P. M. CHAUHAN, J. ( 1 ) BY this petition under Art. 226j Constitution of India petitioner-detenu Khimji Raja Harijan has prayed for the writ of Habeas Carpus and for quashing the detention order dated 31/01/1987 passed by the District Magistrate Bhavnagar the detaining authority under Sec. 3 of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the PASA Act) as on the detaining authority being satisfied that with a view to preventing the petitioner for acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order it was necessary to detain him. ( 2 ) THE detention order was served to the petitioner at about 3 a. m. on 2/02/1987 at his residence at Mahalaxmi Mill Chawl Bhavnagar where his uncle Atubhai Bhikhabhai was residing with him. Shri S B. Patel Police Inspector of A Division Police Station Bhavnagar who served the detention order to the petitioner informed the petitioners uncle Atubai Bhikhabhai in writing about the detention of the petitioner under the PASA Act and also recorded the statement of Atubhai for that purpose. The grounds of detention dated 31/03/1987 were served to the petitioner at the time of serving the detention order and the petitioner was then lodged in prison at Bhuj-Kutch. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 3 ) DERIVING the support from the judgment of the Supreme Court in A. K Roy v. Union on India AIR 1982 SC 710 it is submitted that the family members of the petitioner were not informed in writing about the detention and also about the place where the petitioner was to be lodged and therefore the detention order vitiates. ( 4 ) THE information of the detention in this case was given in writing to the under of the petitioner. In the subsequently added paragraph 14a in the petition the petitioner contended that he was arrested by the Police on 31/01/1937 and was taken to the Police Station and his family members were not informed about his arrest and that he was detained in Special prison Bhuj and as the respondents failed to inform the petitioner is deprived of his personal liberty guaranteed under Art. 21 Constitution of India. That fact is denied by the respondents and affidavit is filed by Shri S. B. Patel Police Inspector of A Division Police Station Bhavnagar who had taken the petitioner in custody. Police Inspector Shri Patel has disposed in his affidavit that the Petitioner was taken in custody at 3. 00 a. m. on 2/02/1987 at the residence of the petitioner at Mahalaxmi Mill Chawl Bhavnagar. Petitioners paternal uncle Atubhai Bhikhabhai resides with him and he was informed in writing by Police Inspector Shri Patel that the petitioner was detained under the relevant provisions of the PASA Act and that he was to be lodged in special Prison Bhuj. He recorded the statement of Atubhai Bhikhabhai and secured his signature. Atubhai Bhikhabhai is a municipal Councilor and he had explained to Atubhai that tiffin could be sent to the petitioner if appropriate arrangements were made for the same by the family members. At the time of hearing Mr. G D. Bhatt learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondents had shown us the writing with the signature of Atubhai. Atubhai in his affidavit dated 24/08/1987 in rejoinder has admitted that he was informed by the Police Officer that the petitioner was to be detained in pursuance of the order of the District Magistrate Bhavnagar and his statement was recorded by the Police Officer wherein he had stated that he was informed that the petitioner was being detained by the order of the District Magistrate Bhavnagar He however denied in the affidavit that he was informed that the petitioner was lodged in Special Prison Bhuj and he came to know about it after 10 days when the petitioner had informed him by letter from Special Prison Bhuj. It is now practically admitted that Atubhai was informed in Writing about the detention order by Police Inspector Shri Patel. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor had produced for our perusal signed statement of Atubhai in which he admitted that he was informed about the detention order. However the learned Additional Public Prosecutor could not produce any document to establish that Atubhai was informed that the petitioner was to be lodged in Special Prison Bhuj Even though no such writing is produced. However the learned Additional Public Prosecutor could not produce any document to establish that Atubhai was informed that the petitioner was to be lodged in Special Prison Bhuj Even though no such writing is produced. we are convinced that Atubhai must have been informed by the Police Inspector Shri Patel that the petitioner was to be detained in Special Prison Bhuj It is but natural that when the petitioner was taken in custody from his residence Atubhai who was the Municipal Councilor would definitely inquire as to where the Petitioner would be lodged. Deposition of Police Inspector Shri Patel in his affidavit that he had informed Atubhai that the petitioner was to be lodged in Special Prison Bhuj should therefore be accepted. However it should be held that such information was given orally and not in writing. First part of the procedural requirement as laid down by the Supreme Court is therefore complied with. ( 5 ) IN A. K. Roys case (supra ). provisions of the National Security Act were challenged on various grounds but in the instant case the observations regarding the provisions of Sec. 5 National Security Act 1980 which are in pari materia with the provisions of Sec. 5 of the PASA Act are relevant. In paragraph 74 of the judgment the note of caution is that the laws of Preventive Detention should not by the backdoor introduce procedural measures of a punitive kind and that the detention without trial is an evil to be suffered but to no greater extent and in no greater measure than is minimally necessary in the interest of the Country and community. The provisions of Sec. 5 Notional Security Act were not struck down as violative of the provisions of Art. 21 or the procedure provided under Art. 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. In paragraph 75 of the judgment by making certain observatories procedural provisions are enunciated as the mandate of Art. 21 Constitution of India 60 that the procedure may us. Just and reasonable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In paragraph 75 of the judgment by making certain observatories procedural provisions are enunciated as the mandate of Art. 21 Constitution of India 60 that the procedure may us. Just and reasonable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 6 ) THE procedure enunciated by the Supreme Court is that (1) just when a person is taken in custody in pursuance of the order of detention the members of his household preferably the parent the child or the spouse must be informed in writing of the passing of the order of detention and of the fact that the detenu has been taken in custody; and (2) intimation must also be given as to the place of detention and in case of subsequent transfer the place where the detenu is transferred. These two procedural requirements over and above the procedural requirements provided in clause (5) of Art. 22 of the Constitution of India and in the PASA Act are introduced by the judicial pronouncement as the procedure to be provided in Art. 21 of the Constitution of India must be fair just and reasonable. The Supreme Court has however not specifically made observations about the effect of the infraction of the said procedural requirements laid down by it. It is asserted by Mr. H. L. Patel learned Advocate for the petitioner that the Supreme Court has read such a mandatory provision in Art. 21 Constitution of India as a part of just and reasonable procedure and the mandate of the Supreme Court being clear should be literally applied and should be complied as is required when a statute has laid down a mandatory procedure. ( 7 ) IT is urged on behalf of the respondents that the effect of non-compliance of the procedural requirements laid down by the Supreme Court should not be considered the same as the effect of the infraction of the statutory procedure either under clause (5) of Art. 22 Constitution of India or under the PASA Act and that the substantial compliance of the intimation to the family members about the detention order taking in custody and the place of lodging of the detenu in any other manner either by orally informing or the relative of the detenu coming to know from any other source will comply the procedural requirements laid down by the Supreme Court and noncompliance by not intimating in writing should not per se vitiate the detention order. It is also submitted that the detenu must establish that prejudice is caused to him by non-compliance of the said procedural requirements laid down by the Supreme Court and if no prejudice is caused the order of detention cannot be quashed. It is submitted that from the observations of the Supreme Court what is more important is the information to the relatives of the detenu and not the fact that it should be in writing It is tried to assert that the procedure required to be followed under Art. 21 Constitution of India is only that procedure which is prescribed by law i. e. the statute by the legislature as the second part of Article of the Constitution provides for the exception for deprivation of personal liberty under the Preventive Detention Act. ( 8 ) WE are indeed bound by the above observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 75 of the judgment in S. K. Roys case (supra) as under Art. 141 Constitution of India law declared by the Supreme Court is binding on all Courts. The procedural requirements under Art. 21 Constitution of India as laid down by the Supreme Court should therefore be followed. We are however considering only the effect of the infraction of the said procedural requirements on which the Supreme Court has not made any observations. ( 9 ) THE second part of direction for giving intimation as to the place of detention is required to be considered. The Supreme Court has not specifically directed that intimation about the place of detention is required to be given in writing. ( 9 ) THE second part of direction for giving intimation as to the place of detention is required to be considered. The Supreme Court has not specifically directed that intimation about the place of detention is required to be given in writing. ( 10 ) THE point for consideration is that it the requirement about the supply of information in writing about the facts of detention is complied with and furthermore information is also given about the place of detention will the detention order fail because the intimation about the place of detention was not given in writing ? or is the detention order saved in above circumstances as there is substantial compliance with the Supreme Court mandate ? or in other words is the mandate to be applied in strict sense in abstract devoid of circumstantial background or whether the mandate is to the applied in the background of facts of each case and to see whether it is satisfied in the essence and spirit by substantial compliance of it. We shall examine these aspects in light of the provisions of Art. 21 Constitution of India and various judgments of the Supreme Court. ( 11 ) ARTICLE 21 Constitution of India pertaining to protection of life and personal liberty provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. The latter part of Art. 21 can be considered to be an exception to the provision of protection of life and personal liberty of a person and the personal liberty can be deprived of by the procedure established by law. That procedure is provided in clauses (4) and (5) of Art. 22 of the Constitution of India and in the PASA Act. Article 21 does not specifically provide that the procedure should be just fair and reasonable but that concept is introduced in clear terms in Art. 21 by the Supreme Court in Mrs. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India 1978 (1) SCC 248 . In that case the provisions of Art. 21 relating to personal liberty are extensively discussed. The main judgment was delivered by His Lordship Mr. Justice P. N. Bhagwati (as he then was ). Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India 1978 (1) SCC 248 . In that case the provisions of Art. 21 relating to personal liberty are extensively discussed. The main judgment was delivered by His Lordship Mr. Justice P. N. Bhagwati (as he then was ). After discussing the observations in A. K Gopalan v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27 and R. C. Cooper v. Union of India 1970 (2) SCC 298 it is observed that the procedure required to be prescribed under Art. 21 should not be arbitrary unfair oppressive or unreasonable. It is also observed that even on principle the concept of reasonableness must be projected in the procedure as contemplated by Art. 21 having regard to the impact of Art. 14 on Art. 21. In the judgment of His Lordship Mr. Justice Y. V. Chandrachud (as he then was) it is observed in paragraph 48 that the mere prescription of some kind of procedure cannot ever meet the mandate of Art. 21. The procedure prescribed by law has to be fair just and reasonable not fanciful oppressive or arbitrary. The question whether the procedure prescribed by law which curtails or takes away the personal liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 is reasonable or not has to be considered not in the abstract or on hypothetical considerations like the provision for a full-dressed hearing as in a Court-room trial but in the context primarily of the purpose which the Act is intended to achieve and of urgent situations which those who are charged with the duty of administering the Act may be called upon to deal with. It is therefore clear that the procedure required to be prescribed must be just fair and reasonable. ( 12 ) IN Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1982 SC 1325 provisions of Art. 21 Constitution of India again came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in which the case of Maneka Gandhi (supra) and the concept of reasonableness were considered. ( 13 ) THE main judgment was delivered by His Lordship Mr. Justice R. S. Satkaria (Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab) ( 1980 (2) SCC 684 ) in which it is observed that the principle of reasonableness pervades all the three Articles (Arts. ( 13 ) THE main judgment was delivered by His Lordship Mr. Justice R. S. Satkaria (Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab) ( 1980 (2) SCC 684 ) in which it is observed that the principle of reasonableness pervades all the three Articles (Arts. 14 19 and 21) with the result that the procedure contemplated by Art. 21 must be bright and just and fair and not arbitrary fanciful or oppressive otherwise it should be no procedure at all and the requirement of Art. 21 would not be satisfied. In paragraph 135 it is also observed:" If this Article is expanded in accordance with the interpretative principle indicated in Maneka Gandhi (supra) it will read as follows:`no parson shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to fair just and reasonable procedure established by valid law. in the converse positive form the expanded Article will read as below:a person may be deprived of his life or personal liberty in accordance with fair just and reasonable procedure established by valid law. THUS expanded and read for interpretative purposes AFt. 21 clearly brings out the implication that the founding fathers recognised the right of the state to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty in accordance with fair just and reasonable procedure established by valid law. " ( 14 ) IN Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator Union Territory of Delhi AIR 1981 SC 746 it is observed that the power of preventive detention has been recognised as a necessary evil and is tolerated in a free society in the larger interest of security of the State and maintenance of public order. The Constitution of India does recognise the existence of this power but it is hedged-in by various safeguards set out in Arts. 21 and 22. Article 22 in clauses (4) to (7) deals specifically with safeguards against preventive detention and any law of preventive detention or action by way of preventive detention taken under such law must be in conformity with the restrictions laid down ky those clause. But apart from Art 22 there is also Art. 21 which lays down restrictions on the power of preventive detention. But apart from Art 22 there is also Art. 21 which lays down restrictions on the power of preventive detention. The Supreme Court then referred Maneka Gandhis case (supra) and observed that it is not enough to secure compliance with the prescription of Art. 21 that there should be a law prescribing some semblance of a procedure for depriving a person of his life or personal liberty but the procedure prescribed by the law must be reasonable fair and just and if it is no so the would be void as violating the guarantee of Art. 21. After referring Hussainara Khatoons case (supra) and Sunil Batras case 1979 SCR 392 and 1980 (2) SCR 557 it is observed that the position now is that Art. 21 as interpreted in Maneka Gandhis case (supra) requires that no one shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except by procedure established by law and this procedure must be reasonable fair and just and not arbitrary whimsical or fanciful and it is for the Court to decide in the exercise of its constitutional power of judicial review whether the deprivation of life or personal liberty in a given case is by procedure which is reasonable fair and just or it is otherwise. The Supreme Court was considering the right of the detenu for interviews with friends relatives and members of his family and not the challenge to the order of detention. In view of that certain clauses of condition of detention order issue by the Delhi Administration were held to be unconstitutional and void as offending the provisions of Arts. 14 and 21 Constitution of India. In A. K. Roys case (supra) no such provisions are declared unconstitutional or void. But it is only observed that for the fair reasonable and just procedure the information should be given in writing to the members of the household about the detention and intimation of the place where the detenu is to be lodged. ( 15 ) IT is however interesting to note that in Maneka Gandhis case (supra) distinction is sought to be made between the procedural safeguards for preventive and punitive detentions and other rights forming the part of personal liberty. Krishna Iyer J. in paragraph 85 of the judgment observed:"to sum up `procedure in Art. 21 means fair not formal procedure. `law is reasonable law not any enacted piece. Krishna Iyer J. in paragraph 85 of the judgment observed:"to sum up `procedure in Art. 21 means fair not formal procedure. `law is reasonable law not any enacted piece. As Art. 22 specifically spells out the procedural safeguards for preventive and punitive detention a law providing for such detentions should conform to Art. 22 It has been rightly pointed out that for other rights forming part of personal liberty the procedural safeguards enshrined. in Art. 2t are available. Otherwise as the procedural safeguards contained in Art. 22 will be available only in cases of preventive and punitive detention the right to life. more fundamental than any other forming part of personal liberty and paramount to the happiness dignity and worth of the individual will not be entitled to any procedural safeguard save such as a legislatures mood chooses. " ( 16 ) AS Art 21 Constitution of India provides that life or personal liberty of a person can be deprived of only in accordance with the procedure established by law it is necessary to consider as to whether the procedure should be established by statutory law or by the law laid down by the Courts. This was considered in A. K Gopalan v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27 . It is observed;"procedure established by law means procedure prescribed by the law of the State These words are to be taken to refer to a procedure which has a statutory origin for no procedure is known or can be said to have been established by such vague and uncertain concepts as the immutable and universal principles of natural justice. "it is also observed:"the word `law in Art. 21 has not been used in the sense of general law cannoting what has been described as the principles of natural justice outside the realm of positive Law. Law in that article is equivalent to State-made law. "in Maneka Gandhis case (supra) Krishna Iyer T observed in paragraph 89 as under:"a certain normative harmony among the articles is thus attained and 1 hold Art. 21 bears in its bosom the construction of fair procedure legislatively sanctioned. "even in Maneka Gandhis case the procedure under Art. 21 is referred as the procedure which is prescribed by the Statute. "in Maneka Gandhis case (supra) Krishna Iyer T observed in paragraph 89 as under:"a certain normative harmony among the articles is thus attained and 1 hold Art. 21 bears in its bosom the construction of fair procedure legislatively sanctioned. "even in Maneka Gandhis case the procedure under Art. 21 is referred as the procedure which is prescribed by the Statute. In Additional District Magistrate Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla 1976 (2) SCC 521 provisions of Art. 21 and the phrase procedure established by law came for consideration before the Supreme Court. In paragraph 190 Beg J. (as he then was) observed that Art. 21 was only meant on the face of it to keep the exercise of executive power in ordering deprivations of life or liberty within the bounds of power prescribed by procedure established by legislation. His Lordship then proceeded to consider the judgment in K. K. Gopalans case (supra) and distinction between guarantee of lex and `jus and observed:"the meaning of the expression Procedure established by law came in for discussion at considerable length by this Court in A. K. Gopalans case. The majority of the learned Judges clearly held there that it furnishes the guarantee of `lex which is equated with statute law only and not of jus or a judicial concept of what procedural law ought really to be. The whole idea in using this expression taken deliberately from the Japanese Constitution on the advice amongst others of Mr. Justice Felix Frankfufter of the American Supreme Court was to exclude judicial interference with executive action in dealing with lives and liberties of citizens and other living in our country on any ground other than it is contrary to procedure actually prescribed by law which according to the majority view in Gopalans eases meant only statute law. The majority view was based on the reason amongst others that according to well established canons of statutory construction the express terms of lex (assuming. of course that the lex is otherwise valid) prescribing procedure will exclude `jus or judicial notions of `due process or what the procedure ought to be. The majority view was based on the reason amongst others that according to well established canons of statutory construction the express terms of lex (assuming. of course that the lex is otherwise valid) prescribing procedure will exclude `jus or judicial notions of `due process or what the procedure ought to be. "it is also observed in para 192:"therefore the question which arises here is whether `jus held by this Court in Gopalans case to have been deliberately excluded from the purview of procedure established by law can be introduced by Courts through a backdoor as thought it was an independent right guaranteed by Chapter III or by any other part of the Constitution. I am quite enable to accede to the suggestion that this could be done. "in Bachan Singhs case (supra) while considering the scope of procedure under Art. 21 constitution of India it is observed in paragraph 16;"the word procedure in Art. 21 is wide enough to cover the entire process by which deprivation is effected and that would include not only the adjectival but also the substantive part of the law. Take for example a law of Preventive Detention which sets out the grounds on which a person may be preventively detained. If a person is preventively detained on a ground other than those set out in the law the preventive detention would obviously not be according to the procedure prescribed by the law accuse the procedure set out in the law for preventively detaining a person prescribed certain specific grounds on which alone person can be preventively detained and if he is detained on any other grounds; it would be violative of Art. 21. Every facet of the law which deprives a person of his life or personal liberty would therefore have to stand the test of reasona bleness fairness and justness in order to be outside the inhibition of Art. " ( 17 ) IT is therefore clear that the procedure prescribed by law under Art. 21 should be the procedure prescribed by the Statute. This aspect is required to be considered for the purposes of ascertaining the effect of infraction of the provisions of such procedure and to consider the effect by substantial compliance of the direction of the Supreme Court in A. K. Roys case (supra ). ( 18 ) MR. This aspect is required to be considered for the purposes of ascertaining the effect of infraction of the provisions of such procedure and to consider the effect by substantial compliance of the direction of the Supreme Court in A. K. Roys case (supra ). ( 18 ) MR. G. D. Bhatt learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondents referred Rajeswar Prasad Misra v. The State of West Bengal AIR 1965 SC 1851 wherein it is observed that the law declared by the Supreme (Court binds Courts in India but it should always be remembered that this Court does not enact. It is submitted on behalf of the respondents that even in case of Maneka Gandhi (supra) infraction of the statutory provisions and procedure is not considered per se fatal by the majority of the Judges except M. H. Beg C. J. and the order of confiscation of the passport was not invalidated as Court was satisfied on the Attorney General making a statement that the petitioner would be heard within two weeks. Admittedly Maneka Gandhi was not heard immediately after impounding of her passport. Even though Chief Justice Beg observed that the order of impounding the passport was per se fatal the majority did not set aside the order only because the Attorney General made such a statement on behalf of the Union of India. From that it can be inferred that such a statutory and procedural infraction should not be considered per se fatal and should be judged in the light of the facts of each case. It is however submitted on behalf of the petitioner that it all depends upon the direction provided in the procedure or in the Statute and if there is no scope for interpreting it the effect of infraction would be per se fatal. It is true that in A. K. Roys case (supra) direction by the Supreme Court is that the information about the detention to the family members of the detenu should be given in writing and so far as that is concerned there is no scope for interpretation. However as in the case of Maneka Gandhi (supra) the effect of the breach is required to be considered in the light of the circumstances following the breach of such provisions. However as in the case of Maneka Gandhi (supra) the effect of the breach is required to be considered in the light of the circumstances following the breach of such provisions. It should therefore be held that while considering the effect of the directions by the Supreme Court in A. R. Roys case (supra) in which direction to give information in writing is clear the effect of the infraction of detention order should be considered in the light of the circumstances which follow viz. the oral information to the members of the household about the order of detention. If the information is given in any other manner then in writing the order should not be set aside as the direction by the Supreme Court is substantially complied with. ( 19 ) MR. G. D. Bhatt learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondents referred Wasi Uddin Ahmed v. The District Magistrate Aligarh U. P. AIR 1981 SC 2166 in which in the grounds of detention the detenu was not informed that he bad a right to make a representation against the order of detention as envisaged by Art. 22 (5) Constitution of India read with Sec. 8 National Security Act 1980 and also a right of being heard before the Advisory Board while he was served with the detention order. It was observed that the right of the detenu to make a representation under Art. 22 (5) would be in many cases of little avail if the detenu is not `informed of that right. However in that case non-compliance of the provisions of Art. 22 (5) was not considered per se fatal as the detenu was an enlightened person and had been in active politics and was fully cognisant of his tight to make a representation. Deriving strength from the observations of the Supreme Court it is submitted that such infraction should not be considered to be fatal and in suitable cases exception can be carved out. It appears that the Wasi Uddin Ahmeds case (supra) was an exception to the general principles as the circumstances in that case warranted it. Such an exception can be carved out if the facts of the case permit such exception. It appears that the Wasi Uddin Ahmeds case (supra) was an exception to the general principles as the circumstances in that case warranted it. Such an exception can be carved out if the facts of the case permit such exception. ( 20 ) SO far as the Infraction of the provisions of Art. 22 (5) Constitution of India or the Statutes relating to detention Acts are concerned it is now well settled law that any such infraction would invalidate the detention order. In Hem Lal Bhandari v Stare of Sikkim. 1987 (2) SCC 9; Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh v. B. K. Jha 1987 SCC 22 : [1987 (2) GLR 705 (SC)]; it is observed that the procedural requirements are the only safeguards available to the detenu. Since the Courts are not expected to go behind the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority they should be strictly complied with and non-compliance would invalidate the order. In Mrs. Tsering Dolkar v. Administrator Union Territory of Delhi 1987 (2) SCC 69 it is observed that the law as laid down by the Supreme Court clearly indicates that in a matter of preventive detention case is not one of prejudice but one of strict compliance with the provisions of the Act and when three is a failure to comply with those requirements it becomes difficult to sustain the order. Other judgments on the point are Bablu Das V. State of West Bengal. AIR 1975 SC 1513 ; Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal 1975 (2) SCC 81 ; and Fogla v. State of West Bengal AIR 1975 SC 245 . It is however clear that in all those cases the detention orders were set aside only because either the provisions of Art. 22 (5) Constitution of India or the extended right of the detenu or the obligation of the detaining authority under the provisions of Art. 22 Constitution of India or the provisions of the Statutes relating to the preventive detentions were infracted. It is however submitted on behalf of the petitioner that no distinction can be made between the infraction of the procedure provided in the Statute or Art. 22 (5) Constitution of India and the procedure prescribed by the Court under Art. 21 Constitution of India. It is however submitted on behalf of the petitioner that no distinction can be made between the infraction of the procedure provided in the Statute or Art. 22 (5) Constitution of India and the procedure prescribed by the Court under Art. 21 Constitution of India. It is true that the procedure prescribed by the Court under Art. 21 can never be considered to have lesser effect than the procedure prescribed by the Statute or under Art. 22 (5) but while considering the effect of the infraction of the procedure prescribed by the Court under Art. 21 the circumstances the directions etc. should be considered as was done by the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhis case (supra ). Every infraction of the procedure prescribed by the Court under Art. 21 therefore should not be considered per se fatal. Even in A. K Roys case (supra) the Supreme Court did not consider the effect of infraction of procedure prescribed by the Court. . ( 21 ) IN A. K. Roys case (supra) the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of Sec. 5 National Security Act 1980 The said provisions were not declared ultra vires the Art. 21 for the reason that they did not conform the test of fairness justness and reasonableness under Art. 21. It is however clear that the Supreme Court observed that in order that the procedure attendant upon detentions should conform the mandate of Art. 21 in the matter of fairness justness and reasonableness it should be considered imperative that immediately after a person is taken in custody in pursuance of an order of detention the members of his household preferably the parent the child or the spouse must be informed in writing of the passing of the order of detention and of the fact that the detenu has been taken in custody. It is also directed that intimation must be given as to the place of detention including the place where the detenu is transferred from time to time. This is the procedure laid down so as to meet the requirements of fairness justness and reasonableness under Art. 21. The direction that intimation should be given in writing is clear. However emphasis is on giving information to the members of the household so that they may immediately take action for making the representation challenging the detention or supplying clothes and food to the detenu. The direction that intimation should be given in writing is clear. However emphasis is on giving information to the members of the household so that they may immediately take action for making the representation challenging the detention or supplying clothes and food to the detenu. That appears to be the purpose which can be served by giving the information in any other manner than in writing. By this we do not mean to say that the direction of giving information in writing is superficial as the law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding to this Court but while considering the effect of infraction of the said procedure we observe that the substantial compliance would meet with the requirements of the directions by the Supreme Court. We are therefore of the view that oral intimation to the members of the household of the order of detention and the place of detention would substantially comply with the directions by the Supreme Court and would not vitiate the order of continued detention. ( 22 ) IT is submitted on behalf of the respondents that no prejudice will be caused to any detenu if the directions by the Supreme Court are substantially complied with by oral information or otherwise. In support judgment in Prakash Chandra Mehta v. Commissioner and Secretary Government of Kerala AIR 1986 SC 687 is referred. In that judgment proposition of law is not laid down that in detention cases prejudice should be proved. On the contrary the Supreme Court in Mrs. Tsering Dolkars case (supra) observed that in case of Prakash Chandra Mehta (supra) there is no clear indication of the test of Prejudice being applied. The observations in the last para of the j judgment in Prakash Chandra Mehtas case are more of a general nature and are not much relevant for the purpose of the instant case. No element of prejudice is therefore required to be proved by the detenu ( 23 ) IN A. K. Roys case (supra) the observation is for giving information in writing of the order of detention and of the fact that the detenu has been taken in custody in pursuance of the order of detention to the members of his household That direction in writing is only relating to the order of detention. It is not stated that the intimation must also be given in writing as to the place of detention including the place where the detenu is transferred from time to time. As it is not specifically mentioned that that intimation should be in writing oral intimation would serve the purpose. If at all the Supreme Court had considered it necessary it would have specifically maintained that such information should also be given in writing. It should therefore not be inferred that such information about the place of detention or transfer of the detenu from one Jail to another Jail should also be given in writing. Reverting to the facts of the instant case it is clear that the information about the order of detention was given in writing and the intimation about the place of detention was given orally. Direction by the Supreme Court was therefore complied with and for that reason the detention order does not vitiate. ( 24 ) EVIDENCE of the witnesses is discussed above and it is clear there from that the activities of the petitioner as a bootlegger are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. As provided in sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the PASA Act if any person is engaged in or is making preparation for engaging in any activities as a bootlegger which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order then such a person shall be deemed to be acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Explanation to sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 3 of the PASA Act provides that public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in sub-sec (4) of Sec. 3 of the PASA Act directly or indirectly is causing or is likely to cause any harm danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or wide spread danger to life property or public health. Evidence is clear that the petitioner is carrying on activities as a bootlegger and to facilitate his activities he created an atmosphere of terror and because of that armed police party and SRP were required to be posted in that locality. Evidence is clear that the petitioner is carrying on activities as a bootlegger and to facilitate his activities he created an atmosphere of terror and because of that armed police party and SRP were required to be posted in that locality. Even witness Jivabhai had to leave the place and go to another place for residing. The detaining authority was therefore rightly subjectively satisfied that the activities of the petitioner as bootlegger affected public order. ( 25 ) NO other point is urged before us. The detention order dated 31/01/1987 passed by the District Magistrate Bhavnagar the detaining authority against the petitioner does not suffer from any vice and therefore should upheld and the petition should be dismissed. ( 26 ) IN the result the petition is dismissed. Rule discharged. Rule discharged. .