JUDGMENT M. P. Singh, J. 1. The present writ petition arises out of proceedings under section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U. P. Act XIII of 1972) (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. The petitioner is a tenant. The admitted facts are that the accommodation in dispute is a non residential building known as Minerva castle situate in Kulri, Mussoorie. The petitioner is running a hotel in the said premises. Labh Singh, who was the tenant, died in 1972 leaving behind his widow Smt. Jaswendra Singh and his three sons, including the present petitioner Mahendra Pal Singh. On 18-9-1982 an application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act for release of the accommodation was filed on the ground of personal need. 3. The tenant contested the said application on the ground that the need of the landlord is not bonafide. The landlord possessed other properties also and he was not going to settle down at Mussoorie. In fact he wanted to dispose of the property after evicting the petitioner. The application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act was not maintainable since the lease was for a fixed term. It was further stated that the application was not maintainable as all the heirs of Labh Singh were not impleaded as defendants in the case who are all tenants in common. 4. After considering the entire evidence on the record the learned Prescribed Authority allowed the application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act by his order dated 8-9-1983 after deciding all the points in favour of the landlord, including the question of maintainability of the application. Aggrieved against the order dated 8-9-1983 the tenant filed an appeal under section 22 of the Act before the learned District Judge who by his order dated 22-12-1983 allowed the same and remanded the case back to the Prescribed Authority to decide the same afresh. 5. Aggrieved against the said order dated 22-12-1983 the landlord filed a writ petition no. 4104 of 1984 Col. P. N. Bahuguna v. District Judge in this court which was decided by Hon'ble V. K. Khanna, J. on 12-2-1987. The writ petition of the landlord was allowed. 5. Aggrieved against the said order dated 22-12-1983 the landlord filed a writ petition no. 4104 of 1984 Col. P. N. Bahuguna v. District Judge in this court which was decided by Hon'ble V. K. Khanna, J. on 12-2-1987. The writ petition of the landlord was allowed. The order of the learned District Judge dated 22-12-1983 was quashed and a direction was given to the learned District Judge to decide the appeal himself within two months. Before this Court a controversy was raised about the effect of non impleadment of all the heirs of Labh Singh in the application under section 21 (I) (a) of the Act. This court while deciding the writ petition took a view that since "admittedly, the parties have led evidence on this point, the appellate court should have decided the question on the basis of the evidence on the record. It was also observed that in case the plea taken by the tenant is established, the Appellate court would be entitled to record a finding on that basis and necessary legal consequence would follow as a result of recording that finding." 6. After the order of this Court the case went back again to the learned District Judge, Dehradun who by his order dated 1-5-1987 has given an opportunity to the landlord-respondent to implead other legal heirs of the deceased Labh Singh, if the landlord so likes. The application for amendment, if any, could be moved within a period of 1C days from that date. It may be mentioned that this was not a final order passed by the learned District Judge. It was only a step in the progress of the appeal. The appeal is still pending before the learned District Judge. gainst this order the present writ petition has been filed in this Court on 21-5-1987. The writ petition has been admitted and further proceedings in the appeal had also been stayed. On 18-9-1987 a supplementary affidavit has been filed by the petitioner in this Court in which paragraph 4 makes a mention that the learned District Judge has allowed the application of the landlord impleading all the heirs of deceased Labh Singh by order dated 11-5-1987. On 18-9-1987 a supplementary affidavit has been filed by the petitioner in this Court in which paragraph 4 makes a mention that the learned District Judge has allowed the application of the landlord impleading all the heirs of deceased Labh Singh by order dated 11-5-1987. The exact order passed by the learned District Judge is being quoted below :- "By the order dated 1-5-1987 it was held by me that the legal heirs of the deceased tenant Labh Singh should be impleaded as parties and the respondent-landlord was given an opportunity to implead them. Through the present application the landlord wants to implead other heirs of the deceased Labh Singh as opposite parties. Application 27-A is allowed. Let the amendment be incorporated within three days and steps for service both by ordinary means and registered post be taken within a weak. Fix 3rd June for hearing. sd/ " 7. This order passed by the learned District Judge on 11-5-1987 had been concealed by the petitioner while filing the writ petition. The order dated 1-5-1987 have already been given effect to and all the heirs of Labh Singh have been brought on record. Had this fact been brought to the notice of the court at the time of admission of the writ petition, probably the writ petition might not have been even admitted. The petitioner has not come to this Court with clean hands and it was deliberate concealment of material fact. The writ petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. 8. Sri K. N. Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that after the death of Labh Singh, all his heirs became tenant in common and since some of them were not impleaded in the application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, the said application was not maintainable and should have been rejected. Section 34 of the Act provides :- " 34. Powers of various authorities and procedure to be followed by them : (1) The District Magistrate, the prescribed authority or any (appellate or revising authority) shall for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing (any appeal or revision) under this Act have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act no. V of 1908) when trying a suit, in respect of the matter namely :- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath ; (b) receiving evidence on affidavits ; (c) inspecting a building or its locality, or issuing commission for the examination of witnesses or documents or local investigation ; (d) requiring the discovery and prosecution of documents ; (e) awarding, subject to any rules made in that behalf, costs or special costs to any party or requiring security for costs from any party ; (f) recording a lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and making an order in accordance therewith ; (g) any other matter which may be prescribed. (2) The District Magistrate, the prescribed authority or (appellate or revising authority), while holding an inquiry or hearing (any appeal or revision) under this Act, shall be deemed to be a civil court within the meaning of sections 345 and 346 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and any proceeding before him or it to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (Act No. XVV of 1860) (3) Where any costs or other sum or money awarded under this Act by the District Magistrate or the prescribed authority or (the appellate or revisional authority) remains unpaid, he or it may issue a certificate of recovery in respect thereof in the prescribed form, and any person in whose favour such certificate is issued may apply to the Court of Small Causes having jurisdiction under the Provincial Small Cause Court Act, 1887 (Act No. IX of 1887) for recovery of the amount specified in the certificate. Such court shall thereupon execute the certificate or cause the same to be executed in the same manner and by the same procedure as if it were a decree for payment of money made by itself in a suit. (4) Where any party to any proceeding for the determination of standard rent of or for eviction from a building dies during the pendency of the proceeding, such proceeding may be continued after bringing on the record :- (a) in the case of the landlord or tenant, his heirs or legal representatives ; (b) in the case of unauthorised occupant, any person claiming under him found in occupation of the building. (5) Where any person has been evicted from a building in pursuance of any order of the District Magistrate or the prescribed authority or made on appeal under this Act, the District Magistrate or the prescribed authority, as the case may be, may after service or publication of a notice in that behalf of such persons and in such manner as may be prescribed, remove or caused to be removed or dispose of, in such manner as may be prescribed, any specific property remaining on such building. (6) Affidavits to be filed in any proceeding under this Act shall be made in the same manner and conform to the same requirements as affidavits filed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act no. V of 1908), and may be verified by any officer or other person appointed by the High Court under clause (b) or by an officer appointed by other court under clause (c) of section 139 of the said Code. (7) The District Magistrate, the prescribed authority or (the appellate or revisional authority) shall record reasons for every order made under this Act. (8) For the purposes of any proceedings under this Act and for purposes connected therewith the said authorities shall have such other powers and shall follow such procedure, principles or proof, rules of limitation and guiding principles as may be prescribed." 9. Rule 22 framed under the Act reads as under :- "22. Powers under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (section 34 (1) (g). Rule 22 framed under the Act reads as under :- "22. Powers under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (section 34 (1) (g). The District Magistrate, the prescribed authority or the appellate or revising authority shall, for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal or revision under the Act, shall have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect of the following manners, namely :- (a) the power to dismiss an application, appeal or revision for default and to restore it for sufficient cause; (b) the power to proceed exparte and to set aside, for sufficient cause, an order passed exparte ; (c) the power to award costs and special costs to any successful party against an unsuccessful party ; (d) the power to allow amendment of an application memorandum of appeal or revision ; (e) the power to consolidate two or more cases of eviction by the same landlord against different tenants ; f ) the power referred to in sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the authority concerned. " 10. A perusal of section 34 of the Act and rule 22 (d) of the rules makes it clear that the prescribed authority or the appellate authority have power to allow the amendment of an application or memorandum of appeal. According to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner the power of the amendment of the application lies with the prescribed authority and the Appellate Authority has only the power to amend the memorandum of appeal. This contention is misconceived. If it is accepted, then it lead to an anomalous position that the amendment of the application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act cannot be allowed by the Appellate Authority or at any subsequent stage and it will frustrate the purpose of section 34 and rule 22. Rue 22(f) provides that the power referred to section 151 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the authority concerned is also vested in the Prescribed Authority as well as Appellate Authority. Rue 22(f) provides that the power referred to section 151 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to make any order for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the authority concerned is also vested in the Prescribed Authority as well as Appellate Authority. The Prescribed Authority has been constituted as a quasi judicial body and has been entrusted with some of the functions of the court as defined under the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus I hold that the appellate authority has power to allow the amendment of the application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act by permitting the landlord to implead all the heirs of Labh Singh. 11. If on account of non impleadment of all the tenants in common some valuable right bad accrued in favour of the tenant, then the position might have been slightly difficult for the landlord. But in the present case it has been conceded by the learned counsel for the petitioner that second application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act is not barred. In view of this statement the argument loses all its force. In my opinion the court below has rightly permitted the landlord to move the amendment application and allowed the application for impleadment of all the co-tenants. Thus the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner which is extremely technical is not acceptable particularly under this equity jurisdiction. Substantial justice has been done between the parties. 12. In AIR 1983 SG 355, Bhagwan Swarup v. Mool Chand it has been held : "But the laws of procedure are devised for advancing justice and not impairing the same. Code of Procedure is designed to facilitate justice and further its ends ; not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties, not a thing designed to trip people up." Division Bench of this Court in the case of S. K. Das v. Prescribed Authority reported in 1980 ARC 269 while considering the power of the rent control authorities to grant prayer for restitution held that although no specific power for restitution are conferred but the same can be granted under section 151 Code of Civil Procedure. This view finds support from a Full Bench decision of this court reported in ILR 5 Allahabad 163 Har Singh v. Mangal Dubey, and AIR 1976 Allahabad page 102 Gangadhar v. Raghubar Dayal. 13. This view finds support from a Full Bench decision of this court reported in ILR 5 Allahabad 163 Har Singh v. Mangal Dubey, and AIR 1976 Allahabad page 102 Gangadhar v. Raghubar Dayal. 13. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has no force and is rejected. 14. The second contention made by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that there was no obligation on the part of the court to make a direction for impleadment of all the tenants in common in the application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. In support of this contention the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a case reported in AIR 1965 SC page 271 Kanakarathanammal v. V. S. Loganatha Mudaliar. In that case no application for amendment was made in the trial court or in the Appellate Court and the High Court passed an order directing the amendment. In such a situation the Supreme Court took the view that the amendment could not have been allowed. The facts in the present case are entirely different. Here an application was filed by the landlord which after giving full opportunity to the other side has been allowed by the Appellate Court. The provisions of Order 1 rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure may not be applicable as such but the principles are definitely applicable in the interest of justice. It provides that :- "The court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit be added." 15. Here in the present case the court has permitted the said addition of parties with a view to avoid multiplicity of the suit and justice be done between the parties. 16. The second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner has also no force and I reject the same. Here in the present case the court has permitted the said addition of parties with a view to avoid multiplicity of the suit and justice be done between the parties. 16. The second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner has also no force and I reject the same. The third submission by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Appellate Court has travelled beyond the scope of the remand order passed by this court. I have carefully looked into the order passed by Hon'ble V. K. Khanna, J. and also the impugned order. I do not find anything which can support the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The petitioner's only grievance is that the effect of the order of this court was that the Appellate Authority will have no power to permit the landlord to add the parties. His entire effort was that in case the court was convinced that all the heirs have not been impleaded as parties, then the necessary legal consequence to flow was that the application should have been rejected. Permitting impleadment was not itself a legal consequence. I do not find any such prohibition in the order of V. K. Khanna, J. I see no force in this submission and I accordingly reject it. 17. On a perusal of the entire facts I come to the conclusion that the impugned orders passed by the learned District Judge on 1-5-1987 and 11-5-1987 do not suffer from any errors apparent on the face of the record or any other legal infirmity. The said orders have been passed in the interest of justice to avoid multiplicity of suit. 18. The writ petition is dismissed but without any order as to costs. The stay order dated 21-5-1987 stands automatically vacated. Since it is a case of 1982, I direct the learned District Judge, Dehradun to dispose of the appeal within a period of two months from the date of presentation of the certified copy of this order before him. Petition dismissed.