JUDGMENT R.M. Sahai, J. - Validity of the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Employees (Other than officers) (Appointing Authorities) Ordinance, 1987 (U.P. Ordinance No. 9 of 1987) defining appointing authorities of the Corporation with effect from 19th June, 1981 has been assailed, in these petitions principally for being beyond legislative competence of the State and also because it transgresses the field already occupied by the Central enactment 64 of 1950. Subsidiary submissions like colourable exercise of power by the Governor in issuing the Ordinance without any material for forming the opinion that urgency existed, vagueness of its clauses, failure to remove the defects in the rules pointed out by this Court, legislative over-ruling of Judicial decision, breach of Article 14 etc. were also raised, although feebly, more with purpose of adding the number of challenges than with any expectation of their being accepted. 2. Necessity to issue the ordinance arose as this Court in Rashid Ahmad v. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, 1986 U.P.L.B.E.C. 613 and Bhopal Singh v. Managing Directors, 1986 (12) A.L.R. 556 held that Preamble of the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Service Regulations 1981 (referred to hereinafter as Regulations) framed under Section 45(c) read with Section 12(1)(c) of Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 (For brevity Transport Act), having superseded all existing resolutions resulted in supersession of the resolution passed by the Corporation, as it stood prior to 1982, including the resolution of 1974 delegating powers of appointing authority to various officers. And there being no fresh delegation the order of dismissal or termination passed by the authorities in pursuance of 1974 delegation was illegal and invalid. If the effect of the decision in Bhopal Singh's case would have remained confined to that case alone probably the Corporation would have submitted to it after the Special Leave petition was dismissed by Hon'ble Supreme Court as in fact it did by reinstating petitioner. But it resulted in larger number of writ petitions by the employees who had been dismissed for misconduct etc. creating huge liability towards past arrears apart from problem of reinstating them. Thus an extraordinary situation arose. To overcome it the State Government issued the Ordinance removing the infirmity by creating fiction that an officer authorised by the Corporation prior to 1982 shall be deemed to have been authorised by the Board. It further validated action taken prior to issuance of the Ordinance. 3. Thus an extraordinary situation arose. To overcome it the State Government issued the Ordinance removing the infirmity by creating fiction that an officer authorised by the Corporation prior to 1982 shall be deemed to have been authorised by the Board. It further validated action taken prior to issuance of the Ordinance. 3. Legislative power exercised under Article 213 of the Constitution was defended by the learned Advocate General by referring to entries 41 or 32 of list II or entry 35 of list III of seventh schedule. He urged that the legislature was competent to enact such law under either of the entries, therefore, the argument of legislative competence was liable to be rejected. Argued Learned Advocate General that even if the ordinance was not directly covered in any entry but it was included in it incidentally then so long it did not trench upon any matter covered by List I it was not repugnant and shall prevail. In the alternative it was submitted by the learned Advocate General that Parliament having delegated the power to frame regulations on service conditions under Section 14 of the Act on State it was conferment of executive power which taken to its logical conclusion under Article 162 extended to matter in respect of which the law could be made by legislature. Therefore, according to him, the ordinance was a valid piece of legislation the legality of which was unimpeachable. 4. Prior to embarking upon scrutiny of various provisions of the Transport Act to ascertain if the entire field was already occupied by the Central legislation therefore, the ordinance being in class with it was liable to be struck down a State Legislature had no jurisdiction to issue the impugned ordinance or the ordinance in true nature and character or in pith and substance was issued in respect of any matter specified in List II or III of seventh Schedule, it appears appropriate to understand the scheme of distribution of legislative powers under Chapter I Part XI of the Constitution to properly appreciate the dimension of the Constitutional issue relating to legislative competence. Since the Constitution is federal in character it begins with laying down extent of laws to be made by Parliament and the legislature by incorporating the principle of territoriality in Article 245. Since the Constitution is federal in character it begins with laying down extent of laws to be made by Parliament and the legislature by incorporating the principle of territoriality in Article 245. It empowers parliament to 'make laws for the whole or any part of territory of India, which under clause (3) of Article 1 of the Constitution comprises of 'territories of the state the Union Territories specified in the First Schedule and such other territories as may be acquired. Whereas a State Legislative can make laws for whole or part of the State. Consequently parliament's power to legislate extends in respect of any territory or part of the country as well as every State included in the Union. It was, therefore, necessary to specify the subject matter of legislation both of parliament and legislature to avoid any conflict or clash. That has been achieved by demarcating legislative field of parliament and State Legislature in Act. They have been conferred with exclusive powers to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I and II respectively of the seventh schedule. And concurrent powers in respect of list III. The pattern is more or less the same as was under Government of India Act 1935, The supremacy or predominance of Parliament has been adhered to in clause (1) by use of expression, 'notwithstanding anything in clauses 1 and 3' the Parliament shall have exclusive powers to legislate in respect of matters specified in list I of the seventh schedule. It has been reaffirmed and put beyond doubt by clause (3) which while conferring exclusive power on State legislature, in respect of items mentioned in list II specifically provides that the exercise of powers shall be subject to exercise of power in clauses 1 and 2. The essence or gist of three clauses of Article 246 read together is that even though the State legislature has exclusive power to make laws in respect of matters enumerated in list II but the exercise of power shall be ultra vires or bad if it encroaches upon any subject matter of list I and if there is a Union Law in force and the State law is found to overlap then the former shall hold the field. In other words if there is any Central law in force or if it comes into being even later than the State law, then to the extent it falls under Entry I the power of the State legislature shall be deemed to be nonexistent or withdrawn. In State of Orissa v. M.A. Tullock, A.I.R. 1964 (S.C.) 1284 the Hon'ble Court while explaining the scope of distribution of powers held, 'If a competent legislature with superior efficacy expressly or impliedly evinces by its legislation's an intention to cover the whole field, the enactments of the other legislature would be overborne'. In K.S.E. Board v. Indian Aluminium Co., A.I.R. 1976 (S.C.) 1037 it was held, The power of Parliament to legislate with respect to matters included in list I is supreme notwithstanding anything contained in clause (3) the entry in List I takes effect notwithstanding the entry in list II'. In Hoechest Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1983 (S.C.) 1019 the Hon'ble Court while analysing the power of legislation of State Legislature held. The exclusive power of the State Legislature with respect to any of the matters enumerated in list II has to be exercised subject to clause (1) i.e. the exclusive power of Parliament to legislate with respect to matters enumerated in list I. As a consequence if, there is a conflict between an entry in list I and an entry in list II which is not capable of reconciliation the power of Parliament to legislate with respect to a matter enumerated must supersede the exercise of power of the State Legislature.' 5. Thus the State Legislature has exclusive power to enact laws in respect of subjects specified in list II except to the extent of Constitutional constraints mentioned in clause (1) of Article 246. What has to be examined, therefore, is if the ordinance issued by State Government can be held to fall as argued by learned Advocate General, either under Entry 32 or 41 of list II or entry 35 of list III as in case it is held otherwise, then the ordinance shall be bad or ultra vires not because of any repugnancy with Central law but due to lack of legislative power. Initial endeavour of the learned Advocate General was to protect the Ordinance by referring it to Entry 41 of List II which is reproduced below: "State Public Service Commission." It was urged that since services under the Corporation were State Public Service, the impugned Ordinance squarely fell under this Entry. It was submitted that providing state road services was a Government or State function, therefore, any employee appointed to perform this function is a member of State Public Service. He argued that legislation in respect of State Public Service being in exclusive domain of State legislature any enactment made in this regard even if it incidentally or indirectly encroached upon any field covered by Central enactment it shall not be ultra vires and shall prevail. 6. State Public Service' has not been defined in the Constitution. In Blacks Law Dictionary, 'Public Service' is explained as under: "Public service. - A term to apply in modern usage to the object and Enterprises of certain kinds of corporations, which specially serve the needs of particular Public or conduct to the comfort and cognizance of an entire community, such as railroad, gas, water and electric light companies, and companies furnishing motor vehicle transportation." 7. In the modern concept of welfare activity public service is the primary function to be discharged by the State. It is expected to stretch its arm to touch every nook and corner. For that purpose and to avoid exploitation by private ownership it may create, constitute or empower corporations or quasi corporations to cater to public convenience and necessity by even contributing funds and may even issue directions or guide lines. But that may not be sufficient to impart it the character of State Public Department. Even if the Corporation is carrying on Governmental activity or it is the, 'Government operating behind a corporate veil it does not become an organ of the State. 'Where the Corporation has a sufficient degree of independence neither the corporation nor its employees are legally servants of Crown, (H.E. Wade Administrative Law). Therefore, an employee may be an employee of a public Service Corporation. But the power under entry 41 is in respect of State Public Service. That is the State is empowered to legislate under this subject in respect of those employees who are not only public servants or carrying on public duty but are members of state public service. 8. Therefore, an employee may be an employee of a public Service Corporation. But the power under entry 41 is in respect of State Public Service. That is the State is empowered to legislate under this subject in respect of those employees who are not only public servants or carrying on public duty but are members of state public service. 8. Reliance was placed on Mathura Dass Mohan Lal Kedia and others v. State of Gujarat A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 53 and State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshari Lal, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 161 and it was urged that an employee may not be a member of State service yet he may be a Government servant. Therefore, legislation in respect of such employees who are Government servants shall be in exclusive domain of State Legislature. Attention was drawn to Sections 14(1), 19(c), 34 and 45 of the Central Act and it was urged that since Government either exercised control or was associated with appointment of employees of Corporation they were Government servants, therefore, the Ordinance did not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. In Mathura Das case (Supra) it was held: INPARA = "The true test for determination of the question whether a person is holding a civil service is existence of a relationship of master and servant between the State and the person holding under it and that existence of such relationship is dependent upon the right of the State to select and appoint the holder of the post, its right to control the manner and method of his doing the work and the payment by it of his wage and remunerations." None of these ingredients either individually or collectively are made oat in the present case. From perusal of Sections 14(3)(b), 19, 34 and 45 it is clear that even though the State Government is entitled to issue directions to Corporation and Corporation can make regulations in respect of service conditions with approval of Government the State does not exercise control either in appointment or suspension or dismissal or even payment of salary etc. 'The legal relationship of master and servant demand that the master shall have complete control of what the servant does. 'The legal relationship of master and servant demand that the master shall have complete control of what the servant does. This test is not satisfied, in the case of a public corporation, merely because the minister may appoint and dismiss the members or give directions, "of a general character" or probably because he can give any kind of direction'. (H.W. Wade Administrative Law). In Ram Lal's case (supra) the Panchayat service was held to be Government service not only because Government contributed substantial funds and duties discharged by employees were in relation to affairs of State but the class, cadre and posts were to be determined by Government and the employees could be transferred in district and promotions could be made from state service. In absence of any provision in the Act or rules establishing control of State either in appointment or promotion or termination or dismissal it cannot be held that relationship of master and servant existed between employees of Corporation and State. In Valjibhal v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1890 it was held that Road Transport Corporation of Maharashtra was not a department of Government bat a separate legal entity. Although expression, 'state public service' is wide in import than Article 309 of the Constitution yet it cannot be extended to employees of Corporation only because they are public servants under Section 43 of the Act or because U.P. Public Services Tribunal Act applied to them. Since service under Corporation cannot be held to be State public service the State legislature could not have enacted any law under entry 41 of list II. 9. Can the Ordinance be justified under entry 32 of List II which reads as under: "Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations, other than those specified in List I, and universities, unincorporated trading, literary, scientific, associations; co-operative societies." The entry is widely worded, it is very comprehensive in nature. But its width is curtailed by excluding from its ambit matters specified in list I. The two entries in Union list are 43 and 44. They deal with trading corporation and corporation with objects not confined to one State. The foremost issue, therefore, is can the Transport Act be referred to either of these entries? As regards entry 44 it is clear that it empowers the Parliament to make laws with respect to corporations which have interstate operation. They deal with trading corporation and corporation with objects not confined to one State. The foremost issue, therefore, is can the Transport Act be referred to either of these entries? As regards entry 44 it is clear that it empowers the Parliament to make laws with respect to corporations which have interstate operation. In K.S.E. Board v. Indian Aluminium Co., (supra) the Supreme Court repelled the submission that Electricity (Supply) Act 1948 was enacted under entry 44 of list I as the Act dealt with Incorporation of Electricity Board, which could operate beyond limits of the State only with agreement of the other State. Therefore, the Transport Act cannot be held to be an Act referable to entry 44 as Section 3 empowers State to establish a corporation for whole or part of State only. 10. So far entry 43 is concerned the argument was built on observation made by Supreme Court in Sita Ram v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1373 that the Road Transport Corporation Act is made by Parliament under Item 43 of List I. The submission, however, ignores that the observation was made by Hon'ble Court presumably because it was stated in objects and reasons of the Act that it was being enacted as creation of statutory corporations by Provinces had been held to be ultra vires as transport corporation were trading corporations. But the matter was not gone into, as the Ordinance issued by State of Rajasthan was upheld under entry 38 of list III. Apart from it since then much water has flown. In K.S.E. Board's case (supra) the controversy was dealt squarely. In the objects and reasons of the Electricity (Supply) 1948 Act, it was urged that the Act made under entry 33 of the Federal list of Government of India Act 1935, corresponds to entry 43 and 44 of list I. It was, however, held: "The fact that statement of objects and reasons mentions entry 33 of list (of Government of India Act) as the legislative head under what the legislation was being undertaken is not conclusive." The Hon'ble Court held that true test was "pith and substance" of the legislation. It repelled the submission that electricity board was a trading corporation. It repelled the submission that electricity board was a trading corporation. And held; They are public service corporations as they have to function without any profit motive and its duty was to promote co-ordinated development of the generation, supply and distribution of electricity in the most efficient and economic manner'. In I.T. Commissioner Hyderabad v. Andhra State Road Transport Corporation, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1054 the question whether a corporation constituted under Road Transport Act 1950 was liable to pay income tax because it earned profits was negatived and it was held that although corporation was not expected to run at loss yet the predominant object of the corporation being charitable and not to earn profit it did not loose its charitable character merely because some profit arose from its activity. It was further held that road development was an object of public utility. In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath, 1986 (53) F.L.R. 523 (S.C.) the Hon'ble Court rejected the claim that the corporation was a trading company as the corporation was of great importance to public interest concern and welfare, In the present day concept of modern state particularly of a developing democracy a corporation or quasi corporation created to share states responsibility cannot be considered to be a trading corporation. 11. Even assuming that it is a trading corporation the Ordinance defines the appointing authority. It does not deal with or relate to incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporation. In Sita Ram's case the Hon'ble Court upheld validity of Section 4 of Motor Vehicle (Rajasthan) Amendment Ordinance 1974 as it dealt with acquisition of State Transport undertaking and not with incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading corporation on principle that the constitutionality of law is to be determined by its real subject matter and not by any incidental effect which it may have on the topic of legislation in list I. 12. It may now be examined if the Ordinance can be held to fall under entry 35 which reads as under: 'Mechanically propelled vehicles including the principles on which taxes on vehicles are to be levied'. 13. It may now be examined if the Ordinance can be held to fall under entry 35 which reads as under: 'Mechanically propelled vehicles including the principles on which taxes on vehicles are to be levied'. 13. The scope of this entry can be better understood if it is examined alongwith entry 13 of List II which is reproduced under; 'Communication, that is to say, roads, bridges, ferries and other means of communication not specified in list I; municipal tramways, roadways, inland water ways, and traffics thereon subject to the provision of list, and list III with regard to such waterways; vehicles other than mechanically propelled vehicle'. The two entries have to be read together as entry 35 of list III deals with what would otherwise have been included in very widely worded entry 13 of list II. But since communication of roads by mechanically propelled vehicles could be for State as well as inter-state the power to legislate in this regard was conferred both on Parliament and legislature by specifying the subject separately. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the argument of learned counsel for petitioner that the ambit of the entry should be confined to legislation's dealing with mechanism or structure of vehicles. That would be narrowing the entry for which there is no warrant and shall be against canons of interpretation that subject of legislation should be given wide and liberal meaning as the entries do not confer any power but demarcate the legislative field, 'the allocation of subjects in the list is not by way of scientific or logical definition but is mere enumeration of broad comprehensive categories' Harak Chand v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1453. The principle has been resorted to and applied extensively while determining legislative competence. For instance in K.D.H.P.Co. v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2301 the Hon'ble Court repelled the argument of lack of legislative competence to enact Karnon Diven Hills (Resumption of Land) Act, 1971, which while resuming agricultural land made provision for settlement of land for plantation which is an exclusive centre subject as, 'the State had legislative competence to legislate in entry 18 list II and entry 42, This power cannot be denied on the ground that it has some effect on the industry controlled under entry 52 list I. Effect is not the same thing as subject matter. In K S.E. Boards, case 'electricity' in list III was held wide enough to include a law relating to constitution of electricity boards as it was, 'incidental to the rationalisation of the production and supply of electricity. 14. In Tika Ram v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 676 the Hon'ble Court upheld validity of U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act even though the entry, Industry at serial No. 52 of List I was very wide and comprised of raw material, process of manufactures or production and distribution yet a legislation on products of controlled industry could be enacted under entry 33 of list III. The Motor Vehicles Act, a legislation enacted under this very entry deals not only with control of vehicles, their registration, grant of permits, licence but also with exclusion of private owners from transport service and compensation to victims of accident by vehicles etc. Thus the power to legislate under entry 35 is not confined to enact law in respect of motor vehicles as such only. It extends to matters which are associated and related to it. The objective of the Road Transport Corporation was to enable State Government, 'to set up Transport Corporation, with the object of providing efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated system of road transport service'. It empowers State Government to establish Corporations for providing transport service which under clause (e) of Section 2 means a service carrying passengers or goods or both by road in vehicles for hire or reward. And vehicles in clause (f) mean mechanically propelled vehicles. The power and duty of corporation under Section 18 of the Act is to provide or secure or promote an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated system of road transport service in the State. This appears to be principle or main objective of the Act. It was to achieve this objective and obviate the effect of declaration that provinces were not empowered to legislate in respect of road transport corporation as they were trading corporations that the Road Transport Act was enacted. 15. Therefore, it is an act which is referable either to entry 43 of list I or entry 35 of list III or entry 32 of list II. 15. Therefore, it is an act which is referable either to entry 43 of list I or entry 35 of list III or entry 32 of list II. If it is a law relating to trading corporation enacted under entry 43 then on ratio of Sita Ram's case (supra) the powers of legislature was eroded only to the extent that it could not undertake legislation relating to incorporation or winding up of corporation. But it did not preclude the legislature from undertaking legislation in other regard. 16. If the Act is a law relating to public service corporation then the State Legislature could enact a law either under entry 32 of list II or entry 35 of list III, subject to the restriction that it could not violate Article 246(1), nor the provisions of the Act could be repugnant to the Central Law as the State Law to the extent of repugnancy was liable to be overborne. That is the exercise of legislative power may not be bad for lack of legislative competence, but the provisions of the Act may be invalid or ineffective because it entrenches on the field already occupied by the law made by Parliament. Since the power conferred under entry 32 of list II and 35 of list III is very wide which extends to enact law not only in respect of corporation or the mechanism or structure or motor vehicles but also to provide for the creation of corporation or to establish authorities to carry into effect the objective of the Act the legislature could enact law in respect of employees of such corporation. It cannot, therefore, be successfully urged that the Ordinance was beyond legislative competence of State. 17. Repugnancy between the Central Act and the Ordinance was vehemently urged. Learned Counsel submitted that no legislature was competent to enact a law on incidental aspect only. According to learned counsel provision for service conditions of employees was incidental to incorporation, therefore, the legislature could not have undertaken legislation on this aspect only. Reliance was placed on Check Post Officer Coimbatore v. K.P. Abdutta and Brothers, A.I.R. 1971 (S.C.) 792 and Ashoka Marketing v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1971 (S.C) 946 it was also submitted that the field being occupied by Central enactment any legislation which directly or indirectly encroached upon incidental or ancillary aspect was liable to be struck down. Reliance was placed on Check Post Officer Coimbatore v. K.P. Abdutta and Brothers, A.I.R. 1971 (S.C.) 792 and Ashoka Marketing v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1971 (S.C) 946 it was also submitted that the field being occupied by Central enactment any legislation which directly or indirectly encroached upon incidental or ancillary aspect was liable to be struck down. The argument stands answered by Sita Rain's case. Section 4 of Rajasthan Ordinance added Section 68 CC alter Section 68 C in Chapter IV of Motor Vehicles Act. It was urged that subject matter of the Ordinance fell under entry 43 of list I. The Hon'ble Court rejected the argument and held that the Ordinance was issued in exercise of power under entry 35 and 42 of list III as, the constitutionality of the law is to be determined by its real subject matter and not by incidental effect which it may have on any topic of legislation in list I. The validity of legislation, therefore, is determined by pith and substance of legislation and not by exercise of power on incidental or ancillary matter only. If the Ordinance was issued in relation to a subject for which the State Legislature was competent to enact law then the exercise of power is not rendered bad or ultra vires because it was exercised in relation to service conditions of employees only. 18. The question of repugnancy arises only in case both the legislations fall within the same list Deep Chand v. State, 1976 S.C. 1031 : 1983 S.C. 1020 : 1959 S.C. 668. The conflict may be direct or the two enactments may not be inconsistent with each other or the field may already be occupied by the Central enactment or it may become occupied from a date latter than the State law. In either case endeavour must be made to resolve it by having recourse to the context and scheme of the Act, and, a reconciliation attempted between two apparently conflicting jurisdictions by reading the two entries together and by interpreting and, where necessary modifying the language of the one by the other in Central Provision and Berar Act., A.I.R. 1939 F.C. I. : A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1031. Since both legislation's are referable to entry 35 it may be seen if there is any conflict. Since both legislation's are referable to entry 35 it may be seen if there is any conflict. Section 18 lays down general duty of corporation to provide or secure or promote the provisions of an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated system of road transport service in the State. It indeed spells out objective of enactment. For its effective implementation Section 3 empowers State Government to establish a corporation. Section 14 provides for officers and servants of corporation. Its sub Section (2)(e) provides that the conditions of appointment and service and the scales of pay and officers and employees of corporation shall be such as may subject to provision of Section 34, be determined by regulation made under the Act. Section 34 empowers State Government to issue direction after consulting the corporation relating to recruitment, conditions of service etc. There is thus no provision in the Act relating to service conditions of employees of corporation. It only empowers the corporation to make regulation in this regard. It does not occupy the field as argued by the learned counsel for petitioner. In Hoechest Pharmaceutical Ltd. (Supra) the Hon'ble Court approved the observation of Lord Dunedin, in Grand Trunk Railway Company of Canada v. Attorney General of Canada 1907 A.C. 65: "There can be a dominion in which provincial and dominion Legislation may overlap in which case neither legislation will be ultra vires if the field is clear, but if the field is not clear and the two legislation's meet the Dominion legislation must prevail." Applying the above, principle it is apparent from various provisions noticed above that the field in respect of service conditions was clear, therefore, principle of predominance of Central Law the Ordinance cannot be struck down. 19. Since validity of the Ordinance has been upheld it is unnecessary to examine the alternative submission of learned Advocate General that the Ordinance was issued in respect of a matter which had been delegated by Parliament. 20. As regard the assault that the Ordinance was issued in colourable exercise of power without being satisfied, that urgency existed no foundation for arbitrary exercise of power has been held in any of the petitions. And the courts power except to this limited extent stands excluded as satisfaction regarding necessity of immediate action is not justiciable. Dr. 20. As regard the assault that the Ordinance was issued in colourable exercise of power without being satisfied, that urgency existed no foundation for arbitrary exercise of power has been held in any of the petitions. And the courts power except to this limited extent stands excluded as satisfaction regarding necessity of immediate action is not justiciable. Dr. D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 579; S.K.G. Sugar Ltd. v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1533 Nor is there any merit in the submission that act of issuing Ordinance was malafide, as it is in exercise of legislative power which cannot be accused of mala fide. K. Nagraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1985 (51) F.L.R. 166 (S.C.), T. Venkatareddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 724. 21. The submission that the Ordinance purports to overrule the decision of the Court is also without substance as it is firmly established that a legislature can remove the defects in the Act or rule from retrospective effect. It is not legislative overruling but removal of defects thereby rendering the law valid Tirath Ram Rajendra Prasad, 1987 S.C. 1454 : A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 405; M/s. Hindustan Gum and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Haryana., 1985 S.C. 1683. 22. Similarly the argument that Ordinance suffers from vice of Article 14 appears to be without any merits. Validation of provision with retrospective effect or enactment of a law to remove defects in existing law from back date cannot be prima facie held to be discriminatory. Argument that Ordinance defines appointing authority from June 1981, and validates action taken by such authority under the resolution of 1974 where as fresh delegation has been given in 1986, and therefore, the action is arbitrary is mis-conceived. Appointing Authority under the ordinance and even under the fresh exercise of powers being the same no plea of discrimination can be raised. Delegation in 1986 was resorted to because of the decisions given by this court. Earlier resolution passed in 1974 had been superseded. Till then ordinance had not been issued. In any case the delegation of power under regulation framed in 1981 does not in any manner contravene the provisions of the ordinance. 23. Delegation in 1986 was resorted to because of the decisions given by this court. Earlier resolution passed in 1974 had been superseded. Till then ordinance had not been issued. In any case the delegation of power under regulation framed in 1981 does not in any manner contravene the provisions of the ordinance. 23. In view of what has been stated above it is not necessary to narrate any fact, but fact of the case of Bhopal Singh and another (supra) may be mentioned to understand the circumstances and background in which controversy had arisen. The petitioner was appointed as conductor on 1-1-1978 by Assistant Regional Manager Varanasi. He was charge-sheeted on 1st July 1985 and after explanation and show-cause notice was subsequently removed from service on 27th February, 1986. Order of removal was quashed by this court on 10th September, 1986 as no valid delegation subsisted on the date the action was taken. The order was confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 20th January 1980. On 20th December, 1926 Board of Directors delegated power to various officers by a resolution in exercise of powers under Section 12(1)(c) of Act 64 of 1950. On 10th May, 1987 ordinance was issued. By virtue of ordinance the defence pointed out by this court stood removed, consequently law officer of the corporation issued circular on 6th June, 107 to terminate services of Bhopal Singh and on 16th June, 170 Regional Manager terminated his services. Similar orders were passed in respect of various employees. Since ordinance has been held to be valid the defect in removal order passed in February, 1965 stands removed and Regional Manager did not commit any error of law in terminating petitioners service on 16th June, 1957. 24. For the reasons stated above petitions fail and are dismissed. But there shall be no order as to costs.