JUDGMENT - S.W. PURANIK, J.:---One Vinod Shah was arrested by the Customs Department for having been found on possession of a gold bar at the time when he landed from Singapore. This was on 14th August, 1984. The matter was under investigation and the remand papers were presented before the Metropolitan Magistrate. The said Vinod Shah was not granted bail earlier. 2. It appears that the said vinod Shah was also detained under the provisions of COFEPOSA and while he was in custody under the Customs Act as well as in detention under COFEPOSA, his wife had fallen sick and he was requesting for a short parole from the jail authorities. The Government of Maharashtra granted him week's parole but he could not avail of the same, since he was also under arrest under the Customs Acts. 3. The said Vinod Shah then applied to the Metropolitan Magistrate for grant of bail and the Magistrate was pleased to grant him bail in the sum Rs. two lakhs. The present petitioner Dr. Chimanlal Shah is father of the said detenu. The petitioner stood surety before the Metropolitan Magistrate on behalf of his son in the sum of Rs. two lakhs. After securing bail the said Vinod Shah was released from the jail. It appears that shortly thereafter the said Vinod Shah absconded and is not yet traced. 4. The Customs Authorities filled a regular complaint on 3rd December, 1985 before the Metropolitan Magistrate and since the accused was not present, a warrant was issued for his arrest. On the subsequent date the detenu had defaulted in appearing in pursuance of the terms of his earlier bail bond on 3rd December, 1985, to answer the charge and thereafter also he repeatedly remained absent and in view of these continuous defaults the present petitioner surety was issued a notice to show cause why the sum of Rs. two lakh stated in the surety bond be not forfeited. The petitioner appeared in pursuance of the show cause notice, submitted his explanation and requested for substantial remission. However, the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate by his order dated 18th December, 1986 granted a limitation remission of Rs. Fifty thousand and further ordered to forfeit the bond amount of Rs. one lakh and fifty thousand. 5. The petitioner thereafter carried an appeal before the learned Sessions Judge, which was summarily rejected on 10th December, 1986. However, the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate by his order dated 18th December, 1986 granted a limitation remission of Rs. Fifty thousand and further ordered to forfeit the bond amount of Rs. one lakh and fifty thousand. 5. The petitioner thereafter carried an appeal before the learned Sessions Judge, which was summarily rejected on 10th December, 1986. It is against these concurrent order that the petitioner has presented this revision application. Shri Mehta, learned Counsel appeared for the petitioner, Shri M.K. Patwardhan appears for the Assistance Collector of Customs, while the State of Maharashtra is represented by Smt. Belose, Public Prosecutor for the State, respondents No. 1 6. With the assistance of the learned Counsel, I have gone through the records of this case as well as the original bail bond and the surety bond executed by the original accused and the surety petitioner respectively. 7. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that inasmuch as the surety bond was totally vague and did not specify the day or data when the detenu was to be produced by the surety before the trial Court, such bond could not be enforced against him. On the other hand Shri Patwardhan, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 vehemently urged that the bail bond in any event bind a surety to produce the accused to answer the charge on which he was arrested and shall continue so to produce until otherwise directed by the Court. In view of this specific term even if no date is specified in the surety bond for production of the accused on a particular date, yet the surety is bound to produce the accused to answer the charge on the date as directed by the Court. In that event, therefore, there is a clear default on the part of the surety for which the bond amount is liable to be forfeited. He further contended that in the proceedings before the trial Court, the bail bond of the accused as well as the surety bond are executed on one end the same paper and the bail bond of the accused clearly specifies the date 17th December as the next date of appearance. He further contended that in the proceedings before the trial Court, the bail bond of the accused as well as the surety bond are executed on one end the same paper and the bail bond of the accused clearly specifies the date 17th December as the next date of appearance. The petitioner surety was therefore aware that the accused was to be produced on 17th December and hence he cannot be presumed to be ignorant of the fact, even if the surety bond does not specify the date for the appearance of the accused independently. These surrounding circumstances therefore go to show that he was bound to produce the accused on 17th December or at any other day dated by the Court to answer the charge. 8. Shri Mehta has relied on several ruling of the various High Court and the Supreme Court. In the case (State of Bihar v. M. Honi)1, reported in A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 478 the brief facts were as under: the convicted accused had preferred an appeal to the Privy Council. His sentence was therefore suspended on furnishing security. The sureties had given undertakings to pay certain amounts in case the accused failed to surrender after the judgement of the Privy Council. In the meantime, however, in 1950 after coming into force of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court took up the appeal and dismissed it. The surety could not produce the accused even after the order of the Supreme Court. The proceedings were initiated to forfeit the bond amount from the surety. It was contended on behalf of the State of Bihar that since the surety had committed a default in producing the accused after the judgement of the Supreme Court, the bond money should be forfeited. The Supreme Court held that the terms of the bond were that the surety had undertaken to produced the accused after the judgement of the Privy Council and not of the Supreme Court. Even with the contention of the learned Advocate General that the Supreme Court was merely a successor in jurisdiction to the Privy Council, the Supreme Court disagreed and stated that the terms in the surety bond are in the nature of a penal clause and they must be strictly construed and while so construing the application of legal friction as suggested by the State cannot be accepted. 9. 9. A similar view has also been taken by the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the matter of (State of Haryana v. Satya Narain)2, 1974 Cri.L.J. 113. They have observed in para 7 that the provision of imposition of penalty and the forfeiture of the bond are penal in character and it is essential that they should be strictly followed. In the said case the surety bond taken by the Police for appearance of the accused did not mention time and place for appearance and the Court concluded that no penalty could be fastened on the surety on the basis a such bond. 10. The same in the view taken by Vivian Bose, J., (as he then was) in Criminal Revision 143 of 1936 reported in 1938 Cri.L.J. at page 100. In which the said case also the surety bond did not specify the day and date on which the accused was to be produced. The said spaces in the surety bond were left blank. Bose, J., observed that the terms of the surety bond have to be determined by the language used in the bond itself. What the surety thought and did not think is immaterial and it is not for the surety to say that the bond is illegal but for the Crown to show that the document it wishes to enforce against him is one which can be so enforced under the law. The same view is taken by the Allahabad High Court in (Shri Kishan Lal v. State of U.P)3, 1978 Cri.L.J. 1429 and by the Gujarat High Court (Chaganlal Kilabal v. State of Gujarat)4, 1969 Cri.L.J. 1164. Execution of bond is mentioned in the Code of Criminal Procedure at section 441. The same view is taken by the Allahabad High Court in (Shri Kishan Lal v. State of U.P)3, 1978 Cri.L.J. 1429 and by the Gujarat High Court (Chaganlal Kilabal v. State of Gujarat)4, 1969 Cri.L.J. 1164. Execution of bond is mentioned in the Code of Criminal Procedure at section 441. The very opening clause of the said section states as follow:--- "441 …Before any person is released on bail or released on his own bond, a bond for such sum of money as the Police Officer or Court, as the case may be, thinks sufficient , shall by executed by such person and when he is released on bail by one or more sufficient sureties and conditioned that the such person shall attend at the time and place mentioned in the bond, and shall continue so to attend until otherwise directed by the Police Officer or Court, as the case may be." Thus, the coma the itself prescribes that the bond must state therein the date and time on which the accused has to remain present before Court. The bond is also to be construed as a contract between the individual and the Court. The bail bond of the accused is a contract between the accused and the Court and the surety bond is a contract between the surety and the Court and the accused and the surety are bound by the terms of the said contract. If the surety violates the terms of the bond, the Court has power to enforce the bond against the surety and forfeit the amount. It is in this perspective that the terms of the surety bond must be strictly construed and if the said terms are vague or ambiguous or silent in material particulars, such as in this case, where no date and time to produce the accused is stated then such a bond cannot be enforced by the Court. 11. It was contended on behalf of the Customs Department that the surety was also aware of the date specified in the bail bond executed by the accused on the same page and he was therefore bound to produce him on that date. I am unable to agree with this contention for the simple reason that even though both the bonds are executed on the same paper, yet such bond is a separate contract and gives right to separate rights and liabilities. I am unable to agree with this contention for the simple reason that even though both the bonds are executed on the same paper, yet such bond is a separate contract and gives right to separate rights and liabilities. A surety is not bound by any of the bonds executed on behalf of the accused to the Court and in that event the surrounding circumstances and presumptions have no scope in interpreting the terms of the surety bond. 12. It is apparent that in many cases the Court Officers or Presiding Officers in trial Courts do not take due care and caution while getting bonds executed before them. Such a careless act even done unintentionally, is likely to result in great loss to the State Exchequer. It is therefore directed that these observations be circulated to all the Criminal Courts at Bombay and other mofussil places and with a direction that in future they must take all the necessary precaution and care even at the simple formality of execution of bond. 13. In view of the discussion above the impugned order forfeiting the sum of money of Rs. One lakh fifty thousand from the petitioner surety will have to be quashed and set aside for want of a specific condition in the bail bond itself. The revision application is, therefore, allowed. The impugned order is quashed and set aside. The petitioner surety is discharged. Rule absolute. Application allowed. -----