JUDGMENT V. K. Khanna, J. - Shri Murlidhar Sanshkrit Pathashala, Andiar, District Jaunpur is a Sanshkrit Degree College duly affiliated to the Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishwa Vidyalaya, Varanasi. The dispute in the present writ petition centres around the question as to which is the managing committee of this college which is entitled to manage the affairs of the college in accordance with the provisions of the statutes applicable to the aforesaid college. 2. The relevant facts for the purposes of deciding the present writ petition are that according to the petitioner till October 1985 respondent No: 2 was the Manager of the aforesaid institution and thereafter according to the petitioner he was elected as Manager and since then he is in actual possession and control of the affairs of the institution. The petitioner after his election wrote to the Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Varanasi for making necessary notification in the statutory forms relating to the registration of the society which is running the institution. A photostat copy of the order of the Assistant Registrar passed by him on 5-12-1986 is filed as Annexure 1 to the writ petition. By notification dated 31-10-1985 according to the petitioner the Regional Deputy Director of Education adjudicated the petitioner as Manager of the college on 8-1-1987. Suit No. 388 of 1986 was filed by respondent No. 2 in the court of Munsif, Varanasi at the stage when the Vice- Chancellor of the Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishwa Vidyalaya, Varanasi passed an order appointing Dr. Kailash Pati Tripathi to look after the management o the college and to get a fresh committee of management constituted. In the aforesaid suit the petitioner applied for being implead as a party. The aforesaid application was rejected on the ground that no relief has been claimed by respondent No. 2 in his suit against the petitioner and therefore he was neither a necessary nor a proper party. A revision was filed by the petitioner against this order which too was rejected. The suit filed by respondent No. 2 was ultimately decreed by the VIII Munsif, Varanasi by his judgment and decree dated 16-4-1987 and the order passed by the Vice-Chancellor was set aside and the defendants in the suit were restrained from interfering in any way in the management of respondent No. 2. The suit filed by respondent No. 2 was ultimately decreed by the VIII Munsif, Varanasi by his judgment and decree dated 16-4-1987 and the order passed by the Vice-Chancellor was set aside and the defendants in the suit were restrained from interfering in any way in the management of respondent No. 2. After passing of the aforesaid judgment and decree in the suit the Vice-Chancellor of the Sampurananad Sanskrit Vishwa Vidyalaya, Varanasi passed an order of approval on 24-4-1987 (contained in Annexure 7 to the writ petition) adjudicating respondent No. 2 as Manager in view of the decision given by the court in suit No. 388 of 1986. The petitioner in this writ petition has challenged this order of the V ice- Chancellor on the ground that the Vice- Chancellor had no jurisdiction under the statutes to pass such an order. 3. It may be mentioned that at the admission stage the respondents had been served in this case and parties have exchanged counter and rejoinder affidavits. The writ petition is thus being disposed of finally in accordance with the Rules of the Court. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the contesting. respondent No. 2 has contended in the writ petition that the Vice-Chancellor was a party to suit No. 388 of 1986 and thus the decree passed in the suit was binding on him and the order passed by the Vice- Chancellor is in accordance with law and is not liable to be set aside. In the alternative it has also been urged that the petitioner has an alternative remedy under section 68 of the State Universities Act to file a representation against the order of the Vice-Chancellor and this Court should not entertain the writ petition on this ground alone. 5. The first question which arises for determination in this case is as to whether the decree passed in suit No. 388 of 1986 is a decree binding on the Vice-Chancellor, the petitioner and the Deputy Director of l Education under Statute 12.28 applicable to the Sampurananand Sanskrit Vishwa Vidyalaya, Varanasi. It has not been disputed that the petitioner's application for impleadment had been rejected and the petitioner was not a party to the suit. The Deputy Director of Education admittedly was also not a party to suit. It has not been disputed that the petitioner's application for impleadment had been rejected and the petitioner was not a party to the suit. The Deputy Director of Education admittedly was also not a party to suit. By no stretch of imagination the decree passed could either be binding on the petitioner or on the Deputy Director of Education. The Vice-Chancellor was a party to the suit. The decree of course was binding on him. In our opinion the Vice- Chancellor in his order dated 24-4-1987 (contained in Annexure 7 to the writ petition) only reiterated as to what has been declared by the Civil Court in Original suit No. 388 of 1986. There was no decision of the Vice- Chancellor of his own under any provision of the statutes and as has been observed above the decree was binding on him. The Vice-II Chancellor in terms of the decree only adjudicated respondent No. 2 as the Manager in whose functions and duties he would not interfere as directed by the court. The order of the Vice-Chancellor in our opinion is, therefore, innocuous and requires no interference in exercise of this Court's power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 6. It has, however, to be seen as to whether the petitioner is remedy less and has got no forum where he can establish that he was in the effective control of the management and the affairs of the institution on the date on which the Vice-Chancellor passed the order i.e. 24-4-1987. In our opinion Statute 12.28 of the statute applicable to the Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishwa Vidyalaya, Varanasi provides a forum which can be invoked by the petitioner for getting the dispute regarding the management of the college adjudicated by the Deputy Director of Education on the limited ground of being in actual possession and control of the affairs of the college. The other alternative remedy available to the petitioner is to get his rights established in a civil court by filing a regular suit. IQ our opinion Statute 12.07 (f) after amendment made in Statute 12.28 is only confined at the stage of affiliation of the college. The other alternative remedy available to the petitioner is to get his rights established in a civil court by filing a regular suit. IQ our opinion Statute 12.07 (f) after amendment made in Statute 12.28 is only confined at the stage of affiliation of the college. The Vice Chancellor at that stage had to see that the constitution of them management of the college provides all that which has been mentioned in the Statute 12.07 and at that stage of the affiliation will also have a power of adjudicating on the question as to whether any person has been duly choosen or is entitled to be a Principal or office bearer of the management and whether the management is legally constituted. Statute 12.07 (f) does not contemplate that the Vice-Chancellor should adjudicate the question as to which is the managing committee which is entitled to he recognised in case there are two rival managing committees before him. Prior to the amendment the statutes contemplated that in such a situation when there are two rival managing committees before the Vice- Chancellor for the purpose of continuance of affiliation, he will have a power under Statute 12.28 to find out the management haying effective control for carrying on the affair, of the institution until a court of competent jurisdiction adjudicates otherwise. The clear intention being that the Vic Chancellor would not adjudicate on question as to who is the legally constituted managing committee after going into the entire evidence in the case there are two rival managing committees before hint. The Vice- Chancellor will only in a summary manner see as to who is in the effective control of the o affairs of the college and will adjudicate him as the manager until a court of competent jurisdiction orders otherwise. After amendment the aforesaid power during the continuance of the affiliation had been conferred on the Deputy Director of Education and it is thus clear that as far as the question of adjudication of this limited question during the continuance of affiliation is concerned that is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Deputy Director of Education. After amendment the aforesaid power during the continuance of the affiliation had been conferred on the Deputy Director of Education and it is thus clear that as far as the question of adjudication of this limited question during the continuance of affiliation is concerned that is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Deputy Director of Education. The Vice-Chancellor during the continuance of affiliation will thus have no jurisdiction to adjudicate on the question as to who is entitled to administer the affairs of the college under Statute 12.28 when there are two rival managing committees claiming management of an institution affiliated tot he Vishwa Vidyalaya. 7. In our opinion, therefore, the proper remedy available to the petitioner is to approach the Deputy Director of Education concerned and in ease the petitioner raises a dispute before the Deputy Director of Education concealed, the Deputy Director of Education shall decide the aforesaid dispute after affording an opportunity to the parties in accordance with the provisions of Statute 12.28 applicable to the Vishwa Vidhyalaya. The petitioner has raised an apprehension that the dispute will remain pending and will not be decided at an early date. In case such a dispute is raised, the Deputy Director of Education will decide the same within a period of two months from the date of the referring of the dispute to him. 8. Subject to the aforesaid observations the present writ petition is finally disposed the present writ petition is finally disposed of. 9. A certified copy of this order shall he given to the learned counsel for the parties withal three days on payment of usual charges.