JUDGMENT Brijesh Kumar, J. - The petitioners, who are transferees of certain plots through a sale deed, executed by opposite party no. 4, were refused mutation in the revenue records on the basis of the sale deed in respect of Sirdari land included in the sale deed. After exhausting their remedy before the Consolidation Authorities the petitioners have approached this Court impugning the orders passed by the said authorities. 2. Briefly, the facts are that after the Consolidation proceedings, opposite party no. 4 Jamuna Prasad was allotted chak no. 49 which stood in his name. The case of the petitioner is that on 19.6.74 the opposite party no.4 sold the chak in favour of the petitioners and opposite party no.5 and delivered the possession of plots constituting chak no. 49. In the same sale deed it was professed by the Vendor, Jamuna Prasad, that the land, which was being transferred, was his Bhumidhari land. The petitioners then applied for mutation in their favour under section 12 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act on 27.6.74, The application was disposed of by opposite party no. 3 by order dated 3.7.76. The Consolidation Officer observed in his order that Khata No. 49 was recorded as Bhumidhari and Sirdari of Jamuna Prasad in C. H. Form No. 23. He, therefore, refused mutation in respect of Sirdari land comprising of the chak no. 49. The petitioners went up in appeal against the order of the Consolidation Officer. In the appeal it was urged that by means of notification dated February 17, 1977 the Sirdari had become Bhmidhars of the Sirdari land. On the basis of the same, it was contended that since Jamuna Prasad had acquired Bhumidhari rights which could be transferred by him, the petitioners should be taken to have acquired the same rights and thus mutation be ordered in their favour. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation, while dealing with this question, observed that the sale deed executed in June, 1974 and the Bhumidhari rights in respect of Sirdari holdings were conferred only in 1977, therefore, on the date, when the transfer was made, Jamuna Prasad had no right to transfer Sirdari land. It also observed that notification dated February 17, 1977 was not given retrospective effect, therefore, the petitioner could not claim advantage from the notification by which Jamuna Prasad acquired Bhumidhari rights. It also observed that notification dated February 17, 1977 was not given retrospective effect, therefore, the petitioner could not claim advantage from the notification by which Jamuna Prasad acquired Bhumidhari rights. He, however, ordered that the name of the petitioners may be mutated in the Khata in question in respect of Bhumidhari land and so far Sirdari land is concerned the name of Jamuna Prasad may continue. The petitioners challenged the order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation by filing a revision under Section 48 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. The revision was, however, dismissed by opposite party no. 1 by its order dated 31.5.79 holding that transfer in respect of Sirdari land in the year 1974 was invalid, therefore, no rights were transferred in respect of the same. It was further held that the petitioners would not get the advantage of the notification issued in the year 1977 by which Bhumdhari rights were conferred upon the Sirdars. The order, thus, passed by the lower consolidation authorities was upheld by the Deputy Director of Consolidation as well. 3. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in view of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, Bhumidhari rights, which were acquired by Jamuna Prasad opposite party no. 4, by means of notification dated February 17, 1977, would pass on to the petitioners as the Sirdari land was transferred in favour of the petitioners giving it out to be Bhumidhari land of Jamuna Prasad. It has been contended that if a person sells some property which he may not be legally entitled to sell, but sells, giving out or professing to be entitled to sell the same, title in such property shall pass on to the Vendee if it is subsequently acquired by the Vendor. Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as follows: Where a person fraudulent erroneously represents that he is authorised to transfer certain immovable property, and professed to transfer such property for consideration, such transfer shall, at the option of the transferee, operate on any interest which the transferor may acquire in such property at any time during which the contract of transfer subsists. Nothing in this section shall impair the right of transferees in good faith for consideration without notice of the existence of the said option. Nothing in this section shall impair the right of transferees in good faith for consideration without notice of the existence of the said option. From a perusal of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, quoted above, it is clear that if a person fraudulently or under some error transfers certain immovable property for consideration, representing himself to be authorised to transfer the property, in that case if he subsequently acquires transferable interest in the property it shall pass on to the transferee. 4. The principle enshrined in Section 43 of the Transfer of property Act is based on principles of equity, that if a person promises more than what he could perform, he must make good his contract when he acquired power to perform it. Under the English Law the Principle is known as feeds the estoppel. If a person sells the property which does not belong to him or in which he does not have transferable rights but afterwards acquires such title, which enables him to transfer the same, he is bound to do so, he feeds the estoppel which arises out of the Vendor's covenant for title expressed or implied. But the condition to be fulfilled for applicability of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act is that the contract of sale must be subsisting at the relevant time and it must have been given out by the Vendor that he was entitled to transfer the property, may be fraudulently or under some mistake. In the present case we find that in the sale deed the opposite party no. 4 has described himself as Bhumidhar of the plots transferred under the sale deed. The sale deed is for consideration. There is nothing to indicate that the petitioners knew that in respect of certain plots Jamuna Prasad did not have Bhumidhari rights or transferable interest on the date when he executed the sale deed. It may be mentioned here that opposite party no. 4 Jamuna Prasad did not file any objection nor seems to have appeared to contest the mutation application. On behalf of the Gaon Sabha it has been contended by the learned counsel that Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act is not applicable in the case under the Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act. 4 Jamuna Prasad did not file any objection nor seems to have appeared to contest the mutation application. On behalf of the Gaon Sabha it has been contended by the learned counsel that Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act is not applicable in the case under the Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act. In the alternative he has submitted that section 43 may be applicable in respect of those cases where a contract for sale is entered into between the Sirdar and prospective Vendee for sale of Sirdari land on acquisition of Bhumidhari rights. He has further submitted that under Section 137 (2) of the Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act the Bhumidhari right relates back to the date of issue of the certificate. To substantiate the first point it has been contended that Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act is a special law and Transfer of Property Act is a general law, therefore, the provisions of Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act shall prevail over the provisions of Transfer of Property Act. The argument is misconceived. On the face of it there is no conflict between Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act or any provision of the Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act, hence the argument raised does not actually arise. In some earlier decisions of this Court to be referred hereinafter it has been held that Section 166 of the Zamindari Abolition & Land Reform Act does not impinge the provisions of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. 5. Sri S. R. Dwivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner, has placed reliance upon a case reported in 1974 RD 92 Desh Raj and others v. Lal Sahai Singh and others. It is a Division Bench case decided by this Court. It has been held in this case that in a case where land is sold on the professed representation that the seller has Bhumidari rights, such a sale cannot be held to be of Sirdari rights. It has further been observed that what is prohibited under Section 166 of the Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act is | transfer of Sirdari rights but when the vendor professes to transfer Bhumidhari rights then it would be a different case and Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act would be applicable. It has further been observed that what is prohibited under Section 166 of the Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act is | transfer of Sirdari rights but when the vendor professes to transfer Bhumidhari rights then it would be a different case and Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act would be applicable. If the contract of such sale subsists at the relevant time the option remains with the Vendee to claim benefit of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. Another Division Bench case also upholds the same proposition 1974 RD Page 94 Ishtiak Ahmed v. Commissioner, Varanasi Division. Yet another case relied upon is reported in 1964 RD 331 Jagat Narain & another v. Lal Ji & others. In this case also it has been held that if a person professes to be Bhumidhar and transfers the land as such although he may have only nontransferable interest of Sirdar but subsequently acquires Bhumidhari interest in the land, the benefit of subsequent acquisition would go to the transferee under section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. 6. In view of the proposition of law, as indicated above, the orders passed by the opposite parties 1 and 2 are not legally correct as when the matter was decided by them, Bhumidhari rights in the land had already accrued to Jamuna Prasad, opposite party no. 4 by virtue of notification dated February 17, 1977 and since he had acquired Bhumidhari rights which he professed to have transferred in 1974, on subsequent acquisition these rights would pass on to the petitioners. It was not necessary that the notification of February 17, 1977 should have had retrospective effect for conferment of Bhumidhari rights, then alone the petitioner could get the Bhumidhari interest in the land in question. 7. In view of the discussion held above, the writ petition is allowed and the order passed by opposite party no. 1, contained in annexure4 to the writ petition, is set aside and the case is remanded to O. P. NO. 1 for expeditious disposal of the revision after restoring the same to its original number, in the light of the observations made in the judgment. There would, however, be no order as to costs.