S. RANANATHAN, J. ( 1 ) AN assessment order was made on 28-3-1974 in respect of the income earned by Shri Nathu Ram during the previous relevant to the assessment year 1971-72. The assessee had filed a return on 1-2-1972 but passed away oh 20-7-1972. The assessment was challenged in appeal by the legal representative on the ground that no notice had been issued to the legal representatives before the completion of the assessment The Appellate Assistant Commissioner accepted this plea but. instead of annuling this assessment order, as contended for by the assessees, sent the matter back to the Income-tax Officer to complete the assessment afresh after giving the legal representatives due notice. The assesses preferred a further appeal to the Tribunal but with no success. The Tribunal held that the completion of the assessment without prior notice lo the legal representatives was merely an irregularity and that this could be cured by setting aside the assessment and directing a fresh assessment in accordance with the law after proper notice. An objection was also taken befors the Appellate Tribunal of the rime of hearing that, by so setting aside the assessment and directing a fresh assessment, the Tribunal would beextending the ordinary period of limitation available for completion of. all assessment since a re-assessment in pursuance of such a direction could be governed by the provisions of Section 153 (3) which removed the bar of limitation ordinarily applicabie in respect of the assessment. But this contention was also rejected by the Tribunal. ( 2 ) IN pursuance of the order of the Tribunal a fresh assessment was made on the executors of the will of late Shri Nathu Ram on 10-9-1979. The assessee preferred objections to the Appeilate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal reiterating his contentions that the assessment dated 10-9-1979 was barred by innitation and could not be saved by what was claimed to be invalid direction given by the Tribunal. The Tribunal, however, rejected these contentions on the short ground that these pleas had already been raised by the assessee in the earlier appeal to the Tribunal. The Tribunal had dis- posed of these contentions and though the assessee preferred a petition under Section 256 (1) from the order of the Tribunal, he had not pursued the matter further under Section 256 (2) when the Tribunal dismissed the application under Section 256 (1 ). The Tribunal had dis- posed of these contentions and though the assessee preferred a petition under Section 256 (1) from the order of the Tribunal, he had not pursued the matter further under Section 256 (2) when the Tribunal dismissed the application under Section 256 (1 ). Thus, the earlier order of the Tribunal had become final and the issues settled therein could not be agitated again. ( 3 ) THE assessee applied for a reference to this court of the following questions of law said to arise out of the order of the Tribunal disposing of the appeal for the second time : "1. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the Tribunal was correct in holding in law that the assessment order in respect of Assessment Year 1971-72 passed by the Income Tax Officer dated 10-9-1979 was not invalid being barred by limitation? 2. That whether on the facts or in the circumstances of the case the Tribunal was correct in holding that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, vide his order dated 21-6-1975 which was confirmed by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal vide order dated 28-7-1977 in I. T. A. No. 2449 (Del) /75-76, could extend the bar of limitation imposed u/s 153 (3) beyond the period of specified therein ? 3. Whether in law anassessment which should have been annulled but was only set aside could get fresh lease of life by its merely having been set aside instead of being annulled? 4. Whether in the facts and in the circumstances of the case the ratio of decision by the Supreme Court in the cases of Guduthur Bros. v. l. T. O. 40. I. T. R. 535 could have any application to the petitioner s case in the matter of legality of the assessment and its sustainability ? 5. Whether the Tribunal was correct in Ignoring the ratio of decision in the case of M/s. Jai Prakash Smghv. CIT,111 ITR507 which clearly directs that an appellate authority cannot exceed its powers and give fresh lease of life, to proceedings by saving limitation by setting aside the assessment instead of annulling the same which is distinguishable from the ratio of decision in the case of Guduthur Bros. v. CIT, 40 ITR 298, the assessment being initially inverted in law ? v. CIT, 40 ITR 298, the assessment being initially inverted in law ? "this application has been rejected by the Tribunal and hence this petition under Section 256 (2) seeking the reference of the same. questions. ( 4 ) SHRI Sharma, learned counsel for the assessee, contended that the Tribunal s order gives rise to the questions of law whether the assessee was not entitled to urge be-fore it the pleas regarding the assessment-dated 10-9-1979 being barred by limitation because these pleas had already been raised and rejected by the Tribunal in the earlier appeal filed against the original assessment. There are two difficulties in accepting the contention. In the first place, though the assessee had sought for the reference of as many as five questions of law, the question now urged by Shri Sharma is not one of the questions of which referenee was sought from the Tribunal. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 256 (2) is in the nature of a mandamus and this court can call upon the Tribunal only to refer those questions of law which arise out of the order of the Tribunal and of which reference to this court was sought before the Tribunal. Moreover, this is also not one of the questions the reference of which is sought in the present application. In these circumstances, we are unable to call upon the Tribunal to refer this question and state acase in respect thereof. The second difficulty is that even assuming that the question raised by Shri Sharma does arise out of the order of the Tribunal and is a question of law reference of which can be directed, we are unwilling to do so for the simple reason that the conclusion of the Tribunal appears to he so obviously and patently correct that the answer to the question proposed is selfevident. It is a settled principle of law that there should be a finally of legal proceedings. It is a settled principle of law that there should be a finally of legal proceedings. When the assessment was made in the first instance the assessee raised in the appeal filed by it-the contentions that the assessment was void and illegal, that the Tribunal was not competent to give a direction validly under Section 153 (3) and that the proper course to be adopted by the Tribunal was to annul the assessment and not to set aside the same and direct the ITO to make a fresh assessment These contentions were duly considered by the Tribunal and were rejected. They have become final in terms of Section 256 (4) of the Act, there having been no reference from the order of the Tribunal. To permit the assessee to raise these contentions once again will offend the rule of finality of judicial proceedings. In fact the very decision on which counsle for the assessee relies makes this point clear. In M. Syed Alavi and others v. State of Kerala (1981-48 STC 150) (1) it was pointed out by this Supreme Court that where matters are decided by one appellate authority in the first instance, that appellate authority would be bound by the said, order and cannot consider those contentions again when the matter subsequently comes up after remand. In that case initially the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had disposed of the appeal. When the same points were urged when the assessment was made on remand, the Supreme Court pointed out that upto the stage of Appellate Assistant Comissioner that would be final, but that it would be open to the Tribunal to consider the contentions if raised before it. On the same principle, in the present case, the contentions having been raised and decided by the Tribunal, it was not own to the Tribunal to re-consider these contentions and the power and appropriate remedy of the assessee was to file a reference application and pursue the same against the original order of the Tribunal. Thedecision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT. v. Rao Tirlok Narayan Singh (1985-56 ITR 234 (2) though rendered in a slightly different context, also lays down the principle of finality above referred to. In these circlumstances, we are of opinion that the view taken by the Tribunal was obviously the correct view and the only view possible in the circumstances. v. Rao Tirlok Narayan Singh (1985-56 ITR 234 (2) though rendered in a slightly different context, also lays down the principle of finality above referred to. In these circlumstances, we are of opinion that the view taken by the Tribunal was obviously the correct view and the only view possible in the circumstances. We, are, therefore, do not see any justification for calling a reference on this question. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the assesses contended that in any event the assessment order dated 10-9-1979 is subsequent to the original order by the Tribunal and that the assessee is entitled to raise a plea that assessment is barred by limitation. In out opinion, though the order dated 10-9-1979 is subsequent to the order of the Tribunal, the question really is whether the direction given by the Tribunal, after setting aside the assessment, that a fresh assessment should be made given in the course of the former appellate proceedings was valid and the assessee had challenged the validity of such a. direction before the Tribunal. But that challenge had been repelled. In the circumstances, that is also an issue on which a decision has already been given and on which it is not open to the assessee once again to raise a controversy. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel also relied upon the decision of the Bombay High Court in P. V. Doshi v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1978-113 ITR 22) (3) and sought to contend that the principle of finality will not apply since in this case the original assessment itself was, according to the petitioner, nill and void. In our opinion. this plea also suffers from an informity. It is no doubt the pica of the assessee that the assessment is void, but the question whether the assessment was void ab initio or was an irregularity assessment, the supervening illegality in which case could be cured, was a debatable point which was urged before, the Tribunal and was decided against the assessee. In fact that decision appears to follow from to the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Estate of late Rangalal Jajodia v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1971-79 ITR 505 (4) and also the decision of this court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Roshan Lal and another (1982-134 ITR 145 (5 ). In fact that decision appears to follow from to the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Estate of late Rangalal Jajodia v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1971-79 ITR 505 (4) and also the decision of this court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Roshan Lal and another (1982-134 ITR 145 (5 ). We are not expressing any opinion on this issue, but we are pointing this out only to show that this is not a clear case of a void assessment, but one in which the question whether it was a void or irregular assessment was raised and decided on the earlier occasion. ( 7 ) COUNSEL submitted that at least the question whether the assessment dated 10-9-1979 is bar-red by limitation should be directed to be referred. We are unable to isolate this question for the reasons already mentioned. If the assessee is precluded from questioning the validity of the direction given by the Tribunal, then obviously the provisions of Section 153 (3) applies and no question of limitation arises. In this context we may point out that, in the similar circumstances, in Jajodia s case (supra) it was held that the second proviso to Sec. 34 (3) of the 1922 Act (corresponding to Section 153 (3) of the 1961 Act) would apply and there would be no limitation for the making of are-assessment in pursuance of a direction given in such circumstances. This question, therefore, is not only not open to the assessee to urge at the present stage; it is also concluded by a decision of the Supreme Court. ( 8 ) FOR the above reasons we have come to the conclusion that no reference is called for in the circumstances of the present case. The petition is, therefore, dismisses. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.