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1987 DIGILAW 109 (DEL)

CAMBRIDGE FOUNDATION EDUCATION SOCIETY v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

1987-03-02

B.N.KIRPAL

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B. N. Kirpal,j. ( 1 ) THIS revision is directed against the order of the Subordinate Judge, Delhi who had passed an order on an application filed under Order 23 Rule I by the petitioner-herein who, by the said application, had sought leave to withdraw the suit with permission to file a fresh one. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration and injunction. In the plaint it is alleged that the D. D. A. had agreed to allot approxmately two acres of land to the petitioner. It is further alleged that D. D. A. wanted to favour respondent No. 2-herein and allotted the land to them though the land is meant for the petitioner. The prayer in the suit is for declaration that the land in question, which is adjacent to the petitioner s existing School, is meant for school purposes and is ear-marked in the Master Plan and in the Zonal Plan for the petitioner only and for a further declaration that the petitioner-plaintiff is entitled to the allotment of land. There is also a prayer for a decree for permanent injunction and for restraining defendant No. I and its employees from allotting the land in question to anybody else. ( 3 ) IN the written statement filed on behalf of respondent No. 2 a preliminary objection has been taken to the effect that the suit was not Maintainable and was liable to be dismissed because no notice for two months before filing of the suit had been given by the plaintiff to the D. D. A. It is further alleged that there was no application under section 80 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure for exemption of such a notice. The case of the said respondent was that in the absence of such a notice, the suit was not maintainabk. In reply to the application filed under order 23 rule I, which application was filed by the petitioner-herein, the respondent D. D. A also took a similar preliminary objection. It was contended on behalf of the D. D. A. that the suit was liable to be dismissed for want of notice under section 53-B of the D. D. A. Act. In reply to the application filed under order 23 rule I, which application was filed by the petitioner-herein, the respondent D. D. A also took a similar preliminary objection. It was contended on behalf of the D. D. A. that the suit was liable to be dismissed for want of notice under section 53-B of the D. D. A. Act. ( 4 ) IT has been contended by Shri Vohra before me that notwithstanding what has been stated in the written statement of his clients and in the reply of the D. D. A. , the Court has itself to see whether the suit is liable to fail because a techincal defect. If the Court is satisfied that the suit is not likely to be dismissed on ground of any techincal defect, then leave to file a fresh suit is not to be granted. ( 5 ) THE trial court has held that in the instant case the provisions of section 53b (3) are applicable. The said provisions reads as under : "nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall be deemed to apply to a suit in which the only relief claimed is an injunction of which the object would be defeated by the giving of the notice or the postponement of the institution of the suit. "the trial court has, however, held that the present suit is essentially for injunction and, therefore, no notice was necessary. Mr. Vohra has also submitted that the substantial relief which was aksed for in this case was of injunction and that the prayer for a decree for declaration was only incidental. ( 6 ) I am unable to accept the contentions of Mr. Vohra. The reading of the plaint leaves no manner of doubt that the main relief which was asked for by the plaintiff-petitioner was of declaration. Without obtaining a decree for declaration in its favour, the plaintiff in this case could not ask for a consequential relief of injunction. There was no letter of allotment which had been issued to the petitioner in the present case. There was also no sale deed in its favour. The case of the petitioner was that on the files of D. D. A. this land had been agreed to be allotted to the plaintiff-petitioner and a letter to this effect had been written by the L. G. to one of the former Members of Parliament. There was also no sale deed in its favour. The case of the petitioner was that on the files of D. D. A. this land had been agreed to be allotted to the plaintiff-petitioner and a letter to this effect had been written by the L. G. to one of the former Members of Parliament. The case, therefore, of the plaintiff was that it was entitled to a declaration that this is the land which has been allotted to the petitioner. It is only thereafter that it could ask for a consequential relief of an injunction. Without establishing its title, there could be no occasion for the petitioner to ask for a relief of permanent injunction. ( 7 ) SUB-SECTION (3) of section 53b is applicable if the only relief which is claimed for is of injunction. In the present case, as has already been observed, the decree for injunction is not the sole relief claimed. It is one of the reliefs which was prayed for in the plaint and the other relief which was prayed for was of declaration. To my mind, the relief of declaration was the main relief and the relief of a decree of injunction was consequential. Even if I am wrong and the correct position is that the decree for declaration is not the main relief, even then sub-section (3) of section 53b will not apply because that provision applies where the only relief claimed for is of injunction. Here admittedly two reliefs are claimed, namely, that of injunction and declaration. Therefore, the provisions of section 53b (3) were not applicable and a notice should ordinarily have been given. ( 8 ) IN view of the aforesaid, the decision of the trial court in holding that the provisions of section 53b (3) are applicable is incorrect. To my mind, the petitioner was right contending that its suit was likely to be dismissed on the ground that a notice under section 53b (1) had not been given. Therefore, the petitioner s prayer for permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh one ought to have been acceded to. ( 9 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order dated 18th December, 1986 is set-aside. Therefore, the petitioner s prayer for permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh one ought to have been acceded to. ( 9 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order dated 18th December, 1986 is set-aside. The application of the petitioner filed under Order 23, Rule 1 C. P. C. before the trial court, for permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh one, is allowed. The revision petition is disposed of in the above terms. Parties shall bear their own costs.