JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS appeal under Section 30 of the Workmens Compensation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has been filed by appellant/management of the Straw Products Ltd. , Chhola Road, Bhopal challenging the order of the Workmens Compensation Commissioner, Bhopal (hereinafter referred to as the Commissioner) passed on July 18, 1980 whereby Mohd. Akhtar Respondent No. 1 has been awarded a sum of Rs. 20,160 towards compensation. The short facts leading to this appeal are as under : Respondent No. 1, Mohd. Akhtar presented an application before the Commissioner for award of compensation on account of the injuries sustained by him in an accident during the course of his employment. In short, his case was that, Contractor M/s. Praveen Kumar engaged him as a painter on daily wages @ 25/- per day for doing some painting job on the chimney of the appellant company. For performing the job assigned to him, Mohd. Akhtar was required to work at an altitude of about 130 ft. Therefore, the appellant Company provided him a rope-ladder, a wooden platform and crane for doing the job of painting at the top of Chimney. It is alleged that the rope-ladder was worn-out and the Respondent No. 1. Mohd Akhtar brought this to the notice of the appellant Company who refused to change the same. Mohd. Akhtar was ultimately required to carry on his work with the help of worn-out rope-ladder among other articles. ( 2. ) ON the fateful day i. e. January 7, 1975, at about 2. 00 p. m. while Mohd. Akhtar and other workers were doing their job, the worn-out rope-ladder gave way and Mohd. Akhtar fell down from a considerable altitude and sustained multiple injuries on his person. His head, teeth, thigh and foot were badly injured. He was immediately hospitalised in unconscious condition. He remained in the hospital as an indoor patient for more than 1 month. The alleged accident rendered him loss of four frontal teeth, facial disfiguration, and fracture in pelvis resulting in shortening of left leg. These injuries permanently disabled Mohd. Akhtar, Respondent No. 1. At the time of the alleged accident Mohd. Akhtar was just over 15 years of age; therefore, he claimed compensation. ( 3. ) M/s. Straw Products Limited, the appellant Company while denying the claim of Mohd. Akhtar submitted that he was not under the employment of M/s. Praveen Kumar. These injuries permanently disabled Mohd. Akhtar, Respondent No. 1. At the time of the alleged accident Mohd. Akhtar was just over 15 years of age; therefore, he claimed compensation. ( 3. ) M/s. Straw Products Limited, the appellant Company while denying the claim of Mohd. Akhtar submitted that he was not under the employment of M/s. Praveen Kumar. However, it is submitted that, the wooden platform and rope-ladder etc. , were provided by way of convenience and not as a matter of contract, and that there was no privity of the Contract between Mohd. Akhtar and M/s, Straw Products Ltd. The other averments also have been denied. Similarly M/s. Praveen Kumar has also denied the claim of Mohd Akhtar. ( 4. ) THE Commissioner, however decided the case in favour of Mohd. Akhtar holding that Mohd. Akhtar was employed by M/s. Praveen Kumar and he was a workman within the meaning of Workmens Compensation Act. It was also held by the Commissioner that Mohd. Akhtar sustained injuries during the course of his employment, and as such directed the appellant company to pay an amount of Rs. 20,160/to Mohd. Akhtar according to the Schedule IV of the Act. ( 5. ) SHRI Prabhakar Rusia, learned counsel appearing for the appellant company strenuouly argued that on January 7, 1975, i. e. the date of the alleged incident, the definition of "workman" as laid down under Section 2 (1) (n) of the Act did not include Respondent No. 1, Mohd. Akhtar as he was earning Rs. 25/- per day i. e. Rs 750/- per month which was more than Rs. 500/ per month; whereas the definition of "workman" under Section 2 (1) (n) of the Act reads as under : "a person employed on monthly wages not exceeding Rs. 500/-per month". Therefore the definition did not include Mohd. Akhtar as a workman, and as such the Commissioner Workmens Compensation had no jurisdiction to entertain the application and to make the impugned award against the appellant. ( 6. ) NO doubt, when the accident occurred, i. e. on January 7, 1975, according to the existing definition or workman the monthly wages should not exceed Rs. 500. But the use of the words "monthly wages" with respect to which upper limit is prescribed, has to be carefully understood to make a workman eligible for compensation. ( 6. ) NO doubt, when the accident occurred, i. e. on January 7, 1975, according to the existing definition or workman the monthly wages should not exceed Rs. 500. But the use of the words "monthly wages" with respect to which upper limit is prescribed, has to be carefully understood to make a workman eligible for compensation. The purpose of fixing a limit to monthly wages is merely to raise the limit of the means of the workman and it does not make any difference whether the workman is paid daily, weekly monthly or even yearly. Therefore, while ascertaining as to whether the claim for Workmans Compensation comes within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner, one has to see whether the emoluments of a workman earned in a month exceed the limit, whatever may be the mode of payment. ( 7. ) IN the instant case, no doubt, earning of Rs. 25/- per day has been stated by the workman himself on the simple calculation it comes to Rs. 750/-per month hitting the jurisdiction of the Commissioner. But the fact, whether actually total monthly payment exceeding Rs. 500/p. m. has been made to the Respondent No. 1 or not has not been proved by M/s. Straw Products Ltd. , Bhopal. Since the plea that Respondent No. 1 was getting monthly wages exceeding Rs 500a has been raised by the appellant company, it is for them to prove this fact by producing payment of wages registers so as to arrive at the decision that Mohd. Akhtar was getting monthly wages exceeding Rs. 500. ( 8. ) THE words used in Section 2 (1) (n) of the Act "monthly wages not exceeding Rs 500" has to be construed in the light of 30 days wages which should not exceed the average of Rs. 500 p. m. Therefore, the appellant company having failed to place any material on record to this effect, the argument advanced by Shri Rusia has no substance being without foundation. It is next contended by Shri Rusia that the word "compensation" has been defined under Section 2 (1) (c) of the Act and "partial disablement" has been defined under Section 2 (1 ) (g) of the Act. It is next contended by Shri Rusia that the word "compensation" has been defined under Section 2 (1) (c) of the Act and "partial disablement" has been defined under Section 2 (1 ) (g) of the Act. partial disablement means where the disablement is, of a temporary nature such disablement if reduces the earning capacity of a workman in any employment, in which he was engaged at the time of an accident resulting in the disablement. Therefore, Shri Rusia made much stress that reduction of earning of Mohd. Akhtar has neither been pleaded in the application nor claimed by adducing evidence by him. ( 9. ) A perusal of the record amply demonstrates that workman Mohd. Akhtar has claimed his compensation on the basis of reduction of earning capacity, as he has stated that on account of alleged accident one of the legs shortened and as such his case squarely comes within the purview of Section 2 (1) (c) read with Section 2 (1) (g) of the Act. No doubt, the record demonstrates that there is enough evidence to arrive at the finding that on account of the alleged accident the capacity of Mohd. Akhtar to earn wages has been reduced. All the same, in absence of any other evidence, the Commissioner, after visualising the situation and looking to the circumstances of the case, particularly that of the workmans disablement, awarded the compensation on the basis of the degree of disablement which is supported by medical evidence etc. As, such, the findings arrived at by the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation regarding Mohd. Akhtars disablement cannot be said to be perverse in any manner and, therefore, the submission of Shri Rusia has no force in this regard. ( 10. ) SECTION 4 (1) (c) (ii) of the Act postulates that the amount of compensation, in the case of an injury not specified in part II of schedule 1, shall be such percentage of the compensation payable in the case of permanent total disablement, as is proportionate to the loss of earning capacity (as assessed by the qualified Medical Practitioner) permanently caused by the injury. The learned Workmens Compensation Commissioner, while keeping in view the above proposition, has awarded the compensation in favour of the Respondent No. 1, which is in conformity with the above provisions. ( 11. ) SHRI Rusia then contended that Mohd. The learned Workmens Compensation Commissioner, while keeping in view the above proposition, has awarded the compensation in favour of the Respondent No. 1, which is in conformity with the above provisions. ( 11. ) SHRI Rusia then contended that Mohd. Akhtar was employed as a painter and he being a casual labourer does not come within the meaning of "workman" as defined in Clause (viii) of. Schedule 11 of the Act. In this connection, while ascertaining as to whether a particular labourer comes within the definition of "workman", one has to consider the provisions of Section 2 (1) (n) read with Schedule II of the Act. The words used in Clause (viii), Schedule II of the Act are comprehensive and the word "repair" includes renewal of paint of a building and as such a painter will be a "workman". In Nadirsha Harmnsji Sidhwa v. Krishnabai Bala and Anr. A. I. R. 1936 Bom, 199, it has been, held that persons employed in construction, maintenance, repair, demolition of any architecture or painting are included in the definition of workman. Therefore, the definition of "workman" in the instant case, considering the provisions of Workmens Compensation Act, Mohd. Akhtar was a workman. In Ghasiram v. Nanhibai A. I. R. 1960 M. P. 267. in a similar situation, a mason employed to plaster the wall of a newly dug up agricultural well has been held to be a Workman. Therefore, the contention of Shri Rusia that, Mohd. Akhtar was not a Workman has no force. ( 12. ) IT is next contended that Mohd. Akhtar was in casual employment as he was getting daily wages. Shri Rusia, however, failed to support his contention by citing any authority of similar situation. ( 13. ) ON the other hand, though the word "casual" is used antithetically to "regular" but the question as to whether the employment is casual or not does not depend upon length of period of employment in Gorelol v. Dropadibai A. I. R. 1963 M. P. 24 while interpreting the provisions of Section 2 (1) (n) of the Act, it is held that even in an employment for longer hours or shorter hours, whatever may be the rate of wages, daily weekly or monthly, if a person is employed in construction work of a building, such employment shall not be construed as a casual one. Therefore, the contention of Shri Rusia that Mohd. Therefore, the contention of Shri Rusia that Mohd. Akhtar was a casual workman, has no force. ( 14. ) THE next contention of Shri Rusia that Mohd. Akhtar was not directly employed by the appellant Company and, therefore, the Company is not liable to make the payment of compensation also has no force for the reason that the definition of "workman" in Section 2 (1) (n) of the Act is pari materia with the definition of "employee" used in Section 2 (9) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948. Because, in both the definitions it is provided that, there has to be a contract of employment. Dealing with the definition of "employee" under Section 2 (9) of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948, the Apex Court of the land in Raval Talkies, Hyderabad and Ors. v. Employees State Insurance Corpn. , through Regional Director, Hill Fort Road Hyderabad (1978-II-LLJ-390) held that employees of cycle-stand and canteen run in a Cinema by a contractor are covered by the definition of employee and the cinema owner was held liable being the principal employer. Similar is the situation here; though M/s. Praveen Kumar was the contractor who had to do the job of painting but M/s. Straw Products Ltd. the appellant Company is the principal employer for whom Mohd. Akhtar was employed. Therefore, it will be deemed that Mohd. Akhtar was employed by the appellant Company for the purposes of employers trade and business and as such, the appellant Company is liable to make the payment of compensation. Therefore, this contention of Shri Rusia also fails. Consequently, from the discussion aforesaid, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. Counsels fee Rs. 750/- if certified. ?