JUDGMENT A. N. Varma, J. - The petitioners are challenging a notification, dated 9-2-1981 issued under Section 7(2)(b) of U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Adhiniyam declaring that the wholesale transactions of certain agricultural produce shall be carried only within the principal market yard of the respondent - Samiti. 2. The first ground of challenge is that the paddy and rice being the essential commodities, the entire business connected therewith is controlled by the U.P. Rice and Paddy Levy Order, 1985 and U.P. Foodgrains Dealers Licensing Order, 1976 and promulgated under the Essential Commodities Act and consequently the impugned notification. 3. We cannot agree. An identical argument was considered at length in the case of M/s. Amrit Rice Mills, Pilibhil and others v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, reported in 1987 UPLBEC 394 by a Division Bench of this Court and repelled. We entirely agree with that decision and it is unnecessary to dilate on this point further. 4. The second contention was that the impugned notification cannot apply to the petitioners as they are carrying on their business from the premises of their mills which though within the market area are not located within the market yard and consequently the said notification cannot be applied to them as it has Amrit Rice Mills case (supra). 5. The allegation that the petitioners are not doing any business within the market yard has been emphatically denied by the respondent it its counter-affidavit. The assertion is that the petitioners are wholesalers and hold license therefor issued by Mandi Samiti. In the license their places of business are also mentioned according to which they are carrying the business within the market yard. The respondent-Mandi Srmiti has also asserted that it is levying market fees and applying the impugned notification only to those traders who are doing wholesale business within the market - yard. No doubt the petitioners have reiterated the allegations made in the petition but we have found no reason for preferring the version of facts put forward by the petitioners to that of the Secretary of the Mandi Samiti who have verified the counter-Affidavit. No mala fides or bias is alleged against the Secretary or at any rate established so as to justify the rejection of his version of facts. In this view. No mala fides or bias is alleged against the Secretary or at any rate established so as to justify the rejection of his version of facts. In this view. We cannot grant She reliefs prayed for in the nature of prohibition restraining the respondent not to enforce the impugned notification against the petitioners as the respondent is enforcing the notification against those traders only who are carrying on business in the market yard. The second contention too must, therefore, be rejected. As regards the decision in the case of Amrit Rice Mills case (supra) and other decisions of this Court, following that decision, it may be mentioned that in those cases the admitted position was that the petitioners were carrying on their business only from their mill premises which were outside the market - yard a situation which was entirely different from that existing in the present case. 6. That take us to the third ground which was that the procedure prescribed under Sections 5 and 6 of the Act mandatory for declaration of market area was not followed in the instant case and consequently the impugned notification is liable to be struck down on this short ground. 7. The submission is devoid of any merit. The principal ground of challenge under this head was that the notifications under Sections 5 and 6 were not published as required by Rule 129 of the U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Rules, 1965. There are more than one reasons for which this contention which must fail. The first is that the petitioners are seeking to raise a controversy which is basically one of fact, namely whether the notification under the aforesaid, provisions were published in the local newspapers and in the manner provided under Rule 129. The notification under Section 5(1) and (6) were issued in the year, 1972, i.e. more than 15 years ago. After such a long lapse of time, it would not be proper and fair to embark upon this kind of enquiry. Admittedly the notification issued under Section 6 has held the field for all these years without any such objection having been raised by the affected traders. In our opinion, such belated challenged should not be entertained or encouraged even if a few of the petitioners happen to have entered the trade recently as alleged. Admittedly the notification issued under Section 6 has held the field for all these years without any such objection having been raised by the affected traders. In our opinion, such belated challenged should not be entertained or encouraged even if a few of the petitioners happen to have entered the trade recently as alleged. What is important is that the local traders who have been affected by the declaration of the area in question as a market area have not complained for almost a decade and a half that they were deprived of the opportunity to file objection contemplated under Section 5(i) of the Act. 8. Even on facts there is a serious dispute between the parties. In the counter-Affidavit, it has been averred by the Secretary of the Mandi Samiti that the notification under Section 5(i) was published in the newspaper as required under Pule 129. The allegation of the petitioners that they came to know for the first time only when they inspected the record in 1987 seems too simplistic to deserve acceptance. It is highly improbable that these traders were unaware of the issue of notification under Section 5(1). The petitioners have not alleged that they filed any objections even after the issue of notification UDder Section 6 or that they challenged it on the ground now put forward during all these years. We are hence not prepared to lend any ordnance to the interested version of the petitioners that the formalities of publication of the notification under Section 5(i) were not observed. We do not think that this grievance of the petitioners, namely, lack of opportunity to file objections is real or genuine. The same is also true of the allegations that the Mandi Samiti did not pass any resolution for the imposition of the market - fees as required under Rule 17(iii)(b) of the Act. The challenge is too belated to deserve serious consideration quite apart from the fact that the allegation of non - publication of the notification under Section 5(i) has also been denied in the counter-Affidavit. 9. In order to explain the inordinate delay in challenging these notifications, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the cause of action is a recurring one and consequently, they can bring the challenge at any time. The contention is misconceived. 9. In order to explain the inordinate delay in challenging these notifications, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the cause of action is a recurring one and consequently, they can bring the challenge at any time. The contention is misconceived. The delay in challenge is in regard to the declaration of the market area under Section 6 and lack of opportunity to file objection under Section 5(i) in respect of which the cause of action cannot be said to recurring. So far as the alleged deprivation of the opportunity to file objection is concerned, the same took place in the year 1972. That cause of action is by no means recurring one. Further, whether the petitioners are guilty of laches or not is a matter which has to be determined with reference, inter alia, the nature of investigation which the court is called upon to make. In the instant case the court is being asked to go into the question whether the publication was made in the newspapers in the year 1972. Judged from this perspective the challenge is clearly for too State to merit consideration. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners also stressed that at least as regard those petitioners who are new entrance to the trade, the delay cannot be a ground for negativing this argument We are not impressed by his submission. Just because a few petitioners have entered the trade recently, they cannot be permitted to reopen the matters which have long since become closed and have been accepted without objection by the traders by and large. 11. And finally the last submission, which was that Section 7(2Xb) is ultra vires under Article 19(i)(g) of the Constitution. This point stands concluded by the decision in M/s. Amrit Rice Mills case (supra) with which we are in entire agreement. 12. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed. The interim orders, if, any are discharged.