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1987 DIGILAW 122 (GUJ)

CHHAGANBHAI KHUSHALBHAI PATEL v. ZAVERBHAI HATHIBHAI

1987-10-09

A.M.AHMADI

body1987
A. M. AHMADI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioners-landlords challenge the order passed by the Deputy Collector Nadiad dated 27/10/1978 which came to be confirmed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal by its order dated 28/08/1979 The facts leading to this petition are as under. ( 2 ) THE petitioners jointly owned S. Nos. 370 and 371 admeasuring 1 acre 37 gunthas and 3 acres 14 gunthas respectively situate in village Gutal of Koira District. The respondent-tenant filed an application before the Mamlatdar-cum-Agricultural Lands Tribunal (hereinafter called `the Mamlatdar praying for fixation of the purchase price on the ground that he was the tenant in respect of the lands in question The said proceeding Tenancy Case No. 10 of 1966 came to be disposed of against the tenant by the Mamlatdar. The said tenant preferred an appeal to the Collector and during the pendency of the said appeal he sought leave to introduce additional evidence. It appears that the effort to lend additional evidence proved unsuccessful and the Collector dismissed the appeal. The tenant therefore approached the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in revision but in vain. He therefore filed a writ petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution in this Court. The said Special Civil Application No. 919 of 1969 was allowed by this Court and the matter was remanded to the Deputy Collector for rehearing after taking decision on the question whether the additional documents sought to be produced should be allowed to be produced. After the matter went back to the Deputy Collector the Deputy Collector directed additional evidence to be led and on the basis of the totality of evidence on record he set aside the order of the Mamlatdar dated 18/08/1966 and held that the respondent was a tenant and was deemed to have purchased the some under Sec. 32ff of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 (hereinafter called the Act) and directed the Mamlatdar to fix the price for the said lands. Against this order passed by the Deputy Collector Nadiad on 27/10/1978 the petitioners filed a revision application. The said revision application was rejected on 22/08/1978 thereby confirming the order of the Deputy Collector. Against this order passed by the Deputy Collector Nadiad on 27/10/1978 the petitioners filed a revision application. The said revision application was rejected on 22/08/1978 thereby confirming the order of the Deputy Collector. It is against these orders of the Deputy Collector and the Revenue Tribunal that the present petition is filed ( 3 ) IN revision the Revenue Tribunal took the view that the surrender order cannot be valid unless it is accompanied by an order for delivery of possession under Sec. 29 (2) of the Act. It found that the surrender order of 30/12/1956 did not contain any direction or order for delivery of possession of the lands to the landlords and therefore the same was not legal and valid. The Tribunal also found that the subsequent entries made in the revenue records after the alleged surrender were merely consequential to the surrender order without physical possession having been delivered to the landlords. The Tribunal thus came to the conclusion that the tenant continued to remain in possession of the lands in question even after the surrender order and therefore the order passed by the Deputy Collector Nadiad was in conformity with law. ( 4 ) THE first question which I must consider is whether the Tribunal was right in law in coming to the conclusion that a surrender order would not be valid unless it is accompanied by an order for delivery of possession as contemplated by Sec. 29 (2) of the Act. Under Sec. 14 the tenancy of a tenant in respect of any land cannot be terminated unless the tenant has committed one or more of the defaults set out in sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 14. Section 31 of the Act is another provision which entitles the landlord to terminate the tenancy of a tenant on the ground that the land is bona fide required for personal cultivation or for any non-agricultural purpose. It will be seen from these two provisions that the landlords right to terminate the tenancy is not absolute but is qualified by these two provisions. Unless the landlord shows that the tenant has been guilty of default as set out in Sec. 14 or that he requires the land for personal cultivation or for non-agricultural purposes he cannot terminate the tenancy and secure an order for eviction contemplated by sub-sec. Unless the landlord shows that the tenant has been guilty of default as set out in Sec. 14 or that he requires the land for personal cultivation or for non-agricultural purposes he cannot terminate the tenancy and secure an order for eviction contemplated by sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 29 of the Act. In this background we may now refer to Sec. 15 of the Act as it stood before the surrender order was passed on 30/12/1988 The relevant part of Sec. 15 as it then stood may be reproduced:"15 (1) A tenant may terminate the tenancy in respect of any land at any time by surrendering his interest therein in favour of the landlord;provided that such surrender shall be in writing and verified before the Mamlatdar in the prescribed manner. (2) Where a tenant surrenders his tenancy the landlord shall be entitled to retain the land so surrendered for the like purposes and to the like extent and in so far as the conditions are applicable subject to the like conditions as far provide in Secs. 31 and 31a for the termination of tenancies. (3) The land or any portion thereof which the landlord is not entitled to retain under sub-sec. (2) shall be liable to be disposed of in the manner provided under clause (c) of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 32p. This provision was introduced by Bombay Act XIII of 1956 which came into force on 1/08/1956 i. e. before the date of the surrender order. We may now refer to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 29 of the Act. Before that sub-section is reproduced it may be stated that Sec. 29 lays down the procedure for taking possession. Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 29 entitles the tenant to apply for possession of any land or dwelling house to the Mamlatdar. Then comes sub-sec. (2) which entitles the landlord to obtain possession of any land or dwelling house held by a tenant. That sub-section as it stood on the relevant date was as under:"29 (2) No landlord shall obtain possession of any land or dwelling house held by a tenant-except under an older of the Mamlatdar. For obtaining such order be shall make an application in the prescribed form and within a period of two years from the date on which the right to obtain possession of the land or dwelling house vas the case may be. For obtaining such order be shall make an application in the prescribed form and within a period of two years from the date on which the right to obtain possession of the land or dwelling house vas the case may be. is deememed to have accrued to him. "the Tribunal has taken the view that since sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 29 begins with a negative covenant the only mode for taking possession of the land from the tenant is by making an application in the prescribed form and obtaining an order of eviction from the Mamlatdar. To put it differently it seems that the Tribunal was of the view that there was no other mode of taking possession of the land from the respondent-tenant except the one mentioned in sub-sec (2) of Sec. 29 of the Act. Since the surrender order of 30/12/1966 admittedly did not contain any order of eviction of the tenant as contemplated by sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 29 the Tribunal was of the view that the surrender order was illegal and was therefore not acted upon. In my view the Tribunal has committed an error in reading the provisions of Sec. 15 and Sec. 29 (2) of the Act. ( 5 ) WE have seen that Secs. 14 and 31 of the Act confer a right on the landlord to terminate the tenancy of a tenant and obtain possession of the land under his cultivation. Under Sec. 14 the landlord has a right to evict the tenant if the tenant has committed defaults set out in sub-clauses (i) to (v) of clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) thereof. Under Sec. 31 a right is conferred on the landlord to seek and obtain possession if he bona fide requires the land for cultivating it personally or for any non-agricultural purpose. These two provisions therefore confer rights on the landlord to terminate the tenancy and obtain possession from the tenant if the required conditions are satisfied. If possession is to be obtained on the basis of the right conferred by Secs 14 and 31 of the Act the landlord has to follow the requirements of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 29 namely to make an application in the prescribed form and within the prescribed time for an order of eviction by the Mamlatdar. If possession is to be obtained on the basis of the right conferred by Secs 14 and 31 of the Act the landlord has to follow the requirements of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 29 namely to make an application in the prescribed form and within the prescribed time for an order of eviction by the Mamlatdar. Therefore when possession is to be sought by enforcement of the right conferred on the landlord the procedure to be followed is the one set out in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 29 of the Act but when the tenant himself desires to terminate the tenancy and surrender the land to the landlord he is required to follow the procedure outlined by Sec. 15 of the Act. Section 15 (1) of the Act therefore confers a right on the tenant to terminate the tenancy in respect of any land at any time a na the mode provided is by surrendering his interest therein in favour of the landlord. The surrender no doubt must be in writing and duly verified before the Mamlatdar in the prescribed manner. Once the tenant has shown his willingness in writing to surrender his tenancy and the Mamlatdar has verified the same as required by law the landlord is entitled to retain the land so surrendered. If the Mamlatdar does not permit the landlord to retain the land surrendered by the tenant the land becomes liable to be disposed of under Sec. 32p (2) (c) of the Act. It is therefore obvious on a conjoint reading of Sec. 15 and Sec. 29 (2) that the former applies to cases where the tenant desires to terminate his tenancy in respect of the land in question and surrenders possession thereof to the landlord. No tenant who does not desire to retain the possession of the land can be forced to remain in possession thereof when a lease is created in favour of a tenant and interest in the leased comes into being the tenant is permitted by Sec. 15 to surrender that interest at any time he likes to the landlord. This was the law at the relevant point of time. Subsequent letters placed on the right to surrender have no relevance. Therefore when the question of surrender of tenancy by the tenant arose in 1956 the Mamlatdar was governed by the provisions of Sec. 15 of the Act as they then stood. This was the law at the relevant point of time. Subsequent letters placed on the right to surrender have no relevance. Therefore when the question of surrender of tenancy by the tenant arose in 1956 the Mamlatdar was governed by the provisions of Sec. 15 of the Act as they then stood. Under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 15 the tenant was given a right to terminate the tenancy in respect of the land leased to him and to surrender possession thereof to the landlord subject to proper verification by the Mamlatdar and consequential orders regarding retention of the land by the landlord passed by him. Sec. 29 (2) comes into operation only in cases where the landlord in exercise of the right conferred on him seeks to evict the tenant. That is why Sec. 15 (2) uses the word retain while Sec. 29 uses the word `obtain when the section speaks of permitting the landlord to retain the possession it clearly envisages prior delivery of possession and its subsequent retention. There can be no question of the landlord retaining the land unless he is put in physical possession thereof sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 15 therefore permits the landlord to retain the land so surrendered which unmistakably shows that the surrender precedes the order of retention. There can be no retention without prior surrender. It is therefore clear on a plain reading of Sec. 15 that when a tenant desires to terminate his tenancy in respect of the land he is permitted to surrender his interest therein in favour of the landlord in writing duly verified by the Mamlatdar in the prescribed manner. After the Mamlatdar has verified the surrender the landlord may be permitted to retain the land so surrendered under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 15 of the Act. If the landlord is not entitled to retain the land under sub-sec. (2) the land becomes liable to be disposed of under clause (c) of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 32p of the Act. However when a landlord desires to obtain possession in exercise of the right conferred on him by the Statute he has to make an application and seek an order as contemplated by sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 29 of the Act. The expression obtain possession used in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 32p of the Act. However when a landlord desires to obtain possession in exercise of the right conferred on him by the Statute he has to make an application and seek an order as contemplated by sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 29 of the Act. The expression obtain possession used in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 29 is indicative of the fact that it is the landlord who seeks to acquire possession of the land from the tenant and not vice versa. In my view therefore on a proper construction of Sec. 15 and Sec. 29 (2) of the Act as they stood at the relevant date the Tribunal was not right in concluding that the surrender order was invalid because it was not accompanied by an eviction order under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 29 of the Act. (REST of the Judgment is not material for the Reports.)RULE made absolute. .