JUDGMENT - M.S. RATNAPARKHI, J.:---The petitioner, who was an applicant before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Wardha in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 56 of 1982, has failed this criminal application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for setting aside the order of dismissal of her claim for maintenance passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and subsequently confirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Wardha on 17-7-1986 in Criminal Revision Application No. 52 of 1984. 2. The petitioner, who is an old lady of about 67, came before the trial Court with her application under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure alleging that she is the wife of the respondent, their marriage having been celebrated about 40-45 years back. It was her contention that she was residing with the respondent after the marriage and during the wedlock she gave birth to one female child Ujwala. They were leading their married life happily. However, about 10 to 15 years prior to the date of filing this application, the respondent No. 1 started ill-treating her. He refused to maintain her. She has, therefore, claimed maintenance at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month. It was also her contention that the respondent No. 1 is a well-to-do agriculturist having the agricultural income of Rs. 40,000/- per year. 3. The claim was denied by the respondent No. 1. He denied that the petitioner is his wife. He denied that the marriage was ever celebrated. It was his contention that he has his first wife living and similarly present petitioner has her first husband living even now. According to him, there was never any divorce between the petitioner and her first husband and, therefore, the so called marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is void. On this count, the claim has been denied. The other allegations are also denied. 4. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate directed the parties to trial. He held that the petitioner is not the legally married wife of the respondent. The allegation regarding desertion and neglect was also negatived. On this count, the learned Magistrate held that the petitioner was not entitled to any maintenance. He, therefore, rejected the application. 5. Feeling aggrieved with this decision, the petitioner went in revision before the Sessions Judge, Wardha. He held that the petitioner is not the legally married wife of the respondent. The allegation regarding desertion and neglect was also negatived. On this count, the learned Magistrate held that the petitioner was not entitled to any maintenance. He, therefore, rejected the application. 5. Feeling aggrieved with this decision, the petitioner went in revision before the Sessions Judge, Wardha. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Wardha, who heard that revision agreed with the trial Magistrate and held that the petitioner was not the validly married wife of the respondents. On this finding he rejected her claim. 6. The petitioner knocked the doors of this Court by filing Criminal Revision Application No. 548 of 1986. This Court, however, rejected that revision on the ground that the second revision by the same party was not maintainable. The petitioner, therefore, filed this special application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Mr. Lambat, the learned Advocate for the petitioner strenuously urged before me that both the Courts below have fallen into error in drawing wrong inferences of law from the facts that are admitted or well established. It is an established position, which has not been controverted even by the respondent, that the petitioner as well as the respondent were already married and their respective spouses were alive and are still alive. The petitioner alleged that she entered a Pat marriage with the respondent about 40 or 45 years back prior to the present application. This comes to near about 1939 or 1940. In her evidence she has specifically stated that she was divorced by her husband and then this Pat marriage was entered into. She has at one stage stated that the divorce deed was, however, obtained after the Pat marriage, with the respondent. It is admitted that since then the petitioner came to stay with the respondent. It is the case of the respondent that the petitioner was staying in his cattle-shed. At one stage the respondent was shy of admitting the sexual relationship between him and the respondent, but thereafter he admitted that a female child namely, Ujwala was born to the petitioner from him. Acceptable evidence has been led that this Ujwala was brought up by the respondent as his daughter and her marriage also was performed by the respondent. An invitation card was printed prior to this marriage and it has been filed on record. Acceptable evidence has been led that this Ujwala was brought up by the respondent as his daughter and her marriage also was performed by the respondent. An invitation card was printed prior to this marriage and it has been filed on record. This marriage was performed on 9-5-1976 and the present respondent Shripatrao Mun is the main person issuing the invitation. Muktabai and Dharambabai, the present petitioner, have been shown as his wives. 7. The admitted or well established position which is prevalent is that right since 1939 or so, the petitioner and the respondent were living together. They were living as wife and husband. During that period, the female child named Ujwala was born to this couple. The respondent brought up this child as his daughter. Not only that, but he admitted performing the marriage of his daughter and people were called to attend the marriage. The invitation card was also printed which shows that the present petitioner was shown as one of the wives of the respondent. Over and above that a voters' list Exh-42 has also been filed which shows the present petitioner as the wife of the respondent. The learned Magistrate considering all the circumstances at paragraph 14 of his judgment, observed that from all these facts taken together, could justify the presumption that the applicant and the non-applicant both lived together as husband and wife. The only difficulty in the way of the learned Magistrate was that this presumption is necessarily rebutted if it is established that at the time of the marriage, the petitioner was the wife of one Vithoba Darunde. 8. As far as the evidence on this point is concerned, the petitioner has stated that she was divorced. However, the divorce deed was obtained after her Pat marriage with the respondent No. 1 As against this the learned Advocate for the respondent urged that there is nothing on record to show that this divorce had taken place before the so-called Pat marriage. It was also alleged by him that the petitioner has not examined Vithoba, the previous husband of the petitioner. It was also alleged by him that the petitioner has not examined Vithoba, the previous husband of the petitioner. In fact, it is the respondent who in challenging the validity of the marriage and, therefore, the burden was upon him to establish that the subsequent marriage by Pat was invalid because the petitioner has her previous husband alive and the marriage ties were in existence even on the date of the marriage by Pat. It could have been very easily done by examining Vithoba. But he has not examined Vithoba. In fact non-examination of Vithoba was not very material for the petitioner. But it was on the other hand material for the respondent because it would be definitely established a positive case of the respondent. In the absence of Vithoba's testimony, we have to appreciate the testimony of the petitioner and the respondent. 9. Mr. Choudhari, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1, wanted this Court to infer that there is nothing in the evidence of the petitioner that she was divorced before she went into a Pat marriage with the respondent. What I find in the evidence is that she has already stated that she was divorced. There being no evidence on the point that the marital ties between the petitioner and Vithoba were still in vogue on the date of the marriage, a presumption can legitimately be drawn in favour of the valid marriage. Law does permit such presumption in a given set of circumstances. It is for the other party to allege and prove that the marriage is void. Looked at from this point of view, it can be very reasonably presumed that the marital ties between the petitioner and the said Vithoba came to an end and thereafter the Pat marriage was entered. 10. It was exactly at this stage that the learned Magistrate as well as the learned Additional Sessions Judge fell into an error. Though both the courts below were prepared to draw a presumption regarding the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on the given set of circumstances they fell into error in holding that there being no proof that the first marriage coming to an end, this presumption cold not be strengthened. The Courts fell into error in two ways. Though both the courts below were prepared to draw a presumption regarding the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on the given set of circumstances they fell into error in holding that there being no proof that the first marriage coming to an end, this presumption cold not be strengthened. The Courts fell into error in two ways. Firstly, the learned Magistrate and the Additional Sessions Judge drew the presumption about the continuity of the marriage even after evidence that there was a divorce. In fact, the evidence ought to have been read in a natural and logical way. When the law says that the woman cannot have two husbands and when the marriage between the spouses is established, the presumption could always be that the marriage was valid and it would be for the other party to successfully establish that the marriage suffered from the illegality. 11. Mr. Choudhari, the learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1 invited my attention to (Yamunabai Adhav v. Anantrao Adhav)1, 1982 Mh.L.J. 871 for his proposition that even the continuous living together of the male and female would not necessarily lead to the presumption of valid marriage, particularly when the circumstances are there. This is a Full Bench decision and the facts were somewhat different. The petitioner and the respondent were in fact married inasmuch as all the ceremonies essential under the personal law were performed under the law. Consequence of the marriage, namely, living together and begetting the children is also valid. However, it was found that the marriage between these two persons was within the prohibited degrees. The marriage was challenged on the ground that it was within the prohibited degree contemplated by section 5(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. This challenge raised by the respondent husband in a petition filed by the wife under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The question arose in that case whether the term "wife" means "legally married wife". This Court held that the term "wife" means a "legally married wife" and whose marriage is according to law. It was also felt that the wife whose marriage is invalid due to the operation of law cannot come within the definition of "wife" under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As far as the pronouncement is concerned, none should have any dispute with the same. It was also felt that the wife whose marriage is invalid due to the operation of law cannot come within the definition of "wife" under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As far as the pronouncement is concerned, none should have any dispute with the same. What I find is that this principle would not be applicable to the present case. In the present case the Pat marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is alleged to have been celebrated in 1939 or 1940 i.e. long before the coming into force of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. There was no prohibition against a male marrying two or more wives. As far as the female is concerned, there was a direction that she could not marry more males than one at a time. This position of law show that inspite of the first wife of the respondent being alive on the date of the alleged Pat marriage, the marriage would not be vitiated. 12. As far as the other aspect is concerned, the record does show that since 1939-40, the petitioner and respondent are living as wife and husband. During this period. The petitioner has given birth to a daughter. Not only that, but he performed the marriage of that girl showing himself as the father of the girl. In the invitation cards which he issued for the marriage he showed the petitioner as his wife along with his first wife. This is about the acts and conduct of the respondent himself. We have also some more evidence on record. An electoral roll published by the Public Authority under the provisions of law showed the petitioner as the wife of the respondent ; and this, according to the petitioner, continued till 1967 or so, i.e. after a continuous period exceeding 25 years. In these circumstances, the point which arises in such cases is whether in the circumstances, a presumption of a valid marriage would be justifiable or whether a presumption of continuation of the marriage between the petitioner and her previous husband would be justifiable. And this has to be examined particularly in view of the position that Vithoba is still living and he has not still complained about the petitioner living with respondent. And this has to be examined particularly in view of the position that Vithoba is still living and he has not still complained about the petitioner living with respondent. In these circumstances, I do not think it justifiable on the part of the learned Magistrate as well as the learned Additional Sessions Judge to have refused the presumption not only refused the presumption not only of a marriage, but of a valid marriage. 13. This is an application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, where this Court is called upon to exercise its inherent jurisdiction. This jurisdiction is very wide and there are no artificial limitations created by the statute. It is however necessary for the Court to see whether the circumstances prevailing, justify the interference while exercising such jurisdiction. Here is a woman aged about 67 coming before the Court complaining against her husband aged about 75 that she was accepted as a wife for a continuous period of 25 years or more and it is only at the fagend of the life that he has refused to carry on his obligation of maintaining her. Till 1967 or so, the same respondent was discharging his obligations not only of maintaining this woman, but also in celebrating the marriage of her daughter. The woman is pretty old, unable to maintain herself and the husband is coming at this stage with a case that she is not his wife. Not only a question of maintenance is involved, but also a question of status has already been involved and it was not proper for the trial Court to take such a shortcut and adjudicate matrimonial relations in the way it has been done. The parties have competent forums open to agitate this point if they want to. But as far as the present forum is concerned, it has a very limited jurisdiction and very limited scope for enquiry. The evidence standing as it is, is unimpeachable to lead one to the conclusion that for 25 years or so, the petitioner was treated as a wife and this leads to a logical presumption regarding not only the factum of the marriage, but also the validity of the marriage particularly when the persons who are interested in agitating against it have not so far agitated against it. I would, therefore, disagree with the finding recorded by the trial Court and hold that the petitioner is the wife of the respondent and as such she is entitled to claim maintenance under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 14. There is not much dispute that the petitioner has been neglected and that the petitioner is unable to maintain herself. The very fact that the respondent has not made any arrangement for the petitioner for the last 15 years is a good proof of neglect. The very age of the petitioner leads to an irresistible conclusion that she is unable to maintain herself. As far as the source and the ability of the respondent is concerned, the petitioner has deposed on oath that he is a man having landed property. He has come before the Court with the case that he has already partitioned his property amongst his sons and that he has not even a single acre with him. As far as the evidence is concerned, it is enough to say that the respondent does not command any credibility. The evidence of the petitioner is thus quite acceptable. She has claimed a maintenance at Rs. 200/- per month. In the society we are living today, Rs. 200/- a month cannot be called as unreasonable. 15. The application is, therefore, allowed. The respondent is directed to pay the maintenance at Rs. 200/- per month to the petitioner right from the date of the application. The respondent shall also bear the costs of the petitioner throughout in addition to his own. Application allowed. -----