JUDGMENT S.N. Jha, J. – Both these applications have been heard together as they arise from common case and they are being disposed of by this common judgment with the consent of the parties. 2. The relevant facts which led to the filing of these application, in short, are that on the basis of a written report of one Gauri Shankar Jha, Professor-in-Charge of Jai Plakash College, Narainpur, a case was instituted against the petitioners under section 408/120B of the Indian Penal Code (in short the Penal Code) being Bhagalpur P.S. Case no. 50 dated 16.5.1977. 3. From the written report, it appears that petitioner of Cr. Misc. No. 3930 of 1986 was appointed Principal of the said college on 21.10.1985 and remained as such till he was allowed to go on forced leave. Petitioner of Cr. Misc. No. 6455 of 1986 was the Head Clerk-cum-Accountant of the said college during the relevant period. 4. It appears that on the basis of certain allegation levelled against these petitioners, the University of Bhagalpur constituted a committee of enquiry to enquire into the matter, which submitted its report on 12.4.1976 to the effect that most of the allegations were found true. According to the report. the District Magistrate, Bhagalpur instructed one M.K. Das, District Accounts Officer to check the accounts and report, and accordingly verification of accounts was made. It transpired that the petitioners had defalcated heavy amount under different heads. A true copy of the first information report is Annexure-1 appended to both the applications. It is needless to go into the details of the allegations because it has elaborately been mentioned in the first information report. 5. After institution of the said case the police investigated into the matter and submitted charge-sheet on 12.9.1979 against both the petitioners under sections 408/120B of the Penal Code. 6. On the basis of the charge-sheet, the Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Naugachia took cognizance on 4.9.1980 against the petitioners under sections 408/120B of the Penal Code and transferred the case to the file of Sri P. Kumar, Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Naugachia for disposal. 7. It further appears that petitioner in Cr. Misc. No. 3930/1986, Tarkeshwar Mishra, thereafter challenged the order taking cognizance in Cr. Misc. No. 7120/1980. The said-application was admitted but ulimately the same was withdrawn vide order dated 13.12.1982. A copy of the said order is Annexure-4 appended to Cr. Misc. 7. It further appears that petitioner in Cr. Misc. No. 3930/1986, Tarkeshwar Mishra, thereafter challenged the order taking cognizance in Cr. Misc. No. 7120/1980. The said-application was admitted but ulimately the same was withdrawn vide order dated 13.12.1982. A copy of the said order is Annexure-4 appended to Cr. Misc. No. 3930/1986. Annexure-4 reads as follows : – “After some arguments Mr. B.F. Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has made a prayer that he may be permitted to withdraw this application with a liberty to take up all the points against the prosecution at the time of framing of charge, If aggrieved by the order framing charge, then the petitioner will be at liberty, if so advised, to move this Hon'ble Court against that order. The application is dismissed as withdrawn.” 8. Now this is the second battle of the petitioner of Cr. Misc. No. 3930/1986 in this Court. Mr. Tara Kant Jha, learned counsel appearing on behalf of this petitioner has vehemently argued that inspite of an order passed as far back as 13.12.1982, the Court below has not yet framed charge against the petitioner and the petitioner is being dragged in the Court for the last ten years for no fault of his own. He has filed the entire order-sheet of the Court-below ranging from 27.2.1985 upto 2.4.1986, which is Annexure-5 appended to this application. From the perusal of order dated 27.2.1985, it appears that petitioner was present in the Court and prayed for direction to the A.P.P. to supply him the police papers, which has not been supplied to the petitioner till that date. It appears that the Court directed the A.P.P. to supply the police papers to the petitioners till 26.3.1985. The order-sheet dated 26.3.1985 shows that papers were not given to the petitioners by that date and times till 10.5.1985 was granted to the A.P.P. to supply the police papers. On 10.5.1985, the papers were not supplied and again time was granted till 28.5.1985 for the supply of police papers. Order-sheet shows that again on 28.5.1985 time was granted to the A.P.P. to supply police papers till 22.6.1985. Order-sheet dated 22.6.1985/24.6.1985 shows that the police papers were not supplied to the accused and time was again granted till 17.7.1985. On 10.5.1985, the papers were not supplied and again time was granted till 28.5.1985 for the supply of police papers. Order-sheet shows that again on 28.5.1985 time was granted to the A.P.P. to supply police papers till 22.6.1985. Order-sheet dated 22.6.1985/24.6.1985 shows that the police papers were not supplied to the accused and time was again granted till 17.7.1985. On 17.7.1985, the petitioners were present but still police papers were not supplied to them and the Court again granted time to the A.P.P. to supply the police papers to the petitioners till 8.8.1985. On 8.8.1985, again time was granted till 7.9.1985 to supply police papers to the petitioners. On 7.9.1985, time till 5.10.1985 was granted to supply police papers. On 5.10.1985 further time was granted till 9.11.1985 for the supply of police papers to the petitioners. In this way, I find that on each and every date, the petitioners were present in the Court, but, police papers were not supplied to them inspite of several indulgence given by the Court to the prosecution. It appears from the original order-sheet that again on 20.5.1986, the petitioners were present in the Court and the Court again gave time to the A.P.P. to supply police papers till 4.6.1986. The fact remained that inspite of several adjournments, the A.P.P. did not supply the police papers to the petitioners and the court was granting so much indulgence to the prosecution least considering the harassment caused to the petitioners in attending the Court on each and every date. Ultimately, the petitioners moved this Court on 1.5.1986 for quashing of the entire proceeding in these two applications on the ground of delay in compliance of this Court's order passed as far back as 1982. 9. It is not in dispute that the first information report was lodged in the year, 1977 and the charge-sheet was submitted as far back as 12.9.1979 and cognizance was taken after one year i.e. on 4.9.1980 against which the petitioner moved this Court and this Court passed an order as contained in Annexure-4 appended to this application, as indicated above. 10. Mr. Jha streneously argued that it is a case of gross abuse of process of the Court and he has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Narain Prasad Saraf v. State of Bihar, 1982 P.L.J.R. 498. 10. Mr. Jha streneously argued that it is a case of gross abuse of process of the Court and he has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Narain Prasad Saraf v. State of Bihar, 1982 P.L.J.R. 498. The facts of the aforesaid case is more or less the same as ill the instant case. In the said case, the petitioner and three other persons had filed an application under section 561 (A) of the Old Code of Criminal Procedure before this Court for quashing the cognizance taken against them, which was disposed of by this Court to the effect that so far as the application of one of the petitioners was concerned, it was dismissed as withdrawn and the cognizance against other three persons was quashed. The petitioner again filed a second application with the same prayer. The first question that fell for consideration in the said case was whether the second application now under section 482 of the Code was permissible and Their Lordships on the basis of a decision in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs of West Bengal v. Mohan Singh and Others, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1002, held that earlier application was no bar against entertainment of second application. 11. Mr. Jha vehemently argued that in the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court must exercise its power under inherent jurisdiction because despite the permission of withdrawal of the earlier application of petitioner Tarkeshwar Mishra with a liberty to take up ail the points against the prosecution at the time of framing of charge, the prosecution has failed to make any progress in the criminal case even though it was filed as far back as 1977 and the criminal case rested where it was for a period of over four and half, ears even after the withdrawal of the earlier application in this Court. 12. My attention was drawn to the fact that although the cognizance was taken in the year, 1980, still the police papers were not supplied to the petitioners inspite of the several indulgence granted by the Court up to as late as May 1986. In the aforesaid case, Their Lordships held : – “In the case before us Mr. 12. My attention was drawn to the fact that although the cognizance was taken in the year, 1980, still the police papers were not supplied to the petitioners inspite of the several indulgence granted by the Court up to as late as May 1986. In the aforesaid case, Their Lordships held : – “In the case before us Mr. Agrawal has drawn our attention to the fact that although the cognizance was taken on 18.12.1971 and the Criminal Miscellaneous No. 114 or 1972 was disposed of on 8.11.75 till 12.9.1979, when the present application was filed, no progress has been made in the case. It will, therefore, be seen that in the present case even after four years no progress has been made in the case against the petitioners. Therefore, we are constrained to hold that in the case before us the continuance of the proceeding against the petitioners for such a long time without any progress, is an abuse of the process of the court. We are unable to discover any satisfactory reason for not taking any further steps in the case.” 13. In the instant case, I find that the first information report was lodged on 16.5.1977, charge-sheet was submitted on 12.9.1979 and the cognizance was taken on 4.9.1980 and in-spite of so much adjournments granted by the Court, the police papers were not supplied by the prosecution to the petitioners and no progress could be made till 1986 although on all dates the petitioners were present in the Court. Taking into consideration all these facts, I am also constrained to hold that in the instant case the continuance of the proceedings against the petitioners for such a long time without any progress is an abuse of the process of the Court. 14. Reference may also be made to a decision In State of Bihar v. Uma Shankar Ketriwal and others, 1981 B.L.J.R. 109, It appears that the High Court quashed the entire proceedings against the accused and the matter went before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court while upholding the order of the High Court observed : – “We cannot lose sight of the fact that the trial has not made much headway even though no less than twenty years have gone by. The Supreme Court while upholding the order of the High Court observed : – “We cannot lose sight of the fact that the trial has not made much headway even though no less than twenty years have gone by. Such protraction itself means considerable harassment to the accused not only monetarily but also by way of constant attention to the case and repeated appearances in Court, apart from anxiety.” 15. It is well known that luxury of protracted trial has always been deprecated by the Supreme Court as well as by this Court. There should be a limit to every thing. I do not find any justification for the trial court to grant so much indulgence to the prosecution. The case ought to have been concluded by now because ten years have lapsed. In this connection, I may point out a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S. Guin & Others v. Grindlays Bank Ltd., A.I.R. 1986 Supreme Court, 289 : 1986 PLJR (SC) 9. In the said case, the accused persons were acquitted by the trial court and the matter came before the Calcutta High Court. The High Court after setting aside the judgment of acquittal ordered for retrial of the case and the matter went to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court while disposing of the case observed as follows : – “We are of the view that following the above Principle the High Court should have dismissed the appeal before it even if it disagreed with the view taken by the trial court with regard to the gist of the offences punishable under Section 341 of the Indian Penal Code, having regard to the inordinate delay of nearly six and half years that had ensued after the judgment of acquittal, the nature and magnitude of the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant and the difficulties that may have to be encountered in securing the presence of witnesses in a case of this nature nearly seven years after the incident.” 16. The Supreme Court held that in view of the inordinate delay and the nature of the offence involved, retrial should not have been ordered even though the acquittal was improper. The Supreme Court held that in view of the inordinate delay and the nature of the offence involved, retrial should not have been ordered even though the acquittal was improper. Therefore, judging from that angle also, there has been inordinate delay in the disposal of this case and prosecution may feel difficulties even to substantiate the allegations levelled against the petitioners. I have already indicated above that these petitioners were always attending the Court on each and every date and without any progress being made in the case, the Court mechanically used to adjourn the case just by writing orders directing the A.P.P. to supply police papers to the petitioners. 17. In my opinion, now any continuance of the case would be an abuse of the process of the Court. I am, therefore, of the view that it would not be justifiable to permit the proceedings to continue against the petitioners with the end not in sight. The impugned order taking cognizance against the petitioners as well as the entire proceedings of Bhagalpur P.S. Case No. 50 dated 16.5.1977 is quashed. 18. In the result, both these applications are allowed. Applications allowed.