JUDGMENT M.M. Gopal, Member - This is a revision against the order dated 19-4-1984 of the trial court by which the trial court allowed the application for setting aside the ex parte decree. The learned Additional Commissioner by his order dated 7-1-1985 recommended for quashing the aforesaid order. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the file. 3. The facts of the case are that a suit under Section 229-B of U.P. Act I of 1951 was filed and as alleged a written statement was filed on 3-7-78 by Naththoo Prasad and then a decree was passed on 21-5-79. An application was filed by Naththoo Prasad on 20-7-83 for setting aside that decree. It is alleged that neither any notice was served, on him nor Naththoo Prasad had filed any written statement and no counsel, as alleged, has identified the thumb impression (signature) in, the so called written statement. The trial court has held that the counsel had denied that he had identified the person concerned Naththoo Prasad and Naththoo Prasad himself denied that he had filed the so called written statement and then the court itself compared the thumb impression of Naththoo Prasad and thumb impression on the so called written statement. The trial court has come to the conclusion that the so called written statement did not bear the thumb impression of Naththoo Prasad and it had set aside the decree dated 21-5-79. The learned Additional Commissioner has recommended that the aforesaid order of the trial court may be quashed because the thumb impression has not been proved by the proper evidence and mere comparison cannot be a ground for believing or disbelieving the fact whether the thumb impression by a person was affixed or not. The learned counsel for the opposite-party has vehemently argued that this contention of the learned Additional Commissioner is not correct because the thumb impression or the signature of the counsel itself has been denied by the person of whose signature or thumb impression alleged to be. On this ground the trial court has compared the thumb impression and then had come to the conclusion that the written statement did not bear the thumb impression of the person concerned. Hence it is a finding of fact and this court should not interfere with the finding of fact. 4. On this ground the trial court has compared the thumb impression and then had come to the conclusion that the written statement did not bear the thumb impression of the person concerned. Hence it is a finding of fact and this court should not interfere with the finding of fact. 4. There is no doubt about this that in the revision the findings of facts are not disturbed. At the same time, it is also clear that when the finding is based on no evidence or on illegally irrelevant considerations or on illegal evidence, in such circumstances the findings of facts can also be scrutinised by this court. 5. In the present case merely denying the fact by a person concerned that he did not sign it or he did not put his thumb impression on the alleged paper, which is going against his interest, cannot be said to be an evidence in support of proving that signature or thumb impression. The handwriting or thumb impression can be proved on two basis, firstly by direct evidence and secondly by indirect evidence. The direct evidence is that the person, who has written it, comes and asserts that he has signed or put his thumb impression on the alleged paper. The indirect evidence is by the statement of the person who is familiar with the writing of the person whose writing is in question, or by the opinion of the handwriting expert. Then the court is not bound to accept the evidence produced by the parties but it has to come to its own conclusion and to believe or to disbelieve the evidence which is (legally permissible) produced by the parties ; and the court has full right to compare and then accept or not to accept the evidence produced by the parties. But there is no provision that the court should only compare and then come to the conclusion about a fact that it was the thumb impression or the signature of the alleged person or not because the court cannot be a witness and the judge at the same matter. 6. I, therefore, find that the reasons given by the learned Additional Commissioner have some force and the trial court has committed an error apparent on the face of it and has wrongly exercised the jurisdiction vested in it. 7. 6. I, therefore, find that the reasons given by the learned Additional Commissioner have some force and the trial court has committed an error apparent on the face of it and has wrongly exercised the jurisdiction vested in it. 7. I, therefore, allow the revision, set aside the order dated 19-4-84 and remand the case to the trial court to decide the matter afresh in accordance with law. Costs easy.