SUDHANSHU SEKHAR GANGULY, J. ( 1 ) THIS Revisional Application has been filed against the judgment dated 27/2/1982 passed by Shri S. P. Sengupta, learned Additional Sessions Judge, 3rd Court, Murshidabad in Sessions Trial No. 2 of January, 1982. ( 2 ) THE accused-opposite parties are 34 in number. The prosecution case was that the deceased Salim Sk. was the head of the village guards of his village. There was theft of paddy from the fields and 4 of the guards placed under him were caught on suspicion and subsequently released. On the following day namely on 14/10/1978 at about 8 p. m. the villagers assembled near the village Mosque for a salis over the incident. The deceased Salim Sk. attended it and his parents also went with him. There the deceased was directed to produce the aforementioned 4 guards and also to give a written undertaking that there would be no further repetition of crop-theft. The deceased pleaded his inability to produce the four men and refused to give the undertaking. In writing, when he was bound up with a rope and assaulted by the present opposite parties, as a result of which he died. ( 3 ) BEFORE the learned Judge the opposite parties were charged under sections 147/148/149/302 of the Penal Code. The prosecution produced no fewer than 15 witnesses before the learned Judge. On a consideration of the evidence produced before him the learned Judge convicted the opposite parties-accused Jullu Sk. under section 304 Part. II of the I. P. C. and sentenced him to 4 years R. I. and also to R. I. for 6 months under section 147 I. P. C.-both the sentences to run concurrently. The learned Judge also convicted the accused opposite parties Hasir, Mustakin, Jamal, Samed and Samser under section 147 of the Penal Code but instead of sending them to prison released them on probation of good conduct under section 360 (1) Cr. P. C. These convicted opposite parties as well as other accused opposite parties were all acquitted of the charges framed against them under section 302/149 (alternatively 302/34) of the I. P. C. Hence, this Revisional Application from the side of the aggrieved father of the deceased. P. C. These convicted opposite parties as well as other accused opposite parties were all acquitted of the charges framed against them under section 302/149 (alternatively 302/34) of the I. P. C. Hence, this Revisional Application from the side of the aggrieved father of the deceased. ( 4 ) IT is urged from the side of the petitioner that there is enough evidence on record establishing the participation of all the accused opposite parties in the offence complained of and that the learned Judge should therefore have convicted all of them under section 302/34 or 302/149 of the I. P. C. It is urged that the judgment and order passed by the learned Judge should be set aside and an appropriate order passed on hearing the present Revisional Application. ( 5 ) THE present petitioner wants the judgment and order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge to be set aside. This prayer of his has been made without taking into consideration the fact that if the judgment and order are set aside without any reservation that will also do away with the orders of conviction and sentence passed therein by the learned Additional Sessions Judge against the accused opposite parties named above. Certainly the conviction and sentence passed by the learned Judge cannot be set aside at the petition of the present petitioner and that also cannot be within his contemplation. Clearly the present Revisional Application has not been dean up in a proper way. ( 6 ) BE that as It may, we take that the present Revisional Application was filed for setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the learned Judge in favour of the accused opposite parties and also for enhancing the punishment of accused opposite parties Sk. Jullu and passing a deterrent sentence on the other convicted accused opposite parties named above. More or less therefore the present is a revisional application against the judgment of acquittal. Jullu and passing a deterrent sentence on the other convicted accused opposite parties named above. More or less therefore the present is a revisional application against the judgment of acquittal. ( 7 ) THE law by now is well settled that there cannot be any interference from the side of the High Court with a Judgment of acquittal except in rare and exceptional cases where there has been some manifest illegality in the approach to the case or the appreciation of the evidence or where the conclusion of facts recorded by the trial Judge is wholly unreasonable so as to be liable to be characterised as perverse and there has been a resultant miscarriage of justice; Bansilal v. Laxman Singh. It is also settled law that if the findings reached by the trial Judge cannot be said to be unreasonable the High Court should not disturb it even if it were possible to reach a different conclusion; Bhagirath v. State of Bihar, Bhagwati v. State of U. P. The impugned judgment cannot therefore be set aside unless it is found spoilt by manifest error of law or procedure resulting in a grave failure of justice. ( 8 ) NOW, even though the prosecution produced not less than 14 witnesses before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, not more than two of them namely, Allarakha Sk. and. Suphia Bibi (P. Ws. 2 and 4) the father and mother of the deceased, deposed before the learned Judge to implicate the accused opposite parties with the killing of their son. Eight witnesses who were produced for telling the facts were merely tendered by the prosecution and therefore not cross- examined by the defence. Even the informant Amanullah Sk. (P. W. 1) refused to own up the statement as per the F. I. R. and he was declared hostile. Besides the partners, therefore, there was no other witness from the side of the prosecution on the point of the circumstances leading to the killing of their son. The learned Judge describing the evidence of the parents of the deceased finds that whereas the father Allarakha (P. W. 2) said that the accused opposite parties Jailal, Sadhu, Rahamatullah, Jullu, Abdul, Badar, Samad and Samser and Mustakin had caught hold of the deceased, the mother Suphia Bibi (P. W. 4) said that the accused opposite parties Jailal, Samad, Samser and Mustakin had caught him. He also points out that whereas the father (P. W. 2) said that the accused opposite party, Jailal, Sadhu, Rahamatullah, Abdul, Hadal, Samad, Samser, Hasir, Nasir, Fakir and Hadar had assaulted the deceased with lathi, the mother (P. W. 4) said that the accused opposite parties Abdul, Samad, Jailal, Mustakin, Hasir and Jullu had assaulted him. The parents, so he points out were unanimous that the accused opposite party Jullu had hit the deceased on his head with an iron as a result of which the deceased had collapsed to the ground. Comparing the statements of the two witnesses the learned Judge observes that the names of Jullu, Jailal, Samser, Samad, Mustakin and Hasir appear in both and he concludes that their participation with the assaults mounted on the deceased may be taken to have been established. Finding no cogent evidence establishing that the accused opposite parties excepting Jullu were armed with deadly weapons he concluded that they must have assaulted the deceased with their fists. Hence, their conviction under section 147 I. P. C. on finding that they formed part of an unlawful assembly, the common object of which was to beat up the deceased when he refused to produce his fellow miscreants or give an undertaking in writing. The learned Judge convicted Jullu separately under section 304, Part-II of the I. P. C. as relying on the evidence of the parents (P. Ws. 2 and 4) of the deceased, he held him responsible for causing the very serious injury on the head of the deceased with an iron rod which according to Dr. D. Saha (P. W. 15) the Doctor who held. the post mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased Salim was the fatal injury in this case. ( 9 ) CONSIDERING the circumstances of the case and the state of evidence the decision of the learned Judge cannot be found fault with. The fact that the only witness who denounced the accused opposite parties are the parents of the deceased is a circumstance to be considered in this case. As it has been observed in R. Kondaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, while such witnesses never fail to denounce the real culprits they cannot be said to be absolutely immune of the tendency of roping in some innocent persons along with the guilty. As it has been observed in R. Kondaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, while such witnesses never fail to denounce the real culprits they cannot be said to be absolutely immune of the tendency of roping in some innocent persons along with the guilty. It has been advised therefore that in a matter of caution the court should seen some assurance of this interested evidence from independent sources qua each accused. The learned Judge therefore made no mistake by refusing go-by the separate evidence of either of the two witnesses. In this case there was no other independent evidence against which the value of the evidence of the two witnesses could be tested. The next best procedure therefore was adopted by the learned Judge and he cannot therefore the blamed for holding only those persons guilty whose names have been mentioned by, both the witnesses. Since the names of the other accused opposite parties have not been mentioned by both of them the learned Judge did nothing wrong by acquitting them of the charges framed against them. ( 10 ) SIMILARLY the learned Judge did not make any mistake by convicting the aforementioned 6 accused opposite parties under section 147 of the I. P. C. The learned Judge has given detailed reasons as to why he has not convicted them under section 148 I. P. C. or section 302 read with sections 34/149 I. P. C. As he points out there is really no satisfactory evidence to show that any of these accused opposite parties excepting Jullu Sk. was armed with a deadly weapon. The results of the post-mortem examination also did not help the prosecution to any great extent. It appears from the evidence of Dr. Saha (P. W. 15) that no less than 8 injuries were found on the dead body of the deceased Salim. Of this Nos. 2 to 5 were superficial injuries. The injury No. 1 might be caused due to fall and the injury. No. 8 was an abrasion of left side of chest. The Doctor opined that the injury Nos. 1 to 6 and 8 considered individually could not be described as fatal injury. In the circumstances stated in the learned Judge refused to hold the aforementioned accused opposite parties guilty under any section other than section 147 I. P. C. I do not see how he could be blamed for that. The Doctor opined that the injury Nos. 1 to 6 and 8 considered individually could not be described as fatal injury. In the circumstances stated in the learned Judge refused to hold the aforementioned accused opposite parties guilty under any section other than section 147 I. P. C. I do not see how he could be blamed for that. ( 11 ) AS for the manner in which the learned Judge chose to punish the aforementioned accused opposite parties, this was within his discretion and it cannot be said that the discretion has not been exercised wisely by him. He convicted the accused opposite parties Jullu under section 304 Part-II of the I. P. C. and sentenced him to 4 years R. I. as he fell that this was an act of gross negligence and indiscretion on his part for which he should be punished. The learned Judge, however, felt that the consequence of what Jullu had done should be suffered by him alone since it does not appear that the other accused opposite parties who have been convicted under section 147 I. P. C. also shared his intention or object of injuring the deceased in such a way as to cause his death. The learned judge points out that even according to the versions of the parents the assault on the deceased went on for a long time and he observed that had it been their common intention of object to do away with him they could have done that without protracting the operation over a long period of time. ( 12 ) THE factual conclusion arrived at by the learned Judge do not appear to be unreasonable or perverse in any way. His judgment does not reveal any glaring defect in law or procedure. In the circumstances stated I am of the view that the judgment and order of conviction and sentence as passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge cannot be interfered with in revision under section 401 of the Cr. P. C. I also do not feel such interference will be permissible under section 482 of the Code. ( 13 ) IN the circumstances stated the Rule issued by this Court on 10-5-82 is hereby discharged. Send the lower court records back immediately. Revision dismissed. .