JUDGMENT N. N. Mithal, J. 1. The petitioners seek a writ of certiorari for quashing the judgment and order dated 12-8-1987 passed by the Addl. District Judge, Gyanpur confirming the decision of the Munsif dated 28-7-87 whereby an injunction sought by them has been refused. Since the parties have already exchanged counter and rejoinder affidavits a joint request was made that the writ petition itself may be disposed of. The learned counsel were, therefore, heard on merits of the writ petition also. 2. The petitioners are Harijan residents of the village to whom some building plots carved out of survey plot No. 99 had been allotted for raising their houses and admittedly they are in possession thereof. In plot No. 99 there exists an old masonary well and the petitioners claim a right to draw water from it for drinking purposes. Since opposite parties Nos. 3 to 5 wanted to instal a diesel pump for drawing water for irrigating their fields asserting their ownership on the well, the petitioners had to rush to the court for seeking a restraint order. Both the courts below have found against the petitioners holding that they do not have prima facie title to the well in question and that opposite parties 3 to 5 has been irrigating their fields from their well from before the abolition of Zamindari. While petitioners claimed that it was their ancestors who had constructed the well in question, the opposite parties nos. 3 to 5 claimed that their forefathers had done so. 3. Initially an effort was made to raise the question as to who had constructed the well but later on the plea was abandoned for the purposes of this petition. Therefore, without entering into the aforesaid controversy I feel that the matter can be decided on a legal plane. Before the date of vesting, plot No. 99 was within the estate of opposite party Nos. 3 to 5. Therefore, without entering into the aforesaid controversy I feel that the matter can be decided on a legal plane. Before the date of vesting, plot No. 99 was within the estate of opposite party Nos. 3 to 5. A notification under section 4 headed the advent of UP ZA and LR Act, 1951 with effect from 1-7-1952 as a result of which all the rights of intermediaries in certain properties were divested and instead got vested in the State of U. P. in view of section 6 thereof and the consequences that follow include the following : (a) All rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries :- (i) In every estate in such area including land (cultivable or barren), grove-land, forests whether within or outside village boundaries, trees (other than trees in village abadi, holding or grove), fisheries, tanks, ponds, water-channels, ferries, pathways, abadi sites, hats, bazars and melas (other than hats, bazars and melas held upon land to which clauses (a) to (c) of sub-section (1) of section 18 apply) and'............... 4. It will be noticed that wells are conspicuous by their absence from various properties enumerated therein as regards which rights of the intermediaries have been extinguished. Section 9 of the Act on the other hand is in the nature of exception and it only saves the rights of intermediaries, tenants or other persons in respect of the various properties mentioned therein. While section 6 of the Act divests that intermediaries of their rights, section 9 saves certain rights and the two must therefore be read together to determine the extent to which rights in wells have been extinguished or saved by the Act. While section 6 of the Act divests that intermediaries of their rights, section 9 saves certain rights and the two must therefore be read together to determine the extent to which rights in wells have been extinguished or saved by the Act. IT is, relevant, therefore to have a look at section 9 also which is in these terms : "All wells, trees in abadi, and all buildings situate within the limits of an estate belonging to or held by a intermediary, tenant or other person, whether residing in the village or not, shall continue to belong to or be held by such intermediary, tenant or person, as the case may be, and the site of the wells or the buildings with the area appurtenant thereto shall be deemed to be settled with him by the State Govt., on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed." On a plain reading of the section it appears to me that all wells irrespective of the fact whether these are in abadi or outside it shall be deemed to have been settled with the intermediary, tenant or other person to whom it belonged or by whom it was held on the date of vesting along with area appurtenant thereto. 5. According to the petitioners, however, the section applies to wells situate in abadi only and has no application to wells that lie beyond the abadi area, lie wants the court to read this section as "all wells and trees in abadi" while the actual punctuation used in the section is all wells, trees in abadi and all buildings.........It is difficult to agree to petitioners submission. The words 'in abadi' only qualify trees and the buildings have been dealt with in this section differently. While it speaks of all wells, the scope for 'trees' is limited to only those which are situate in the abadi. Again the scope as regards 'building' is enlarged so as to apply to "all buildings situate within the limits of an 'estate' ". The wells and buildings on the one hand and the trees on the other have been dealt with quite a distinct and different manner. Placing of a coma between the words 'all wells' and 'trees' in abadi is disjunctive which becomes all the more pronounced when the word 'and' is used after these words while referring to buildings. The wells and buildings on the one hand and the trees on the other have been dealt with quite a distinct and different manner. Placing of a coma between the words 'all wells' and 'trees' in abadi is disjunctive which becomes all the more pronounced when the word 'and' is used after these words while referring to buildings. Thus it is not possible to read the section in the manner suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 6. The matter can be looked into from another angle also. It is significant to note that originally in section 6 (a) between the words 'fisheries and tank' the words 'wells' (other than private wells in village abadi), holding or grove existed. Similarly in section 9 for the existing words 'all wells' the words 'all private wells in holding, grove or abadi' had been used. These two provisions were deleted by section 5 of U. P. Act No. XVI of 1953 and made effective retrospectively from 1st July, 1952 when UP ZA and LR Act came into force. It was provided that it will be deemed that the amended provisions had always existed in the Act. The change in the phraseology of the two sections is clearly indicative of the legislative intent that the distinction between the private wells and other wells was intended to be removed. Apart from this initially the intention of the legislature was to extinguish the rights in respect of wells other than private wells but later on the provision was deleted and the wells were left intact whether they be private or otherwise. Thus it is obvious from the legislative amendment that the intention of the legislature was to settle all wells be they in abadi or outside it with the owner thereof. The view that I am inclined to take is further fortified by the fact that now we do not find any mention of well in section 6 and rights in that regard have neither been divested or extinguished nor vested in State. Rights in wells have also not been vested in Gaon Sabha or local authority under section 117 of the Act although in forests, trees, fisheries etc. such rights have been conferred. Rights in wells have also not been vested in Gaon Sabha or local authority under section 117 of the Act although in forests, trees, fisheries etc. such rights have been conferred. Thus a comparison of these provisions leads us to the conclusion that the owners of all wells have neither been divested of their rights nor any such right came to be vested in the State. So far as wells are concerned, original proprietors continued to hold the same as owner under section 9 of the Act. In this view of the matter it is difficult to accept the petitioners' contention that the courts below have erred in holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish any prima facie case. 7. A faint effort was made to urge that the petitioners' rights are saved under section 7 (aa) since easementary and similar rights continued to vest in them. These rights have been protected for more beneficial enjoyment of the land but this can be only in form of a bhumidhari, sirdari or adhivasi or asami of the land. Since the petitioners do sot claim to fall in either of these categories they cannot take benefit of these provisions. Besides this the section applies only in respect of the land and makes no reference to the wells. Thus it will not be possible for the petitioners to seek any aid from these provisions. 8. However, I may make it clear that any observations made by me in the body of the order have been made only for considering the prima facie nature of the claim set up by the petitioners and will not be taken as final expression of opinion by this court on the matter in issue before the Court. The court will be free to decide the matter in accordance with law on the evidence that is adduced before it at the trial. In view of the above discussion I find no merit in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case costs shall be borne by the parties themselves. Petition dismissed.