Judgment :- 1. This civil revision petition is directed against the order passed by the Appellate Authority (Land Reforms) Alleppey in AA No. 57 of 1978. 2. The petitioner filed OA 771 of 1977 before the Land Tribunal, Trivandrum under S.80B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act for purchase of kudikidappu rights in respect of 61/2 cents of land alleging that the building occupied by the petitioner was a'hut' within the meaning of Explanation.2(25)(a) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The application was dismissed by the Land Tribunal. The appeal filed therefrom also ended in dismissal. The main reason for the dismissal of the application was that the respondent had filed OP (BRC) No. 248 of 1974 and had obtained an order of eviction against the petitioner herein and that the petitioner had not raised any plea of kudikidappu in that proceedings. 3. The contention now urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the order passed by the Rent Control Court which was later confirmed by the Appellate Court and the Revisional Court does not operate as res judicata as the petitioner herein did not contest the matter and that the earlier order of eviction passed under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is not an order passed on merits. 4. In order to substantiate this contention a decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in Subramonian v. Anandanarayanan (1985 KLT 227) was cited. That was a case where the respondent therein filed a suit for injunction and damages. The defendants-appellants claimed tenancy right over the property. They had filed an earlier application before the Land Tribunal for purchase of tenancy rights. After the filing of the application they did not pursue the matter and therefore the same was dismissed. This Court held that the earlier order passed by the Land Tribunal in dismissing the application for purchase did not finally hear and decide the controversy between the parties and therefore it would not operate as res judicata. 5. The relevant provision of the CPC is S.11. S.11 with Explanation IV reads as follows: 11. This Court held that the earlier order passed by the Land Tribunal in dismissing the application for purchase did not finally hear and decide the controversy between the parties and therefore it would not operate as res judicata. 5. The relevant provision of the CPC is S.11. S.11 with Explanation IV reads as follows: 11. Res judicata No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised and has been heard and finally decided by such Court". "Explanation.4 Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit, shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit." In the earlier rent control proceedings filed by the respondent the revision-petitioner entered appearance; but later remained ex parte and did not contest the proceedings. This ex parte order was challenged by the revision petitioner unsuccessfully before the Appellate Court and revisional court. The revision petitioner did not contend before the rent control court that the building occupied by him was a but and that he was a kudikidappukaran in that property. This is a matter which might and ought to have been raised as a ground of defence in the earlier proceedings. 6. This Court in Ranga Pai v. Special Tahsildar, Vypeen (1983 KLT 77) held that if a person resisting any earlier proceedings under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, did not raise a contention before the Rent Control Court that he was a kudikidappukaran and that he contested the petition for eviction as a tenant, he cannot later contend that he was a kudikidappukaran. His plea of kudikidappu was barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. So also in Lakshmi Ammal v. Madhavan Pillai (1978 KLT 484) this Court held that a person who had full opportunity of recourse at the trial stage to the protection of the statute and failed to raise that plea cannot raise the same in the execution proceedings. His plea of kudikidappu was barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. So also in Lakshmi Ammal v. Madhavan Pillai (1978 KLT 484) this Court held that a person who had full opportunity of recourse at the trial stage to the protection of the statute and failed to raise that plea cannot raise the same in the execution proceedings. This Court held: "But in a case where the question could have been raised and agitated upon in the trial court and a person consciously and deliberately absented himself from such proceedings, such a person cannot be permitted to protract the proceedings by raising the question for the first time in execution." 7. The scope and amplitude of S.11 of the CPC engaged the attention of the Full Bench of the Supreme Court in Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar (AIR 1966 SC 1332). The words 'heard and finally decided' have been.explained by the Supreme Court in the following manner: "In order that a matter may be said to have been heard and finally decided, the decision in the former suit must have been on the merits. Where, for example, the former suit was dismissed by the trial Court for want of jurisdiction, or for default of plaintiff's appearance, or on the ground of non-joinder of parties or misjoinder of parties or multifariousness, or on the ground that the suit was badly framed, or on the ground of a technical mistake, or for failure on the part of the plaintiff to produce probate or letters of administration or succession certificate when the same is required by law to entitle the plaintiff to a decree, or for failure to furnish security for costs, or on the ground of improper valuation or for failure to pay additional Court-fee on a plaint which was undervalued or for want of cause of action or on the ground that it is premature and the dismissal is confirmed in appeal (if any) the decision not being on the merits would not be res judicata in a subsequent suit." 8. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner placed reliance on the decision in S. P. Shah v. B. N. Singh ((1969) 3 SCR 908). That was a case where two execution petitions filed earlier were dismissed for default and when the third application was filed the same was resisted on the plea of rea judicata. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner placed reliance on the decision in S. P. Shah v. B. N. Singh ((1969) 3 SCR 908). That was a case where two execution petitions filed earlier were dismissed for default and when the third application was filed the same was resisted on the plea of rea judicata. The Supreme Court repelled the contention and held that the principle of res judicata was not applicable. The Court held: "The objection was not barred by the principles of res judicata. Before a plea can be held to be barred by res judicata that plea must have been heard and determined by the court. Only a decision by a court could be res judicata, whether it be statutory under S.11. Civil Procedure Code or constructive as a matter of public policy on which the entire doctrine rests. xx xx xx xx Even the dismissal for default of objections raised under S.47, Civil Procedure Code does not operate as res judicata when the same objections are raised again in the course of the execution." It is true that the principle of res judicata "is grounded in the policy that unless a litigant gets a real bite at the apple of discord he should not be foreclosed from another attempt" (Rutledge: Angel v. Bullington 330 US 183, 207). However, in the instant case the revision petitioner had full opportunity to contest the matter before the Rent Control Court. He did not raise any contention that he was a kudikidappukaran. The order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court cannot be equated with the order of dismissal for default. The order of dismissal for default could be characterised as one which was not heard and finally decided as it did not settle the matter involved in the proceedings. Whereas in a matter the counter-petitioner refuses to appear and fails to raise the necessary plea of defence, it cannot be heard to say that the order passed thereafter is not one heard and finally decided. Such an order would definitely be hit by Explanation.4 of S.11 of CPC If the contention of the revision-petitioner is accepted, any ingenuous party would protract any civil litigation by absenting himself from the court and later contend that the order would not operate as res judicata. Such an order would definitely be hit by Explanation.4 of S.11 of CPC If the contention of the revision-petitioner is accepted, any ingenuous party would protract any civil litigation by absenting himself from the court and later contend that the order would not operate as res judicata. That would be against the very scheme and purpose of S.11 of CPC and would be even against public policy. A party who had slept over his rights cannot be allowed to raise the same at a later stage and avoid the earlier decision on the plea of res judicata. The order passed by the Appellate Authority does not call for any interference. The Civil Revision Petition fails and it is dismissed with costs.