Judgment :- 1. The two plaintiffs sued the defendants namely the Toddy Workers Welfare Fund Inspector, Ernakulam, the Tahsildar, Alwaye and the Village Officer, Malayattoor for an injunction to restrain them from resorting to revenue recovery proceedings for realisation of the contributions due from the plaintiffs towards the Toddy Workers Welfare Fund as adjudged by the 1st defendant as per his final order dated 30-6-1976 under S.8 of the Kerala Toddy Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1969 (the Act for short). The trial court dismissed the suit for the reason that there was no prayer to declare the final order of the 1st defendant as invalid and a mere injunction cannot be granted without a prayer either to set aside the final order or to declare it invalid. It is also found that the suit is not maintainable in the absence of notice under S.80 CPC. On the question of jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit against the defendants the trial court held that the Act does not exclude the civil court's jurisdiction. On the above findings the suit was dismissed. The lower appellate court has confirmed the decree dismissing the suit on the ground that the suit for an injunction without a prayer to set aside the final order of the statutory authority is not maintainable and also for the reason that S.17A expressly bars the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain suits in respect of matters covered by the Act. 2. S.8 of the Act is extracted below: "Determination of amounts due from employers:- (1) The Chief Welfare Fund Inspector or any other Welfare Fund Inspector authorised by him in this behalf may by order, determine the amount due from any employer under the provisions of this Act or of the scheme and for this purpose may conduct such inquiry as he may deem necessary. (2) The Officer conducting the inquiry under sub section (1) shall for the purposes of such inquiry, have the same powers as are vested in a court for trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in respect of the following matters, namely:- (a) enforcing the attendance of any person or examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavit; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. (3) Any inquiry under this section shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of S.193 and 228 and for the purpose of S.196 of the Indian Penal Code. (4) No order shall be made under sub-section (1) unless the employer has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. (5) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (1) may prefer an appeal to the Government or any other authority as may be specified by the Government within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order and the decision of the Government or of such authority on such appeal shall be final". Sub-s. (1) constitutes the authority mentioned therein with exclusive jurisdiction to determine the amount due from any employer under the provisions of the Act subject only to a right of appeal by the person aggrieved to the Government, or any other specified authority under sub-s. (5) and the decision of the appellate authority on such appeal is final. Sub-ss (2) and (3) make it clear that the enquiry under the section is a judicial enquiry and the provisions of the CPC are made applicable in respect of matters specified in sub-s. (2). The employer is given a right to be heard with reasonable opportunity to prove his case under sub-s. (4). From these provisions of the Act it is clear that it is a self-contained Code and the jurisdiction of the civil court in matters dealt with under the Act should therefore be held to be barred. The Supreme Court in the decision reported in Munshi Ram v. Chheharta Municipality (AIR 1979 SC 1250) stated at page 1254: "24. From these provisions of the Act it is clear that it is a self-contained Code and the jurisdiction of the civil court in matters dealt with under the Act should therefore be held to be barred. The Supreme Court in the decision reported in Munshi Ram v. Chheharta Municipality (AIR 1979 SC 1250) stated at page 1254: "24. It is well-recognised that where a Revenue Statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner, and all other forums and modes of seeking it are excluded." Referring to the provisions of S.56 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estate (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act of 1948, the Supreme Court in M. Chayanna v. K. Narayana (AIR 1979 SC 1320) stated at page 1322: "The Andhra Pradesh Estates Abolition Act is a self contained code in which provision is also made for the adjudication of various types of disputes arising after an estate is notified by specially constituted Tribunals. On general principles, the special Tribunals constituted by the Act must necessarily be held to have exclusive jurisdiction to decide disputes entrusted by the statute to them for their adjudication." 3. S.17A was introduced by the Amendment Act of 1978. S.17A reads: "Bar of jurisdiction of civil courts - No civil court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question or to determine any matter which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with or to be determined by the Government or the Board or the Chief Welfare Fund Inspector or any Welfare Fund Inspector." 4. True, the present suit was instituted prior to the commencement of the Amendment Act. Since, however, I have found that the Act is a self-contained code in the matter of determination of the liability of the employer under S.8, the jurisdiction of the civil court should be held to be necessarily excluded even without S.17A. At any rate, after the coming into force of S.17A the civil court ceases to have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The decision of the courts below dismissing the suit does not call for interference in second appeal. The second appeal is accordingly dismissed. At any rate, after the coming into force of S.17A the civil court ceases to have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The decision of the courts below dismissing the suit does not call for interference in second appeal. The second appeal is accordingly dismissed. I need hardly state that the decision in the suit will not preclude the plaintiffs from resorting to the remedies if any available under sub-s. 5 of S.8 of the Act, if so advised. There will however be no order as to costs.