V. P. MATHUR, J. This criminal revision is directed against the judg ment and order dated 11-4-1983 passed by Mr. Sushil Kumar, the then Sessions Judge of Pil ibhit. The learned Judge had partly allowed the Criminal Appeal No. 19 of 1983 He had upset the judgment of the Vth Additional Munsif Magistrate, Pilibhit dated 23-2- 1983 in Criminal Case No. 590 of 1982 in part.-The learned Magistrate had convicted Naresh Chandra Jauhari both under Sections 352 and 353, I. P. C. and sentenced him to six months rigorous im prisonment under Section 475, I. P. C. and to six months rigorous imprison ment under Section, 353 I. P. C. He had also directed the two sentences to run concurrently. The learned Sessions Judge set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 352, I. P. C. but maintained the conviction under Sec tion 353 of the I. P. C. but reduced the sentence awarded to two months rigorous imprisonment. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case were that on 11-5-1931 the appel lant was a clerk in the Election Office of Pilibhit Collectorate and Mr. Sri Krishna Arya was posted as Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Pilibhit and perhaps was looking after the election omce also. It so happened that Sri Krishna Arya had returned from a meeting with the District Magistrate and after having taken his lunch,. he was in his Drawing- room, when at about 2. 45 p. m. Naresh Chandra Jauhari came to his house. He indicated that he had come to obtain signatures of Mr. Arya on some election office papers. It is con tended that Mr. Arya told him that he would sign the pap; rs in office and not at his residence. Then it is said that the applicant Naresh Chandra Jauhari misbehaved with Mr. Arya. There was some exchange of hot words and then Naresh Chandra Jauhari raised his hands which gesture indicated that he wanted to give a blow to the officer and thus assaulted him. The officers Chaprasi who was present, intervened and when Mr. Arya told the accused-revisionist that he was going to ring the District Magistrate, the revisionist is said to have left the place. At 3. 25 p. m. that very day the first information report was lodged by Mr. Arya. It was duly investigated and a charge-sheet was submitted. 3. The officers Chaprasi who was present, intervened and when Mr. Arya told the accused-revisionist that he was going to ring the District Magistrate, the revisionist is said to have left the place. At 3. 25 p. m. that very day the first information report was lodged by Mr. Arya. It was duly investigated and a charge-sheet was submitted. 3. The contention of the revisionist was that the whole story was bogus. He had definitely visited Mr. Arya at his house to have his signatures on certain election office papers but he neither assaulted Mr. Arya nor misbehaved with him. He gave out that he was at a loss to understand why he was being pro secution in this case. 4. Two witnesses were examined on the side of the prosecution. Mr. Sri Krishna Arya entered the witness box as P. W. 1 in support of his case. He gave all the details of the occurrence. Strangely enough he was not cross-examined about the factum of the occurrence as well as the sequence in which it took place and the only cross-examination that was directed to him was to elicit that when the matter reached the District Magistrate subsequently there was a hush up of the matter by way of compromise and the revisionist begged to be excused and was promptly excused and thereafter Sri Arya had no complaint left against him. The District Magistrate even directed Mr. Arya to withdraw the case. The second witness for the prosecution was the Orderly who simply came to say that the present revisionist had visited Mr. Aryas house on that ciate and at that time, but he did not support the prosecution story regarding the assault or use of criminal force. 5. Nevertheless on account of the uncontieverted testimony of Mr. Arya both the courts below accepted prosecution version of the occurrence. The Sessions Judge was, however, of the view that no case under Section 352 of the I. P. C. would be deemed to have been made out, because there was nothing on the record to show that the revisionist had gone to Mr. Aryas house after having made preparations to commit any offence. It appears that Mr. Arya as Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Pilibhit and perhaps in his capacity as Election Officer, was getting papers at his house and officials were visiting his also for official work. Aryas house after having made preparations to commit any offence. It appears that Mr. Arya as Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Pilibhit and perhaps in his capacity as Election Officer, was getting papers at his house and officials were visiting his also for official work. Under these circumstances, the learned Sessions Judge was justified in coming to the conclusion that the visit of the revisionist at the house of Mr. Sri Krishna Arya, in the absence of any evidence regarding his intention to commit trespass with a view to commit an offence cannot be covered by Section 452, I. P. C. The charge under Section 452, I. P. C. was, therefore, rightly found not proved. The learned Sessions Judge however was of the view that it was a case to be covered by Section 353, I. P. C. and not by Section 352, I. P. C. 6. There is some importance in this case attached to the fact whether Section 352, I. P. C. will apply or Section 353, I. P. C. will apply and the basis of this is that Section 352, I. P. C. is comparatively a minor offence and it is not cognizable and is compoundable, while Section 353, l. P. C. defines a graver offence which is neither cognizable nor compoundable. 7. We have therefore to find out as to under what provisions of the Indian Penal Code, the guilt of the accused-revisionist will fail. The prosecu tion evidence of Mr. Arya having been believed (as it has not been challenged through any cross-examination at all), the learned Sessions Judge in para 8 of his judgment has taken note of the fact that the revisionist had gone to the house of Mr. Arya to obtain his signatures on some official papers. Obviously it was not a private visit. The learned Sessions Judge has also noticed that an officer can be on duty at home and also in the Office. Section 352, I. P. C is generally a provisions of law which applies to all the cases in which assault or use of criminal force to any person otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation given by that person, is alleged. Section 353, I. P. C. requires two further ingredients in order to be applicable. Section 352, I. P. C is generally a provisions of law which applies to all the cases in which assault or use of criminal force to any person otherwise than on grave and sudden provocation given by that person, is alleged. Section 353, I. P. C. requires two further ingredients in order to be applicable. The first is that the assault or use of criminal force should be to a public servant and the second is that it should be at a time when the public servant is discharging the duty imposed upon him by virtue of his office. In other words when a public servant is performing an act which is so integrally connected with the duty attached to his office as to form part of it and he is assaulted or use of criminal force is made against him, then the offence shall be graver and shall be covered by Section 353 of the I. P. C. Mr. Arya was undoubtedly a public servant. This fact is neither disputed not denied. He was an Executive Magistrate posted as Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Pilibhit and the circumstances show that he was also officially connected with the election work. He, therefore was a public servant in terms of Section 353, I. P. C. 8. The question, however, remains whether at the time of the assault that was made in this case he was in execution of his duty as such public servant; or whether this assault or use of criminal force was made with intent to prevent or deter him from discharging his duty as such a public servant or in conse quence of anything done or attempted to be done by him in the lawful dis charge of his duty as such public servant. I agree with the learned Sessions Judge that an officer (better designated as a public servant) can be on duty at home as well as in the office. But I do not agree with him that a public servant is constantly on duty whether he is in cfllce or at his house and at all times and all hours of the day and night. No law lays down that if he is designated as a public servant then he should be deemed to be on duty all through and always. No law lays down that if he is designated as a public servant then he should be deemed to be on duty all through and always. The very use of specific words in Section 353, I. P. C. shows that a public servant can be in execution of his duty as such a public servant at a particular time and at another occasion he may not be doing anything connected with his duty according to law. This section will only apply when a public servant is discharging the duty imposed on him by virtue of his office. It seems to have been proved that at the time when the assault took place or criminal force was used, he was not performing any act which may be so vitally con nected with the duty attached to his office as to form an integral part of it. The public servant taking meals at his house is not on official duty. And similarly when he is in his drawing-room doing no official work, he cannot be deemed to be busy in execution cf his duty as such public servant. In the present case, there is absolutely no allegation or evidence of the fact that the revisionist Naresh Chandra Jauhari assaulted Mr. Arya or used criminal force against him with the intention to prevent or deter him from discharging his duty as such public servant, or that he did so in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by Mr. Arya in the lawful discharge of his duty as such a public servant. There is nothing on the record to show that there was any previous enmity between the parties or that the revisionist had any reason to ensure that Mr. Arya did not discharge his official duties and with that aim in view he used criminal force and committed this assault. There is also nothing on the record to show that Mr. Arya had done anything in the lawful discharge of his duty as such a public servant or was going to do anything in the lawful discharge of his duty as such a public servant and as a consequence of the same this assault was made on him. There is also nothing on the record to show that Mr. Arya had done anything in the lawful discharge of his duty as such a public servant or was going to do anything in the lawful discharge of his duty as such a public servant and as a consequence of the same this assault was made on him. I will not agree with the learned Sessions Judge that because it was part of the duty of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate to sign documents even of the election office not only at in his office but also at his home, hence he will be deemed to be busy in the execution of his duty as such a public servant at all times that he remained at his house. If he was doing some official work at his house at the time of this use of criminal force and assault then of course the case will be covered by Section 353, I. P. C. But in the present case the evidence simply shows that the revisio nist entered his drawing room and told that his signatures were required on certain papers. I may agree with the learned Sessions Judge that since the revisionist had gone there on official business he (The revisionist) was on official duty but when Mr. Arya refused to si. qn those documents at home and directed that they may be placed before him in the office, then it simply shows that he (Mr. Arya) was not doing arflofficial at his home at that time. 9. A distantly akin case came up before the Supreme Court in the matter of D. Chattiah and another v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1978 (15) ACC p. 302. It was a case under Section 353 of the I. P. C. The allegations were that Shaikh Masthan was a typist in the Panchayat Samiti. In the same office, appellants Nos. 1 and 2 and the accused Guravareddy were working as Health Inspector, Lower Division Clerk and Health Worker respectively attached to the Primary Health Centre. It was alleged in the first information report that while Shaikh Masthan was attending to his work in the office, the three accused persons who worked in the same office, approached and questioned him as to why he had abused them on an earlier occasion. It was alleged in the first information report that while Shaikh Masthan was attending to his work in the office, the three accused persons who worked in the same office, approached and questioned him as to why he had abused them on an earlier occasion. When the informant denied the accusation, they beat him and one of them used a stick and scissors. It was found during evidence that the incident was the sequal of private quarrel which had taken place between the complainant and the accused one day earlier. The Supreme Court was of the view that the assault on the typist and no real nexus or even casual connection or consequential relation with the perfor mance of his duty as public servant. There was not even a scintilla of evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that the intent of the assailant was to prevent or deter the typist from discharge of his duty as such public servant. With this observation the charge under Section 332, I. P. C and the conviction on that count were set aside. Section 333, I P. C. applies to cases in which hurt is caused voluntarily to deter a public servant from his duty. The typist was working in his office and in spite of that, since the dispute related to the incident of abusing a day earlier, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion there was no real nexus or connection between the assault and the performance of the duty as a public servant. 10. In the present case, I am definitely of the view that at the time when the occurrence took place Sri Arya was not performing any duty imposed upon him by law. Undoubtedly he was a public servant but since he was not discharging any duty imposed on him by virtue of his office and was not per forming any act connected with the duty attached to his office and forming integral part thereof, hence the case will not be covered by Section 353 of the I. P. C. but will only be covered by Section 352 of the I. P. C. In this respect I will not agree with the view of the learned Sessions Judge. 11. 11. The result is that from the evidence on the record, a case under Section 352 of the I. P. C. was made out and the revisionist was liable to be punished for the same. But, there is another circumstance which intervenes. 12. During examinatirn-in-chief Sri Srikrishna Arya clearly gave out that on the basis of a letter sent to the District Magistrate, Sri Naresh Chandra Jauhari was suspended. Thereafter the matter came before Smt. Neena Ranjan who was the District Magistrate. Before her, the revisionist begged for pardon and on that ground his suspension was revoked and be was reinstated. During cross-exammaion he further gave out that when the matter came up before Smt. Neena Ranjan, he was also called along with one Mr. Jain who was the then Election Officer and some others and in their presence this matter was compro mised and after this compromise he had no grievance left against the revi sionist. The District Magistrate even told Mr. Jain that the case should be withdrawn. 13. It is clearly means that there had been a compromise in this case before the District Magistrate after lodging of the report. The legal position is very clear. An offence under Section 352 of the I. P. C. is compoundable even without the permission of the court. A composition is an arrangement whereby there is settlement of the differences between the injured party and the person against whom the complaint is made. It is not necessary that the composition should be in writing. It may be oul. If both the parties agree that there has been a compromise, then the court has to dispose of the case in terms of that compromise and the petitioner is to be acquitted. If on the other hand, parties differ then the Court has to call upon them to lead evidence and then record a finding on such evidence whether the allegations regarding the compromise are true or not. 14. In the present case, there is no dispute, as regards the factum of the compromise. If on the other hand, parties differ then the Court has to call upon them to lead evidence and then record a finding on such evidence whether the allegations regarding the compromise are true or not. 14. In the present case, there is no dispute, as regards the factum of the compromise. This fact has been narrated by the complainant-first informant himself in his deposition both in examination-in-chief and also in cross-exami nation and it is clearly made out that on account of the intervention of the District Magistrate, the matter was compromised, The suspension order against Sri Naresh Chandra Jauhari was withdrawn and he was reinstated and thereafter the complainant had no grievance left against the revisionist. It has been laid down in the case of Alohammad Mansoor v. Him Singh and another, AIR 1959 SC page 627, that the effect of a compromise is automatic. Where -ever the composition of an offence takes place it has instantaneous effect of acquittal of the accused. Therefore, whenever it is contended befor the Magis trate that the applicant stood acquitted on account of composition of the offence, it also meant that his trial was barred by Section 403, Cr. P. C. and it was the duty of the Magistrate to decide the matter in this respect. 15. In the case of Mrs. F. M. Torpey v. King Emperor, AIR 1927 All. 375, the complainant admitted in his cross-examination that there was a com promise to the effect that he should leave on a particular date and no dues will be charged. The lower court refused to accept the compfomlse on the ground that the complaint was filed subsequent to the alleged compromise and not prior thereto. The matter came to the High Court and it was held that no provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that a compromise should be arrived at only after the filing of the complaint. If an offence is compoundable without the permission of the court, it does not seem necessary that the composition should be arrived at after the complaint has been filed. It was also held that a compromise can be there even prior to the filing of the complaint. 16. An offence is complete when the acts constituting it have been com mitted, irrespective of whether any complaint or charge has been laid before the court or not. It was also held that a compromise can be there even prior to the filing of the complaint. 16. An offence is complete when the acts constituting it have been com mitted, irrespective of whether any complaint or charge has been laid before the court or not. The allusion to the word "accused" in the section only describes his character at the time of the trial. But, it is undoubted that an offence is complete as soon as all acts constituting it have been committed and it is the compounding of the offence and not of the trial, which is the matter to be considered. Therefore, it is neither necessary for a compromise or com position to be in writing nor that it should be made after the case has been launched or the complaint has been made. In the present case the compro mise took place after the lodging of the report and when the proceedings of the case were going on. It will be a valid compounding of an offence under Section 352, I. P. C. which is compoundable without intervention of the court. 17. The result will be that the accused will have to be acquitted on that charge in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties. 18. In the result the revision is allowed. The charge framed against the accused under Section 353, I. P. C. was not justified and his conviction under Section 353, I. P. C. is set aside. His case was to be covered by Section 352 of the I. P. C. and in view of the compromise that has been arrived at between the complainant-first informant and the revisionist, this offence stands compounded and the accused stands acquitted. He need not surrender. His bail bonds shall stand discharged. Revision allowed. .