be equated with the required previous consent or sanction contemplated under section 470 (3) of the Code which admit of exclusion of time there-under. Such instructions cannot be equated with the required previous consent or sanction contemplated under section 470 (3) of the Code which admit of exclusion of time there-under. ( 14 ) ASSUMING for a moment that instructions of the Controlling Authority constitute a prior condition for the Inspector to institute prosecution, it may be pointed out that it is not the prosecution case that the Inspector made any application to the Controlling Authority seeking instructions for the prosecution of the petitioner. Therefore, the provision embodied in section 470 (3) of the Code regarding exclusion of time taken in making an application for fulfilling the required condition as to consent or sanction for institution of prosecutionfor an offence, is, in term, not attracted in this case. ( 15 ) THE next contention of the learned counsel for the State is that though section 25 (1) of the Act provides that Government Analyst shall deliver to the Inspector his report in triplicate, in actual practice a copy of the report is sent by him direct to the Controlling Authority and the Inspector has merely to await instructions regarding institution of prosecution. Suffice to say that even the existence of such a practice cannot be permitted to be successfully urged for extension of time under section 470 (3) of the Code. Negligence on the part of the prosecution agency is at the root of the delay in launching the present prosecution and in the ultimate analysis, I find that the inescapable conclusion is that delay in launching the prosecution has not been properly explained and the non-applicant is not entitled to any exclusion of time on this count. ( 16 ) THIS is however, not the end of the matter so far as the prosecution is concerned. The impact of section 473 of the Code has still to be considered. ( 17 ) IN the instant case although negligence on the part of the prosecution agency is at the root of the delay, in launching the prosecution, the crucial question is whether the petitioner who is accused of having manufactured sub- standard drug should be allowed to claim the benefit accruing to him as a result of such negligence. ( 17 ) IN the instant case although negligence on the part of the prosecution agency is at the root of the delay, in launching the prosecution, the crucial question is whether the petitioner who is accused of having manufactured sub- standard drug should be allowed to claim the benefit accruing to him as a result of such negligence. In the circumstances, the answer has to be in an emphatic No. In the decision In Food Inspector, Nagar Palika, Mandsaur v. Devilal6 with reference to the decision in Dalchandts case7 it has been pointed out that unless negligence of these to whom public duties are entrusted has caused prejudice to the accused it cannot, by statutory interpretation, be allowed to promote public mischief and cause public inconvenience and defeat the very object of the statute. Manufacture of sub-standard drugs constitute a crime of major magnitude against the ailing society and it is in the interests of justice that these alleged to have indulged in it are made to stand their trials. Between the conflicting interests of the individual and the society these of the latter must be permitted to prevail. The delay in question does deserve to be excused in the larger interests of public justice. ( 18 ) REVISION is not a vested right and as provided in section 403 of the Code there is no right of hearing. As pointed out in the decision in State of Rajasthan v. Nakula Sahu8 although the revisional power of the High Court as provided under Section 401 of the Code is as wide as the power of the Court of Appeal, it is by now well settled that normally this jurisdiction has to be exercised only in exceptional cases to set right miscarriage of justice. ( 19 ) IN the decision in State of Rajasthan v. Gurucharandass Chaddha9 the High Courts second judgment in revision though wrong and even without jurisdiction was not interfered with by the Supreme Court on ,the ground that it was in consonance with its later decision and was calculated to promote the ends of justice. ( 20 ) ON a careful consideration I find that no case for interference in exercise of the discretionary revisional jurisdiction has been made out. ( 21 ) IN the result, the revision petition fails and is dismissed. .