JUDGMENT : H.L. Agarwal, C.J. - In this writ application the question for determination is as to whether the order of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Orissa (0. P. No. 1) contained in Annexure-B by which he has allowed the application of the workman for addition of the President of another Union, namely, Orissa Forest Corporation Shramika Sangha (O. P. No. 3) is valid in law or not. 2. In order to appreciate the controversy it is necessary to state that relevant facts in brief. The Petitioner-Corporation, an undertaking of the State Government, carries on trade and business in forest products. Opposite parties 3 & 4 are the two trade unions of the workmen., The case of the Petitioner is that All Orissa Forest Corporation Karmachari Sangha (O. P. No. 4),is the officially recognised union of the Corporation and the majority of its workmen are members of this union and O. P. No. 3 is a parallel organisation and since it represents a very small group of workmen, it is not a recognised trade union. Abhaya Chandra Mohanty, O. P. No. 2, was working as an Assistant Account in the Corporation. In the year 1978 on the recommendation of the Selection Committee, certain Assistant Accounts were promoted as Accountants. The name of opposite party No. 2 was, however, not included in the first batch of promotees as his position was 24th in the Selection Committee's list. Opposite, party No. 2 took the stand that he was superseded by his juniors, and the union-opposite party No. 4 raised a dispute on this account. The conciliation proceedings ended in failure and thereafter the State Government referred the dispute to the Labour Court u/s 12 (5) read with Section 10 (1) (d) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') for adjudication of the question as to whether in the order of promotion the eligibility of opposite party No. 2 was wrongly ignored. I would do well to quote the question referred for adjudication: Whether the action of the Management of M/s. O. F. C. Ltd., Bhubaneswar in affording promotion to others to the cadre of Accountant with effect from 24-1-1978 ignoring the eligibility of Sri A. C. Mohanty, Asst. Accountant is legal and/or justified ? I would do well to quote the question referred for adjudication: Whether the action of the Management of M/s. O. F. C. Ltd., Bhubaneswar in affording promotion to others to the cadre of Accountant with effect from 24-1-1978 ignoring the eligibility of Sri A. C. Mohanty, Asst. Accountant is legal and/or justified ? If not, to what relief Sri Mohanty is entitled." When the adjudication proceeding commenced before the Labour Court, written statements were tiled by the Petitioner and opposite party No. 4 vide Annexures-6 and 5 respectively. Opposite party No. 4 filed a further written statement on 27-7-1981 (Annexure-7) in order to meet some of the points raised by the Petitioner. The case of the Petitioner is that from the two written statements filed by opposite party No. 4, i.e., Annexure-5 and 7, it would appear, that this trade union was seriously contesting the case of the Petitioner for redress of the grievance of opposite party No. 2 and to set up his right for promotion. Opposite party No. 2, however, wanted to be represented through a lawyer which is ordinarily not permissible in view of the provisions contained in Section 36 of the Act and accordingly he filed a representation through Sri Satyabadi Das, opposite party No. :3-, who being not a party to the reference was not competent to represent opposite party No. 2. The Petitioner accordingly took an exception to this filing of the representation by opposite party No. 2 and the Labour Court by order dated 26-2-1982 refused the prayer of opposite party No. 2. Thereafter, on 16-6-1982, opposite party No. 3 made an independent application to represent opposite party No. 2 in the capacity of the President of the Orissa Forest Corporation Shramika Sangha. This application was, also rejected by the Labour Court on 16.6-1982. After the rejection of the above prayers, opposite party No. 2 made a fresh application on 29-7-1982 for being represented through opposite party No. 3 on the plea that "opposite party No. 4 may not support his case for want of legal knowledge. The Petitioner opposed this attempt of opposite party No. 2, but the Labour Court this time allowed the petition vide the impugned order and recalled its previous orders. The Petitioner opposed this attempt of opposite party No. 2, but the Labour Court this time allowed the petition vide the impugned order and recalled its previous orders. The case of the Petitioner in this regard is that the ground advanced by opposite party No. 2 is flimsy and that at no point of time his case was sponsored by opposite party No. 3 and in view of the fact that opposite party No. 4 is the only recognised union and duly safeguarding the interest of the workmen in general and that of opposite party No. 2 in particular, there was no occasion for doubting the sincerity of opposite party No. 4. It was the further stand of the Petitioner that a non-sponsored union or a rival union has no right to ask to be impleaded in the reference as a necessary party as in a civil suit and that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to implead new parties in the reference is very much limited. 3. Counter affidavits have been filed on behalf of both opposite party Nos. 2 and 3. In their counter affidavits basically their stand is that the question referred for adjudication was of a general nature and that the decision would affect not only opposite party No. 2 but also other employees and therefore for passing an effective award for the sake of industrial peace it was necessary to implead the other trade union also. The further stand of opposite party No. 3 is that it is functioning as a registered trade union since 1967 and that it is opposite party No. 4 which came into existence recently. It asserted that it was this union which represented the majority of the workmen of the Petitioner. 4. The findings recorded by the Labour Court are as follows: (1) Opposite party No. 2 is a member of opposite party No. 4. (2) Opposite party No. 4, who initially espoused the cause of opposite party No. 2, was not taking any interest and was siding with the Management. (3) The present dispute involves a matter of common interest of all the employees of the Corporation. (4) Opposite party No. 3 is a registered union of which many of the employees of the Petitioner are members who will be naturally affected by the decision of this Court in this regard. 5. (3) The present dispute involves a matter of common interest of all the employees of the Corporation. (4) Opposite party No. 3 is a registered union of which many of the employees of the Petitioner are members who will be naturally affected by the decision of this Court in this regard. 5. Now, let us see some of the relevant provisions of the Act in this regard: Section 18 specifies the person on whom the settlement and the awards of the Tribunal are binding. Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 18 which "is relevant for the purpose reads as follows: (d) where a party referred to in Clause (a) or Clause (b) is composed of workmen all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment as the case may be to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part. Then comes Section 36 which deals with the question of representation of the parties: 36. Representation of parties. (1) A workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceeding under this Act by: (a) any member of the executive or other office bearer of a registered trade union of which he is a member. (b) any member of the executive or other office bearer of a federation of trade unions to which the trade union referred to in Clause (s) is affiliated. (c) where the worker is not a member of any trade union by any member of the executive or other office bearer of any trade union connected with, or by any other workman employed in the industry in which the worker is employed and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed. (2) xx xx xx (3) No party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings under this Act or in any proceedings before a Court. (4) In any proceeding before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to the proceeding and with the leave of the Labour Courts Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be. 6. (4) In any proceeding before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to the proceeding and with the leave of the Labour Courts Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be. 6. From the above provisions it becomes obvious that no party can claim representation by a legal practitioner as a matter of right. See M/s. Eastern Manganese Mineral Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal (Central) Dhanbad and other 1968 Lab. I. C. 1430. 7. From the scheme of Section 36 it is obvious that a work man to a dispute is entitled to be represented in any proceeding under the Act only by that registered trade union of which he is a member of the apex body of which his trade union is a member under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1). He can, however be represented by the other persons only when he is not a member of any trade union. Ordinarily, therefore, a union cannot represent a person before an adjudicator when that person is not a member of that union. See Jehangir Kabir (General Secretary of the Bengal Mariners' Union) v. Fourth Industrial Tribunal. West Bengal 1963 (I) L L. J. 751 (Calcutta) and J.L. Toppo Vs. Tata Locomotive and Engineering Company Ltd.. In Ram Prasad Vishwakarma Vs. Ordinarily, therefore, a union cannot represent a person before an adjudicator when that person is not a member of that union. See Jehangir Kabir (General Secretary of the Bengal Mariners' Union) v. Fourth Industrial Tribunal. West Bengal 1963 (I) L L. J. 751 (Calcutta) and J.L. Toppo Vs. Tata Locomotive and Engineering Company Ltd.. In Ram Prasad Vishwakarma Vs. The Chairman, Industrial Tribunal the Supreme Court was considering the question whether a workman could ask for representation by a person of his own choice after his case had been espoused and he was being represented by a member of the executive or other office bearers of a trade union of which he was a member on the ground that he had lost faith on the office bearers of the trade union or the trade union, and though the Court recognised the position that Sub-section (1) entitles a workman who is a party to the dispute to be represented by an officer of a trade union of which he is a member, it did not think it wise to lay down a general proposition of law in the matter and left it by saying that the ordinary rule could be that such representation of the workman by an officer of the trade union should continue throughout the proceedings in the absence of exceptional circumstances which may justify the Tribunal to permit other representation of the workman. The ground on which the workman in the case in hand wanted to change his representative was that opposite party No. 4, his union, may not support his case for want of legal knowledge. We have seen that he had also attempted earlier to have his representation through opposite party No. 3, an advocate. I am afraid, in the circumstances there could be any justification in la w for the Labour Court to allow the prayer of the workman to change his representative. Such a ground for the change is basically untenable in law and should not have been allowed. 8. Let us now see some of the authorities which have been referred to by the Labour Court and also those cited by the learned advocate for opposite party No. 3. The Labour Court has referred to an observation of the Supreme Court made in the case of M/s. Williamson Margor and Co. Ltd. v. Mr. Williamson Margor and Anr. 1962 Lab. The Labour Court has referred to an observation of the Supreme Court made in the case of M/s. Williamson Margor and Co. Ltd. v. Mr. Williamson Margor and Anr. 1962 Lab. I. C 33 to the effect that in order to settle the dispute between the management and its workman in such an effective manner that industrial peace may be maintained, the industrial Tribunal should not be constrained by the formal rules of law and to avoid the inability of arriving at an effective award to meet justice in a particular dispute. The Labour Court has applied this principle under an erroneous impression that opposite party No. 3, being interested to participate in the proceeding which was a matter of common concern for all the employees of the Corporation, should be given an opportunity to contest the case. The Labour Court has also referred to two other decisions of the Supreme court, namely The Manager, Hotel Imperial Vs. The Chief Commissioner and Others, and Hochtief Gammon Vs. Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneshwar, Orissa and Others, besides the decision of this Court in Mazdoor Sangha, Titaghur Paper Mills No. 3 v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal and Ors. 1972 Lab. I. C. 1603. These three cases were also referred to by Mr. J. Patnaik, learned Counsel for opposite party No. 2. At the outset, I must indicate that in both the above cases of the Supreme Court, the disputes were of general nature. Hotel lmperials case6, has no bearing at all to the question. The controversy, in that case was as to whether the union could be made a party to the reference and whether the reference was vague in the absence of any indication as to how many of the workers of the 30 different categories working in the hotel were involved in the dispute. In the second case of the Supreme Court, the question for consideration was about the power of the Tribunal to add necessary and proper parties. In the second case of the Supreme Court, the question for consideration was about the power of the Tribunal to add necessary and proper parties. Referring to the scheme of Section 18 (3) (b) of the Act, the Supreme Court observed: If it appears to the Tribunal that a party to the industrial dispute named in the order of reference does not completely or adequately represent the interest either on the side of the employer, or on the side of the employee, it may direct that other persons should be joined who would be necessary to represent such interest. Proceeding further, the Supreme Court observed: If the unions specified in the reference do not represents}} the employees of the undertaking it may be open to the tribunal to add such other unions as it may deem necessary. But a caution has been given that there may always be a test as to whether the non-joinder of the party would make the arbitration proceedings ineffective and unenforceable. The Supreme Court expressed the limitations of the Tribunal in these words " x x x x The implied power of the Tribunal to add parties must be held to be limited," In this case before the Supreme Court, the dispute was regarding payment of bonus between the employer and its workman. Obviously, therefore the nature of the question Was touching every workman of the company. The situation in the case before this Court was also somewhat similar. The very question was of general nature, namely, "Whether the existing wage structure of the employees of Titaghur Paper Mills No. 3 at Choudwar in the District of Cuttack needs any revision? If so, what should be the details ?" Therefore, the observations made and the orders passed by the Courts in these cases would have hardly any application to the present case where the only question was as to whether opposite party No. 4 was superseded in the matter of promotion. If he succeeds, then only the junior most person promoted in the First batch may be affected and nothing more would happen. The nature of the dispute, therefore, cannot be said to be collective to which the workman as a community are a party by virtue of the espousal of such a dispute. If he succeeds, then only the junior most person promoted in the First batch may be affected and nothing more would happen. The nature of the dispute, therefore, cannot be said to be collective to which the workman as a community are a party by virtue of the espousal of such a dispute. In the second case of the Supreme Court Hochtief Gammon's case7, the Supreme Court has also said that the implied power u/s 18 (3) (b) could not be exercised by the Tribunal so as to enlarge material, the scope of the reference itself, because basically, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to deal with an industrial dispute is derived solely from the order of reference passed by the appropriate government. I, therefore, do not find any justification in the view of the Labour Court that the present dispute involves a matter of common interest of all the employees of the Corporation. 9. The other finding recorded by him that opposite party No. 4 was not taking any interest and was siding with the management is also based on no material or evidence. The ground on which the prayer for representation was founded by the workman has not at all been touched by the Labour Court, and it has recorded conclusions which are quite foreign and beyond the pleadings and thus having misdirected itself the Labour Court has passed the impugned order on assuming certain facts without any foundation. If the workman had lost faith in opposite party No. 4, the union which has been espousing the cause of the workman, he could not claim representation by a rival union while still continuing as a member of the earlier union with the only purpose of having the benefit and advantage of its lawyer-President. 10. The provisions and limitations contained in Section 36 of the Act are based on high public policy and must be strictly adhered to by the Labour Courts to avoid unholy competition between the trade unions of an industry, Considering the entire matter from all possible angles, I find it difficult to sustain the order of the Labour Court. 11. I would accordingly allow this application and quash the impugned order contained in Annexure-8, but inasmuch as the Petitioner is a Corporation and the contesting opposite party is a representative of the workmen, I shall not saddle him with costs of this proceeding. 11. I would accordingly allow this application and quash the impugned order contained in Annexure-8, but inasmuch as the Petitioner is a Corporation and the contesting opposite party is a representative of the workmen, I shall not saddle him with costs of this proceeding. D.P. Mohapatra, J. 12. I agree. Final Result : Allowed