JUDGMENT B. N. Sapru, J. - The petitioner was employed in a temporary capacity as a conductor in the U.P. Government Roadways. Thereafter he became a Government servant on deputation with the Corporation. The petitioners services were terminated by an order dated 17-8-1973. Aggrieved by the termination order, the petitioner instituted a civil suit being Suit No. 114 of 1975 of the Court of Civil Judge. Azamgarh. The suit was transferred to the Public Service Tribunal. The Tribunal has by its judgment dated 3-11-1979 dismissed the claim petition. 2. Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal, the petitioner has preferred the instant writ petition. 3. The first argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner before this Court is that he was a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the termination of his services was made in violation of provisions of Section 25-A of the Industrial Disputes Act or alternatively Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. As he has been in the continuous employment of the Corporation for more than 240 days when his services were terminated, he was not given the benefit under the said Acts. 4. From a perusal of the counter-Affidavit, it is clear that the petitioners services were temporary and he had been given various appointments for various period. When term of one appointment ended, another appointment was made and he was continuously in service for more than 240 days. Sri S. K. Sharma, appearing on behalf of the Corporation, urges that the petitioner has not continued 240 days because each appointment should be treated as a separate period and, therefore, the petitioner did not complete 240 days continuous service, in tact, the fact that the petitioner was in continuous service for more than 240 days is admitted. This period of continuity would not break - up into parts because his appointment was made under the various appointment orders. In the circumstances. I am satisfied that as the petitioner was in the continuous service for more than 240 days, the order of termination is bad either under Section 25 - F of the Industrial Disputes Act or Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. 5. It is conceded by M. S. Negi, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, that the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to grant any relief to the petitioner for a violation of industrial law. 5. It is conceded by M. S. Negi, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, that the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to grant any relief to the petitioner for a violation of industrial law. This position would also be cleared from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke and others, AIR 1975 SC 2280, which is brought to my notice by Sri S. K Sharma, learned Counsel for the respondents. The Tribunal's order cannot be said to be erroneous because it has no jurisdiction to grant relief on the ground that Section 25 - F of the Industrial Disputes Act or Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act had been violated. 6. The argument of M. S. Negi, learned Counsel for the petitioner is that when the petitioners services were terminated by an order dated 4th March, 1972, he preferred an appeal to the Deputy General Manager who by an order dated 1-12-1973 set aside the termination order directing the authority to hold an enquiry into the matter as carrying of passengers without tickets is serious offence. It is said that this order was not complied before the order of termination was made. This argument cannot be accepted because before the order of the Deputy General Manager could be given effect to, an order of termination had been made. This fact was brought to the notice of the General Manager who allowed the appeal and he took no action. 7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the year 1980 when the petitioner went to the public services Tribunal, it was not clear as to whether bis remedy lay under the Industrial Disputes Act before the Labour Court or before the Tribunal. The suit of the petitioner has been transferred. At that point of time, there was uncertainty. The petitioner should not be penalised for filing the civil suit which was transferred to the Public Services Tribunal. 8. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that from the record, no error in the order of the Public Services Tribunal is pointed out and the petition should be dismissed. At that point of time, there was uncertainty. The petitioner should not be penalised for filing the civil suit which was transferred to the Public Services Tribunal. 8. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that from the record, no error in the order of the Public Services Tribunal is pointed out and the petition should be dismissed. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has, however, urged that as there is violation of the provisions of the industrial law apparent on the face of record, this Court should exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution and treat this petition as a petition directly against the order of termination and quash the order of termination. I will treat the petition as one directly against the order of termination. 9. Since the order of termination is bad for the reasons given above, quash the order dated 17-8-1973 (Annexure - 3 to the writ petition) of the Sahayak Chatriya Prabandhak (Rural). I, however, make it clear that this order will not entitle the petitioner to his salary for the period between the date of termination of his service and the date of this judgment. He is entitled to his salary from today's date. 1 deprive the petitioner of the benefit of his salary because a charge of carrying passengers in his bus without tickets was prima facie established. The respondents shall reinstate the petitioner. Costs on parties.