JUDGMENT Palok Basn, J. 1. The present petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by 16 Firms engaged in the business of sale and purchase of paddy, rise, wheat, oil seeds and the like, within their mill premises situated in Sitarganj, district Nainital on the strength of various licences issued to them under different control orders passed under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. It is alleged that the sole respondent i.e. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Sitarganj, district Nainital (through its Chairman) hereinafter referred to as the Samiti, is illegally insisting that the petitioners should make their sale and purchase of the various agricultural produce in and from the Navin Mandi Samiti Sthal (i. e. new market yard) Sitarganj and not from any other place. Feeling aggrieved the petitioners have filed this writ petition. 2. Before the admission of the writ petition, notice was accepted by the counsel for the Samiti who has filed a counter-affidavit to which the petitioners have filed a rejoinder-affidavit. Counsel for both the sides have been heard at length at the admission stage itself and therefore this writ petition is being finally disposed of today. The Samiti has come into existence in pursuance of U. P. Act No. XXV known as the U. P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964. By the said legislation measures have been taken to regulate the markets in the State with a view to achieve the following among other objectives : 1. to reduce the multiple trade charges, levies and exactions charged at present from the producer sellers ; 2. to provide for the verification of accurate weights and scales and see that the producer seller is not denied his legitimate due ; 3. to establish market committees in which the agricultural producer will have his due representation ; 4.to ensure that the agricultural producer has his say in the utilisation of market funds for the improvement of the market as a whole ; 5. to provide amenities to the producer-seller in the market. 3. Consequently the State of U. P. issued a notification on 28-5-70 under sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Act, a true copy whereof has been filed as Annexure-1 to the petition, whereby " the entire area within Nyay Panchayat circles of Vikas Khand Khatima district Nainital viz. 1......... 2......... 3......... 4. Sitarganj, 5......... 6......... 7......... 8......... 9...... 3. Consequently the State of U. P. issued a notification on 28-5-70 under sub-section (1) of section 5 of the Act, a true copy whereof has been filed as Annexure-1 to the petition, whereby " the entire area within Nyay Panchayat circles of Vikas Khand Khatima district Nainital viz. 1......... 2......... 3......... 4. Sitarganj, 5......... 6......... 7......... 8......... 9...... was sought to be declared as " Sitarganj market area. " (other names omitted by us) 4. By another notification dated 6-1-72 (Annexure-3 to this writ petition) the State Government declared that Sitarganj market area shall comprise of the following local bodies and Nyaya Panchayat circles : 1. The entire locality of......Khatima, Nainital. 2. The entire locality of......Tanakpur, Nainital. 3. The entire area within 9 Nyaya Panchayat circles of Vikas Khand Khatima district Nainital viz. 1...... 2...... 3...... 4. Sitarganj 5...... 6...... 7...... 8...... 9...... The petitioners have filed a notification dated 14-10-1971 (Annexure-4 to this petition) which shows that the State Government had constituted a local-body known as " town area Sitarganj " comprising of the village Sitarganj and Rampur, which notification has been issued under Clause-A of sub section (1) of section 3 of U. P. Town Areas Act 1914. The argument now advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that whereas a town area has been constituted on 14-10-1971 the notifications under section 5 and/or 7 of the Act should refer only to "town area Sitarganj" and not "Nyaya Panchayat Sitarganj" because Nyaya Panchayat Sitarganj ceased to exit. The petitioner have filed a copy of another notification dated 6-8-86 whereby "town area Sitarganj" has been constituted as a "Municipal area Sitarganj" within the meaning of U. P. Municipalities Act 1916. It is argued that since the notification dated 6-1-72 issued under the Act has been published after the "town area Sitarganj" had come into being, the said notification as also subsequent notifications should be declared void and inoperative. 5. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to the notification issued u/Sec. 7 of the Act (Annexure-10 to this petition) whereby "Sitarganj principal market yard" was constituted which covered : (a) the entire locality within the limits of Gaon Sabha Sitarganj, (b) the entire locality within the limits of Gaon Sabha Rampur. 5. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner has also referred to the notification issued u/Sec. 7 of the Act (Annexure-10 to this petition) whereby "Sitarganj principal market yard" was constituted which covered : (a) the entire locality within the limits of Gaon Sabha Sitarganj, (b) the entire locality within the limits of Gaon Sabha Rampur. Needless to say, the notification issued from time to time declaring market yard will depend only upon the initial notification issued u/Sec. 5 of the Act declaring certain area as market area. 6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties we are of the view that there is no force in the aforesaid contention. Several petitioners have joined in this petition who are carrying on their respective business in the market area Sitarganj over since the year 1971. More than 15 good years have elapsed since then. The notification (Annexure 3) itself recites "and whereas all objections, suggestions received by the Director of Agriculture within a specified time in regard to above intention have been duly considered by the State Government." Thus, a combined reading of the annexures referred to above indicates that the "area" within the limits of Nyaya Panchayat Sitarganj, first transformed itself into the area constituting the Town area Sitarganj and then finally transferring into Municipal area Sitarganj. There is no question thus of any citizen being deprived of the information as to what area was being sought to be included for the purposes of declaring a market area within the meaning of the Act. We do not see any reason as to why a little difference in the nomenclature alone will render the entire scheme of the Act in-operative particularly when the actual area indicated through the notification remains the same whether it is called Nyaya Panchayat Sitarganj or town area Sitarganj or Municipality Sitarganj. Therefore, we do not find any force in the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that such a notification affects the real local area and not nomenclature alone. In this connection there is another aspect which merits mention. The department dealing with the Act and proceedings thereunder is the Ministry of Agriculture while the matters concerning town area, municipalities etc. are dealt with by another Ministry i. e. the Ministry of Local-Self Government. In this connection there is another aspect which merits mention. The department dealing with the Act and proceedings thereunder is the Ministry of Agriculture while the matters concerning town area, municipalities etc. are dealt with by another Ministry i. e. the Ministry of Local-Self Government. Again, the close proximity between the notifications i. e. one u/Sec. 5 of the Act (6-1-72) and the other under Section 3 of the Town Areas Act (14-10-1971) indicates that proceedings in one department was not known to the other department as those proceedings in the two departments were wholly unconnected with each other. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioners then urged that proper publication as required by the provisions of the Act was not done and therefore the petitioners could not come to know about the establishment of the market area and consequently of the market yard. Learned counsel for the Samiti has referred to the counter affidavit in which it has been averred in detail that all requirements envisaged by law were fulfilled and it is only thereafter that the impugned notifications were published. The learned counsel has further said that many acts have been done by the Samiti in the 15 years since the Samiti has been constituted and commenced working. It was further pointed out that several writ petitions had been tiled by the local traders in this Court which had been dismissed nearly a decade ago. Our attention has been drawn to the petitioners pleading in para 34. It will be useful to quote the relevant portion : " The petitioners had been paying the market fee under protest and under coercion and in the threat of colourable exercise of executive powers of Mandi Samiti, under mistake of law since January 1972, which mistake for the first time came to the knowledge of the petitioners on 11th September 87. The petitioners reserved their right to seek the refund of the entire market fee collected by the Mandi Samiti, Sitarganj right from 1972 till this date alongwith 18% interest thereon till the entire payment is made to the petitioners by means of a separate writ petition. " 8. It is rightly argued that all the petitioners have full knowledge of the Samiti's creation and have accepted its authority for all these years and thus they are estopped from raising controversy about its legitimate birth. " 8. It is rightly argued that all the petitioners have full knowledge of the Samiti's creation and have accepted its authority for all these years and thus they are estopped from raising controversy about its legitimate birth. We uphold this argument of the respondents' counsel, In this connection we may mention that the learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Baldeo Singh v. State of Haryana, 1987 (2) SCC 510 ; State of Orissa v. Sridhar, 1985 (3) SCC 697 and Union of India v. Cynamide, AIR 1987 SC 1802 . We have perused them and are satisfied that none of those authorities apply to the facts of the present case though the propositions laid down in those decisions do not admit of any controversy whatsoever. 9. It has been urged on behalf of the petitioners that since market fee is being levied and charged by the Samiti which is being paid by the petitioners, therefore, their petition is maintainable and they are entitled to the reliefs claimed. We find no merit in this argument either. As stated, this cuts cross the argument raised above that the petitioners have no knowledge of the notification and declaration of market area and market yard. The case reported in 1986 UP LB EC 767 was cited at the Bar but the facts of the said case have no relevance to the present facts. 10. We would like to emphasise that the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam is a welfare legislation with the primary objective of helping the farmers so that they are not exploited in any manner by those who deal in the agricultural produce. Once it has been accepted that market fee is being levied by the Samiti and paid by those who stand governed by the provisions of the Act, hairsplitting arguments about those certifications, accepted by all sections of society without any reservation, must not be encouraged. WE feel that by the Act many issues which were despised as economic exploitation of the rural masses have been and are being settled while by this writ petition those issues are being attempted to be raised all over again, which we will not permit. No other point has been argued before us. In view of what has been stated, we find no merit in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed. No other point has been argued before us. In view of what has been stated, we find no merit in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed. We, however, pass no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.