A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) SO a party to a devise of frustrating the provision of a welfare legislation. [in this case the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 ] Deprive the society of its legitimate share and take it nearly impossible to carry out public housing scheme envisaged under the relevant provision of law. Thereafter invoke the provisions of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India and pray protect us and permit us to retain our ill-gotten fruits. In such a situation not to exercise the powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India would amount to denial of any of the fundamental rights or any other rights of the petitioners? Further question arises why and for what purpose powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution are conferred upon the High Court and with what objects in view they are to be exercised. ( 2 ) THERE are 31 petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 7130 of 1985 while Special Civil Application No. 996 of 1986 is filed by one petitioner only who is also respondent No. 3 in Special Civil Application No. 7130 of 1985. Respondents Nos. 4 to 8 of special Civil Application No. 7130 of 1985 are the original owners of the land who along with other co-owners have purported to transfer the land to respondent No. 3 of Special Civil Application No. 7130 of 1985. By execution of a chain of documents petitioners have been put into possession of the land. They have put up construction on the land which is sought to be demolished by the Municipal Corporation. Hence the petitions challenging the action of demolition on the ground that the same is not in accordance with law and it is violative of petitioners fundamental rights under Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 996 of 1986 who is also respondent No. 3 in Special Civil Application No. 7130 of 1985 is hereinafter referred to as respondent No. 3. ( 3 ) IN view of the fact that common questions of law and fact arise in both these petitions at the request and with the consent of the parties both these matters have been heard together and they are being disposed of by a common judgment. ( 3 ) IN view of the fact that common questions of law and fact arise in both these petitions at the request and with the consent of the parties both these matters have been heard together and they are being disposed of by a common judgment. ( 4 ) THE facts in brief: respondent No. 3 had earlier formed Mukta Madhu Co-operative Housing Society. However it was not possible to get the society registered. Therefore the same has been registered as Mukta Madhu Owners Association as a non-trading Corporation under the provisions of the Bombay Non-Trading Corporations Act some time in September 1982 Petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 7130 of 1985 are members of this association. The land on which the construction stands is part of final Plot No. 2/4 of T. P. Scheme No. 24 of Maninagar. (formerly its Survey Number was 270 of Rajpur Hirpur ). The total area of the land admeasured about 25000 sq. yds. ( 5 ) IN respect of the land in question town panning scheme was finalised as far back as in the year 1969. The State Government issued notification under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act on 1/07/1973 for the purpose of acquiring the land for construction of houses for the Municipal employees Since the land acquisition proceedings were being delayed the owners of the land i. e. respondents Nos. 4 to 8 of Special Civil Application No. 7130 of 1985 and other co-owners who are 22 in number filed a petition being Special Civil Application No. 3510 of 1980. In that petition they prayed that the Government should be directed to pass award within reasonable time. The petition was allowed by judgment dated 26/12/1980 It was directed that the award should be passed within reasonable time. It may be noted that the Land Acquisition Act was amended by Act No 68 of 1984 which came into force on 24/09/1985 As per this amendment in respect of notification issued earlier if award is passed within two years from the date of coming into force of the amendment the notification should not lapse. In the instant case the award has been passed on 23/08/1986 ( 6 ) DURING the aforesaid period a curious development took place. Respondents Nos. 4 to 8 alongwith other co-owners of the land executed an agreement to sell the land in favour of respondent No. 3. In the instant case the award has been passed on 23/08/1986 ( 6 ) DURING the aforesaid period a curious development took place. Respondents Nos. 4 to 8 alongwith other co-owners of the land executed an agreement to sell the land in favour of respondent No. 3. The agreement is dated 15/09/1981 and it is at Annexure-C to the petition. Later on on 31/03/1982 the owners of the land appear to have executed a deed of partition. Pursuant to the petition deed entries in the revenue record appear to have been mutated. It may be noted that deed of partition or copy thereof and a copy of the entries in the revenue record have not been produced in the case. Thereafter the owners of the land respondent Nos. 4 to 8 and other co-owners and respondent No. 3 executed a document on 21/05/1982 on a stamp paper of Rs. 10. This document is also not on record. Thereafter the entire piece of land has been divided into sub-plots by respondent No. 3. After dividing the land into sub-plots respondent No. 3 executed documents in favour of different petitioners on 4/07/1982 A specimen of such document is produced at Annexure-D to the petition. ( 7 ) FROM the record of the case it appears that first of all respondent No. 3 the organiser started to put up construction on the land. He has constructed a huge bungalow and thereafter the petitioners who had become members of the association have put up their constructions. They have constructed their tenements. At the earlier stage when there was construction of two or three buildings only the Municipal Corporation issued notice to respondent No. 3 and to some of the owners of the land under Sec. 267 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act. It appears that the Municipal Corporation intimated to the police also. This has happened some time in the month of July 1983 In the month of August 1983 a criminal complaint against the organiser that is respondent No. 3 has also been filed. Respondent No. 3 appears to have been served with notice dated 13/17-9-1983 under Sec. 260 (1) of the B. P. M. C. Act. For one reason or another no effective steps to prevent the constriction or to remove the constructions were taken by the Municipal Corporation. Respondent No. 3 appears to have been served with notice dated 13/17-9-1983 under Sec. 260 (1) of the B. P. M. C. Act. For one reason or another no effective steps to prevent the constriction or to remove the constructions were taken by the Municipal Corporation. In September 1984 even bills for payment of different taxes have been issued by the Municipal Corporation. Thus when the construction activity was going on in full swing and when people could occupy the premises without any hindrance other persons also joined in the venture. They also put up construction on the land in question. ( 8 ) AS stated by respondent No. 3 in his petition he has been handed over possession of the land pursuant to the agreement to sell dated 15/09/1981 As stated in para 3 of his petition he has made payment to the owners to the tune of Rs. 10 21 0 The petitioners appear to have paid the price of the land to respondent No. 3 at the rate of Rs. 55 to Rs. 60 per sq. yd. This is what is stated in the petition and in the documents produced on record. There is no means to know how much actual consideration of the paper would have changed the hands. But if a common sense approach is made and stock realities of dealings in urban immovable properties are taken in to consideration it has got to be inferred that much more amount must have been passed as consideration than what is reflected on paper. ( 9 ) THEREAFTER in the month of August 1985 either on account of public uproar or on account of the fact that the Municipal Authorities might have felt flabbergasted by the volume of construction coming up on the land the Municipal Corporation issued notices under Sec. 260 (1) of the B. P. M. C. Act to the petitioners. Notices have been served in the month of August 1985 The petitioners submitted their reply and in the reply they prayed for time for submitting documents. Some of the petitioners filed a civil suit in the Court of City Civil Judge and prayed for injunction restraining the respondent. Municipal Commissioner from demolishing their property. Notices have been served in the month of August 1985 The petitioners submitted their reply and in the reply they prayed for time for submitting documents. Some of the petitioners filed a civil suit in the Court of City Civil Judge and prayed for injunction restraining the respondent. Municipal Commissioner from demolishing their property. In the civil suit the respondent Municipal Corporation appeared and filed its written statement on 25/09/1985 When the officers of the Municipal Corporation actually started demolition work in respect of the premises for which there may not be any injunction order from the Court some of the petitioners rushed to this Court and filed a petition in this High Court and obtained interim relief. That was a skeleton petition hurriedly drafted wherein sufficient particulars were not mentioned. Therefore the petitioners withdraw the same with permission to file a fresh petition on the same cause of action. Some of the petitioners who had filed civil suit in the City Civil Court withdrew the suit and joined themselves in the petition being Special Civil Application No. 7130 of 1985. Later on respondent No. 3 of this petition also filed petition being Special Civil Application No. 996 of 1986. ( 10 ) AT the initial stage this Court passed ad-interim order and restrained the Municipal Corporation from demolishing the buildings occupied by the petitioners. After hearing the parties on 14/02/1986 detailed order has been passed. As per this order the petitioners were required to hand over possession of the premises to the Commissioner appointed by the Court. Only some of the petitioners namely (1) Paulbhai Acharya; (2) Divyaprabhaben Babubhai Desai; (3) Sajansinh Lalsinh; (4) Mahendrasinh Sajansinh; and (5) Vinesh Chimanlal Shah were allowed to occupy the princesses as watchmen and on certain terms and conditions mentioned in the order. Later on three other petitioners have also been allowed to occupy the premises as watchmen on the same terms and conditions mentioned ill the order dated 14/02/1986 The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the respondent Municipal Corporation has not taken any decision after service of the notices under Sec. 260 (1) of the Act. Even if any decision is taken as required under the provisions of Sec. 260 (2) the same has not been communicated to the petitioners. It is submitted that before taking decision under sub-sec. Even if any decision is taken as required under the provisions of Sec. 260 (2) the same has not been communicated to the petitioners. It is submitted that before taking decision under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 250 of the Act the petitioners ought to have been afforded adequate opportunity of making representation. This has not been done in the instant case and therefore even if there is any decision taken by the Municipal Corporation the same is not in accordance with law. Therefore pursuant to such decision the property occupied by the petitioners cannot be demolished. It is also contended that the action of demolition is in violation of the principles of natural justice because the petitioners have a right to live as per the provisions of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India their right to live peacefully will be violated if the demolition is carried out. It is also submitted that crores of rupees thus may be an exaggeration have been spent in bringing up the construction. The construction in question has not come up over night. When it was being put up the officers of the Municipal Corporation set silent. Therefore it should be presumed that they have permitted the construction to come up and therefore now they should not be permitted to demolish the same. ( 11 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent Municipal Corporation has submitted that the provisions of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act have been complied with and the action of the respondent Municipal Corporation is in accordance with the provisions of the said Act and the Rules framed thereunder and the petitioners are not entitled to claim fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 21 of the Constitution. In his submission they have violated the provisions of law. It is submitted on behalf of the respondents that the action of the petitioners is nothing but theft of the social goods and an attempt to devour the property which actually belongs to the society. Inaction or alleged complacency on the part of the officers of the Municipal Corporation does not give any right to the petitioners to do something which is unlawful. The Corporation has a duty to enforce the provisions of the Act. Inaction or alleged complacency on the part of the officers of the Municipal Corporation does not give any right to the petitioners to do something which is unlawful. The Corporation has a duty to enforce the provisions of the Act. In short he has submitted that petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution cannot be entertained and the same is required to he rejected ( 12 ) IT is an undisputed position that the land in question is situated within the urban agglomeration area of Ahmedabad. The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 came into force on 17/02/1976 The contents of the document of banakhat or agreement to sell dated 15/09/1981 executed between the owners and respondent No. 3 clearly show that the parties to the document were aware of the applicability of the provisions of the Urban land (Ceiling and Regulations Act 1976 to the land in question The parties to the document were also aware of the fact that the land was earlier in green belt and it was released therefrom but in the development plan it was shown in reservation for public housing purposes. The contents of the document also show that the parties were aware with regard to the land acquisition proceedings pending in respect of the land. The document also mentions about the notifications under Secs. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act having been published. After the aforesaid agreement to sell was executed between the owners of the land and respondent No. 3 document dated 4/05/1982 has been executed betbeen respondent No. 4 and owners of the land. This document is not on record. After execution of document dated 4/05/1982 respondent No. 3 has executed a document called in favour of the petitioners. This document appears to have been executed separately in respect of each of the petitioners a specimen of which is produced at Annexure-D to the petition. The contents of this document also show that the parties were aware with regard to the applicability of the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 to the land. As stated hereinabove and as reflected in the banakhat respondent No. 3 has paid price at the rate of Rs. 55 per sq. yd. and he in turn as organiser of the Mukta Madhu Owners Association has sold the land to the respective petitioners at different rates ranging from Rs. As stated hereinabove and as reflected in the banakhat respondent No. 3 has paid price at the rate of Rs. 55 per sq. yd. and he in turn as organiser of the Mukta Madhu Owners Association has sold the land to the respective petitioners at different rates ranging from Rs. 60 to Rs. 70 per sq. yd. The owners of the land handed over possession to respondent No. 3 and respondent No. 3 has after subdividing the land into plots handed over possession to different petitioners. ( 13 ) IN the aforesaid background the rights and interests of the petitioners in the land are required to be examined. As per the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act no vacant land to which the provisions of the Act applied could be transferred except in accordance with the provisions of law. In the instant case the parties very well knew that the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations Act was applicable to the land. So much so that an attempt is made to show that the parties were purchasing the vacant land below the ceiling limit and therefore the provisions of the said Act were not applicable and hence they were not required to take permission while effecting the transfer. It is difficult to believe that the parties did not understand that the partition inter se alleged to have been affected by the owners of the land would not take the land out of the purview of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. If one looks at the banakhat or the agreement to sell which is on record and which has been executed between respondent No. 3 and the owners of the land it has been made abundantly clear that the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulated) Act were applicable to the land. Even otherwise whether it is mentioned in the document or not the parties are bound to know the law. Ignorance of law is no excuse. The petitioners do not belong to poor illiterate and ignorant sections of the society. Each of the petitioners appears to be knowing the ways of the world. They are hailing from relatively affluent section of the society. They could manage to invest lakhs of rupees for construction of their dwelling houses. Ignorance of law is no excuse. The petitioners do not belong to poor illiterate and ignorant sections of the society. Each of the petitioners appears to be knowing the ways of the world. They are hailing from relatively affluent section of the society. They could manage to invest lakhs of rupees for construction of their dwelling houses. Thus both from the point of view of legal presumption that everyone is presumed to know the law and also from the stand point of status and location of the petitioners in life and from the facts and circumstances of the case and particularly the contents of the documents referred to hereinabove it has got to be inferred that the petitioners knew about the applicability of the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act to the land in question. It also appears that even though they knew the law they have made an ingenious effort to circumvent the provisions of law. ( 14 ) THE parties also knew that as per the development plan the land was reserved for public housing purpose. It was within the knowledge of the parties that the land was in the process of being acquired for the purpose of construction of houses for the municipal employees. The contents of the documents referred to hereinabove clearly show that the parties knew that the notification under Sec. 4 and Sec. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act were issued. ( 15 ) IN above view of the matter the question arises when petitioners knew about the applicability of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act and about the fact that the land was reserved for public housing purposes and that it was in the process of being acquired and yet the petitioners ventured to enter into an unlawful transaction and thereafter put up construction on the land in unlawful manner are they entitled to the protection of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India ? Can they claim any fundamental right under Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution ? Can they claim that provisions of Art. 226 be invoked for protection of their rights or any other purpose ? Can they claim any fundamental right under Arts. 14 and 21 of the Constitution ? Can they claim that provisions of Art. 226 be invoked for protection of their rights or any other purpose ? ( 16 ) THE provisions of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India are meant for issuance of writ order or direction for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution and for any other purpose. The phrase any other purpose confers very wide jurisdiction on the High Court. Moreover the High Court being sentinel of the rights of the people both conferred under Chapter III of the Constitution as well as any other rights would exercise its power under Art. 228 of the Constitution to protect the citizens right against any unlawful and arbitrary action by the executive. However while keeping this in mind it cannot be forgotten that the basic idea for conferring powers under Art. 226 upon the High Court is to see that the rule of law is maintained in the society. Powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India are to be exercised so as to keep the executive authority in check. The executive authorities are to be corrected wherever they transgress the limits of their powers and encroach upon the rights of citizens Thus the basic idea and object is to ensure that the power conferred on executive is not exercised arbitrarily and or with mala fides. The Court is also duty bound to see that the power under Art. 226 is exercised in conformity with the object with which the power is conferred upon it Therefore the High Court would not exercise its power so as to cut at the very root of the rule of law. The powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India should be exercised with a view to see that the public administration runs in accordance with law. In other words object underselling the provisions of Art. 226 is to see that the people ultimately turn to law and not turn away from the law. Just as the executive is required to be kept in leash the people who claim the protection of the orders of the Court are also required to abide by law. Rule of law is not a one way traffic. Just as the executive is required to be kept in leash the people who claim the protection of the orders of the Court are also required to abide by law. Rule of law is not a one way traffic. Path of rule of law is very wide and open It enjoins duty upon each one walking on this path to abide by its discipline. This discipline obligates the citizens to respect the ideals and objects of the Constitution and to behave lawfully. Similarly executive should act in accordance with law and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. In this view of the matter those who take law in their hands either by creating a device or otherwise and openly commit unlawful acts and thereafter when they are visited with the consequences of their unlawful actions they cannot claim protection under Art. 226 of the Constitution so as to claim protection and preservation of their ill-gotten fruits. If this is done it would amount to exercising the powers for the purpose for which they are not conferred. Rather it would amount to exercise of powers for contrary purpose that is to encourage the people to do something illegal and then seek the protection of the Court. Petitioners have openly contravened the provisions of law. They have done something which is in flagrant violation of the provisions of law. This they have done not on account of compelling necessities of life but with a view to earn more property or amass further wealth such persons have no right to involve the provisions of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India and claim protection from the Court. Even in such cases if petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is entertained and powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution are exercised I am afraid we will be leading towards a society where anything and everything else may be there except the rule of law. Therefore to entertain such a petition and allow the prayer would amount to doing something which runs counter to the basic principles for which the provisions of Art. 226 of the Constitution are enacted. On this short ground alone the petitions are required to be rejected. ( 17 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners referred to a decision of this High Court in the case of Surat Municipal Corporation v. Rameshchandra Shantilal Parikh and Ors. On this short ground alone the petitions are required to be rejected. ( 17 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners referred to a decision of this High Court in the case of Surat Municipal Corporation v. Rameshchandra Shantilal Parikh and Ors. 1985 (2) GLR 679: AIR 1986 Gujarat 50. Relying on this decision it is submitted that even when people might have contravened some statutory provisions they should be extended protection by Court and they should not be thrown on streets. Reliance placed on aforesaid decision is misplaced. It was a case of hutment dwellers. In a suit filed by a construction-contractor and builder who wanted to develop his land the trial Court directed the Municipal Corporation to remove the hutment dwellers. It was in the context of the aforesaid fact-situation and particularly in view of the fact that the hutment dwellers were under compelling necessity to take shelter at some place the order passed by the trial Court was set aside. Be it noted that the hutment dwellers had not entered into the premises with a view to commit any offence. They entered the land in question so that they can exist (a fundamental right conferred under Art. 21 of the Constitution of India ). If one is compelled to violate certain statutory provisions so that he can exist then it should not be treated as a ground for exercising discretionary powers against him. Such violation of statutory provisions should not be visited with drastic consequences of removal from the place when they were taking shelter. Moreover in that case they were not even party to the suit. The principle laid down and the observations made in that case are not at all applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. In this case the petitioners have knowingly of on account of compelling necessities of life but will a view to earn and amass wealth have indulged in unlawful acts. Such was not the case in the case of the Surat Municipal Corporation (supra ). Hence the reliance placed on this decision is of no help to the petitioners. ( 18 ) IN the instant case if the powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution are exercised and protection is extended to the petitioners it would adversely affect the rights of the Municipal Corporation. Hence the reliance placed on this decision is of no help to the petitioners. ( 18 ) IN the instant case if the powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution are exercised and protection is extended to the petitioners it would adversely affect the rights of the Municipal Corporation. It is an admitted position that the land has been put under acquisition for the purpose of construction of houses for the Municipal employees. Formerly in the development plan it is mentioned that the land is reserved for public housing purpose. In view of the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 the owners of the land knew that the land above the ceiling limit will be declared as surplus and would ultimately vest in the Government. As per the scheme of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act the excess land so vesting in the Government is to be distributed to the weaker sections of the society. After publication of notification under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act any improvement or addition made on the land cannot be a matter of compensation. The owner of the land would not be entitled. to ask for compensation for the construction made on the land after publication of the notification under Sec. 4 of the Act. Therefore in view of the provisions of the Urban L3nd (Ceiling and Regulation) Act and in view of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act even if the owners of the land had spent any amount on the land and had put up construction they also would not have been able to claim compensation or would not have been able to say that they be allowed to retain the land with them. Thus that which could not have been claimed by the original owners cannot be given to the petitioners who derive the title if any from the original owners. ( 19 ) IN the case of Ambalal Purshottsm v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and Others AIR 1968 SC 1223 a question arose as to whether the tenants who were inducted in the land after the publication of notification under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act would be entitled to claim any compensation or not. ( 19 ) IN the case of Ambalal Purshottsm v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and Others AIR 1968 SC 1223 a question arose as to whether the tenants who were inducted in the land after the publication of notification under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act would be entitled to claim any compensation or not. It may be noted that in that case the owner of the land was permitted to put up construction after the notification under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was published. In the super-structure constructed by the owner tenants were inducted. These tenants prayed for compensation. The Supreme Court negatived their claim and held as follows:" The appellants were not on the lands at the date of the notification under Sec. 4 and being tenants of the structures they acquired prima facie no interest in the lands. Even assuming that they had acquired by virtue of their respective tenancies any interest in the lands their remedy was to approach the Land Acquisition authorities for claiming apportionment of compensation. "the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision makes it clear that anyone who enters on the land after the publication of notification under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act acquires or interest whatsoever on the land. If the owner himself could not have retained possession and could not have claimed any compensation for any structure put up on the land after the publication of notification under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act then it is inconceivable that someone who alleges to have derived title from the owner would acquire any such right or interest in the land or right to claim compensation for such construction. The position would become clear if the question is examined from a different angle. What would have been the rights and interest of the original owners had they put up construction on the land after the publication of the notification under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act ? The owners could not have claimed any right or interest in the super-structures that might have been put up by them. What would have been the rights and interest of the original owners had they put up construction on the land after the publication of the notification under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act ? The owners could not have claimed any right or interest in the super-structures that might have been put up by them. Similarly the owners or any other person who might have been inducted in the property as tenant could not have maintained a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India and claimed that since they have put up construction they may be allowed to retain the same otherwise they would suffer greater hardship. In this view of the matter if the petition is entertained and reliefs prayed for granted it would be very easy to set at naught any land acquisition proceedings undertaken for public purpose. Similarly the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 can easily be circumvented by resorting to this device. The Court cannot and would not exercise its powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India so that the law is circumvented and unlawful benefits are reaped by the people who have ventured to take the law in their hands. ( 20 ) IN above view of the matter both from the point of view of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act as well as from the point of view of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act the petitioners cannot claim any right whatsoever over the land or over the construction put up by them At the most the petitioners may be entitled to take away the super-structures with them as and when they are required to vacate the land. The petitioners are surely coming from relatively better off section of the society. They knew the ways of the world. They knew fully well the restrictions to which the land was put to. They knew about the limited ownership rights of the owners. In fact they have been made aware about the same in the documents which have been referred to hereinabove. The petitioners knew about the rights of the persons who were parting with the possession of the from. They knew fully well the restrictions to which the land was put to. They knew about the limited ownership rights of the owners. In fact they have been made aware about the same in the documents which have been referred to hereinabove. The petitioners knew about the rights of the persons who were parting with the possession of the from. In fact the models operand of the owners as well as that of the petitioners appears to be that ultimately the land which was to vest in the Government and which was to be utilised for public housing purposes should not be allowed to be used for that purpose. The owners who could not have sold the land parted with the possession under an agreement to sell. They could certainly like to receive the price of the land rather than the amount of compensation which in the fact of this case is likely to be far less than the amount which they fetch in the market. In the instant case it appears that initially the owners and respondent No. 3 appear to have created a device of forming one society called Mukta Madhu Co-operative Housing Society. That could not be registered and hence the creation of an association Mukta Madhu owners Association a non-trading Corporation. The owners probably very well knew that if they put up construction they would not be entitled to any compensation for the construction put up by them or they would not even be able to retain possession with them. In view of the settled legal position the owners could never have claimed protection of the Court. Therefore they adopted the device. The owners entered into an agreement or some transaction with respondent No. 3 who in turn collected money from the petitioners. Even after parting with the possession of the land by the owners. it is only the owners who will be entitled to compensation from the Govt. because the so-called kabja karor or banakhat does not create any interest in the land whatsoever in the petitioners. Owners and respondent No. 3 have probably taken advantage of the weakness of the petitioners. Some of the petitioners might have been duped but they are duped and defrauded because they wanted to purchase the land and become landlord at a very cheaper rate. Owners and respondent No. 3 have probably taken advantage of the weakness of the petitioners. Some of the petitioners might have been duped but they are duped and defrauded because they wanted to purchase the land and become landlord at a very cheaper rate. Had the petitioners restrained themselves and had not fallen prey to the instict of get rich quick they probably would not have been caught in the net thrown by the organiser and the owners of the land. . ( 21 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners are innocent and many of them have put in their lifes savings in purchasing the property and in putting up the construction. Therefore it is submitted that the petitioners should be protected. It is difficult to accept the submission. The position of the petitioner is akin to that of an offender under Sec. 411 of the Indian Penal Code. Under Sec. 411 of the Indian Penal Code a person who dishonestly receives or retains any stolen property knowing or having reason to believe the same to be stolen property is liable to be punished with imprisonment as prescribed under the section. Section 410 of the Indian Penal Code defines stolen property. It may not be possible to bring the land in question within the definition of stolen property. However the position is almost like that. The fact remains that after coming into force of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act and after publication of the notification under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act if any improvement is made on the land the owner would not be entitled to claim any compensation Moreover as per the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act the land would vest in the Government. Thus either way the land was to become the property of the society. By adopting the device something which was to go to the society is sought to be taken away by the owners and the petitioners. Thus in a way it is nothing hut theft of social goods. In view of these facts and circumstances the petitioners in both the petitions are not in a better position than that of the offenders under the provisions of Sec. 411 of the Indian Penal Code. Thus in a way it is nothing hut theft of social goods. In view of these facts and circumstances the petitioners in both the petitions are not in a better position than that of the offenders under the provisions of Sec. 411 of the Indian Penal Code. In this view of the matter if the petitioners are protected it would amount to protecting the accused persons guilty of offence punishable under Sec. 411 of the Indian Penal Code. Such a course cannot be adopted by the High Court while exercising powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 22 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation AIR 1986 SC 180 Relying on this decision it is submitted that if the petitioners are removed from the premises occupied by them and if the premises are demolished that would affect their right to life enshrined in Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. That case was instituted by and on behalf of the hawkers pavement dwellers and persons living in the slum areas of the city of Bombay. It was a case wherein people were compelled to carry on their business and live on pavements and on open space belonging to the Municipal Corporation or to the Government. They had no other place to live. In order to exist and in order to earn their livelihood they were required to stay in the city of Bombay. They did not enter upon the land with a view to commit any crime or knowing that they were circumventing the provisions of law. They did not enter into any transaction with a view to deprive the society at large from getting the surplus land which would have otherwise vested in the Government. They did not spend lacs of rupees on construction of super-structures. Moreover they did from hurriedly put up Construction with a view to claim that now that the construction has come up their possession should not be disturbed otherwise it would be a national waste. They did not directly or indirectly try to grab the land which was meant for public housing purposes. They could not even spend a few hundred rupees to protect themselves from the vageries of nature. They did not directly or indirectly try to grab the land which was meant for public housing purposes. They could not even spend a few hundred rupees to protect themselves from the vageries of nature. It was out of sheer compelling necessity created on account of socio-economic circumstances of the society that they happened to be on the pavements in slum or in other public places. Such persons have surely a right to claim that their right to live under Art. 21 of the Constitution be protected. But the persons like the petitioners who have as stated hereinabove knowingly tried to circumvent the provisions of law and have thereby amassed wealth for their own private gains cannot claim the protection of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India. Therefore reliance placed on the aforesaid decision is of no help to the petitioners. ( 23 ) ON account of the colonial hang-over or for one reason or another individual private property rights and the litigations pertaining to the same has dominated our legal system. The extent legal system has so far protected the individual private property rights some times even at the cost of the society. However when the social goods and the property of the society are being invaded openly it is certainly not open to the Courts to protect such invasion on the social goods and property of the society by private powerful interests. This is the mandate of the Constitution. The nation has pledged itself to establish an egalitarian society based on socialist seculars democratic principles. This is clear from the Preamble to the Constitution. The directive principles which are fundamental in the governance of the country. They are equally important while administering justice by the Courts. These principles enjoins duty upon the State (which also includes Judiciary) to strive for promotion of the welfare of the people for securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice social economic and political should inform all the institutions of the national life. It is also enjoined upon the State to see that the operation of the legal system promotes justice on the basis of equal opportunity to all. It is the duty of the State to see that inequalities of the income are minimised and inequality in status facilities and opportunities are eliminated. It is also enjoined upon the State to see that the operation of the legal system promotes justice on the basis of equal opportunity to all. It is the duty of the State to see that inequalities of the income are minimised and inequality in status facilities and opportunities are eliminated. It is enjoined upon the State to see that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of production to the common detriment. In view of these constitutional provisions it is obligatory upon the Courts to see that the society is also protected from the onslaughts of the private powerful interests. The aforesaid constitutional imperatives have got to be kept in mind by the Court while exercising powers under Art. 225 of the Constitution of India. In the case of Olga Tellis (supra) the Supreme Court has upto an extent protected the interests of weaker session of the society. It has not laid down any principle to protect the private powerful interests invading the society and enriching themselves at the cost of the society. ( 24 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decision of the Division Bench (coram: S. H. Sheth and G. T. Nanavati JJ.) of this High Court in the case of Parshottamdas Ramdas Patel v. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad and Another 22 GLR 137. In that decision it was inter alia held that the land which was the subject matter of land acquisition proceedings and which was included in the town panning scheme of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation was not vacant land within the meaning of Sec. 2 (9) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act and therefore the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act did not apply to the land in question. However it is conceded that appeal against the aforesaid judgment has been preferred before the Supreme Court and the same is admitted. It is also conceded that the Supreme Court has stayed the operation and implementation of the aforesaid judgment rendered by this High Court. In view of this admitted position the judgment cannot be taken into consideration. Hence no further discussion in regard to this judgment is necessary. It is also conceded that the Supreme Court has stayed the operation and implementation of the aforesaid judgment rendered by this High Court. In view of this admitted position the judgment cannot be taken into consideration. Hence no further discussion in regard to this judgment is necessary. ( 25 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decision of this High Court in the case of Rajnagar Bobbin Works v. The Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation 16 GLR 156. This is a decision with regard to the procedure to be adopted by the Municipal Commissioner after issuing notice under Sec. 260 (1) of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act. In the facts and circumstances of the case it appears that the Municipal Commissioner after issuing notice under S. c. 260 (1) of the said Act has taken into consideration the replies submitted by the petitioners. It cannot be said that the action of the respondent. Municipal Corporation is not in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. Even if it is held that there is some defect or flaw in following the procedure laid down under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act and the Rules framed thereunder no relief can be given to the petitioners. As observed hereinabove in the facts and circumstances of the case petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable so as to extend protection for preservation of ill-gotten fruits by the petitioners. Petitioners have no such right and no lawful purpose will be served by extending the protection to the petitioners. ( 26 ) BEFORE I part with the judgment I am constrained to observe that even though the act of the owners and organiser and that of the petitioners taken together would amount to theft of social goods this would never have been possible had the concerned officers of the Municipal Corporation and that of the Government remained a little more alert. There appears to be deliberate in action or complacency on the part of the concerned officers. Otherwise such construction could not have come up After such construction comes up and people occupy the permits it becomes difficult to evict them and put the land in the original position. There appears to be deliberate in action or complacency on the part of the concerned officers. Otherwise such construction could not have come up After such construction comes up and people occupy the permits it becomes difficult to evict them and put the land in the original position. A belief appears to have been formed in the mind of the people that once the construction comes up either in lawful or unlawful manner and interest of number of persons are created therein the Government or the Municipal Authorities would not be able to take any action. People also seam to think that at any rate the Courts will protect them. If such beliefs are fostered and allowed to perpetuate in the minds of the people it should hit at the very basis of the rule of law. Therefore It is in the Interest of clean administration and for the maintenance or equilibrium in the society in future that even if there be harsh consequences at some stage the authorities must take stern action. All concerned should be made to realise that they cannot take the law in their hands and commit theft of social goods. ( 27 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case and particularly with an idea to impress upon the petitioners that they cannot take law in their hands and then seek protection of the orders of the Court it was directed that they should vacate the premises and hand over the possession of the same to the Commissioner appointed by the Court. I am told that despite the strenuous effort made by the petitioners they have not been able to arrive at any amicable solution. It some pragmatic solution could have been found out and the hardships of the petitioners minimised I would have been happy. If the super-structure standing on the land is saved and not demolished it would save considerable amount of capital and labour invested therein. However it is for the Municipal Corporation and the concerned Government officers to take appropriate actions in accordance with law. In the facts and circumstances of the case it is expected of the Municipal Corporation to give minimum one months notice to the petitioners before taking any action of actual demolition of the premises. ( 28 ) IN the result the petitions are rejected. In the facts and circumstances of the case it is expected of the Municipal Corporation to give minimum one months notice to the petitioners before taking any action of actual demolition of the premises. ( 28 ) IN the result the petitions are rejected. Pursuant to the order dated February 14 1986 the petitioners were required to hand over the possession of the premises in question to the Commissioner appointed by this Court. Since the petitions are rejected and as observed above the Municipal Corporation also will in all probability give atleast one months notice before actual dentition it would be proper to hand over back the possession of the premises to the petitioners. Hence it is directed that the Court Commissioner shall hand over back the possession of the premises to the petitioners immediately. Rule discharged in each of the petitions. Interim relief granted earlier stands vacated. (REST of the Judgment is not material for the Reports.)RULE discharged. .