JUDGMENT D.S. Bajpai, J 1. First Civil Appeal No. 87 of 1981 is an appeal by the State of Uttar Pradesh under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act (Act No. 1 of 1894) against the judgment and decree passed in a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The appeal was presented 318 days beyond time. This was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act (hereinafter referred to as, the Act) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In other appeals which have been filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh against judgment and decrees challenging the judgments and decrees of various courts also under the provisions of Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act in different references under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act there were applications under Section 5 of the Act since they were all filed beyond time and were barred by the provisions of the Limitation Act. The delay in filing the appeals was more than 309 days and it varied from 309 days to 318 days. It is worthwhile to note that all the applications under Section 5 of the Act are routine applications with materially the same allegations and have been stenciled in which the names of the opposite party respondents have only been filled by hand and similar is the case with the affidavits accompanying these applications. 2. In some of the cases the Court prima facie was not satisfied with the explanation of the delay so as to entitle the Slate to claim the benefit of Section 5 of the Act whereupon the Standing Counsel took time to file a better affidavit explaining the unexplained inordinate delay in moving the Court that the cause shown for the appeals having been filed beyond time was sufficient to entitle the State to invoke the benefit of Section 5 of the Act. The supplementary affidavits filed do not improve the matters. Their Lordships; of the Supreme Court in the case of Bikram Dass v. Financial Commissioners and others ( AIR 1977 SC 2221 ) observed: Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard taskmaster and judicial interpretation has encased it within a narrow compass. The supplementary affidavits filed do not improve the matters. Their Lordships; of the Supreme Court in the case of Bikram Dass v. Financial Commissioners and others ( AIR 1977 SC 2221 ) observed: Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard taskmaster and judicial interpretation has encased it within a narrow compass. A large measure of caselaw has grown around Sec. 5, its highlights being that one ought not easily to take away a right which has accrued to a party by lapse of time and that therefore a litigant who is not vigilant about his rights must explain every day's delay. A perusal of the affidavits filed in support of the applications under Section 5 of the Act on behalf of the State indicates that the concerned officers belated the matters to such an extent that on the basis of the affidavits filed it is difficult to hold that the delay was due to any bona fide mistake or for reasons beyond their control but it was due to their negligence alone. 3. The provisions of section 6 of the Act have to be strictly construed and the contention that the Court should not be unduly technical in complying them has been squarely rejected by the Supreme Court in the case of Mewa Ram v. State of Haryana ( AIR 1987 SC 45 ) when the Court held: The learned counsel contends on the strength of the provisions contained in Sections 25 and 28 A that the Court should not be unduly technical and deprive the citizens of their legitimate claims. In support of his submission he reliese on certain 0bservations made by this Court in Madras Port Trust v. Hymanshu International by its Proprietor v. Venkatadri (dead) by Lrs. (1979) 4 SCC 176 : ( AIR 1979 SC 1144 ) to the effect that plea of limitation by the Government to defeat just claims of citizens should not be countenanced. We are afraid, the contention cannot prevail. 4. On consideration of facts disclosed in the affidavit accompanying the application under Section 5 of the Act no cause, much less sufficient cause is made out to condone the delay. 5. We are afraid, the contention cannot prevail. 4. On consideration of facts disclosed in the affidavit accompanying the application under Section 5 of the Act no cause, much less sufficient cause is made out to condone the delay. 5. The principle of law laid down in various decisions of this Court as also of the Supreme Court is very clear and I hold that no exception is made for the Government in the matter of condonation of delay which is not satisfactorily explained in terms of section 5 of the Act which varies from 309 days to 318 days in different cases. 6. In the result all the applications under Section 5 of the Act in all the appeals stand rejected and as a consequence the first appeals must fail and are hereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. (Appeal dismissed)