G. B. SINGH, J. Ali Raza and Peer Ali appellants have been convicted for the offence of dacoity puninshable under Section 395, IPC by the lit Additional Sessions Judge, Bahraich. Ali Raza appellant, has been ordered to be kept in safe custody under Section 32 of the U. P. Children Act instead of being sentenced to imprisionment. Peer Ali, -appellant has been sentenced to ten years R. I. and a fine of Rs. 2,000 in default to undergo rigorous impri sonment for one year. 2. The case of the prosecution was that on the night between 20/21-2-1979 at about midnight 18 or 20 dacoits armed with lathis and country-made pistols raided the house of Ahmad informant in village Bahadur Purwa, P. S. Nanpara, district Bahraich, they committed dacoity there. The dacoits were carrying electric torches and were flashing them Ahmad and other inmates of the house raised alarm whereupon several persons of toe village arrived. The rescuers made an attempt to apprehend the dacoits whereupon marpit took place. One dacoit died on the spot and Ali Raza and Peer Ali were captured on the spot. Other dacoits succeeded in making their escape good alongwith the booty. 3. Ahmad lodged the FIR of the incident on 21-2-1979 at 6. 35 p. m. at P. S. Nanpara, which is at a distance of about four miles from the place of incident. On that report a case under Sections 395/397, I. P. C. was regis tered Ali Raza and Peer Ali were taken to P. S. Nanpara and they were handed over there to the police. The case was investigated and the charge-sheet was submitted against the appellants and some others. 4. On behalf of the prosecution Ahmad, P. W. 1, Bechan P. W. 2, Raunaq Ali, P. W. 3, Ishaq Ali, P. W. 4 and Abdul Majeed P. W. 5 were examined as witnesses of the occurrence. The evidence of other witnesses was a formal nature. Ali Raza and Peer Ali stated in defence that they have been falsely implicated on account of enmity with police. Ali Raza further stated that Khaibar barbar of village Kheshwapur is his Khalu. He had gone to see Khaibar. Ahmad and others apprehended him from the place of his relation Khaibar and implicated him in the case. Peer Ali stated that Tahir, resdent of village Bahadurpurwa is his Sarhu. Ali Raza further stated that Khaibar barbar of village Kheshwapur is his Khalu. He had gone to see Khaibar. Ahmad and others apprehended him from the place of his relation Khaibar and implicated him in the case. Peer Ali stated that Tahir, resdent of village Bahadurpurwa is his Sarhu. He hid gone to see his relation Tahir. The village people apprehended him on suspicion and got him implicated in the case. The appellants did not give any evidence in defence, 5. The learned Additional Sessions Judge believed the statements of the prosecution witnesses and convicted and sentenced them as mentioned above. Feeling dissatisfied with it the present appeal has been filed. 6. The learned counsel for the appellants did not challenge the finding of the trial Court that the appellants were among the dacoits who committed dacoity at the house of Ahmad on the relevant night and they are guilty for the offence of dacoity punishable under Section 395, I. P. C. In my opinion he did not rightly assail the finding of the trial Court on this point, Trie reason is that Ahmad, P. W. 1, Bechan, P. W. 2, Raunaq Ali, P. W. 3, Ishaq Ali, P. W. 4 and Abdul Majid, P. W. 5 made consistent statement that Ali Raza and Peer Ali appellants were among the dacoits who were responsible for the dacoity at the house of Ahmad and they were captured by the village people on the spot. The appellants did not give any evidence in support of their defence that they were captured on mere suspicion. They did not even pray to examine their so-called relations to support their version. The suggestion made on their behalf in cross-examination of the witnesses that they were among the rescuers and chased the dacoits itself shows that they were present near the place of incident at the time of dacoity. Die prosecution witnesses had no motive to make false statements against the appellants. There is nothing in their cross- examination to indicate that they were making false statements about the appellants. The evidence led on behalf of the prosecution, therefore, fully proved that Ali Raza and Peer Ali were among the dacoits and they along with others committed dacoity at the house of Ahmad on the relevant night. 7. There is nothing in their cross- examination to indicate that they were making false statements about the appellants. The evidence led on behalf of the prosecution, therefore, fully proved that Ali Raza and Peer Ali were among the dacoits and they along with others committed dacoity at the house of Ahmad on the relevant night. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants agued that the sentence of ten years R. I. along with a fine of Rs. 2,000 imposed against Peer Ali is severe. There is much force in this contention. Though dacoity is a serious crime and a deterrent sentence is generally called for, gravity of the offence is measur ed by the amount of violence used, the manner in which the dacoity is committed and valuation of the property looted. The normal sentence in a case of dacoity is seven years. There is noting en record showing that the dacoits committed any of attrocity or torture against the inmates of the house. Ahmad and others have not made clear statements if the property looted was of much value. When Peer Ali was apprehended no looted property was recovered from his possesion. In view of these circumstances I am of the opinion that seven years R. I. will be sufficient to meet the ends of justice. The sentence passed against Peer Ali is, therefore, liable to be reduced to seven years, R. I. It does not appear necessary in the case that fine should also be imposed against him and the order for payment of fine is, therefore, liable to be set aside. 8. It was argued on behalf of Ali Raza appellant that the order for detaining Ali Raza in safe custody under Section 32 of the U. P. Children Act for a period of eight years is not justified. It was further argued by him that Ali Raza was about 15 years old at the time of occurrence and as such he was a child within the meaning of U. P. Children Act. He further argued that a child cannot be sentenced to imprisonment in view of Section 2 (4) read with Section 27 of the U. P. Children Act and after the attainment of the age of 18 years he cannot be sent to Approved School, so he should have been released. He further argued that a child cannot be sentenced to imprisonment in view of Section 2 (4) read with Section 27 of the U. P. Children Act and after the attainment of the age of 18 years he cannot be sent to Approved School, so he should have been released. In support of this argument he placed reliance on Jayendra v. State of U. P. , AIR 1982 SC 685 . I do not agree with the argument advanced by the learned counsel. It has been held in that case : "the appellant Jayendra was a child within the meaning of the provision Section 2 (4) of the Uttar Pradesh Children Act, 1951, on the date of the offence. Section 27 of the aforesaid Act says that notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law, no court shall sentence a child to imprisonment for life or to any term of imprisonment. Section 2 provides in so far as it is material, that if a child is found to have committed an offence punishable with imprisonment, the court may order him to be sent to an approved school for such period of stay as will not exceed the attainment by the child of the age of 18 years. In the normal course, we would have directed that the appellant Jayendra should be sent to an approved school but in view of the fact that he is now nearly 23 years of age, we cannot do so. " From the facts narrated in that judgment it is not clear for what offence Jayen dra was found guilty. The proviso to Section 27 and Section 32 were not considered in that case. It cannot, therefore, be said on the basis of this ruling that a child, who is 12 years of age or upwards, cannot be sent to prison in any case. 9. The learned Additional Sessions Judge on the basis of the material placed before him came to the conclusion that Ali Raza was born in the year 1964 and he was about 15 years old at the time of occurrence which took place in the year 1979. This finding was not challenged before me and it appears acceptable. 9. The learned Additional Sessions Judge on the basis of the material placed before him came to the conclusion that Ali Raza was born in the year 1964 and he was about 15 years old at the time of occurrence which took place in the year 1979. This finding was not challenged before me and it appears acceptable. Ali Raza appellant was, therefore, a child within the meaning of the U. P. Children Act at the time of occurrence and since he has been found guilty for the offence of dacoity he is a youthful offender within the meaning of Section 2 (13) of that Act. 10. Chapter IV of the U. P. Children Act deals with youthful offenders. The relevant sections for purposes of the point under consideration are Sections 27, 32 and 33. They read as follows: "27. Sentence that may not be passed on child.-Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, no Court shall sentence a child to death or transportation or imprisonment for any term or commit him to prison in default of payment of fine : Provided that a child who is twelve years of age or upwards may be committed to prison when the Court certifies that he is of so unruly, or of so depraved a character that he is not fit to be sent to an approved school and that none of the other methods in which the case may legally be dealt with is suitable. 32. Detention in case of certain crimes by Children.- (1) When a child is found to have committed an offence of so serious a nature that the Court is of opinion that no punishment which under the provisons of this Act it is authorised to inflict is sufficient, the Court shall order the offender to be kept in safe custody in such place or manner as it thinks fit and shall report the case for the orders of the State Government. (2) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 13 the State Govern ment may order any such child to be detained in such place and on such conditions as it thinks fit, and while so detained the child shall be deemed to be in legal custody : Provided that no period of detention so ordered shall exceed the maximum period of imprisonment to which the child could have been sentenced for the offence committed. 33. 33. Methods of dealing with children charged with offences.-Where a child charged with any offence is tried by any Court, and the Court is satisfied of his guilt the Court shall, before passing orders take into consideration the manner in which, under the provisions of this or any other Act enabling the Court to deal with the case, the case should be dealt with, namely, whether- (a) by discharging the offender after due admonition, or (b) by committing the offender to the care of his parent, guardian, other adult relative or other fit person or such parent, guardian responsible for his good behaviour ; or (c) by so discharging the offender and placing him under the supervision of a person named by the Court; or (d) by committing the offender to the custody of any suitable person, whether a relative or not, who is willing to undertake the care of the offender ; or (e) by releasing the offender on probation of good conduct; or (f) by sending the offender to an approved school; or (g) by ordering the offender to pay a fine ; or (h) by ordering the parent or guardian of the offender to pay a fine ; or (i) by dealing with the case in any other manner in which it may be legally dealt with ; or (j) when the offender is a child or twelve years of age or upwards by sentencing him to imprisonment. Provided that nothing in this section shall be construed as authorising the Court to deal with any case in any manner in which it could not deal with the case but for this section," 11. The case of Jayendra v. State of U. P. (supra) is mainly based on the first part of Section 27 of the Act. From the proviso to Section 27 it is evident that even a child who is 12 years of age or upwards can be sentenced to imprisonment when the Court certifies that he is of so unruly or depraved a character that he is not fit to be sent to an approved school and that none of the other methods in which the case may legally be dealt with is suitable. Clause (j) of Section 33 also points out that where a child is found guilty for an offence by any Court and he is of 12 years of age or upwards ha can be sentenced to imprisonment. The proviso to Section 27 and clause (j) of Section 33 where not attracted to the facts of the case reported in the case of Jayendra and as such this ruling does not lay down any absolute proposition of law that a child who is 12 years of age or upwards cannot be sent to prison in any case, Since the learned Additional Sessions Judge did not commit Ali Raza to prison and sentenced him to imprisonment and passed an order under Section 32 of the LJ P. Children Act for detaining him in safe custody the point of sentencing him to imprisonment does not arise in the present case. 12. From the facts on record it is quite clear that on the date of judg ment Ali Raza appellant was about. 19 years of age, to he could not be sent to an approved school under Section 29 of the said Act. An argument for releasing Ali Raza appellant on probation of good conduct and commit ting him to suitable custody under Section 3u of the Act advanced before the learned Additional Sessions Judge but it did not find favour with him for valid reasons. He had committed a serious offence of dacoity which is generally committed in an organised way. Release on probation of good conduct or committing him to suitable custody was, therefore, righthy deemed insufficient by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. In view of these facts he could proceed under Section 32 of the said Act. All necessary require ments of Section 32 appear to be fulfilled in the case of Ali Raza appellant. He had committed an offence of a serious nature. He could not be committed to an approved school and released on probation of good conduct under Section 30 for sufficient reasons. Discharge after due admonition under that section and directing tae parents to pay fine under Section 31 of the Act was also insufficient. Ali Raza could, therefore, be detained in safe custody and his case could be reported for orders of the State Government. Discharge after due admonition under that section and directing tae parents to pay fine under Section 31 of the Act was also insufficient. Ali Raza could, therefore, be detained in safe custody and his case could be reported for orders of the State Government. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, therefore, passed the order in accor dance with the provisons of Section 32 of the Act and as such it cannot be said to be illegal or unjust. 13. It has been observed in Muntia v. State of U. P. , AIR 1982 Supreme Court 806 : "even where a child is found to have committed an offence of so serious a nature that the Court is of opinion that no punishment which under the provisions of the Act it is authorised to inffict is sufficient, Section 32 provides that the offender shall not be sent to jail but shall be kept in safe custody in such place or manner as it thinks fit and shall report the case for the orders of the State Government. " 14. Thus, the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is in consonance with the provision of Section 32 of the Children Act and the observations made in the aforesaid Supreme Court case Jayendra v. State of U. P. (Supra) had no application to the present case and on its basis it cannot be held that the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge is not warrant ed by law and deserves interference. 15. The period of keeping Ali Raza appellant in safe custody for a period of 8 years, however, appears too long. The offence was committed in the year 1979 when Ali Raza appellant was about 15 years o) d. No. looted property was recovered from his possession when he was captured on the spot. No acts of violence have been attributed to him by the prosecution witnesses. In view of all this, the period of three years in safe custody would meet the ends of justice. 16. The appeal is, therefore, partly allowed. The conviction of Ali Raza and Peer Ali for the offense of dacoity punishable under Section 395, I. P. C. is maintained. The sentence passed against Peer Ali is reduced to seven years R. I. and the order for payment of fine is set aside. Fine, if realised from Peer Ali, shall be refunded to him. The conviction of Ali Raza and Peer Ali for the offense of dacoity punishable under Section 395, I. P. C. is maintained. The sentence passed against Peer Ali is reduced to seven years R. I. and the order for payment of fine is set aside. Fine, if realised from Peer Ali, shall be refunded to him. Since Peer Ali appellant is in jail he shall serve out the sentence as reduced above. Ali Raza appellant shall be kept in safe custody for a period of three years and the case shall be reported himself before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bahraich, who shall commit him to safe custody and send compliance report with in one month. Appeal partly allowed. .