KULKAMI, J. ( 1 ) THESE revisions by the third party-Anneppa, are directed against the common order dated 4-6-1987, passed by the first Additional Munsiff, Gulbarga, in execution case Nos. 31, 31, 33 and 34 of 1987, over-ruling the objections of the third party-revision petitioner in these cases. ( 2 ) THE respondent-1-Babu Rao, filed eviction cases in HRC Nos. 28, 29, 31 and 32 of 1982 against respondent-2 judgment debtor in all these executions. The present revision petitioner filed an application in the said H. R. C. cases under Order 1 Rule 10 to implead him alleging that he was the owner and landlord of the property and that the present respondent-1 was not at all the landlord or owner of the property. The tenants in the H. R. C. cases supported the contention raised by the revision petitioner. The Court dismiss the applications filed by the revision petitioner. Thereafter the present revision petitioner filed a suit in original Suit No. 61/1985 seeking declaration of his title against the present respondent-1 and the tenants contending that the property involved in each of the said H. R. C. cases had been purchased by him in the name of rcspondent-1. He filed an application for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 C. P. C. The trial Court granted an injunction by its order dated 6. 2. 1986. Respondent-1, being aggrieved by the said grant of the temporary injunction in Original suit No. 61/1981, approached this Court in mfa. No. 295/1986. The said M. F. A. was allowed on 13-3-1986. Thereafter the present revision petitioner withdrew Original suit No. 61/1985. ( 3 ) THEREAFTER a final order was passed in the said H. R. C. case holding that there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent-1 and respondent-2. Ultimately, in all these revisions, the order of eviction was passed. ( 4 ) THEREAFTER, the present execution petitions were filed. The present revision petitioner has now filed two suits seeking declaration of his title to the property and an injunction against the present respondent-1 and others, which are pending. ( 5 ) IN the present execution petition nos. Ultimately, in all these revisions, the order of eviction was passed. ( 4 ) THEREAFTER, the present execution petitions were filed. The present revision petitioner has now filed two suits seeking declaration of his title to the property and an injunction against the present respondent-1 and others, which are pending. ( 5 ) IN the present execution petition nos. 31, 32, 33 and 34/1987, the present revision petitioner appeared and filed an application contending, that in view of the pendency of the two suits filed by him, seeking declaration in respect of the suit property, these four executions should be dismissed or in the alternative he submitted that pending the disposal of the two suits filed by him, the proceedings in the execution should be stayed. ( 6 ) THE execution of Court over-ruling the objections of the revision petitioner ordered issue of delivery warrant. The revision petitioner being aggrieved by the said common order, in the four execution petitions, has come up with these four revisions. ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel Sri Gunjal for the petitioner contended that the application filed by the revision petitioner requesting for the dismissal of the execution or to stay the further proceedings in the execution amounted to an application within the meaning of Order 21 Rule 97 C. P. C. and that the very objection of the decree holder to such an application also amounted to an application within the meaning of Order 21 rule 97 C. P. C. and the Court ought to have held an enquiry and thereafter passed the final order. He in short contended that the summary dismissal of his objections without holding an enquiry was in relation of the principles of Order 21 Rules 97, 98 and 99 cpc. He referred to RAMAIAH v krishnappa by LRS. (1969 (2) mys. L. J. 273 ). It has been laid down in the said case-"on an application for delivery of possession under Or. 21, R. 35 CPC. , the delivery warrant cannot be refused, because some one who is not a pary to the decree opposes the issue of that warrant asserting his own possession. (1969 (2) mys. L. J. 273 ). It has been laid down in the said case-"on an application for delivery of possession under Or. 21, R. 35 CPC. , the delivery warrant cannot be refused, because some one who is not a pary to the decree opposes the issue of that warrant asserting his own possession. "it has been further held in the said case-"at the stage when the decree-holder makes an application for the issue of a warrant for delivery of possession, he is entitled to its issue, even if there had been an earlier obstruction in an earlier execution proceeding. "it is further held in the said case- "where the executing Court declined to allow execution to proceed even against the judgment-debtor, because a person not a party to the decree opposed the same, an appeal from that order which concerned the executability against judgment debtor falls within Section 47 cpc. , and so is appealable. The appealability of that order did not disappear merely because the intervener purported to present an application under section 151 CPC. He contended that it did not lay down the correct law. The other railing referred to by him is, TAVANAPPA HAMBANNA sangani by LRs. and OTHERS v veerabhadrappa T1ppanna (1968 (1) M. L. J. 311 ). . What is laid down in the said case is, that the judgment-debtor has no interest in the property to protect and he is not entitled to raise any objection to the delivery effected through the process of the court which is accepted by the decree-holder, except where objection is raised that there is excess delivery or that property is not covered by the decree. Therefore, this 1968 case will not help the petitioner in the least. ( 8 ) HE then relied on BHAGWAT narayan DWIVEDI v KASTURI (A. I. R. 1974 M. P. pa'ge 26 ). The said Bhagwat narayan Dwivedi's case is over-ruled by the subsequent Bench decision of the Madhya pradesh reported in SMT. USHA JAIN and others v MANMOHAN BAJAJ and others (A. I. R. 1980 MP. 146 ). It is laid down in the said case that the executing court is not bound to stay its hands on the strength of the objection raised by the third party till full investigation is made. It has laid down that Rule 97 C. P. C. is permissive and not mandatory. 146 ). It is laid down in the said case that the executing court is not bound to stay its hands on the strength of the objection raised by the third party till full investigation is made. It has laid down that Rule 97 C. P. C. is permissive and not mandatory. This Full Bench decision has in clear terms over-ruled the ruling reported in A. I. R. 1974 M. P. 26. ( 9 ) THE Counsel then relied on ramchandra VERMA v MANMAL singhi and ANOTHER (A. I. R. 1983 sikkim ). The Sikkim High Court laid down-" Where in the course of the execution of a decree for the delivery of any immovable property, a person in possession of the property, who was not a party to the decree, preferred an objection to the execution of the decree by filing an application that he was not bound by the decree, the executing Court, without holding the person to be bound by the decree, could not reject the application as not maintainable under the law and order the execution to proceed. The executing Court should have stayed its hands in the matter leaving it to the decree-holder to proceed under Rule 97 or in such other manner as he might have thought fit. "the principle laid down by the Sikkim Court runs contrary to the principles laid down by this Court reported in MANOHAR ishwarappa CHATAGI and ANOTHER v GAJANANA and OTHERS (1986 (1) K. L. J. Law Journal 242), ARJUN v ZEMPANNA gangappa SAMBANNI (ILR -1985- 3637), JESARAJ GHASIML BETAL v ahammad HUSSEIN (ILR- 1986 -Kar. 2647) and M/s MAHAVEERA v mangaraj (I. L. R. 1987-Kar. l940 ). In view of the specific rulings of this court covering the point on hand, I am inclined to follow the Sikkim decision. ( 10 ) THIS Court in MANOHAR v gajanana and OTHERS (1986 (1) bangalore Law Journal page 244, has laid down -" It is no doubt true that Rule 97 of order 21 would come into play if there is it further lays dc a request by the decree holder for the removal of the obstruction. The said rule only speaks that the decree holder should be resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property. The said rule only speaks that the decree holder should be resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property. There is nothing in that rule to indicate that the obstruction or resistance contemplated by it should happen only at the time of the delivery of possession of the property. If in the course of the execution or if at the stage of even issuing the delivery warrant, obstructers appear before the court and urge that they offer the obstruction, it would amount to resistance or obstruction within the meaning of that rule. If the obstructers filed an application in the course of the execution offering obstruction or resistance and if the decree holder filed objections to that application then such objections would amount to an application within the meaning of Order 21 Rule 97 of the C. P. C. "similar is the view expressed by this Court in m. M. JAMADHAR AND OTHERS v smt. AMIRBI and OTHERS (A. I. R. 1985 kar. 91), ARJUN v ZEMPANNA gangappa SAMBANNI (I. L. R. 1985- kar-3637) and JESARAJ GHASIMAL betal v AHAMMAD HUSSEIN (I. L. R. 1986 Kar. page 2647 ). ( 11 ) THIS Court has further laid down in m/s MAHAVEERA v MANGARAJ (I. L. R. 1987 Kar. 1940)-"the provision is meant to assist the decree-holder in execution. The only person who can invoke the provision is the decree-holder or the purchaser. The legal position is that this remedy which is available to the decree-holder is permissive and not mandatory. He can make successive applications for the issue of delivery warrant. He cannot be penalised for not having taken action under Order 21 Rule 97 CPC against resistance. "it further lays down-"that the executing Court had no jurisdiction to start an enquiry either suo moto or at the instance of third party regarding the title of the third party. Third party's remedy is under Order 21 rule 100 C. P. C. after he is dispossessed and not before. "it further lays down-"that the executing Court had no jurisdiction to start an enquiry either suo moto or at the instance of third party regarding the title of the third party. Third party's remedy is under Order 21 rule 100 C. P. C. after he is dispossessed and not before. "this Court has taken a consistent view that if any third party appears in the execution and intimates the Court that he is offering obstruction to the delivery of the possession, that would not be sufficient to start an enquiry under Order 21 Rule 97 c. P. C. The said ruling lays down that such an obstruction is offers by a third party in the execution, if the decree holder files an objection and if those objections filed by the decree- holder are sufficient to pray for the removal of the obstruction, then such objections filed by the decree holder might be taken as an application within the meaning of Order 21 rule 97 C. P. C. and then only the Court is bound to hold an enquiry and pass orders. If the decree-holder does not file any objection to the third party's obstruction filed in the course of the execution, then the case will not fall under Order 21 Rule 97 C. P. C. at all. In this case, the revision petitioner has no doubt filed an application contending that in view of the suits filed for declaration of title and injunction, the execution should be dismissed or that the further proceedings in the execution should be stayed. But unfortunately for him, the decree-holder has not at all filed any objection to the application by him. What was now conterded by the learned counsel Sri vishweshwara was, that such an application by a third party was not competent at all. Therefore, such a submission does not amount to filing objections by the decree-holder and thus does not bring the case within the ambit of Order 21 Rule 97 c. P. C. Under these circumstances, the submission of the learned Counsel Sri Gunjal that when a third party had offered the obstruction, it was incumbent upon the Court to hold an enquiry under Order 21 Rules 97 to 99 C. P. C. , merits to be rejected. ( 12 ) THE contention of the tenant-respondent-2 that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between respondent-1 and himself has been negatived by the H. R. C. Court and that has become final. When that is the conclusion arrived at by the H. R. C. Court, it is not now open to respondent-2-tenant to contend that rcspondent-1, is not his landlord and it is the revision petitioner that is his landlord. Respondent-2 also contends that he had handed over the possession to the revision petitioner. If the tenant had handed over the possession to the revision petitioner, and if the revision petitioner has taken possession of the property, that would not be binding on present respondent-1 who has obtained an order of eviction against rcspondent-1. The versions of the revision petitioner and respondcnt-2 arc nothing but an attempt the court or tolerate please rectify with to the eviction decree obtained by respondent-1. Such attempts if allowed to be encouraged would make the decree almost inexecutable for centuries together. Therefore, even if respondent-2 has handed over the possession to the revision petitioner, that will not come in the way of the 1st respondent - decree -holder on obtaining the actual possession of the property from respondcnt-2. ( 13 ) IN the result, the order passed by the court below needs no interference. All the revisions are therefore dismissed. The revision petitioner in all the four cases should pay the costs of respondent-1 and should bear his own. Revision Petition dismissed. --- *** --- .