Ulagammal v. The National Insurance Company Ltd. — 1987 DIGILAW 119 (MAD)

JUDGMENT Swamikkannu, J. 1. This is an appeal filed Under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act (Act No. 4 of 1939) by the petitioner Ulagammal, the appellant herein, against the award dated 21-4-1980 in M.O.P. No. 172/79 on the file of the Court of the learned II Addl. Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu granting a compensation of Rs. 12,500/- with proportionate costs against the respondents and directing the first respondent to deposit the said amount within four months from the date of the award and also holding that if the amount was not deposited within six months, the appellant is entitled to 9 per cent interest from the date of the award till the date of deposit. 2. The petition before the Tribunal was filed by the mother of the deceased Radhakrishnan praying the Tribunal to pass an award granting a compensation of Rs. 30,000/- for the death of the said Radhakrishnan in a motor vehicle accident on 8-12-1978 on G.S.T. Road caused by the car of the second respondent Ravindra Chander Chowdia bearing Registration No. T.M.Y. 5567 at Meenambakkam. The case of the appellant before the Tribunal is that the deceased was coming on G.S.T. Road on the western side, but the car of the second respondent, which was proceeding from north to south driven rashly and negligently, knocked down the deceased Radhakrishnan causing fatal injuries and this occurrence was due to the rash and negligent driving of the car of the second respondent. Therefore, the appellant has claimed Rs. 30,000/- as compensation. 3. The respondents have denied the rash and negligent driving of the car of the second respondent. According to them, the car was proceeding at a moderate speed on its proper side near Pazhavanthangal road junction, that a lorry, which was proceeding ahead of the car, was suddenly stopped, that the deceased suddenly darted across the road without caring for the traffic on the main road, that the driver of the car, who did not anticipate this, applied brake suddenly, that as it was drizzling at that time, the car dragged to its further right and the deceased jumped into the front portion of the car holding the wiper. Therefore, according to the respondents, the occurrence was due to the negligence of the victim himself. The quantum of compensation also was disputed by the respondents. 4. Therefore, according to the respondents, the occurrence was due to the negligence of the victim himself. The quantum of compensation also was disputed by the respondents. 4. The following points were framed for consideration by the Tribunal: (1) Whether the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of the car of the second respondent? (2) To what amount, if any, the appellant is entitled? 5. The petitioner has examined herself as PW 1. PW 2 Krishnan was also examined on behalf of the petitioner/appellant. On behalf of the Respondents, RW 1 Sambantham was examined. On a consideration of the above evidence, under point 1, the Tribunal held that the accident was due to the rash and negligent driving of the car of the second respondent. Under point 2, the Tribunal held that the appellant is entitled to a compensation of Rs. 12,500/- as mentioned above. Aggrieved by the above award of the Tribunal, the petitioner before the Tribunal has come forward with this appeal. 6. The appellant has restricted her claim to a total sum of Rs. 25,000/- in this appeal. 7. It is inter alia contended on behalf of the appellant that the Tribunal having given a clear finding that the accident was due to the rash and negligent act of the driver of the car, it has materially erred in law and on facts in awarding only a sum of Rs. 12,500/-, whereas the amount claimed was Rs. 30,000/- and having arrived at a finding that the total compensation is Rs. 15,600/- according to the appellant, the Tribunal has erred in law and on facts in allowing 20% deduction towards lump sum payment and uncertainty of life time. It is also contended that the Tribunal ought to have seen that when a multiplier is fixed after taking into account all the relevant circumstances, there is no question of making a further deduction on account of lump-sum payment. According to the appellant, the Tribunal has erred in law in not taking into account the increased income that the deceased would have got but for the unfortunate accident, which resulted in his death at the age of 19 and that the finding of the Tribunal that the deceased would have earned only about Rs. 200/- per month is perverse. 8. 200/- per month is perverse. 8. The learned Counsel for the appellant had referred to a decision reported in A. Munirathnam v. Perundevi and Ors. 1980 TLNJ 348 in support of his contention. 9. The point for consideration in this appeal is whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is adequate and in accordance with law. 10. Point: The Fiat Car of the second respondent, which was coming from north to south along G.S.T. road, hit against the son of the appellant by name Radhakrishnan on 8-12-78 at about 7.00 a.m. PW 2 who is running an Auto Workshop on the western side of the G.S.T. Road near the place of the occurrence, gave a report to the police with regard to the occurrence. The lower court, which had the benefit of seeing P W 2 in the box has believed that he must be an eye-witness for the occurrence. According to PW 2, the deceased and some others came in a lorry, which was parked on the eastern side of the road, that they crossed the road for worshipping in the small Vinayagar Temple on the western side of the road, that after worship, the deceased Radhakrishnan came from the temple and while he was standing on the platform on the western side of the road, the First Car which came from the northern side at a high speed, dashed against the platform which is almost to the road level and the deceased was pushed back and jammed with an electric post on the edge of the road. Therefore, according to PW 2, the occurrence was due to the rash and negligent driving of the car. But the driver of the car, who was examined as RW 1, has stated in his evidence that the lorry, which was proceeding in front, was suddenly stopped and the deceased also suddenly ran from east to west in front of the lorry and on seeing the car which was overtaking the stationary lorry, he suddenly jumped upon the bonnet of the car and as he applied brake, the car skidded to his right hand side and dashed against the electric post. Therefore, the driver of the Car also would admit that his car dashed against the electric post on the western side of the road jamming the deceased Radhakrishnan. Therefore, the driver of the Car also would admit that his car dashed against the electric post on the western side of the road jamming the deceased Radhakrishnan. PW 2 also stained in his evidence that the deceased was standing on the western side of the road in the platform and the Car suddenly swerving to its right hand side, hit against him. The driver admits that his car went to the wrong side due to the skidding of the tyres and ran over across the platform and hit against the electric post. It is clear that unless the car was driven at a high speed, there was no chance for skidding and the car also could not have crossed the platform even after applying the brakes. Therefore, it is evident that the car was driven at a high speed. It is also relevant in this connection to note that the evidence of PW 2 is that the deceased boy was on the western side of the platform at the time of the occurrence. Thus it is clear that when the car came to the wrong side, crossing the platform on the western side it hit against the deceased Radhakrishnan who was returning from Vinayagar Temple. The evidence of R W 1 that the deceased jumped upon the bonnet of his car while he crossed the road is worth rejection since it is clear that RW 1 indulges in fertile imagination. It is also pointed out on behalf of the respondents that RW 1 pleaded guilty when he was prosecuted for causing the death of Radhakrishnan by rash and negligent driving of the car and paid fine. Of course, the result of the case nor any observation in the judgment of the court, when the prosecution is launched against the driver, should not be taken as conclusive, while dealing with a petition for compensation by the dependants, under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. Thus, on the evidence available on record, it is clear in the instant case before us that the occurrence was due to rash and negligent driving of the car of the second respondent. 11. Now let us deal with the claim of compensation by the mother of the deceased. Thus, on the evidence available on record, it is clear in the instant case before us that the occurrence was due to rash and negligent driving of the car of the second respondent. 11. Now let us deal with the claim of compensation by the mother of the deceased. The appellant is the mother of the deceased and she states in her evidence that her son was aged 19 and he was employed at Madras under a lorry owner to load materials in the lorry. She also would say that her son was earning daily Rs. 10/- to Rs. 13/- and he was sending Rs. 150/- per month to her. PW 1 is living in a different place. As the deceased was employed under a lorry owner for loading blue metals in the lorry, I am of the opinion that the deceased might have earned about Rs. 250/- per month by loading blue metals because at the time of the occurrence it cannot be said that the daily wage of Rs. 10/- cannot be earned by a worker even giving concession to those days on which he may not have any work. Therefore, I feel that the fixation by the Tribunal so far as the monthly income of the deceased is concerned, namely Rs. 200/- is necessarily to be enhanced to Rs. 250/-. As the deceased was staying at Madras, he might have spent Rs. 100/- for his food and clothing and the balance of Rs. 150/- could have been sent to the family for maintenance, which consisted of his mother and sisters during the relevant time. Therefore, I fix the dependency of the appellant at Rs. 150/- per month. In other words, the compensation claimed in this regard is enhanced by Rs. 50/-. 12. The deceased was aged 19 at the time of the occurrence and he was a bachelor. Usually, the males in this part of the country will be married at the age of about 25 years. Therefore, the deceased would give his earnings to his mother till the time of his marriage and thereafter he cannot give his entire savings to his mother because he will have to maintain his wife and children from his earnings. The evidence of PW 1 is that the deceased was her only son. Therefore, the deceased would maintain his mother till her life time by spending atleast Rs. The evidence of PW 1 is that the deceased was her only son. Therefore, the deceased would maintain his mother till her life time by spending atleast Rs. 75/- per month. The lower court had fixed Rs. 50/- per month in this regard. The evidence available on record justifies the enhancement of this amount by Rs. 25/- i. e. by fixing Rs. 75/- per month in this regard. I fix the normal life time of T the appellant upto the age of 65. Hence from the date of the occurrence for a period of 6 years, that is upto the time of marriage of the deceased, the dependency of the appellant will be Rs. 150/- per month and thereafter for 14 years her dependency will be Rs. 75/- per month. At this rate, the total compensation will be arrived at Rs. 23,400/-. The Tribunal had allowed 20% deduction towards lump sum payment and uncertainty of life time. It is in this regard the above decision reported in A. Munirathnam v. Perundevi and Ors. 1980 TLNJ 348 has been referred to by the learned Counsel for the appellant. The relevant portion of the said decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the appellant reads as follows: This is an appeal against the award of compensation dated 17-8-1979 made in OP. No. 259 of 1979 on the file of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Madras. Even at the time when the appeal came up for admission, there was no dispute about the liability to pay compensation and there was a dispute only about the quantum and that too with regard to the fact that the Tribunal had not made necessary deduction from the total compensation on account of the compensation being paid as a lump sum. Consequently, the only question that we have to consider now is whether the Tribunal should have deducted any amount on the ground that a lump sum compensation is being paid. The Tribunal has held that out of his earnings, the deceased would have paid a sum of Rs. 7,600/- per annum for the maintenance of the family. He was aged 36 at the time of the accident It is also in evidence that the age of retirement in Parle Products (Private) Ltd., where the deceased was employed, was 60 years. The Tribunal has held that out of his earnings, the deceased would have paid a sum of Rs. 7,600/- per annum for the maintenance of the family. He was aged 36 at the time of the accident It is also in evidence that the age of retirement in Parle Products (Private) Ltd., where the deceased was employed, was 60 years. Consequently, normally speaking, he would have been in service for another 24 years and earned from the said company. However, the Tribunal multiplied the sum of Rs. 7,600/- only 20 times and not 24 times. Even before the Tribunal, an argument was advanced on behalf of the appellant herein that some deduction had to be made on account of lump sum payment. The Tribunal relied on the decision of this Court in C.M.A. Nos. 586 of 1975 and 88 of 1976 dated 13-12-1977 Jagadambal and Ors. v. Pallavan Transport Corporation Ltd., for holding that where the multiplier is fixed on a consideration of all the relevant circumstances and the uncertainties of life, it is not necessary to make any further deduction on account of lump sum payment. In fact, the decision of this Court referred to above refers to two different methods of arriving at the compensation and points out that when a multiplier is fixed after taking into account all the relevant circumstances, there is no question of making a further deduction on account of lump sum payment because all the relevant circumstances and the uncertainties of life are taken into account before fixing the multiplier itself. That reasoning will certainly apply to the present case. Independently of the above, the appellant will have to pay the compensation awarded on another ground also. As we pointed out already, the deceased would have served in Parle Products (Private) Ltd., till his sixtieth year, that is for another twenty four years. But the Tribunal has taken the multiplier only as 20 thereby making a deduction of 1/6th out of 24 which would normally be the percentage of deduction for lump sum payment. Consequently, looked at from any point of view, the award of the Tribunal does not call for any interference. 13. In the instant case before us, I find that there is nothing irregular or illegal in the Tribunal allowing 20% deduction towards lump sum payment and uncertainty of life time. Consequently, looked at from any point of view, the award of the Tribunal does not call for any interference. 13. In the instant case before us, I find that there is nothing irregular or illegal in the Tribunal allowing 20% deduction towards lump sum payment and uncertainty of life time. The decision cited is not applicable to the facts of the instant case before us. Therefore, the balance is Rs. 18,720/-. As the appellant is the mother of the deceased, I feel that Rs. 18,720/- is a reasonable compensation to her. Thus when the lower court had given a compensation of only Rs. 12,500/- on the heads claimed, this Court is of the view, on the basis of the evidence available on record, that the interests of justice would be amply met if the compensation is enhanced to Rs. 18,720/- as mentioned above. 14. In the result, an award is passed for Rs. 18,720/- with proportionate costs against the respondents and the first respondent-Insurance Company shall deposit the amount within four months from today. If the amount is not deposited within four months, the appellant is entitled to 9% interest from the date of the award till the date of deposit. This appeal is partly allowed. Under the circumstances, there is no order as to costs.