JUDGMENT J.N. Dubey, J. - Feeling aggrieved by an order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) respondent no. 2 Smt. Ram Shree filed a revision to the Deputy Director of Consolidation which was dismissed in default. Subsequently she moved an application for setting aside the aforesaid order on the ground that as she was not served with any notice she failed to appear in court when the revision was taken up and dismissed in default. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has allowed the application and restored the case to its original number. 2. Heard learned counsel for the Petitioners and perused the record. 3. Learned counsel for the Petitioners contended that the Deputy Director of Consolidation was not justified in allowing the restoration application of the respondent no. 2 without assigning any reason. It is true that the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation is not happily worded but that alone cannot be a ground for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. Admittedly revision of the respondent no. 2 was dismissed in default. It is now well settled that the provisions of restoration and condonation of delay should be liberally construed. In Prabhu v. The Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, reported in ALJ 1964 page 240, a Division Bench of this Court laid down that where in a revision the Deputy Director of Consolidation, acted in excess of jurisdiction vested in him under Section 48 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, but his order was proper, equitable and a just order. The High Court should not issue a writ for setting aside such an equitable order. 4. Similarly in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji and another, reported in AIR 1987, SC page 1353, the Supreme Court held that the "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts and that when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deli-berate delay. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 5. By setting aside an order which was admittedly passed in absence of respondent no. 2 no prejudice is going to be caused to the Petitioners, in as much as the revision will be heard afresh on merits after affording both the parties an opportunity of hearing. This being so, it is not a fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed.