JAMNA PRASAD MODI v. STATE OF M P — 1987 DIGILAW 122 (MP)

JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS petition and following four petitions raise identical questions and are, therefore, being decided by a common order :- (1) M. P. No. 3709/86 Chitrakut vs. State of M. P. and another, (2) M. P. No. 757/87, premsingh vs. Collector Chhindwara and two others, (3) M. P. No. 772/87 Atmaram vs. Collector Mandla and two others, (4) M. P. No. 762/87, Jitendrakumar Shukla vs. State of M. P. and three others. ( 2. ) THE petitioner in each of these writ petitions, is a Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat. Proceedings under Section 35 of the M. P. Panchayats Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), have been initiated against the petitioners of these writ petitions and notice along with charge sheets have been served on them requiring them to show cause as to why they should not be removed from the office of Sarpanch. In each of these cases, an order under Section 34 (1) (c) of the Act has also-been passed suspending them from the office of Sarpanch pending enquiry into the charges under section 35 of the Act. ( 3. ) IN some of these cases the petitioners had filed revisions before the commissioner under Rule 5 of the M. P. Panchayats (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules ). These revisions, however, have been dismissed on the basis of a Government order stating that since sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the act contemplates that the order of suspension under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 34 shall be reported to the State Government within a period of 10 days and shall be subject to such orders as the State Government may deem fit to pass, the commissioner, by entertaining an appeal, could not nullify the provision contained in the said sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the Act. ( 4. ) IN these writ petitions, the validity of Section 34{l) (c) of the Act has been challenged. The order passed by the State Government referred to above on the basis of which revisions filed by some of the petitioners were dismissed, had also been challenged. ( 4. ) IN these writ petitions, the validity of Section 34{l) (c) of the Act has been challenged. The order passed by the State Government referred to above on the basis of which revisions filed by some of the petitioners were dismissed, had also been challenged. The first submission made by counsel for the petitioners in support of the challenge to the validity of Section 34 (1) (c) of the Act is that the said provision does not lay down any guide-lines for passing an order of suspension. We find it difficult to agree with this submission. Sub-section (c) of Section 34 (l)of the Act contemplates passing an order of suspension only against such Sarpanch who has been served with a notice along with charge sheet to show cause as to why he may not be removed from his office. The guide-line provided for is that unless a notice along with charge sheet to show cause under this Act for the removal of the Sarpanch from his office has been served on him, an order suspending him under clause (c) of Section 34 (1) of the Act cannot be passed. In all these cases, action under Section 35 of the Act for removal of the petitioners from the office of Sarpanch has been initiated and the relevant notice along with the charge sheet to show cause has been served on them. Consequently it was open to the prescribed authority to pass an order of suspension under Section 34 (1) (c) of the Act ( 5. ) IT was then urged by counsel for the petitioners that the power conferred by section 34 (1) (c) of the Act was capable of misuse and consequently it was liable to be struck down. Suffice it to say, so far as this submission is concerned, that it is settled law that a statutory provision cannot be struck down merely on the ground that it was capable of misuse. In cases where misuse of power was established, it is the resulting action which will be liable to be quashed and it will have no bearing on the validity of the provision. If authority were needed for this proposition, reference may be made to naraindas Indurkhva vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others, AIR 1974 SC 1232 . In cases where misuse of power was established, it is the resulting action which will be liable to be quashed and it will have no bearing on the validity of the provision. If authority were needed for this proposition, reference may be made to naraindas Indurkhva vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and others, AIR 1974 SC 1232 . In that case, the validity of Section 4 of the M. P. Prathamik Middle School Tatha madhyamik Shiksha (Pathya Pustakon Sambandhi) Vyavastha Adhiniyam, came up for consideration. It was urged in that case that the power to select and prescribe text books conferred by the said sub-section, was unguided and unfettered leaving it free to the state Government to select and prescribe such text books as it may wantonly or capriciously please. On an interpretation of Section 4 of that Act, this plea was repelled and it was held that the power was not unguided and unfettered. It was thereafter held that if the State Government, in selecting and prescribing text books, does not follow the standard or criterion, the prescription of text books made by the State Government and not Section 4 (1) would be liable to be condemned as invalid. ( 6. ) COUNSEL for the petitioners then urged that since no period was prescribed in clause (c) of Section 34 (1) of the Act during which an order of suspension of a Sarpanch was to remain in operation, it was capable of being misused by keeping a Sarpanch suspended even till the expiry of the term for which he had been elected. It is true that no period has been prescribed under clause (c) of Section 34 (1) of the Act during which the order of suspension is to remain in force. However, keeping in view the nature of the power to be exercised under Section 34 (l) (c) of the Act, namely that the order of suspension is to remain operative till the pendency of the proceedings for removal of the sarpanch under Section 35, it is apparent that the order of suspension would be quo terminus with the final orders being passed in proceedings under Section 35 of the Act ( 7. ) COUNSEL for the petitioners then urged that even Section 35 of the Act does not contemplate any period during which proceedings under the said section could be finalised. ) COUNSEL for the petitioners then urged that even Section 35 of the Act does not contemplate any period during which proceedings under the said section could be finalised. Suffice it to say, so far as this submission is concerned, that it is settled law that even in those cases where no period has been prescribed, for taking an action by statutory provision, the rule of reasonable time applies, namely, that the action contemplated by the said provision has to be taken within a reasonable time. Reference in this behalf may be made to Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition (Vol. 36), page 607. It has been stated that where no time is specified for the doing of an act, it may be done within a reasonable time and what is a reasonable time is dependent upon the surrounding circumstances. Earlier, on page 591, various meanings of reasonable time have been given and one of them is that reasonable time is defined to be so much time as is necessary under the circumstances to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires to be done in a particular case. In Mukutdhari Sharma vs. The State of M. P. and others, AIR 1978 M. P. 46, it was held as under: ". . . When a statute provides no date for holding an election, it can be inferred that elections must be held within a reasonable time; and when the authority entrusted with the duty to hold elections abuses its discretion by not holding elections for inordinately long period, the Court can control its action by directing it to hold elections and by fixing a date for the same. (Perris Extraordinary Legal Remedies P. 386 ). " ( 8. ) IN this view of the matter, if in a given case, it is established that final orders under Section 35 of the Act have not been passed within a reasonable time, the person against whom action under the said section is being taken, can approach this Court for a direction to the authority concerned to pass final orders within reasonable time. On that ground alone, however, neither the provision of Section 35, nor of Section 34 (1) (c) of the Act would become invalid. ( 9. On that ground alone, however, neither the provision of Section 35, nor of Section 34 (1) (c) of the Act would become invalid. ( 9. ) COUNSEL for the petitioners then urged that the order of the Govt, saying that no appeal as contemplated by the Rules, was maintainable against an order suspending a Sarpanch under Section 34 (1) (c) of the Act was, on the face of it, invalid and the State govt. did not have any authority to issue such a general order which had the effect of taking away the power of the Commissioner to entertain a revision under Rule 5 of the Rules. ( 10. ) BEFORE dealing with the submission, we think it necessary to point out that the rules relied on by the petitioners were framed in exercise of powers conferred in this behalf by the Madhya Pradesh Panchayats Act, 1962. By the M. P. Panchayats Repeal ordinance,, 1981, the said section was repealed which in turn, has been repealed by section 124 of the Act No rules similar to the Rules relied on by counsel for the petitioner have been framed under the Act Section 25 of the M. P. General Clauses Act, 1957 provides as under: "25. Continuation of orders, etc. issued under enactments repealed and re-enacted.- Where any enactment is repealed and re-enacted by a Madhya Pradesh Act with or without modification, then unless it is otherwise expressly provided any appointment notification, order, scheme, rule, regulation, form or bye-law made or issued under the repealed enactment shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-enacted, continue in force, and be deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted unless and until it is superseded by any appointment notification, order, scheme, rule, regulation, form or bye-law made or issued under the provisions so re-enacted. " Dealing with the provision of Section 25 of the aforesaid Act, it was held by a Division bench of this Court in Dayaprasad Mohanlat vs. Election Officer and others, 1983 MPLJ 713 that the Panchayat Adhiniyam 1981 is nothing more than a re-enactment of the repealed M. P. Panchayats Act, 1962, no doubt with some modifications and is not altogether a new law. The M. P. Panchayat Adhiniyam of 1981 is now the law enacted and thus it squarely falls within the ambit of Section 25 of the M P. General Clauses Act and, therefore, the rules framed under Section 357 of the repeated Act of 1962 in the matter of Election Petitions which were continued because of Ordinance No. 6 of 1981 are saved and, therefore, they are still in force till rules are framed under Section 117 of the M. P. Panchayat Adhiniyam, 1981. In effect, therefore, the Rules relied on by counsel for the petitioners are still in force. ( 11. ) RULE 3 of the Rules deals with appeal and appellate authorities. Section 25 of the 1962 Act was the section corresponding to Section 34 of the new Act. However, section 25 did not contain any provision similar to clause (c) of Section 34 (1) of the Act authorising suspension of a Sarpanch pending proceedings for his removal consequently, even though an appeal against an order under Section 25 was provided for under Rule 3 of the Rules, no appeal against an order passed under Section 34 (1) (c)of the Act could lie under Rule 3 inasmuch as the said Rule was framed at a point of time when there was no similar provision in the 1962 Act corresponding to Section 34 (l) (c) of the 1981 Act. Since Rule 3 of the Rules cannot be treated to contain a provision for appeal against an order directing a Sarpanch to be suspended under Section 34 (1) (c) of the Act, the petitioners were not entitled to prefer any appeal against the order suspending them from the office of Sarpanch. It is settled law that appeal is a creature of statute. Even so, they did have the right to prefer revision under Rule 5 of the Rules. Rule 5 of the said Rules is as under: "5. It is settled law that appeal is a creature of statute. Even so, they did have the right to prefer revision under Rule 5 of the Rules. Rule 5 of the said Rules is as under: "5. Revision - (1) The State Government, the Commissioner or the Collector may, on its/his motion or on the application by any party, at any time for the purpose of satisfying itself/himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by, or as to the regularity of the proceeding of the authority subordinate to it/him, call for and examine the record of any case pending before, or disposed of by such authority and may pass such order in reference thereto as it/he may think fit: provided that it/he shall not vary or reverse any order unless notice has been served on the parties interested and opportunity given to them for being heard: provided further that no application for revision shall be entertained against an order appealable under the Act, , (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1) - (i) Where proceedings in respect, of any case have been commenced by the State Government under sub-section (i) no action shall be taken by the commissioner or the Collector in respect thereof; and (ii) Where proceedings in respect of any such case have been commenced by the Commissioner or the Collector under sub-rate (1), the state Government may either refrain from taking any action under this rule in respect of such case until the final disposal or such proceeding by the commissioner or the Collector, as the case may be, or may withdraw such proceeding and pass such order as it may deem fit" ( 12. ) IN this connection, it now becomes necessary to consider the effect of sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the Act which contemplates that the order of suspension under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 34 shall be reported to the State government within a period of 10 days and shall be subject to such orders as the State government may deem fit to pass. It was urged by counsel for the petitioners that the effect of sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the Act was that unless an order of suspension passed by the prescribed authority under clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 34 of the act had been approved by the State Government, it could not be operative. In view of the unambiguous language used in sub-section (2) of Section 34, we find it difficult to agree with this submission. The words used in the said sub-section are not that the order of suspension shall be subject to the approval of the State Government. On the other hand, the sub-section only contemplates that the order passed by the prescribed authority shall be subject to such orders as the State Government may deem fit to pass. In order to give effect to the interpretation urged by counsel for the petitioners some words will have to be added in sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the Act. As held by the supreme Court in British Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Captain Itbar Singh and others, AIR 1959 SC 1331 , the rules of interpretation do not permit a Court to add words unless the section as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful meaning. In Collector of Customs baroda vs. Digvijay Singhji Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd, AIR 1961 SC 1549 , it was held that it is one of the well established rules of construction that if the words of a statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous no more is necessary then to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the Legislature. Given such construction we are of the opinion that there seems to be no doubt that the order suspending the sarpanch passed under Section 34 (1) (c) of the Act becomes operative on its own force and continues to remain operative "subject to such orders" that is till some order to the contrary is passed by the State Government under sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the act. In other words if the State Government does not deem fit to pass any order to the contrary the order of the prescribed authority shall hold that field. ( 13. In other words if the State Government does not deem fit to pass any order to the contrary the order of the prescribed authority shall hold that field. ( 13. ) IN this connection it may be pointed out that the right to be elected a sarpanch and to continue as a Sarpanch is a purely statutory right and is subject to the limitations placed by the Act which are to be found out from the language used in the act. Dealing with the provisions of the Representation of the Peoples Act it was held by the Supreme Court in Jyoti Barn vs. Debi Ghosal, AIR 1982 SC 983 - "a right to elect, fundamental though it is to democracy, is anomalously enough, neither a fundamental right nor a Common Law right. It is pure and simple, a statutory right. So is the right to be elected. So is the right to dispute an election. Outside the Statute there is no right to elect, no right to be elected and no right to dispute an election. Statutory creations they are, and therefore, subject to statutory limitation. " (Emphasis supplied ). ( 14. ) THE other aspect which falls fort consideration on the language of sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the Act is in regard to the revisional power exercisable by the authorities mentioned in Rule 5 of the Rules. As seen above, sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the rules contemplates the revisional jurisdiction to be exercised by the State Government, the Commissioner or the Collector. Clause (i) of sub-rule (2), however, makes an exception and it is to the effect that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1)where proceedings in respect of any case have been commenced by the State Govt, under sub-rule (1), no action shall be taken by the Commissioner or the Collector in respect thereof. ( 15. ) WE may point out that the words sub-section in clause (i) of sub-rule (2) of rule 5 of the Rules seem to be a misprint or an error. The proper words Would be sub-rule. The effect of clause (i) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 is that if the revisional power has been commenced by the State Govt. , the said power cannot be exercised by the commissioner or the Collector. The proper words Would be sub-rule. The effect of clause (i) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 is that if the revisional power has been commenced by the State Govt. , the said power cannot be exercised by the commissioner or the Collector. When sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the Act contemplates that the order of suspension under clause (c) of Section 34 (1) of the Act shall be reported to the State Government within 10 days and shall be subject to such order as the State Govt. may deem fit to pass, it necessarily implies that oh such a report being made, the State Govt. is ceased of the jurisdiction to pass an order in respect of the order of suspension in exercise of the powers conferred on it by Rule 5 of the Rules. Consequently, on a harmonious construction being placed on sub-section (2) of Section 34 (1) of the Act and Rule 5 of the Rules, we are of the opinion that as a result of the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 34 (1) of the Act, the power of revision under Rule 5 of the Rules against an order passed under Section 34 (l) (c) of the Act suspending a Sarpanch, can now be exercised only by the State Government and not by the Commissioner. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, the orders passed by the commissioner dismissing such of the revisions as were filed by the petitioners of these petitions, cannot be said to suffer from any such error which may call for interference with those orders.- ( 16. ) IN some of these petitions, it had also been stated that the order of suspension has been passed by the prescribed authority mala fide. The allegation of mala fide is that since the Sarpanch as belongs to a party other than the Ruling Party, the prescribed authority passing the order of suspension has apparently been influenced by the members of the Ruling Party. The allegation of mala fide is that since the Sarpanch as belongs to a party other than the Ruling Party, the prescribed authority passing the order of suspension has apparently been influenced by the members of the Ruling Party. The prescribed authority contemplated by Section 34 (1) (c) of the Act is Collector of the District and in our opinion, it is not possible to take the view that simply because any Sarpanch may be belonging to a Party other than the ruling Party, the Collector would go out of his way to pass an order of suspension under section 34 (1) (c) of the Act merely on that ground. ( 17. ) AS seen above, the jurisdiction to pass an order under Section 34 (1) (c) of the act has been conferred on the prescribed authority only in such cases where a notice along with charge sheet has been served on the Sarpanch under Section 35 of the Act to show cause as to why he should not be removed from the office of Sarpanch. The question as to whether a case has been made out for removal of any of the petitioners from the office of Sarpanch on the basis of charge sheets served on them, is one which in our opinion, can appropriately be decided only by the authority concerned after i sealing the petitioners in support of their replies to the show cause notice lest any of the parties may be prejudiced, we do not find it expedient to make any observations in regard to the merits of the charges contained in the respective charge sheets which have been served on the petitioners of these petitions. ( 18. ) IN view of the foregoing discussion, the legal position, in our opinion, can be stated thus: (i) Section 34 (1) (c) of the Act, in so far as it authorises the prescribed authority to pass an order of suspension of a Sarpanch who has been served with a notice along with charge sheet to show cause as to why he may not be removed from office, is not ultra vires. (ii) If the order of suspension passed under the aforesaid provision is proved to have been passed mala fide, or on any ground extraneous to the grounds contemplated by clause (c) of Section 34 (1) of the Act, it is the action of the prescribed authority in passing an order of suspension which may be vulnerable, but on that ground, the provisions of Section 34 (l) (c) of the Act cannot be held to be ultra vires. (iii) Even though no period has been prescribed during which an order of suspension is to remain, in force or within which a final order under Section 35 of the Act is to be passed the rule of reasonable period applies. As such in each case, an order under Section 35 of the Act has to be passed within a reasonable period and the order of suspension passed under Section 34 (1) (C)of the Act shall be quo terminus with the order that may be passed in proceedings under Section 35 of the Act (iv) On a harmonious construction of sub-section (2) of Section 34 and Rule 5 of the rules, a revision against an order suspending a Sarpanch under Section 34 (1) (c) of the act is maintainable and would he only before the State Government and not before the Commissioner. (v) Rule 5 of the Rules contemplates exercise of power by the State Government not only suo motu but also on an application by any parry. Consequently, a Sarpanch against whom an order of suspension has been passed under Section 34 (1) (c) of the Act, would be entitled to make an application for revision under Rule 5 of the Rules before the State Govt. Moreover, proceedings before the State Government consequent upon the report contemplated by sub-section (2) of Section 34 can be treated as a revision if a prayer to this effect is made by the Sarpanch concerned. ( 19. ) IT was urged by counsel for the petitioners that the impugned orders of suspension passed under Section 34 (l) (c) of the Act could be invalid inasmuch as they were in violation of the principles of natural justice. According to them, before passing such an order, it was incumbent on the prescribed authority to give the petitioners an opportunity of hearing. We find it difficult to agree with this submission. According to them, before passing such an order, it was incumbent on the prescribed authority to give the petitioners an opportunity of hearing. We find it difficult to agree with this submission. Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 35 of the Act contemplates that no person shall be removed unless he has been given an opportunity to show cause as to why he should not be removed from his office. A similar provision was not, however, incorporated in clause (c) of section 34 (1) of the Act. The intention of the Legislature is, therefore, apparent that even though an opportunity to show cause was specifically contemplated before an order under Section 35 of the Act was to be passed, no such opportunity was contemplated before passing an order of suspension under Section 34 (l) (c) of the Act ( 20. ) IN Union of India vs. J. N. Sinha and another, AIR 1971 SC 40 , it was held that rules of natural justice are not embodied rules, nor can they be, elevated to the position of fundamental rights. Their aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They do not supplant the law, but supplement it. If a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the courts should do so. But if a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any rules of natural justice then the court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. Whether the exercise of a power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice Or not, depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of exercise of that power. ( 21. Whether the exercise of a power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice Or not, depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of exercise of that power. ( 21. ) IN Union of India and another vs. Tulsiram Patel AIR 1985 SC 1416 a constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held as under: "so far as the audi alteram partem rule is concerned, both in England and in india, it is well established that where a right to a prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before an order is passed would obstruct the taking of prompt action such a right can be excluded. This right can also be excluded where the nature of the action to be taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant statutory provisions warrant its exclusion, nor can the audi alteram partem rule be invoked if importing it would have the effect of paralysing the administrative process or where the need for promptitude or the urgency of taking action so demands. . . . " ( 22. ) A similar question came up before us in Indrajeetsingh vs. Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Sagar, M. P. NO. 331/87, decided on 8-2-1987, in connection with the provisions contained in Section 53 of the MP. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960. In that case, a notice was issued under sub-section (2) of Section 53 of the Co-operative societes Act, 1960 to a President of the Board of Directors requiring cause to be shown as to why the Committee may not be superseded. In the same show cause notice, there was an order under sub-section (10) of Section 53 of that Act stating that the Board of directors shall, during the pendency of the enquiry, function under the supervision of the Collector. It was urged in that case that an order under sub-section (lo) of Section 53 of the Act passed in violation of rules of natural justice was liable to be quashed. This argument was repelled. It was held as under: "it appears that the intention of the legislature was not to make any provision for issuing a show cause notice before passing an interim order under sub-section (10) of Section 53. This argument was repelled. It was held as under: "it appears that the intention of the legislature was not to make any provision for issuing a show cause notice before passing an interim order under sub-section (10) of Section 53. The reason apparently seems to be that sub-section (10) of Section 53 contemplated immediate action and issuing of a show cause notice and giving opportunity of hearing before passing the interim order may result in frustrating the very purpose of passing the interim order. In these circumstances in our opinion, the requirement of giving an opportunity of hearing on the principles of natural justice before passing an order under sub-section (10) of Section 53 stands excluded by necessary implication. Consequently, the order in the instant case passed under the said sub-section, cannot be held to be invalid on the ground of violation of the rules of natural justice. " ( 23. ) IN the instant case also, we are of the opinion that keeping in view the purpose of passing an order of suspension and the fact that even though a notice to show cause was contemplated to be given while taking action wider Section 35 of the Act, no such notice was contemplated to be given under Section 34 (1) (c) of the Act, it is apparent that the rules of natural justice were, by necessary implication, excluded by the legislature while passing an order under Section 34 (1) (c) of the Act and as such, their compliance could not be insisted upon in view of the law laid down by the Supreme court in the cases referred to above: ( 24. ) BEFORE parting with these cases, we consider it necessary to consider another link of the submissions made before us, namely, in regard to the power of the State government to pass an interim order in a revision against an order of suspension passed under Section 34 (1) (c) of the Act. In Income Tax Officer Cannanore vs. N. K. Mohammed Funhi, AIR 1969 SC 430 , it was held as under : "there can be no manner of doubt that by the provisions of the Act or the income-tax Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963, powers have not been expressly conferred upon the appellate Tribunal to stay proceedings relating to the recovery of penalty op tax due from an assessee. XXX xxxx xxxx xxxx indeed the tribunal has been given very wide powers under Section 254 (1) for it may pass such orders as it thinks fit after giving full hearing to both the parties to the appeal. If the Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner have made assessment or imposed penalties raising very large demands and if the appellate tribunal is entirely helpless in the matter of stay of recovery, the entire purpose of the appeal can be defeated if ultimately the orders of the departmental authorities are set aside. It is difficult to conceive that the legislature should have left the entire matter to the administrative authorities to make such orders as they choose to pass" in exercise of unfettered discretion. xxxx xxxxx xxxxx xxxx it is a firmly established rule that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective. " Their Lordships further observed in para 9 as under: "it is needless to point out that the power of stay by the Tribunal is not likely to be exercised in a routine way or as a matter of course in view of the special nature of taxation and revenue laws. It will only be when a strong prima facie case is made out that the tribunal will consider whether to stay the recovery proceedings and on what conditions. . . " Relying on the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court, it was held by a Division bench of this Court in Ramsahai vs. State Industrial Court M. P. Indore and another, 1973 M. P. LJ. 320 as under :- "it would thus appear that the well established principle has been recognised that a regularly established tribunal has the authority to stay proceedings by the subordinate authorities in order to prevant irreparable mischief during the pendency of the proceedings before it. . . . . " ( 25. ) IN Baleshwar Dayal vs. State of U. P. and others, 1971 All Law Journal. 1074 a question as to whether the State Government, in exercise of powers conferred on it under Section 7-F of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1974, had the power to pass an interim order of stay or not, came up for consideration before a full Bench of the Allahabad High Court. 1074 a question as to whether the State Government, in exercise of powers conferred on it under Section 7-F of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1974, had the power to pass an interim order of stay or not, came up for consideration before a full Bench of the Allahabad High Court. It was held that the State Govt, did have such a power. Section 7-F of the aforesaid Act was as under :- "the State Government may call for the record of any case granting or refusing to grant permission for the filing of a suit for eviction referred to in section 3 of requiring any accommodation to be let or not be let to any person under Section 7 or directing a person to Vacate any accommodation under section 7-A and may make such order as appeared to it necessary for the ends of justice. " There was no specific power conferred on the State Govt, to pass an interim order of stay against an application under Section 7-F made to it Notwithstanding this fact it was held by the Full Bench as under :- "the power given to the State Govt under this section is in very wide and general term After the State Government calls for the record under this section, it gets the jurisdiction to make such orders as may appear to it necessary in the ends of justice. This power, in our opinion, includes the power to make interim orders which may appear to the State Government to be necessary in the ends of justice. There does not seem to be any reason to confine the jurisdiction of the State Government to the making of final orders alone. It is a well recognised principle of interpretation of statutes that where a statute confers a power on an authority, such ancillary or incidental powers must be implied as are necessary for the effective and complete exercise of that power. " ( 26. ) IN Ramsahai supra, we find reference to a decision in the case of Kanhaiyalal vs. State of M. P. and others, M. P. No. 387/69, dated 24-11-1969. In that case, while dealing with Section 314 of the M. P. Panchayats Act 1962, it was held that the State govt. did not have any inherent power to pass an interim order under Section 314 of the act. In that case, while dealing with Section 314 of the M. P. Panchayats Act 1962, it was held that the State govt. did not have any inherent power to pass an interim order under Section 314 of the act. In our opinion, that case is clearly distinguishable. Section 313 of the M. P. Panchayats Act 1962, deals with the powers of appeals and revisions. The said section contemplated that an appeal or revision would lie against such order of Gram panchayats Janapada Panchayats and Zila Panchayats and of other authorities under that Act, to such authorities and in such manner as may be prescribed. The M. P. Panchayats (Appeal and Revision) Rules 1964 referred to above were the Rules framed prescribing the necessary details for the exercise of powers conferred by Section 313. Section 314, on the other hand, dealt with the control of the State Government The, power exercisable by the State Govt, under Section 314 which dealt with control, was apparently distinct from the power exercisable by the State Government as a revisional authority constituted under the Rules to hear a revision contemplated by Section 313 of the Act. In the case of Kanhaiyalal supra, it is only Section 314 of the Act which came up for consideration and not the power of the State Govt to pass an interim order in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Rule 5 of the Rules. ( 27. ) AS a consequence of the aforesaid discussion, it would be open to such of the petitioners who had not filed any revision before the State Govt, against the order suspending them from the office of Sarpanch under Section 34 (1) (c) of the Act to file revisions now. We are conscious that sub-rule (1) of Rule 6 of the Rules provides that no application for revision shall be entertained tinder sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the Rules after the expiry of 60 days from the date of order; Sub-rule (2) however, makes it clear that the revisional authority may admit an application for revision after the expiry of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period. Since the legal position was not so far clear and has been made clear by this order, there was apparently sufficient cause for the petitioners for not presenting a revision to the State Government against the order suspending them. Consequently, we are confident that if revisions are filed by such of the petitioners who have not filed them so far against the order of their suspension before the State Government the State government shall entertain and decide the same on merits. It has also been brought to our notice by counsel for the petitioners that considerable time has elapsed since after the notices alongwith charge sheets were served on the petitioners under Section 35 of the Act, but no final orders have been passed in those proceedings so far. In our opinion, a case has been made out for issuing a direction to the State Govt to pass final orders in the proceedings under Section 35 of the Act within a reasonable time Which, on the facts of the instant case in our opinion, would be 4 months from today. ( 28. ) IN the result these writ petitions, in so far as they challenge the constitutional validity of Section 34 (1) (c) of the Act are dismissed. The State of M. P. however, is directed to entertain revision that may be filed by the petitioners, if not already filed by them as contemplated by Rule 5 of the Rules referred to above and pass necessary orders in the said revisions in the light of the observations made above. The prescribed authority, namely the respective Collectors concerned who have issued the notices along with charge sheets under Section 35 of the Act in these cases, are also directed to pass final orders in the proceeding for removal of the petitioners from the office of sarpanch within four months from today, In me circumstances of the case, however, the parties shall bear their own costs. Security amount be refunded to the petitioners, if it has been deposited. Order accordingly.