B. S. KAPADIA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner has filed the present application under Sec. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the proceedings in the Criminal Case No. 17 of 1987 pending before the learned JMFC Sidhpur. ( 2 ) ON perusal of the complaint which is annexed as Annexure-A to the petition it appears that the complaint was filed under Secs. 272 and 273 of the IPC as also under Sec. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). It is alleged in the complaint that the complainant is doing the business of selling cold drinks in the Court compound at Sidhpur. He was also keeping Thums Up drink manufactured and supplied by the original accused present petitioners. It is also alleged that on 15/05/1987 a customer asked for Thums Up bottle which the complainant had purchased from the Garden Hindu Hotel who are the distributors of Thums Up for Sidhpur vide bill No. 3332. When the complainant took the bottle of Thums Up he found that it was containing insects. It was a sealed bottle. On realising that the drink of Thums Up was infected with insects a notice was given to the accused through his lawyer but no reply was given by the accused. The complainant therefore filed the complaint making all the required allegations for the commission of the offences under Secs. 272 and 273 IPC. He has also produced the said bottle before the learned Magistrate and also requested to send it for the report of the Chemical Analyser. On the said complaint the learned Magistrate has issued process against the present petitioners for the offences under Secs. 272 and 273 IP Code only. ( 3 ) IT may be stated that when the petition was originally filed the entire attack was with regard to the provisions of the Act but at the time of hearing Mr. S. K. Zaveri the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners learnt that process was issued under Secs. 272 and 273 IPC and he sought permission to amend the petition. Permission was granted. Now he has amended the petition accordingly. ( 4 ) MR. Zaveri during the course of arguments has submitted that the learned Magistrate has committed an error in issuing the process against the petitioners for the offences under Secs. 272 and 273 IPC and he sought permission to amend the petition. Permission was granted. Now he has amended the petition accordingly. ( 4 ) MR. Zaveri during the course of arguments has submitted that the learned Magistrate has committed an error in issuing the process against the petitioners for the offences under Secs. 272 and 273 IPC inasmuch as the provisions of Secs. 272 and 273 IPC are repealed by the provisions of Sec. 25 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. He submits that the provisions of Secs. 272 and 273 IPC are provisions of corresponding law which was in force at the time when the provisions of the Act came into force and therefore the aforesaid two Sections of the IPC are repealed. ( 5 ) MR. J. M. Panchal the learned Addl. P. P. and Mr. P. K. Jani the learned Advocate appearing for the original complainant have very strongly opposed the present application. In their submission the provisions of Secs. 272 and 273 cannot be said to be corresponding law and therefore they are not repealed. They further submit that they are not repugnant and/or inconsistent with the provisions of the Act and therefore also there is no question of implied repeal of the said provisions of the IPC. Relying on the statement of object and reasons for the Act and also on the wordings of Sec. 25 (2) of the Act they submits that all other local Prevention of Food Adulteration Acts which were prevalent are repealed but the provisions of the I. P Code are not repealed mr. J. M. Panchal Addl. P. P. submits that at the time of presenting the bill of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act the statement of objects and reasons was made and it inter alia stated that laws exist in number of States in India for the Prevention of Adulteration of food stuff but they lack uniformity having been passed at different times without mutual consultation between States. The need for Central Legislation for the whole country in this matter has been felt since 1937 when a Committee appointed by the Central Advisory Board of Health recommended the step. Adulteration of food stuffs and other goods is now included in the concurrent list in the Constitution of India. It has therefore become possible for the Central Government to enact all India Legislation on this subject. Adulteration of food stuffs and other goods is now included in the concurrent list in the Constitution of India. It has therefore become possible for the Central Government to enact all India Legislation on this subject. The Bill will replace local Food Adulteration Laws where they exist and also apply to these States where there are no local laws on the subject. Relying on these observations with regard to the statement of objects and reasons Mr. Panchal submits that it only repeals the local laws and not the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. It is true that that is the statement made by the Minister while presenting the Bill and therefore there is no doubt that in view of the language of Sec. 25 (1) of the Act all local law dealing with food adulteration are repealed on the commencement of the provisions of the present Prevention of Food Adulteration Act but the dispute in the present matter is whether the provisions of IPC namely Secs. 272 and 273 are also repealed as corresponding law prevailing at the commencement of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. On this point Mr. S. K. Zaveri submits that the statement of objects and reasons cannot be used as a key for interpreting the section. It is true that in the case of S. C. Prashar and Another v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas and Others AIR 1963 SC 1356 the Supreme Court has so held and also observed in para 23 as under:". . . . . It is indeed true that the Statement of Objects and Reasons can be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the circumstances which led to the legislation in order to find out what was the mischief which the legislation aimed at "in that view of the matter the statement of objects and reasons can be useful for the purpose of ascertaining the circumstances which led to the introduction of the Bill of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. In that view of the matter for finding out the true interpretation thereof the statement of objects and reasons cannot be taken as an aid. It is true that for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the Legislature other provisions of the Act can be considered. In that view of the matter Mr. Panchal further submits that sub-sec. In that view of the matter for finding out the true interpretation thereof the statement of objects and reasons cannot be taken as an aid. It is true that for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the Legislature other provisions of the Act can be considered. In that view of the matter Mr. Panchal further submits that sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 25 of the Act also refers to the saving of the Rules Regulations Bye-laws relating to prevention of adulteration of food and therefore also the repeal applies only to the local laws of prevention of food adulteration which were prevalent at the time of commencement of the Act. According to him there were 22 different Acts prevalent in different states. He further submits that there were no rules under the I. P. Code. That argument also cannot be accepted at this juncture as in the present case the meaning of the words any law corresponding is to be ascertained and further that it is relating to the savings of the Rules and Regulations made under the relevant repealed Acts. ( 6 ) WITH a view to properly appreciate the contentions raised in this matter it is necessary to quote Sec. 25 of the Act which reads as under:"25 (1) If immediately before the commencement of this Act there is in force in any State to which this Act extends any law corresponding to this Act that corresponding law shall upon such commencement stand repealed. (2) Notwithstanding the repeal by this Act of any corresponding law all rules regulations and bye-laws relating to the prevention of adulteration of food made under such corresponding law and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall except where and so far as they are inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of this Act continue in force until altered amended or repealed by rules made under this Act. The use of particular form of words is not necessary to bring about an express repeal. It is clear from Sec. 25 (1) of the Act that the Legislature has not chosen to put the list of the Acts repealed in a schedule nor the Legislature has used the phraseology to the effect that any law which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act would be repealed. It is clear from Sec. 25 (1) of the Act that the Legislature has not chosen to put the list of the Acts repealed in a schedule nor the Legislature has used the phraseology to the effect that any law which is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act would be repealed. Instead of that the Legislature has used the words that if there is any law in force in any State to which this Act extends any law corresponding to this Act that corresponding law shall upon such commencement stand repealed This device is adopted by the Central Legislature because it was not in a position to know with any exactness the laws in force in the States. The principle underlying repealing the corresponding law is to avoid duplication of the proceedings under the corresponding law under two different Acts where the repealed law also provided substantially for all matters contained in the Act effecting the repeal. While the principle of implied repeal is based on the fact that provisions of the two Acts i. e. the Act which was in force and the new Act are so inconsistent with each other and/or repugnant with each other and that they cannot stand together. It is very clear from the wordings of Sec. 25 of the Act that what is expressly repealed is the law which was in force at the commencement of the Act which was corresponding to the provisions of the Act. It is true that as provided in some other Act no list of the repealed Act is provided for. Therefore it is necessary for the Court to do some exercise for considering as to whether the provisions of Secs. 272 and 273 IPC are the provisions corresponding to the provisions of the Act. ( 7 ) AT this juncture it is necessary to examine certain provisions of the Act. This Act first of all gives the definitions inter alia for words adulterated food and sale. Section 2 (v) defines that food means any article used as food or drink for human consumption other than drugs and water and includes - (a) any article which ordinarily enters into or is used in the composition or preparation of human food (b) any flavouring matter or condiments and (c) any other article which the Central Govt. Section 2 (v) defines that food means any article used as food or drink for human consumption other than drugs and water and includes - (a) any article which ordinarily enters into or is used in the composition or preparation of human food (b) any flavouring matter or condiments and (c) any other article which the Central Govt. may having regard to its use nature substance or quality declare by notification in the official gazette as food for the purpose of this Act. The definition of adulterated also includes an article of food which will be deemed to be adulterated which inter alia also includes article which consists wholly or in part of any filthy putrid rotten decomposed or diseased animal or vegetable substance or is insect-infested or is otherwise unfit for human consumption. Definition of sale also includes agreement for sale and exposing for sale also. Further it provides in Sec. 4 of the Act about the Central Food Laboratory. It also provides in Sec. 7 that no person shall himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture for sale or store sell or distribute any adulterated food. Act also provides for analysis by Public Analyst who has to be appointed by the Central Govt. or State Govt. There is also provision for appointment of Food Inspectors. It also prescribes the method as to how the good Inspector should take the sample for analysis and send it to the Public Analyst and also to the Court by various provisions. However it is important to note that Sec. 12 does not prevent a purchaser of any article of food other than a Food Inspector from having such article analysed by the Public Analyst on payment of such fees as may be prescribed and from receiving from the Public Analyst a report of his analysis. Section 16 of the Act provides for the punishment to a person whether by himself or by any other person on his behalf imports into India or manufactures for sale or stores sells or distributes any article of food which is adulterated and it is prescribed that punishment shall not be less than six months but which may extend to three years and with fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees. In the proviso it is provided in respect or certain excepted category like primary food that for any adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months and with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees. Section 20 of the Act speaks about the cognizance of the offence under this Act. It specifically provides that no prosecution for an offence under this Act not being an offence under Sec. 14 or Sec. 14a shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Govt. or a person authorised in this behalf by a general or special order. Proviso to Sec. 20 provides that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to Sec. 12 if he produces in the Court a copy of the Report of the Public Analyst along with complaint. It is also to be noted that Sec. 13 (5) of the Act provides for the use of certificate issued by the Public Analyst or by the Director of Central Food Laboratory as the case may be as evidence of the facts stated therein in any proceeding under this Act. It also provides that it can be so used in any proceedings under Sec. 272 to 276 of the IPC. It is important to note that Sec. 13 of the Act has undergone material changes by the Amending Act No. 34 of 1976 which has come in force with effect from 1-4-1976 and it has been renumbered and sub-secs. (2a) to (2e) are newly inserted by the said Amending Act which has now become the part of the Act. Sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 13 is also accordingly amended by the Amending Act No. 34 of 1976 wherein it provides that on the production of the certificate under Sec. 13 (2b) in any proceedings under this Act or under Secs. 272 to 27c IPC it shall not be necessary in such proceeding to produce any part of the sample of food taken for analysis. 272 to 27c IPC it shall not be necessary in such proceeding to produce any part of the sample of food taken for analysis. Lastly Sec. 25 (2) of the Act speaks about the saving of the Rules Regulations and Bye-laws relating to the prevention of adulteration of food made under such corresponding law and in force immediately before the commencement of this Act shall except where and so far as they are inconsistent with or repugnant to the provisions of this Act continue in force until altered amended or repealed by rules made under this Act. ( 8 ) AFTER considering the aforesaid provisions of the Act it will be new convenient to refer to Secs. 272 and 273 of I P. C. Section 272 is in the Chapter XIV of the IPC which provides for the offences affecting the public health safety convenience decency and morals. Sections 272 and 273 IPC read as under:"272 Whether adulterates any article of food or drink so as to make such article noxious as food or drink intending to sell such article as food or drink or knowing it to be likely that the same will be sold as food or drink shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. 273 Whoever sells or offers or exposes for sale 35 food or drink any article which has been rendered or has become noxious or is in a state unfit for food or drink knowing or having reason to believe that the same is noxious as food or drink shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. On perusal of Sec. 272 it is clear that it provides for the punishment to a person who adulterates any article of food or drink so as to make such article noxious as food or drink but that would become an offence provided he does so with the intention to sell articles as food or drink and the maximum sentence prescribed there for is imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. Similarly Sec. 273 IPC also makes it an offence against the person who sells or offers or exposes for sale as food or drink any article which has been rendered or has become noxious or in a state unfit for food or drink but it also provides that it would be an offence provided he does so knowingly or having reason to believe that the same is noxious and the punishment which is prescribed is imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both. It is to be noted that I. P. Code no where defines food or drink or article of food or drink or sale. 9 After perusing the aforesaid provisions of the Act as well as the IPC it is necessary to consider as to what meaning is attached to the words corresponding law occurring in Sec. 25 (1) of the Act. The words corresponding law were required to be considered by the Bench of Five Judges of the Supreme Court in the case of A. B. Abdulkadir and Others v. State of Kerala and Another AIR 1962 SC 922 . In the said case in para 11 the Supreme Court referred to its earlier judgment in the case of Custodian of Evacuee Property v. Abdul Shakoor AIR 1961 SC 1087 and observed as under:". . Where the Act repealed provides substantially for all matters contained in the Act effecting the repeal there is correspondence between the two Acts and the earlier Act would thus stand repealed: it is not necessary that there should be complete identity between the repealing Act and the Act repealed in every respect. . . . . . . . "similar view is taken in the case of Jagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh and Others AIR 1979 SC 381 where the question before the Supreme Court to be considered was whether the order passed under Sec. 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code can be considered as the order passed under the corresponding Section of the new Act. In the said case it is observed by the Supreme Court that to accept the submission would be to give the expression corresponding provision the meaning identical provision. Whenever an Act is repealed and re-enacted there are bound to be changes and modifications. In the said case it is observed by the Supreme Court that to accept the submission would be to give the expression corresponding provision the meaning identical provision. Whenever an Act is repealed and re-enacted there are bound to be changes and modifications. To say that a modified provision deal with the same subject matter in substantially the same matter as the original provision is not a corresponding provision would be to practically nullify the effect of repealing provision like Sec. 484 (2) (b) of the New Code. After referring to various dictionary meanings the Supreme Court held as under:". . . WE are therefore of the view that Sec. 125 of the new Code corresponds to Sec. 488 of the Code notwithstanding the fact that under the new Code a child who has attained majority and who does not suffer from any infirmity is not entitled to be maintained by the father. . . . . We therefore hold that the order for maintenance made in favour of the respondent must be deemed to be an order made under Sec. 125 of the new Code and that it does not automatically cease to be effective on the coming into force of the new Code. . . . "ultimately the Supreme Court allowed the application under Sec. 127 for cancelling the order made under Sec. 125 ( 9 ) NOW in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court the position of law in interpreting corresponding law is well settled that where the Act repealed provides substantially for all the matters contained in the Act effecting repeal there is correspondence between the two Acts and the earlier Act would stand repealed. That it is not necessary that there should be complete identity between repealing Act and the Act repealed in every respect. However there will be no correspondence and no repeal if the two Acts are substantially of differing scopes. ( 10 ) IN the present case applying the aforesaid principles can it be said that the provisions of Secs. 272 and 273 IPC are corresponding to the provisions of the Act. Answer would be definitely in the negative. As stated earlier Sec. 16 of the Act provides for stricter punishment than what is provided under the aforesaid provisions of the IPC. Apart from this main distinguishing feature there is also departure on the point of mens rea. 272 and 273 IPC are corresponding to the provisions of the Act. Answer would be definitely in the negative. As stated earlier Sec. 16 of the Act provides for stricter punishment than what is provided under the aforesaid provisions of the IPC. Apart from this main distinguishing feature there is also departure on the point of mens rea. So far as the offences under Secs. 272 and 273 IPC are concerned mens rea as required under the aforesaid provisions would be necessary to establish the commission of the offence under the provisions of the said Sections of the IPC. While Sec. 16 read with Sec. 7 of the Act make absolute liability and mens rea is dispensed with. It is clearly pointed out in the case of Pyarali K. Tejani v. Mahadeo Ramchandra Dange and Others AIR 1974 SC 228 . In the said case in para 4 it is observed as under:"4 A close up of the law relevant to this case will help focus attention on the criminal area into which the appellant is alleged to have entered. The central concept of the statute is prevention of adulteration of food in the sombre background of escalating manoeuvres by profiteers who seek to draw dividends from the damage to the health of the people caused by trade in adulteration. The social sternness and wide sweep of the statute can be realised from the thought that an insidious host that internally erodes the vitelity of a nutritionally deficient notion is. in one sense a greater menace than a visible army of aggression at our fromtiers and so the police power of the State must reach out to protect the unsespecting community with over powering laws against those whose activities are a serious hazard to public health. And so a minimum Jail term is fixed in the Act itself. "in para 11 of the said judgment the Supreme Court further observed that It is trite law that in food offences strict liability is the rule not merely under the Indian Act but all the world over. The principle has been explained in American Jurisprudence (2nd Vol. And so a minimum Jail term is fixed in the Act itself. "in para 11 of the said judgment the Supreme Court further observed that It is trite law that in food offences strict liability is the rule not merely under the Indian Act but all the world over. The principle has been explained in American Jurisprudence (2nd Vol. 35 P. 864) thus:" Intent as element of offence: The distribution of impure or adulterated food for consumption is an act perilous to human life and health hence a dangerous act and cannot be made innocent and harmless by the want of knowledge or by the good faith of the seller it is the act itself not the intent that determines the guilt and the actual harm to the public is the same in one case as in the other. thus the seller of food is under the duty of ascertaining at his peril whether the article of food conforms to the standard fixed by statute or ordinance unless such statutes or ordinances expressly or by implication make intent an element of the offence. "nothing more than the actus reus is needed where regulation of private activity in vulnerable area like public health is intended In the words of Lord Wright in Mcleod v. Buchanan 1940 (2) AER 179 at 186 (HL):"intention to commit a breach of statute need not he shown. The breach in fact over powers individual freedom to injure in special situations of strict liability. Section 7 casts an absolute obligation regardless of scienter bad faith and mens rea. If you have sold any article of food contrary to any of the sub-sections of sec. 7 you are guilty. There is no more argument about it. The law denies the right of a dealer to rob the health of a supari consumer. We may merely refer to similar plea overruled in the case reported in AIR 1971 SC 2746 Andhra Pradesh Grain and Seed Merchants Asson v. Union of India. "thus the main distinguishing features are higher punishment and dispensing with mens rea in the offence under the provisions of the Act. Further looking to the definitions of the words food adulterate and sale given in the Act they have very wide scope and embrace within its scope many items. While it is not 60 in the offence under Secs. 272 and 273 IPC. Further looking to the definitions of the words food adulterate and sale given in the Act they have very wide scope and embrace within its scope many items. While it is not 60 in the offence under Secs. 272 and 273 IPC. In view of the above discussion it is clear that the ingredients of the offence under Sec. 7 read with Sec. 16 of the Act are different from the ingredients for the offence under Secs. 272 and 273 IPC. In substance the offence described in the earlier Act. Under these circumstances it cannot be said that the provisions of Secs. 272 and 273 IPC is the law corresponding to the provisions of the Act. Hence the offences under Secs. 272 and 273 of the IPC cannot be held to have been expressly repealed by Sec. 25 (1) of the Act. ( 11 ) MR. Zaveri the learned Advocate for petitioners further submitted that if the principle of implied repeal is to be applied than also the test of inconsistency and repugnancy will be complied with and therefore in his submission it should be held that provisions of Secs. 272 and 273 IPC are impliedly repealed. In support of his submission he has relied on two authorities which lay down the test of repugnancy. The test of repugnancy was laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Zaverbhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay AIR 1954 SC 752 which has been subsequently approved by the Supreme Court in the case of T. Barai v. Henry Ab Hoe and Another AIR 1983 SC 150 . 13. It may be stated that similar question arose before the Full Bench of Seven Judges of this Court in the case of Babulal Vadilal v. Ambica Iron and Steel Works and Re-Rolling 1974 GLR 474 . In para 25 of the said judgment it is observed as under:". . . . IT is true that the Legislature can exercise the power of repeal by implication but it is an equally well-settled principle of law that there is a presumption against implied repeal. That presumption is based on the ground that the intention to repeal if any had existed would have been declared in express terms. . . . IT is true that the Legislature can exercise the power of repeal by implication but it is an equally well-settled principle of law that there is a presumption against implied repeal. That presumption is based on the ground that the intention to repeal if any had existed would have been declared in express terms. Of course this presumption would be rebutted if the provisions of the subsequent statute are so inconsistent with these of the prior statute that the two Cannot stand together or the two statutes together would lead to wholly absurd consequences or the entire subject matter were taken away by the subsequent statute. . . . . . In other words they must be absolutely repugnant or irreconciliable. Otherwise there can be no implied repeal as we have pointed out in the preceding section for the intent of the legislature to repeal the old enact ment is utterly lacking. " ( 12 ) IN the case of Zaverbhai Amaidas ( AIR 1954 SC 752 ). There was Bombay Act No. 36 of 1947 which was to provide for enhanced penalty for contravention of the orders under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 1946 and subsequently there was Central Act No. 52 of 1950 on the same subject matter. In para 11 of the said judgment it is observed as under:" 11. It is true as already pointed out that on a question under Art. 254 (1) whether an Act of Parliament prevails against a law of the State no question of repeal arises but that principle on which the rule of implied repeals rests namely that if the subject-matter of the later legislation is identical with that of the earlier so that they cannot both stand together than the earlier is repealed by the later enactment will be equally applicable to a question under Art. 254 (2) where the further legislation by Parliament in respect of same matter as that of the State law. We must accordingly hold that Sec. 2 of Bombay Act No. 36 of 1947 cannot prevail as against Sec. 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act (24 of 1946) as amended by Act No. 52 of 1950. We must accordingly hold that Sec. 2 of Bombay Act No. 36 of 1947 cannot prevail as against Sec. 7 of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act (24 of 1946) as amended by Act No. 52 of 1950. " ( 13 ) SIMILAR question arose with regard to the States amendment made to the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act by the West Bengal Government in the case of T. Barai v. Henry Ab Hoe and Another AIR 1983 SC 150 wherein subsequently the parliament amended the said Act by the Amendment Act of 1976. In the said case it is observed that the predominance of the State law may however be taken away if Parliament legislates under the proviso to Clause (2 ). The proviso to Art. 254 (2) empowers the Union Parliament to repeal or amend a repugnant State law even though it has become valid by virtue of the Presidents assent. Parliament may repeal or amend the repugnant State law either directly or by itself enacting a law repugnant to the State law with respect to the same matter. Even though the subsequent law made by Parliament does not expressly repeal the State law even then the State law will become void as soon as the subsequent law of Parliament creating repugnancy is made. A State law would be repugnant to the Union law when there is direct conflict between the two laws. Such repugnancy may also arise where both laws operate in the same field and the two cannot possibly stand together e. g. where both prescribe punishment for the same offence but the punishment differs in degree or kind or in the procedure prescribed. In all such cases the law made by Parliament shall prevail over the State law under Art. 254 (1) of the Constitution. Thus these two cases referred to by Mr. Zaveri are on the point with regard to interpretation as to whether law made by the Parliament would prevail over the State law which is repugnant to the law made by the Parliament. ( 14 ) SIMILAR question arose before the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Shiv Shanker AIR 1971 SC 815 wherein it was contended that the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act are repealed by the provisions of Essential Commodities Act or the Fruit Products Order made thereunder. ( 14 ) SIMILAR question arose before the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Shiv Shanker AIR 1971 SC 815 wherein it was contended that the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act are repealed by the provisions of Essential Commodities Act or the Fruit Products Order made thereunder. In the said case the Supreme Court observed that:" When two Acts are inconsistent or repugnant the later will be read as having impliedly repealed the earlier. As the legislature must be presumed in deference to the rule of law to intend to enact consistent and harmonious body of laws a subsequent legislation may not be too readily presumed to effectuate a repeal of existing statutory laws in the absence of express or at least clear and unambiguous indication to that effect. This is essential in the interest of certainty and consistency in the law which the citizens are enjoined and expected to obey. The legislature which may generally be presumed to know the existing law is not expected to intend to creats confusion by its omission to express its intent to repeal in clear terms. The Courts therefore as a rule loan against implying a repeal unless the two provisions are so plainly repugnant to each other that they cannot stand together and it is not possible on any reasonable hypothesis to give effect to both at the same time. The repeal must if not express flow from necessary-implication as the only intendment. The provisions must be wholly incompatible with each other so that the two provisions operating together would lead to absurd consequences which intention could not reasonably be imputed to the legislature. It is Dot when a consistent body of law cannot be maintained without abrogation of the proviso law that the plea of implied repeal should be sustained. To determine if a later statutory provision repeals by implication an earlier one it is accordingly necessary to closely scrutinise and consider the true meaning and effect both of the earlier and the later statute. Until this is done it cannot be satisfactorily ascertained if any fatal inconsistency exists between them. The meaning scope and effect of the two statutes as discovered on scrutiny determines the legislative intent as to whether the earlier law shall cease or shall only be supplemented. Until this is done it cannot be satisfactorily ascertained if any fatal inconsistency exists between them. The meaning scope and effect of the two statutes as discovered on scrutiny determines the legislative intent as to whether the earlier law shall cease or shall only be supplemented. If the objects of the two statutory provisions are different and the language of each statute is restricted to its own objects or subject then they are generally intended to run in parallel lines without meeting and there would be so real conflict though apparently it may appear to be so on the surface. Statutes in pari materia although in apparent conflict should also so far as reasonable possible be construed to be in harmony with each other and it is only when there is an irreconcilable conflict between the new provision and the prior statute relating to the same subject matter that the former being the later expression of the legislature may be held to prevail the prior law yielding to the extent of the conflict. The same rule of irreconcilable repugnancy controls implied repeal of a general by a special statute. The subsequent provision treating a phase of the same general subject matter in a more minute way may be intended to imply repeal pro tanto of the repugnant general provision with which it cannot reasonably co-exist. When there is no inconsistency between the general and the special the latter may well be construed as supplementary. " ( 15 ) THE provisions of both the Acts have been considered to some extent earlier in the judgment. Now considering the said provisions again in the light of the aforesaid judgments we have to consider as to whether they can stand together or not. It is true that Secs. 272 and 273 IPC also separate in the field of public health as the provisions of the Act. The test is as to whether they can stand together or not. At this juncture it is important to note that apart from the fact that there is no reference of the provisions of the Penal Code in Sec. 25 of the Act providing for the repeal still however it is necessary to scan certain provisions of the Act which would clearly give the indication that the provisions of the IPC namely Secs. 272 and 273 are also to work as the supplementary provisions. 272 and 273 are also to work as the supplementary provisions. Sections 13 (4) and (5) of the Act gives the clue on this point. Section 13 (5) of the Act also speaks about the using the certificate given by the Public Analyst is also the Director of Central Food Laboratory as evidence even in the proceedings under Secs. 272 to 276 of the IPC. It is interesting to note that Sec. 13 of the Act underwent drastic changes by the Act No. 34 of 1976 and sub-sec. (2b) of Sec. 13 imposes a duty on the Court for ascertaining that the mark and seal or fastening as provided in clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 11 are intact and the signature or thumb impression as the case may be is not tampered with and the Court has to despatch the part or as the case may be one of the parts of the sample under its own seal to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. By virtue of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 13 as amended by the Act No. 34 of 1976 it is also made applicable to the proceedings under Secs. 272 to 276 IPC meaning thereby that it shall not be necessary in any such proceedings to produce any part of the sample taken for analysis where the certificate of Director of Central Food Laboratory is produced. If at all the Legislature wanted to have the implied repeal they would not have made these provisions. This is clear indication of the intention of the Legislature to keep those provisions of the IPC as a supplementary one to the provisions of the Act. It may be that the same facts may invite the applicability of the offences under the provisions of the IPC as well as the Act. Still however at that time the provisions of Sec. 26 of the General Clauses would come in to play. Section 26 of the General Clauses Act lays down that where an act of omission constitute an offence of two or more enactments then the offenders shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of the enactments but shall not be punished twice for the same offence. In that view of the matter it cannot be said that the provisions of Secs. In that view of the matter it cannot be said that the provisions of Secs. 272 and 273 IPC and the provisions of the Act are so repugnant that they cannot stand together though in certain cases Sec. 26 of the General Clauses Act would take care. In that view of the matter the argument of implied repeal advanced by Mr. Zaveri cannot be accepted. ( 16 ) LOOKING to the facts of the present case as alleged in the complaint which is annexed to the application it is clear that there are sufficient allegations with regard to the alleged commission of the offences under Secs. 272 and 273 of the IPC. When that is so and when the learned Magistrate after taking cognizance of the offence and on perusal of the complaint and the record having been satisfied that there was prima facie case for issuing process against the present petitioners has issued the process it cannot be said that the learned Magistrate has exceeded the powers vested in him under the law. As the Magistrate is restricted to finding out whether there is a prima facie case or not for proceeding against the accused and he cannot enter into detailed discussion on merits or demerits of the case and the learned Magistrate has accordingly issued process against the petitioners-accused there is no case for interference by this Court under Sec. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. ( 17 ) BEFORE concluding the judgment I would like to deal with the additional argument advanced by Mr. Zaveri. He submits that Sec. 272 IPC refers to adulteration of article of food or drink so as to make such article noxious as food or drink and further it refers to the intention of the adulterating party. He further submits that Sec 173 IPC provides that whoever sells or offers or exposes for sale as food or drink any article which has been rendered or has become noxious or is in a state unfit for food or drink shall be punished with imprisonment. He submits that it speaks of selling such article with knowledge that the same has been noxious as food or drink. He submits that it speaks of selling such article with knowledge that the same has been noxious as food or drink. It may be stated that in this case allegations have been already made in para 3 of the complaint with regard to the manufacturing of the article Chums Up) containing insects which are likely to cause danger disease like cholera and that after bottling the same the petitioners have put the same in the market for sale. In my view these allegations are sufficient for attracting the provisions of Secs. 272 and 273 IPC. ( 18 ) MR. Zaveri in this connection has relied on the judgment in the case of Emperor v. Saling Ram 3 Criminal Law Journal page 208 wherein the case was under Sec. 273 IPC. In the said cases the accused did not sale any article as food or drink. He sold to a trader in grain a grain pit containing some 350 maunds of grain a portion of which was found to be in a state unfit for human consumption. In the said case it was held that as the sale was for the purpose of trade and not as food no offence under Sec. 273 was committed. Section 273 refers to sell or offer or expose for sale as food or drink any article which has been rendered or has become noxious. In the aforesaid case what was sold was food grain which could not have been used as food or drink without undergoing any process of cooking etc. In that view of the matter in my view the said judgment does not help Mr. Zaveri. Hence the additional argument advanced by Mr. Zaveri cannot be accepted. ( 19 ) IN result the Misc. Criminal Application fails and stands dismissed. Rule discharged. Interim relief stands vacated. ( 20 ) MR. Zaveri states that the petitioners want to approach the Supreme Court and therefore he requests that the operation of this judgment may be stayed for a period of six weeks from today. Accordingly the operation of this judgment is stayed for a period of six weeks from today. Petition dismissed. .