A. N. VARMA, J. ( 1 ) THE controversy sought to be raised in this group of petitions is squarely covered by a Division Bench decision of this Court which is directly on the point [shiv Mangal Singh v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, v. P. , 1982 UPLBEC 46 : 1981 AH LI 1297]. The question involved is whether while allowing the extension of the time schedule fixed for the election of the Committee of Management of a notified Society, it is competent to the registrar of the Co-operative Societies to extend the dates of even those processes of election which have already been completed. Analysing the entire scheme of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act and the Rules framed thereunder governing the election of such notified Societies in considerable depth the Division bench answered this question in the affirmative. As the point involved in these petitions is identical, they are being disposed of by a common judgment. ( 2 ) WE will first have a brief look at the scheme of the election. The general body for the election of the Committee of Management of a notified society consists of delegates who are themselves elected by the primary members of the Society in accordance with the rules set out in Part IV of the Rules framed under the Act. After the election of the delegates who constitute the electorate, the Committee of Management is elected in accordance with the rules appearing in Part IV. ( 3 ) UNDER Rule 439 (i) the superintendence, direction and control for organising these elections vests in the Registrar and under sub-rule (2) of Rule 439, the Registrar fixes the date or dates for the election in such Co-operative societies and requires the District Magistrate concerned to appoint an Election officer for conducting these elections. The latter then notifies the time schedule for the election. Under the second proviso to Rule 440 the Registrar has power to allow extension of the time schedule in special circumstances to be recorded in writing. ( 4 ) IN the exercise of the power under Rule 439 (1) and (2) the Registrar fixed by an order issued on 16-10-87 a time schedule and required the District magistrates of the concerned districts to appoint Election Officers so that the elections of the Committee of Management of these Societies could be held on the dates fixed by him. Following these directions the Election Officers notified the dates for the publication of provisional voters list, filing of objections and the decision of the same, publication of the final voters list, the declaration of the reserved constituencies, filing nomination papers and for the withdrawal of the same and the decision of the objections in regard thereto, allotment of the symbols and finally, of the poll and declaration of result and thereafter the election of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman and the declaration of their results. By way of illustration, we are reproducing the time schedules fixed in the leading case (Itwari v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies): (i) the date for display of provisional voters list: 25-11-87 (ii) the date, time and place for filing objections and their disposal; 26-11-87 (iii) the date for display of final voters list ; 28-11-87 (iv) the date, time and place for filing nominations : 29-11-87 (v) the date, time and place for withdrawal of nomination : 30-11-87 (vi) the date, time and place for allocation of election symbols and display of final nominations : 30-11-87 (vii) the date, time and place of poll : 10-12-87 ( 5 ) IN pursuance of the above election programme the various petitioners filed their nomination papers and it is alleged that in the case of some of the petitioners after the expiry of the date fixed for the withdrawal of the nomination papers they alone were left in the field. Some of the petitioners had even been allotted symbols on 30-11-1987. On these allegations the petitioners contended that if the election had been allowed to be concluded according to the time schedule fixed as above, they would have become entitled to be declared elected unopposed on 10-12-1987, the date fixed for the final poll. ( 6 ) ON 30-11-87, however, the Registrar issued an order to the District magistrates of the concerned districts in supersession of his previous order dated 16-10-87 stating that in view of Rabi Campaign undertaken in consequence of the drought affecting the State, it was decided to extend the time schedule shifting the date fixed for the poll from 10-12-87 to 26-12-87. On the same date, another order was issued by the Registrar to the District Magistrates of the concerned districts annexing thereto a fresh time schedule fixed by bin) in the light of the extension of the time schedule ordered by him under the second proviso to Rule 440 and directing them to ask the Election Officers to organise the elections in accordance with the extended time schedule. The extended time schedule runs as under : (I) the date of display of provisional voters list: 12-12-87 (ii) the date, time and place for filing objections and their disposal: 13-12-87 (iii) the date for display of final voters list : 17-12-87 (iv) the date, time and place for filing nominations : 21-12-87 (v) the date, time and place for withdrawal of nomination : 21-12-87 (vi) the date, time and place for allocation of election symbols and display of final nominations : 22-12-87 (vii) the date, time and place of poll: 26-12-87 ( 7 ) ON the receipt of the aforesaid directions the Election Officer issued a fresh election programme in consonance with the time schedule fixed by the registrar. It is by the aforesaid action of the respondents that the petitioners have felt aggrieved. ( 8 ) THE principal contention raised was that the Registrar could not in the exercise of his powers under the second proviso to Rule 440 (1) extend the time schedule of the election even in respect of the process which had already been completed. The Registrar could under that provision, it was urged extend the time schedule only from the point which had already reached. Thus, it was argued, where the nomination papers had been accepted without any objection and symbols allotted, the Registrar could only shift the date fixed for the poll and declaration of result and nothing more. ( 9 ) THIS very contention was considered in considerable depth in Shiv mongol Singhs case [1981 All LJ 1297] (supra ). There also precisely similar arguments were advanced. It was contended that after the acceptance of the petitioners nomination, no other candidate had been left in the field and if the election had been allowed to proceed from that point onwards, all that remained was to declare the petitioner elected unopposed. There also precisely similar arguments were advanced. It was contended that after the acceptance of the petitioners nomination, no other candidate had been left in the field and if the election had been allowed to proceed from that point onwards, all that remained was to declare the petitioner elected unopposed. As a result of the intervention of the Registrar, however, who extended the entiie time schedule from beginning to the end, the petitioner had been deprived of a valuable right. The contention was rejected by the Bench with following observations :"16. Sri A. Kumar, the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that under the proviso to Rule 440, the Registrar bad no power to change the entire schedule. He could only change the date of the poll and not the date for filing nominations. Under sub-rule (1) of Rule 439 the election is to be organised under the superintendence, direction and control of the Registrar. The power conferred on the Registrar is of a very wide nature. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 439 says that the election in a Co-operative Society shall be held on such date or dates as the Registrar may by order fix. Taking these two provisions together, we find that the Registrar has ample authority under these rules to not only change the date of the poll but also to lay down the manner in accordance with which the elections have to take place. The expression "control" has to be given a wide meaning so that it achieves the purpose for which the power had been conferred upon the Registrar. The Registrar is overall in charge of the co-operative Societies. This was the reason that sub-rule (1) of rule 439 provides that election of a Co-operative Society would be held under the superintendence, direction and control of the registrar. ""17. Sub-rule (2) further shows that the election of the Co-operative society shall be held on such date or dates as the Registrar may by order fixed. The expression election has been used in this sub-rule of Rule 439 in the wide sense, that is to say, to connote the entire procedure to be gone through to return a candidate. It covers the whole procedure whereby an elected member is returned whether or aot it be found necessary to take a poll. Doubtless, in its ordinary meaning it implies some act of choosing. It covers the whole procedure whereby an elected member is returned whether or aot it be found necessary to take a poll. Doubtless, in its ordinary meaning it implies some act of choosing. But this term has not been used in the narrow sense. Considering the context and the background to us, it appears that the word "election" used in this rule bears the wide meaning referring to the entire process which consists of several stages and embraces many steps. "18. We are now require 1 to deal with the second proviso to Rule 440, on the basis of which, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Registrar could only extend the date of the poll and not other dates which had been fixed by the Election Officer. ""19. We are unable to find any merit in this submission. The proviso empowers the Registrar to allow extension in time schedule. A time schedule of an election does not only consists of the poll. it requires many other things to be done to hold an election to be mentioned therein. It was wrong to suggest that the power of extension granted by the Proviso could be exercised by the Registrar only for changing the date of the poll and not of the entire schedule preceding it. The power conferred is for extension of the time schedule. The time schedule does not only talk of the poll. It implies within itself the entire process commencing from the date of filing of the nomination paper to the date of the final election. The expression "extension" has been deliberately used to bring within its hold the lengthening out of time previously fixed for holding of the elections. This expression lends itself to variety of meanings whch must in each case be gathered from the context. It means enlarge than the original limit. As already observed above if the power conferred by the proviso is interpreted in the context, one would lead to the conclusion that a restricted meaning, if given, is likely to defeat the object and purpose for which the power has been conferred on the registrar. The only restriction placed is that the time schedule fixed should not travel beyond the period for which the Administrator has been appointed under Section 29. ""20. The only restriction placed is that the time schedule fixed should not travel beyond the period for which the Administrator has been appointed under Section 29. ""20. In the instant case, the Registrar had fixed two dates : (1) for the holding of the elections of the Branches of the U. P. State Co-operative land Development Bank Limited, and (2) for the constitution of the Committees of Management of the peak body, that is, the U. P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank Limited. These dates were 7-9-1981 and 2-9-1981 respectively. After having fixed these two dates, the rest of the details were required to be arranged by the flection Officer. Such a direction, we have already held above, could be rightfully given by the Registrar in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by Rule 439. That rule provides for holding of the election under the supervision and control of the Registrar. In exercise of this power the Registrar has stated in the impugned notification that the elections had to take place de now" ( 10 ) WITH respect, we entirely agree with the above statement of the law. The second proviso to Rule 440 conferring power on the Registrar to allow extension in time schedule has been expressed in wide terms being subject only to the provisions of Section 29. It must be read with the overall power of superintendence, directions and control of the Registrar vested in him under rule 439. This power is, in our opinion, available to the Registrar right up to the point of time of the declaration of the result of the elections whereafter the power to disturb the same belongs to the machinery provided for adjudicating disputes pertaining to the validity of elections. The second proviso to rule 440 cannot be read in isolation divorced from the general power of superintendence vested in Registrar under Rule 439 (1 ). So construed, we are clearly of the opinion that the power to allow the extension of time schedule includes the power to extend the entire schedule and not only a part of it. As held in the ease of Shiv Mangal Singh [1981 All LJ 1297] (supra), the expression "election" used in these rules must connote the entire process of election. As held in the ease of Shiv Mangal Singh [1981 All LJ 1297] (supra), the expression "election" used in these rules must connote the entire process of election. Consequently, the power to extend the time schedule vested in the Registrar in the context must carry with it the power to allow extension of the entire schedule from beginning to the end. ( 11 ) RELYING on Rule 443 (1) which provides that "where the member filed nomination does not exceed the number of persons to be elected, the election Officer shall declare them to have been duly elected only after the date of the poll" (emphasis supplied) learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that if the power of the Registrar is construed so widely it would deprive those candidates who are alone in the field of a vested right to be declared elected under Rule 443. ( 12 ) THE submission is misconceived. The right to be declared elected in the circumstances mentioned under Rule 443 (1) arises only after the date of the poll. It is not, in our considered view, a vested civil right. It is at a mere chance, a possibility and nothing more. The mere fact, therefore, that a candidates nomination was the only one accepted by the Election Officer does not by itself vest in nun any indefeasible civil right to be declared elected immediately. That right arises only after being declared elected and only after the date of the poll. There may be a variety of circumstances not difficult to visualise in which the Registrar may before the results are declared exercisiug power of superintendence be compelled to intervene and direct that the election be held de now in accordance with a fresh time schedule. These circumstances may, for example be famine, floods, fire, riots etc. which may justify the repetition of the process already accomplished towards the final election. It is for this reason that Rule 443 provides that the person who is the lone candidate in the field shall be entitled to be declared duly elected only after the date of the poll. Admittedly the date of the poll had not arrived in any of these petitions. No claim could hence be founded on the mere circumstance that the petitioner was the only candidate in the field. Admittedly the date of the poll had not arrived in any of these petitions. No claim could hence be founded on the mere circumstance that the petitioner was the only candidate in the field. ( 13 ) FURTHER, it is settled law that the right to stand as a Candidae and contest an election is not a common law right but it is a special right created by staute and can be exercised only on the conditions laid down thereby. This has been recognised time and again by their Lardships of the Supereme Court. Thus in Ram Chand Bhatia v. Hardyal. [reported in AIR 1986 SC 717 ], their lordships observed in paragraph 8 at page 720 :"the right to stand as a candidate and contest an election is not a common, law right. It is a special right created by statute and can only be exercised on the conditions laid down by the statute. " ( 14 ) THE same view has been expressed by a recent Division Bench of this court folloing various Supreme Court decisions [writ Petn No, 699 of 1987 connected with Writ Petn. No. 21130 of 1986 decided on 24-2-87. (reported in 1987 All LJ 1420)] in which it was observed :"the right to vote or stand as a candidate at the election is indisputedly not a civil right but isacreature of a statute or a speciel law and it must be subject to limitation imposed on it. If the legislature entrusts the determination ot matters relating to election to a special tribunal and invests it with special jurisdiction that alone ought to be invoked for enforcement of the right. Where as in this case the statute conferring right to or and at the etection prescribed specific statutory remedy embracing the disputes pertainin to all aspects of the entire process of election, we are not persuaded and find title justification to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution efficacious by taking resource to Rule 444-C read with section 70 (1) of the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965. " ( 15 ) IT is unnecessary to dilate on the scope of the second proviso to Rule 440, further as the above decision, with which we are in respectful agreement, provides a complete answer to the subbmissions of the petitioners. " ( 15 ) IT is unnecessary to dilate on the scope of the second proviso to Rule 440, further as the above decision, with which we are in respectful agreement, provides a complete answer to the subbmissions of the petitioners. ( 16 ) THIS bring us to the last submission which was that the Rabi Campaign necessitated by the drought conf ton ting the State could not furnish a valid ground for disturbing the entire time schedule, though it may have justed postponement of the elections from the point it has already reached but not that which had already bsen left behind. ( 17 ) WE are unable to agree. The ground furnished in the Registrars order could be valid both for the future processes as also for the past as the need for drafting all available manpower towards making the Rab, Campain under-for drafting all available affected the processes already completed. The Registrar has an over all view of the manner in which elections must have been conducted. ( 18 ) FURTHER, whether the entire time schedule should be extended or only part thereof is undoubtedly a matter which had better be left to the Registrar who oversees these elections beicg currently held throughout the State. In the absence of any reliable material indicative of misuse of power, therefore, this court ought not, in our humble view, to interfere with the descietion exercised by the Registrar. The Registrar may have thought that piecemeal shituing of the elections might not be conducive to the best results sought to be achieved and consequently he directed that the entire time schedule be extended under proper conditions when the machinery of the State necessary lor conducting these elections properly would be fully available after the conclusion ot the rabi Campaign. ( 19 ) IN this connection, we would like to adopt the approach which found favour with the Bench in Shiv Mangal Singhs case [1981 All LJ 1297] (supra)in paragraph 25 of which it was observed :"we wish to note that as the special circumstances were relevant to the exercise of power we cannot hold that the postponement of the election is in contravention of the law. As to what is special circumstances is to be decided by the Registrar and not by this court. Had the reasons given been thoroughly irrelevant, it would have been different. As to what is special circumstances is to be decided by the Registrar and not by this court. Had the reasons given been thoroughly irrelevant, it would have been different. This is not so in the present case. Since proper and adequate reasons were given there can be no complaint. " ( 20 ) ON the material brought by the petitioner on record, we have no reason to suspect that the power was exercised by the Registrar in good faith and not for collateral purpose or otherwise tuan in accordance with law. The extension of time schedule which the Registrar has allowed is uniformly appllcabie to all the concerned districts. There was no pick and choose approach in the matter so as to lend credibility to any charge ot mala fides or bias and the like. I here was nothing to indicate, beyond vague unsubstantiated hints, that this whole exercise was initiated by the Registrar with any oblique motive to rescue aoy political party or to harm the other aud so on. ( 21 ) THAT being so, we see no ground for interfering with the process of the elections. ( 22 ) THERE now remains to be considered two authorities cited on behalf of the petitioners: 1985 UPLBC pages 234 and 495: 1986 All LJ 445 in both of which it has been ruled that the power of extension which vests in the Registrar is subject to the outer limit imposed by Section 29 (6 ). Shri i. K. N. Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioners, however, very fairly conceded that the power exercised by the Registrar is still within the time limit prescribed under sub-section (6) of Section 29. The authorities cited hence do not advance the case of the petitioners. ( 23 ) LEARNED counsel also read the definition of the expression "extension" as given in the Strouds Judicial Dictionary and submitted that the term does not import the revesting of an expired right. We have already dealt with this aspect of the case and found that no right had yet come to be vested in those who had already filed the nomination papers. The right comes to be vested only on the declaration of the result after the poll (See Rule 443 ). ( 24 ) FOR the reasons stated above, we find no merit in these petitions which are dismissed. Petitions dismissed. .