JUDGMENT - M.S. DESHPANDE, J.:---This writ petition by the non-tribal transferee is directed against the order passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal rejecting his application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal before it. 2. The Additional Tahsildar, Warora, passed an order on 15th December, 1977 in suo motu proceedings started under section 3 of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974 and after hearing the parties, made an order on 15th December, 1977 directing restoration of 3 acres of land from Survey No. 99/3 situated at Atmurdi to the tribal transferor. An award was also passed awarding Rs. 36/- as compensation to the petitioner on 20th November, 1978. According to the petitioner though the impugned order was passed on 15th December, 1977, it was communicated to him on 28-9-1979 on which date he applied for a certified copy and it was delivered to him on the same day. Without filing an appeal before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal the petitioner filed a writ petition in this Court challenging the vires of the Act and for quashing the impugned order. That petition was filed on 5-10-1979 and was allowed to be withdrawn on 17-4-1984 because it was ultimately held that the provisions of the Act were not ultra vires. The petitioner, therefore, presented and appeal before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on 16-5-1984, i.e. about 29 days after the writ petition was withdrawn. In the application made for condonation of delay under sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, the petitioner contended that though the order was passed by the Additional Tahsildar on 15-12-1977, it was communicated to him on 28-9-1979 and he required time form 28-9-1979 to 5-10-1979 for collecting necessary documents and then writ petition came to be filed in this Court on 5-10-1979. No reason was given why the filing of the appeal from the award of compensation was delayed. 3. In order to show that the appeal against the order of restoration was within time, Shri Badiye the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on the wording of section 6 of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974, which runs as follows : "6(1) An appeal against any decision or order passed by the Collector may notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, be made to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal constituted under the Code. (2) Every such appeal shall be made within a period of sixty days from the date of receipt of the decision or order of the Collector. The provisions of sections, 4, 5, 12 and 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, shall apply to the filing of such appeal". The contention was that it was necessary before the period of sixty days can be computed, that there should be receipt of the decision or order of the Collector which means that the order or decision should be communicated to the aggrieved party. According to Shri Badiye, this purpose is not achieved by merely obtaining the signature of the aggrieved party on the order-sheet. In the present case, the order-sheet dated 15th December, 1977 was that "the transferor and the transferee were present, their statements recorded. Form No. III recorded. The order passed communicated. Form No. IV issued. File". The petitioner as well as the tribal transferor the present respondent No. 2 had attested that order-sheet. Whether the petitioner can be said to be in receipt of the decision or order, would depend on what meaning can be given to the words "within a period of sixty days from the date of receipt of the decision or order of the Collector" appearing in sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Act. According to Shri Badiye, it means that a copy of the decision or order should have been delivered to the aggrieved party. Now it is well settled in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in (Raja Harish Chandra v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer)1, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1500, where the expression "the date of the award" used in proviso (b) to section 18(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, came to be considered, that those words must be the date when the award either communicated to the party or known by him either actually or constructively, because it would be unreasonable to construe the words "from the date of the Collector's award" used in the proviso to section 18 in a literal or mechanical way. It is obvious that unless the party is aware of the order made against it, knowledge or notice thereof cannot be imputed to him. It is obvious that unless the party is aware of the order made against it, knowledge or notice thereof cannot be imputed to him. If the party is present and known of the order and is informed about it on the date it is passed and he acknowledges it in writing, the purpose is served. The question is whether the words "receipt of the decision or order" used in sub-section (2) of section 6 requires something more to be done. In Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary "receipt" means receiving, place of receiving; capacity; a written acknowledgment of anything received; that which is received; a recipe, etc. In the context in which the word "receipt" is used in the present case, it can only mean that it is acknowledgment of something received and that would obviously be the knowledge of the order. In the circumstances of the present case, therefore, nothing more was required to be done for fulfilling the requirements of sub-section (2) since it must follow that the petitioner on receipt of the decision or order on 15-12-1977, he was obliged to file the appeal within sixty days and he could not have waited until 28-9-1979 for obtaining a copy without sufficient reason. No such reason has been mentioned in the application for condonation of delay filed before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal was, therefore, right in holding that the appeal filed before it was barred by time. 4. In the result, I see no merit in the writ petition. The rule is discharged. There will be no order as to costs. Rule discharged. -----