JUDGEMENT R. S. Thakur, J.—This second appeal is directed against the judgment in appeal passed by the District Judge, Shimla, dated September 7, 1977, whereby the appeal of the present appellants (hereinafter referred to as the defendants) was dismissed with costs affirming the judgment and decree passed against the defendants and in favour of the respondent, Sapuran Dass (hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff; on December 17, 1973, by the Sub-Judge at Rohru. 2. The facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed a suit in the Court of the Sub-Judge at Rohru against the defendants for possession of 3.Id Bighas of land, i hereinafter called as the suit land), which was a part of Khasra No. 1F4, Khita Khatoni No. 177/352 min situate in Chak Khatasu as per Jamabandi for the years 1964-65 which totally measured 7.1.2 Bighas, the suit land, therefore, being denoted by Khasra No. 1134/1. 3. The averments in the plaint were that the plaintiff was the owner in possession of the suit land and sometime in the year 1967, the defendants took forcible possession of the suit land when he got the land demarcated and during demarcation in the presence of the panchayat, it was found that the defendants were in illegal possession of the suit land which was a part of Khasra No. 1134, while the rest of the area appertinent to said Khasra No. was still in the ownership and possession of the plaintiff. The defendants in their written statement admitted that the demarcation was carried out qua the suit land in the presence of the parties but asserted that they had not accepted the correctness of this demarcation. They further averred that in any case they have been in open and hostile possession of this land to the knowledge of the plaintiff for more than 12 years and had, therefore, become owners of the suit land by virtue of their adverse possession thereon which had matured to title in their favour. They denied that they took forcible possession of the suit land in 1967 only. 4. On these pleadings of the parties, the lower Court framed the following issues :— 1. Whether the suit has been properly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction ? If not, what is the correct valuation. OPP. 2. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties ? OPD. 3. 4. On these pleadings of the parties, the lower Court framed the following issues :— 1. Whether the suit has been properly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction ? If not, what is the correct valuation. OPP. 2. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties ? OPD. 3. Whether the land in dispute is part of Khasra No. 1134 owned by the plaintiff ? OPP. 4. Whether the defendants have become owners of the land in dispute by adverse possession ? OPD. 5. Relief. 5. The lower Court decided issues No. 1 and 3 in favour of the plaintiff and issues No. 2 and 4 against the defendants and thus decreed the suit leaving the parties to bear their own costs. 6 The defendants then challanged this judgment and decree before the learned District Judge, Shimla, and the only point argued before the learned District Judge was that the original court was in error in returning the finding that the defendants had failed to prove that they had become owners of that suit land by adverse possession for more than 12 years. The learned District Judge, however, vide impugned judgment after discussing the entire evidence threadbare on the point raised before him, concurred with the finding of the trial Court by holding that the defendants had not led any satisfactory evidence to prove that they had been in possession of the suit land for over 12 years adversely to the plaintiff and thus dismissed the appeal with costs as stated earlier. 7. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and also gone through the record of the case and feel that there is no justification for this court to interfere with the concurrent findings of the two court below. 8. This court has held in AIR 1971 HP 5 Moti, Appellants v. Rothan and others respondents, that in paragraph 32 of the Himachal Pradesh (Courts) Order 1948, read with Section 17 of the Delhi High Court Act, 196 and Sections 23 and 25 of the State of Himachal Pradesh Act, 1970, a second appeal lies on questions of law as well as of fact when the judgment and decree of the trial Court is reversed by the first appellate court and the value of the subject-matter, where it is land, is more than Rs. 250. 250. In the instant case, the value of the suit land for purpose of jurisdiction has been assessed as at sixty times of the land revenue thereof which comes to Rs. 7.20 and for purpose of Court fee ten times which comes to Rs. 1.20 and this has been held by the trial Court as correct valuation of the land which finding was not challenged by the defendants before the first appellate court and, therefore, this finding is binding upon the defendants. The value of the suit land thus had no where been shown as more than Rs. 2}0. Further the first appellate court obviously has not reversed the finding of the trial court but has rather affirmed the same and, therefore, the benefit of the relevant provisions of the aforesaid order and Acts cannot be extended to the defendants and under these circumstances, it would not be proper for this court to go into the question of facts pertaining to the instant case. 9. Now so far as the question of law is concerned, it has neither been pointed out to this court as to what substantial question of law is involved in this second appeal nor does the Memo, of appeal indicate any such question of law with precision nor was any such question formulated at the time of admission of the appeal to bring it within the four-corners of Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code or the Acts and order, cited supra. 10. The only question involved in this case is whether the defendants have become owners of this suit land by adverse possession over a statutory period which is a mixed question of law and fact. So far as the law is concerned, the position is clear that the case is covered by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, the relevant portion whereof is ; "Description of suit : For possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title ; period of limitation : Twelve years ; Time from which period begins to run : When the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff." It is clear that the instant suit is for possession based on the title of the plaintiff. Thus the onus lay heaving upon the defendants to prove as to at what point of time their possession become adverse prior to the statutory period of twelve years so as to entitle them to defect the title of the plaintiff. In the instant case, there has been no error committed by any of the courts below on the question of law as the onus to prove the issue whether the defendants had become owners of the suit land through adverse possession for over twelve years, has been placed upon them. Both the courts below also rightly raised a presumption of ownership and possession of the plaintiff on the basis of the jamabandi qua the suit land as the said Jamabandi being the record of rights carried a presumption of truth unless property rebutted. 11. Thus in my opinion the two courts below have no where committed any error of law. 12. Now so far the question as to whether the defendants were able to discharge the burden of proving the ownership by adverse possession or rebutting the entries in the revenue records is concerned, it is a question of fact over which both the courts have concurred in holding that the defendants have failed to discharge the burden and, therefore, this finding on the question of fact, in my opinion, has become unassailable in this court. 13. Despite this, however, to satisfy the judicial conscience of this court, the entire evidence on record has been scanned by this court carefully and it has felt satisfied that the concurrent finding of the two courts below is free from any infirmity. It is clear that the defendants on this point of adverse possession, in their written statement, had merely averred that the defendants took possession of the suit land in the year 1949 when they settled in the village in that year and have been in possession thereof in open, continuous and hostile manner to the knowledge of the plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest, that is, one widow who gifted the land in favour of the plaintiff. While adducing evidence, however, they have come out with a story that in fact the suit and was taken into possession by their father Rattan Dass (since deceased) while the defendants were still minors and that at that time one Ganga Ram (since deceased;, the husband of Smt. Murtu (since deceasd) who inherited the land from said Ganga Ram and then gifted it in favour of the plaintiff, had got the land demarcated by Halqa Patwari when the suit land was found to be in illegal possession of their father Rattan Dass, but, said Rattan Dass did not give up the possession of the suit land despite the fact that Ganga Ram was asking him time and again to vacate the possession in his favour and that since then they have been continuing in possession of this suit land. This story, however, on the part of the defendants, was rightly disbelieved by the courts below as it appears to be just an after thought it. There is no documentary evidence whatsoever to prove this factual of Ganga Ram restoring to any such demarcation and calling upon the father of the defendants to vacate the possession and it appears highly improbable that if Ganga Ram had found that Rattan Dass, the father of the defendants, was in illegal possession of the suit land and was persisting in his illegal possession, he (Ganga Ram) would not have taken any further steps to get the illegal possession vacated. Further it is also very improbable that despite the fact that the defendants knew that they had been in continuous adverse possession of the suit land for more than 30 years, they should not have taken any steps to get their possession regularised by initiating proceedings in the revenue courts for the correction of the revenue records. One of the defendants, Had Datt, while in the witness-box has no doubt stated that he had taken up such proceedings before the Tehsildar Jubbal but the same according to him, were dismissed by the Tehsildar, ex-parte. The lower courts, however, have rightly not relied on this statement since it was a matter of record and the defendants failed to produce any document on record in connection with these proceedings to show that he had taken up any such plea of ownership through adverse possession qua the suit land anywhere. The lower courts, however, have rightly not relied on this statement since it was a matter of record and the defendants failed to produce any document on record in connection with these proceedings to show that he had taken up any such plea of ownership through adverse possession qua the suit land anywhere. In fact it is clear from the record that when the plaintiff get the suit land demarcated in the year 1967 in the presence of defendant Hari Datt, even at that late stage, said defendant failed to assert even before the panchayat under whose aegis the demarcation was carried out that he was owner of the suit land by adverse possession. All that he asserted at that time was that he did not agree with the correctness of the demarcation as carried out at that time which objection was over-ruled by the panchayat. He has merely examined a couple of witnesses to prove this factum and I feel that their evidence was rightly rejected by the courts below as they appear to be just tutored and do not inspire confidence at all. 14. R. Mitra in his commentary on Article 65 of the Limitation Act, Fourth Edition, at page 598 in note 21 has stated : ".21. Distraction between possession and adverse possession.—If occupation by A of an immovable property belonging to B to operate as a vestive fact, his possession must be adverse to that of B. There is a real distinction between adverse possession and possession simplicitor. Possession in order to be adverse must be hostile to that of the true owner. If it is to be a vestive fact the intent to possess in ones own right, must be there, adverse possession cannot operate in vacue. Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applies not merely to the want of actual possession by the real owner, it comes into play only when the person in actual occupation for the statutory period is in such occupation in denial of the title of the true owner. The fundamental principle of law is that there can be no adverse possession without animus to prescribe. In other words, there can be no acquisitive prescription without the intent to acquire property of which another is the owner. The fundamental principle of law is that there can be no adverse possession without animus to prescribe. In other words, there can be no acquisitive prescription without the intent to acquire property of which another is the owner. Then in note—34 at page 607, he has this to say : "Adverse Possession".—Adverse possession means possession, which is adverse, i. e. possession of land or an interest in land by a wrong man against the will of the right man, who is the owner of the land or has an interest in the land. Therefore, adverse possession, as its words imply, must be actual possession of anothers land with intention to hold it and claim it as his own to the exclusion of rightful owner. It must commence with the wrongful dispossession of the rightful owner at some particular time, and must commence to wrong and maintained against right. It must be actual, open, notorious, hostile, under claim or right, continuous, and exclusive and maintained for the statutory period. In Sitabai v.Jumo, (1935) 157 I C 283 (sind) it was held that the possession and adverse possession do not mean the same thing. A mere user of the property cannot be taken as a definite assertion of proprietary right ; there must be some definite quality in the possession before it can be called adverse, and some act of an unequivocal character to put the owner on guard. There cannot be adverse possession if the defendant himself did not know that he was occupying somebody elses land. Mere possession however long does not necessarily mean that it is adverse to the true owner. Adverse possession really means a hostile possession which is expressly or impliedly in denial of the title of the true owner, and in order to constitute adverse possession, the possession proved must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent so as to show that it is adverse to the true owner. The classical requirements of acquisition of title by adverse possession are that such possession in denial of the true owners title must be peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be open and hostile enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property, though it is not necessary that there should be evidence of the adverse possessor actually informing the real owner of the formers hostile action." 15. The possession must be open and hostile enough to be capable of being known by the parties interested in the property, though it is not necessary that there should be evidence of the adverse possessor actually informing the real owner of the formers hostile action." 15. In the instant case none of these conditions appear to have been present so as to hold the defendants as having become owner of the suit land through adverse possession. 16. The defendants have also tried to prove by adducing evidence that they had not only cultivated this land by breaking it but had also constructed Khalyan and Okhli thereon besides having planted trees thereon. None of these factors even if existing are of any consequence once it is held that their are trespassers on this land and this illegal possession of theirs on the suit land has not ripened into ownership through adverse possession. So far as the trees are concerned, no doubt it has been proved that some trees of appricet and peach were quite old thereon but it is a known fact that they are of wild variety and not actually planted. There are some apple plants thereon but they appear to have been planted only somewhere at the time when the plaintiff get the suit land demarcated, So far as Khalyan and Ukhali, are concerned, even if they are existing on this land, the defendants at the most are entitled to carry the material thereof away when the plaintiff obtains possession of the suit land. 17. In view of the above discussion, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 100. Appeal dismissed.