JUDGMENT Palok Basu, J. - This writ petition has been filed by : 1. M/s. Shajan Das Rice Factory, 2. M/s. Modern Rice Mills, 3. M/s. Navin Rice Industries, 4. M/s. Annapurna Rice & General Mills and the reliefs claimed may be categorised as under : (a) Mandi Samiti, Pilibhit, be restrained from enforcing the provisions of U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Adhiniyam (for short the Act hereafter). (b) Mandi Samiti, Pilibhit, be commanded not to charge any market fee @ I% in market area Pilibhit and it be commanded to refund the market fee charged since 1972 along with up to date interest @ 18"/,, per annum. (c) Mandi Samiti, Pilibhit, be commanded to comply with the High Court order dated 24.7.87 in Writ Petition No. 8319/1983 Wastiram v. State of U.P. before initiating coercive measures. 2. The petitioners and some other firms had filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8319/1983, decided by Honble Mr. Justice K. C. Agarwal and Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.K. Gulati on 27-4-1987 (24-7-1987 ?). One of the reliefs claimed therein was that since no service was being rendered by the Samiti, no market fee could be levied by it. It was held by the Division Bench that this question was dependent upon the disputed facts and could be resolved only in some other appropriate proceeding. The other relief claimed was that since the petitioners were manufacturing rice from out of paddy in the same Mandi area, no market fee could be realised and that the fee already realised should be refunded. It was directed by the Bench that an inquiry about the petitioners' claim for refund be made within a period of 3 months. 3. These very petitioners had again joined M/s. Amrit Rice Mills and some other firms in Civil Misc. Writ Petri. No. 1025/1986 : (reported in 1987 All U 1118), wherein notifications under S. 6 of the Adhiniyam was challenged. It was held by the Division Bench that since after the notification No.584/XII-8-104-76 dated April 11, 1978. points trying to judge the legality of notifications prior to that date carried little force and were unacceptable. 4. In the present petition the learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. It was held by the Division Bench that since after the notification No.584/XII-8-104-76 dated April 11, 1978. points trying to judge the legality of notifications prior to that date carried little force and were unacceptable. 4. In the present petition the learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. S. P. Agarwal again contends the following points : No. 1 : The notifications under S. 5(I) of the Act were not published in the local news- paper hence no further action could be taken by the Mandi Samiti, Pilibhit, so as to impose and charge market fee. No.. 2 : The notification u rider S. 6 dated 6- 2.1972 and notification under S. 7, dated 9-2- 72 were not published in the required manner. No. 3 : The notification dated July 6, 1972 under S. 7(11)(b) of the Act fixing a place for carrying of wholesale transaction of specified agricultural produce was also bad and illegal, since the notifications creating market area and carving out market yard were illegal. 5. We have heard Sri S.P. Agarwal learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri B.D. Mandhyan learned counsel for the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Pilibhit, though we are fully convinced that the relief claimed in the instant writ petition do not materially differ from the reliefs claimed in the two writ petitions mentioned above, yet Mr. Agarwal sought to argue this petition basically on 2 grounds which are detailed in his Rejoinder- Affidavit. "No. 1 : The non-compliance of R. 129 read with notifications dated 14-9-67 have visited the civil consequences upon the petitioner. The cause of action of payment of market fee is recurring and continuous, the petitioners cannot be stopped to challenge the realisation of the market fee........" "No. 2 : The petitioners are now challenging the very authority of Mandi Samiti. Pilibhit in the present writ petition for realisation and collection of any market fee from the petitioners........." 6. Some allegations have been made in the Supplementary Rejoinder-Affidavit about the non-publication of the notification under Sections 5 and 6 of the Act on the ground that they were not published in the local newspapers etc. Some correspondence and certificates by newspapers reporters have been filed. Some allegations have been made in the Supplementary Rejoinder-Affidavit about the non-publication of the notification under Sections 5 and 6 of the Act on the ground that they were not published in the local newspapers etc. Some correspondence and certificates by newspapers reporters have been filed. It is notable indeed that paras 1 to 11 of the Rejoinder-Affidavit have been sworn on personal knowledge and all the paragraphs of supplementary Rejoinder-Affidavit have been sworn partly on personal knowledge and partly on perusal of records. In the counter-affidavit and the supplementary counter-affidavit the averments made have been denied. The learned counsel for the respondent has argued that the present petition has been filed in order to get over some earlier decisions. It is further argued that all earlier notifications issued under various sections of the Act prior to the one issued on 11-4-1978 cannot be reopened now in view of the consistent Division Bench judgments of our Court and the view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar v. State, AIR 1980 SC 1124 : 1980 All LJ 490. 7. In order to reinforce his argument the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision-of a Division Bench of our Court in Writ Petri. No. 15275/1981: (reported in 1987 All LJ 1535), M/s. Nandram Rice Mills v. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Ram Nagar. It has been held in the said case that since the District Magistrate had not authorised or delegated the powers to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate concerned who had imposed the market fee, realisation of the said fee could not be made because at the relevant time such a fee could be imposed only by the District Magistrate himself. The said case, therefore, stands on an entirely different footing. The other two cases referred to in Para 11 of the petition reported in 1979 All WC (SOC) 31: (1979 Cri Li NOC 53) and AIR 1973 SC 1361 (sic) was not cited during course of arguments. However, the learned counsel has relied upon two other cases reported in 1986 UPLBEC 766: (1987 All LJ 61) and AIR 1972 SC 121 . Both these cases relate to the provisions of the Municipalities Act, the former deals with the U.P. Municipalities Act and the later with the Punjab Municipal Act. However, the learned counsel has relied upon two other cases reported in 1986 UPLBEC 766: (1987 All LJ 61) and AIR 1972 SC 121 . Both these cases relate to the provisions of the Municipalities Act, the former deals with the U.P. Municipalities Act and the later with the Punjab Municipal Act. Some notifications imposing octroi duty were challenged and it was held that the provisions of the Act and the rules should be strictly adhered to while dealing with the imposition of tax and fee. We bow down to the observations of the Supreme Court and agree with the view of our Division Bench. But on the facts of the present case, those observations have no bearing. 8. In Paragraph 16 of the writ petition, the petitioners want to get away from the decision passed by this Court in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8319/1983, and re agitate the question of payment of market fee on the ground that 'it is further stated that the petitioners have never taken any ground challenging the market fee on the ground as being challenged in present writ petition, since the grounds which are now being taken by the petitioners for the challenge of the records and collection of the market fee were (not?) in the knowledge of the petitioners. (The word 'not' has been perhaps inadvertently left out). During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the facts concerning non-publication of the original notification as detailed in the foregoing paragraphs came to be known to the petitioners only in October, 1987 hence they will be entitled to argue the question of levy of market fee afresh and anew. We, however, observe that the petitioners should not be permitted to change their stand from time to time and from case, to case. The petitioners should better have been advised to abide by the earlier decisions of this Court. It appears to us that the petitioners have tried to and have made conscious efforts to dig oU.P.ints so as to make this petition again arguable notwithstanding the earlier judgments. 9. The petitioners should better have been advised to abide by the earlier decisions of this Court. It appears to us that the petitioners have tried to and have made conscious efforts to dig oU.P.ints so as to make this petition again arguable notwithstanding the earlier judgments. 9. All these discussions, apart, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar v. State of U.P., reported in AIR 1980 SC 1124 : 1980 All LJ 490, remarked "at the outset it may be mentioned that because of the litigations cropping up from time to time between the traders and Market Committee the working of the Committees had not successfully proceeded so far, as, fees levied from time to time could not be realised fully. Sometime illegal or unauthorised collection seems to have been made. Money justiceably realised also does not seem to have been fully utilised as it ought to have been done." In spite of this observation, there is a persistent attempt to somehow by-pass the provisions of the law enforced through the said Act. 10. Adverting again to the observations, of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ram Chandra's case (supra) it is but necessary to refer to point No. 5 and Point No. 6 formulated and decided in the said judgment in paragraphs 11 and 12 at page 1133 (of AIR) : (at Pp. 499-500 of All LJ) : "Point No. 5 : Under Clause (b) of Section 17 (iii) of the Act minimum and maximum limit of market fee chargeable has been fixed by the legislature. The minimum is 1% and the maximum is 1.5% of the price of the agricultural produce sold. The fixing of minimum of I% fee by itself is not illegal but it would be subject to the rendering of adequate services as explained by this Court in Kewal Krishna Puri's case, AIR 1980 SC 1008 . The facts placed before the High Court as also before us were too meagre to indicate that services to the extent of the fee levied at 1% are not being rendered. In Puri's case we upheld the levy of market fee at 2% on the value of the goods sold. The facts placed before the High Court as also before us were too meagre to indicate that services to the extent of the fee levied at 1% are not being rendered. In Puri's case we upheld the levy of market fee at 2% on the value of the goods sold. But there we found that Market Committees were rendering greater services then are being rendered by the Market Committees of U.P. yet charging of 1% fee as is being charged throughout the State of Uttar Pradesh by all the Market Committees is not illegal and does not go beyond the quid pro quo theory discussed in Puri:s case. Point No. 6 It is difficult to understand the significance of this point. The notification dated 11-4-1978 indicates that in the various districts, the number of committees is about 55,250/-. Market Committees have been constituted and about 115 items have been selected in respect of which market fee has been directed to be levied. None of the items was specified as such that it cannot be covered by the schedule which is a part of the Act. The definition of agricultural produce is very wide. It is not confirmed to items of agricultural produce indeed but includes items of produce of horticulture, viniculture apiculture, sericulture, pisciculture, animal husbandry or forest. Such items are specified in the Act which is undoubtedly a part of the Act. That being so challenge to the notification dated 11-4-1978 on the ground that it was issued without any application of mind is devoid of any substance and must be rejected." 11. Needless to say, once the levying of market fee was upheld, and, the notification dated 11-4-1978 setting up Market Committees and selecting 115 items as 'Agricultural produce' for attracting the provisions of the Act was specifically upheld, even much earlier than the decisions given in petitions filed by the petitioners referred to above, we would have expected a little respite from being called upon to decide the same points over and over again on one pretext or the other. Incipiently, we may mention here that the notification of 1972 which is under challenge in this writ petition was superseded by the notification dated 11-4-1978 which has been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 12. Incipiently, we may mention here that the notification of 1972 which is under challenge in this writ petition was superseded by the notification dated 11-4-1978 which has been upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 12. In this very connection we may state that the averment made in the petition about some information having been conveyed to the deponent filing the affidavit in support of this writ petition and also swearing the rejoinder affidavit and supplementary affidavit which we have scanned very carefully, do not at all inspire confidence. Similar averments concerning publication of notification u/s 7(2) (b) were made in M/s. Amrit Rice Mills' case, 1987 All LJ 1118, and the Division Bench observed as under : -- "Sri S.P. Agarwal referred this also in the course of arguments. The allegations, to say the least, are reckless. The deponent purports to swear the entire para 6, the whole of the affidavit paras 1 to 8 for the matter on personal knowledge. We have no hesitation to discard this as untrustworthy. Counsel is unable to satisfy as. Moreover as to how may this be regarded as justiciable or confer a right to the petitioner to assail the notification on such basis..." 12A. We may hasten to add that the learned counsel for the respondent has strongly relied upon the earlier decision as well as the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above by us in order to lend support to his argument that none of the points raised in the present petition are available to the petitioners. He further argues that on the principles of constructive res judicata the petition should be dismissed. In fact he had raised a preliminary objection to that effect. Instead of permitting him to argue the said points as a preliminary point, we requested him to contend the same in detail while replying to the petitioner's counsel's arguments. The learned counsel further laid emphasis on the fact that each and every averment of fact as to the publication of notification is wrong and have been denied in the counter-affidavit filed by the Secy. of the Samiti. We find no reason to disbelieve the said averments particularly because he has no malice or basis against the petitioners. The learned counsel further laid emphasis on the fact that each and every averment of fact as to the publication of notification is wrong and have been denied in the counter-affidavit filed by the Secy. of the Samiti. We find no reason to disbelieve the said averments particularly because he has no malice or basis against the petitioners. Hence, we do not place any reliance upon I the averments in the petition as to non publication of the notifications in view of the specific denials made in the counter-affidavit t and the supplementary counter-affidavit as also for the reason that the notification dated 11-4-1978 already stands upheld by Division Bench decision of our Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 13. In the result we find no merit in this petition which is dismissed. The interim order dated 17-101987 is vacated.