JUDGEMENT Sanjay Karol, J:- Petitioner herein has prayed for quashing of the office dated 6th March, 1993 dismissing the petitioner from service. While serving with the respondent as Security Guard, petitioner was charge-sheeted vide memorandum dated 7.6.1990 (Annexure R-5) with the following articles of charge:- ‘That the said Shri Baldev Raj, while functioning as Security Guard under Electrical Circle Khairi remained willfully absent from duties without prior intimation and sanction of leave w.e.f. 25.4.1990 till date. He has been warned to abstain from such practices in past also. Thus, Shri Baldev Raj, Security Guard has failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion of duty. His behaviour is thus in contravention to the conduct prescribed IN rule No. 28 47 and 28.54 of Model Standing Orders." 2. As per the statement of imputation in respect of the aforesaid charge, it was mentioned that his previous record showed that he had absented himself w.e.f. 30.1.89 to 5.2.89,. 8.2.89 to 20.2.89, 24.2.89 to 27.2.89 & 1.3.89to 4.3.89 = 28 days, which was subsequently sanctioned by the competent authority and further remained absent w.e.f. 27th & 28.3.89, 22.4.89 to 11.6.89, 17 to 19.6.89, 21.6.89, 5.7.89, 21 to 26.7.89, 1 to 6.8.89, 16 & 17.8.89..4 to 6.9.89, 27 to 30.10.89, 1.11.89, 18.11.89 to 21.11.89, 3.12.89, 15 & 16.12.89, 18.12.89, 21.12.89, 21.12.89, 30.12.90, 1.1.90 to 5.2.90. Even this unauthorized period was regularized by the competent authority subsequently with a warning that he should not remain absent without proper and prior intimation to the superiors. Petition was warned in writing to improve his conduct but inspite of his having tendered several apologies, he again absented himself w.e.f. 25th April, 1990. 3.After due compliance of all the codal formalities as also the principles of natural justice, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report dated 19th March, 1991 (Annexure R-10) holding that the petitioner has accepted all the charges. He further recorded that petitioner has assumed that he would not repeat the same in future and has requested for a sympathetic view in the matter. 4. However, memorandum dated 12.9.1991 (Annexure R-11) was issued to .the petitioner proposing the penalty of dismissal from service and asking him to show cause as to why the penalty be not imposed. He further recorded that petitioner has assumed that he would not repeat the same in future and has requested for a sympathetic view in the matter. 4. However, memorandum dated 12.9.1991 (Annexure R-11) was issued to .the petitioner proposing the penalty of dismissal from service and asking him to show cause as to why the penalty be not imposed. Based on the said Enquiry report as also the other material, the disciplinary authority awarded the punishment of dismissal from service vide office order dated 6.3.1993 (Annexure R-12) after objectively considering the entire material on record. 5. Petitioner thereafter preferred an appeal, which was duly considered by the appellate authority and after examining the entire material on record, the same was dismissed vide order dated 15th of May, 1993 (Annexure R-16). The order shows that even though the appeal was filed beyond the stipulated period, however, the same was not only entertained by considered sympathetically. However, keeping in view the petitioners past conduct, it was not appropriate to" interfere. 6.Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the penalty is highly disproportionate to the alleged misconduct and that no adequate opportunity has been afforded to the petitioner before awarding the punishment, he has pressed for the direction that the petitioner be re-engaged as Scrutiny Guard with all consequential benefits like arrears of salary and seniority etc. or in the alternative, respondent be directed to release the pensionary / retrial benefits to the petitioner along with retrospective interest. 7. It is settled law that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by the limits by judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority. (State of A.P. Vs. S. Sree Rama Rao, reported in AIR 1963 SC1723). 8. It is also settled that that this Court would not reverse a finding of the inquiring authority in the ground that the evidence adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the inquiring authority, it is not the function of the court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the inquiring authority, it is not the function of the court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. As long as there is some legal evidence to substantiate the finding, the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the court in writ proceedings. 9.Further in Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and others vs. P.C. Kakkar, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 364, it has been held as under:- "12. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten litigation it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed." "15.....It needs no emphasis that when a court feels that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate, it must record reasons for coming to such a conclusion. Mere expression that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate would not meet the requirement of law." 10.On the issue of punishment being disproportionate to the misconduct alleged to have been committed by the petitioner, the ratio of law laid down of the apex Court in State of UP vs. Sheo Shanker Lal Srivastava and others, reported in (2006) 3 SCC 276, is also reproduced hereinbelow:- "22. It is now well settled that principles of law that the High Court or the Tribunal in exercise of its power of judicial review would not normally interfere with the quantum of punishment. Doctrine of proportionality can be invoked only under certain situations. It is now well settled that the High Court shall be very slow in interfering with the quantum of punishment, unless it is found to be shocking to ones conscience." 11. Record shows that the petitioner has been habitual in absenting himself without prior permission or intimation. Respondents are carrying out the work of construction of Hydroelectric Power Project in the remotest corner of the State of Himachal Pradesh. Record shows that the petitioner has been habitual in absenting himself without prior permission or intimation. Respondents are carrying out the work of construction of Hydroelectric Power Project in the remotest corner of the State of Himachal Pradesh. Respondents have engaged the services of the persons like petitioner to guard the valuable machinery which the respondents are using for the construction of dam. Petitioners record shows that he has been absenting continuously without leave. In fact, before the Enquiry Officer, he has admitted this fact. He did not bother to mend his ways inspite of adequate notices, opportunities and warnings given to him. The authorities below have sympathetically considered his case and only after considering the entire material objectively, they have come to the conclusion that he is no longer to be retained in service and consequently the order of dismissal was passed. 12. I have seen the record and am satisfied that the action taken against the petitioner is totally justified. Adequate opportunities have been given to the petitioner of the disciplinary proceedings. He had admitted his guilt, apologized and requested for pardon. I agree with the reasoning and the finding of the authorities below. 13.1 see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the authorities below based on adequate material, cogent and reliance evidence. No infirmity or illegality, shocking the conscious of this Court, has been brought to notice. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents has also argued that in view of ratio of law laid down in Cheripalili Madar v. Assistant Division Engineers and others (2005 (11) SCC 546), SDO, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. & Others v. Timudu Oram (2005 (6) SCC 156) and Suresh Chand vs. Union of India and others (2004 (13) SCC 563), this Court should not entertain the petition as it is hopelessly time barred. I am in agreement with the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner even otherwise is hopelessly belated, however, I have considered the petition on merits and decided as such. Respondents have stated that no amount towards retrial benefits is due and payable and infact the entire amount already stand paid to the petitioner. 15. No other point was urged by the learned counsel for the parties. 16. In view of the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is dismissed. JUDGMENT P. D. Desai, C. J. —The petitioner is an employee of the respondent-University. 15. No other point was urged by the learned counsel for the parties. 16. In view of the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is dismissed. JUDGMENT P. D. Desai, C. J. —The petitioner is an employee of the respondent-University. The dispute in the petition relates to the fixation of his seniority in the cadre of clerks/typists. The question arising for determination at the present stage is whether by virtue of the enactment and coming into force of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and the issuance of the notification, dated August 29, 19&6, read with the corrigendum, dated September 3, 1986 under sub-section (2) of section 15 by the State Government, the jurisdiction of this Court to determine the dispute raised in the petition is ousted and whether the case is required to be transferred to the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal"). The determination of the question depends upon an in-depth examination of the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions against the background of their enactment, 1. The backdrop.—The real means actually used in the statute. The rule of literal interpring of a statutory enactment is best ascertained by gathering the intent of them that make it". The legislative intent may ordinarily be gathered primarily from the wordetation does not, however, exclude an inquiry into the background against which the statute was enacted in order to be informed about the true aim, scope and object of the enactment. The "mischief rule" evolved by Lord Coke v Heydon’s Co. case (1584) (3) Co. Rep 7 a, which has received the approval in R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla and another v. Union of India and another, AIR 1957 SC 628 and many subsequent cases, permits and indeed requires the Court to consider : (i) What was the law before the legislation was enacted? (ii) What was the mischief and defect for which the law had not provided any remedy? (iii) What remedy the Parliament has appointed to cure the disease? and (iv) What the true reason of the remedy is? (ii) What was the mischief and defect for which the law had not provided any remedy? (iii) What remedy the Parliament has appointed to cure the disease? and (iv) What the true reason of the remedy is? It is legitimate, therefore, to have regard to all such factors, which can be properly taken into account in ascertaining the true intention of the legislature, such as the history of the legislation and the purposes thereof, the mischief which it was intended to suppress, the other provisions of the statute etc and to construe the statutory language in light of the indications furnished by them. Turning first to the legislative background, the framers of the Constitution in their wisdom invested the Supreme Court and the various High Courts with the power of judicial review by specifically enacting Articles 32, 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution. With the simultaneous enactment of Articles 12, 14, 15, 16, 309 and 311 in the Constitution, a large number of service matters calling for the adjudication of disputes relating to the recruitment and conditions of service of Government servants and also of employees in the other fields of public employment started coming up before the various High Courts whose power of judicial review was invoked for the said purpose by the aggrieved employees. In the thirty-six years following the enforcement of the Constitution, the High Courts have played a definite and significant role in evolving the service jurisprudence in the exercise of their power of judicial review. The positive contribution by the High Courts made as aforesaid, coupled with the growth in the number of employees in the public field and the manifold problems arising in the context of their recruitment and conditions of service and their implicit faith and confidence in the High Courts as the unfailing protector of their rights and honour, led to a gradual increase in the institution and pendency of service matters in the High Courts. This, in its turn, focussed the attention of the Union Government on the problem of finding an effective alternative institutional mechanism for the disposal of such matters. A committee set up by the Union Government in 1959 under the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice J. C. Shah, as he then was, recommended the setting up of an independent Tribunal to handle service matters pending before the High Courts and the Supreme Court. A committee set up by the Union Government in 1959 under the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice J. C. Shah, as he then was, recommended the setting up of an independent Tribunal to handle service matters pending before the High Courts and the Supreme Court. The Administrative Reforms Commission also recommended the setting up of Civil Services Tribunals to deal with the appeals of government servants against disciplinary actions. Some of the State Legislatures thereupon enacted laws setting up Tribunals to decide such cases. However, in the absence of a constitutional amendment empowering the enactment of a law providing for the exclusion of the power of judicial review conferred upon the High Courts by Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the remedy accordingly provided failed to achieve the purpose of relieving the High Courts of their burden, since the decisions of such Tribunals were subject to judicial review and, therefore, service matters still continued to reach the High Courts through such Tribunals under Article 227 of the Constitution. Ultimately, therefore, Part XIV-A comprising Arts. 323-A and 323-B was introduced in the Constitution by section 46 of the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 with effect from January 3, 1977 Article 323-A authorised Parliament to provide by law for the setting up of Administrative Tribunals for the adjudication of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of certain categories of employees in the field of public employment including government servants and also to provide for the exclusion of the jurisdiction of all courts, except that of the Supreme Court under Article 136, with respect to disputes or complaints of such nature. No step was, however, still taken in the direction of enacting a law for the setting up of Administrative Tribunals as contemplated by the said Article, A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of K. K. Datta v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 2056, highlighted the need for the Constitution of Service Tribunals by the State Governments with an apex Tribunal at the Centre, which, in the generality of cases, should be made the final arbiter of controversies relating to conditions of service, including the vexed question of seniority, so that the High Courts may be saved from the avalanche of writ petitions in service matters. Even for nearly five years thereafter, no move was made in the direction of enacting a law to set up such Tribunals. Ultimately, Parliament enacted the Act which received the assent of the President on February 27, 1985. Certain amendments were thereafter made in some of the provisions of the Act by the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Ordinance, 1986, which was promulgated by the President on January 22, 1986 and which came into force at ones. The Ordinance was repealed by the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 1986, which received the assent of the President on March 25, 1986 and Sec. 1 whereof provided that the amended Act shall be deemed to have come into force on and with effect from January 22, 1986, that is, the date on which the Ordinance was promulgated. The constitutional validity of the Act has since been upheld in S. P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India and others, AIR 1937 SC 386, subject to certain directions with regard to the amendment of some of the provisions of the Act. The legislative backdrop hereinabove traced indicates that the establishment of Administrative Tribunals was a step in the direction of providing an effective alternative authority for judicial review over service matters to the exclusion of all courts other than the Supreme Court with the end in view of reducing the burden of such courts and of securing expeditious disposal of such matters, The statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Constitutional Amendment Bill by which Article 323-A was sought to be inserted in the Constitution highlights this point in the following words : "To reduce the mounting arrears in High Courts and to secure the speedy disposal of service matters.....................it is considered expedient to provide for administrative....tribunals for dealing with such matters while preserving the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in regard to such matters under Article 136 of the Constitution." The Statements of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Bill which on being passed and approved became the Act also contains similar recitals: The establishment of Administrative Tribunals under the aforesaid provision of the Constitution has become necessary since a large number of cases relating to service matters are pending before the various courts. It is expected that the setting up of such Administrative Tribunals to deal exclusively with service matters would go a long way in not only reducing the burden of the various courts and thereby giving them more time to deal with other cases expeditiously but would also provide to the persons covered by the Administrative Tribunals speedy relief in respect of their grievances." It is settled law that the exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred but such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. This principle applies to the exclusion of the power of judicial review conferred on the High Courts by Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution with greater force. However, section 28 of the Act, which has been enacted by Parliament in exercise of the power conferred by clause (1) of Article 323-A, expressly excludes the jurisdiction of the High Courts with respect to the adjudication of disputes or complaints of the nature referred to in the said clause and such exclusion is specifically authorised by the constitutional amendment enacted in clause 2(d) of the said Article. Having regard to the background hereinabove traced and the explicit provision in that regard contained in the aforesaid constitutional and statutory enactments and in light of the decision in Sampat Kumars case, there is no manner of doubt that the power of judicial review conferred on the High Courts by Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is no longer exercisable with respect to disputes or complaints of the specified categories. The question may still arise sometimes whether a given case raises a dispute or complaint of the nature which falls within the purview of the relevant statutory provision excluding the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the determination of that question may involve the exercise of the construction of the statutory language. If the statutory language is ambiguous or susceptible of different meanings, then, for the purposes of appreciating the true meaning of the relevant words and terms, it would be helpful to bear in mind the aforesaid legislative backdrop and to construe the language, as far as possible, in a manner which helps achieving the avowed legislative object of providing an effective alternative institutional mechanism or authority to the exclusion of the High Courts for judicial review in specified categories of service matters. 2. 2. Article 323-A.—Article 323-A, clause (1) of the Constitution enables parliament, by law, to provide for the adjudication or trial by administrative tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to "recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation owned or controlled by the Government". (Underlining supplied) According to clause (2), a law accordingly made may, inter alia: "(a) provide for the establishment of an administrative tribunal for the Union and a separate administrative tribunal for each State or for two or more States; (b) specify the jurisdiction, powers (including the power to punish for contempt) and authority which may be exercised by each of the said tribunals ; (c) * * * * * * * * (d) exclude the jurisdiction of all courts, except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136, with respect to the disputes or complaints of the nature referred to in clause (1); (e) provide for the transfer to each such administrative tribunal of any cases pending before any court or other authority immediately before the establishment of such tribunal as would have been within the jurisdiction of such tribunal if the causes of action on which such suits or proceedings are based had arisen after such establishment. (f) * * * * * * * * (g) * * * * * * * * Clause (3) enacts that the provisions of the article have the effect notwithstanding anything in any other provision of the Constitution or in any other law for the time being in force. It will be seen that a law made under clause (1) of this article may provide for the adjudication or trill by the Administrative Tribunals to established thereunder of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs: (a) of the Union or of any State ; or (b) of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India ; or (c) of any corporation owned or controlled by the Government. On a comparison of (b) and (c) above, it is apparent that the coverage of the law to be so enacted may extend to persons appointed to services and posts in connection with the affairs of (i) any local or other authority provided such local or other authority is within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India, or (ii) any corporation owned or controlled by the Government, that is, by the Government of India or the Government of any State. This follows logically from the fact that Parliament has used two different expressions, namely, "the Government of India" and "the Government" in clause (I) of the article itself while dealing with persons appointed to services and posts in connection with the affairs of two distinct entities, namely, any local or other authority and any corporation, and thereby manifested the intention of conveying a meaning other than that of the Government of India by the use of the expression “the Government" in the latter part of clause (1), and the only different connotation that could be given to the said expression in contradistinction to the expression "the Government of India" is that it has a broader sweep and that it includes both the Government of India and the Government of any State. Article 12, which defines the words "the State" for the purposes of Part III of the Constitution wherein the Fundamental Rights are set out, enacts that those words include, inter alia, "all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India". As seen earlier, the same expression is used also in clause (1) of Article 323-A and, therefore, the judicial decisions expounding the meaning of those words in Article 12 will be relevant also for construing and comprehending the true connotation of the said expression in clause (1) of Article 323-A. In Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Mohan Lai and others, AIR 1967 SC 1857, the expression "other authorities” in Article 12 has been held to include every authority created by a statute and functioning within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India and exercising powers which are conferred by law. A statutory University being a body corporate created by law and exercising powers conferred by such law is thus covered by the expression "other authority" occurring in clause (1) of Article 323-A and, therefore, persons appointed to any service or posts in connection with the affairs of such University can be brought within the sweep of the law enacted by the Parliament under the said clause provided such University is functioning within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India. In K.S. Ramamurthy Reddiar v. Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry and another, AIR 1963 SC 1464, the question for consideration, inter alia, was whether on a true and proper interpretation of Article 12, the Appellate Authority in Pondicherry under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, at a time when Pondicherry was under the administration of Government of India but outside the Indian territory, was comprehended within the meaning of the expression "all local or other authorities under the control of the Government of India". The following observations extracted from Paragraph 11 of judgment analyse the true import of the expression "all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India”: "Article 12 gives an inclusive definition of the words the State and within these words of that article are included, (i) the Government and Parliament of India, (ii) the Government and the legislature of each of the States, and (iii) all local or other authorities..................Then follow the words which qualify the words all local or other authorities. These local or other authorities which are included within the words the State of Article 12 are of two kinds, namely, (i) those within the territory of India, and (ii) those under the control of the Government of India.............................From the scheme of Article 12 it is clear that three classes of authorities are meant to be included in the words the State, there ; and the third class is of two kinds and the qualifying words which follow all local or other authorities define the two types of such local or other authorities as already indicated above. Further all local or other authorities within the territory of India included all authorities within the territory of India whether under the control of the Government of India or the Governments of various States and even autonomous authorities which may not be under the control of the Government at all. In contradistinction to this the second qualifying clause refers only to such authorities as are under the control of the Government of India and so the second qualifying clause must govern the word authorities...................................... All local or other authorities would thus be of two kinds, namely, (i) those within the territory of India, and (ii) those under the control of the Government of India. In the latter case there is no qualification that they should be within the territory of India. It is enough if they are under the control of the Government of India wherever they may be." (Underlining supplied) In Paragraph 12 of the judgment the true meaning of the words "under the control of the Government of India" fell for discussion. The decision in N. Masthan Sahib v. Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry and another, AIR 1962 SC 797, was referred to in that context and the following observations were made : "It follows from these observations in the majority decision in that case that the control envisaged by the words under the control of the Government of India in Article 12 is not the control which arises out of mere appointment, payment and the right to take disciplinary action ; the control envisaged under Article 12 is a control of the functions of the authorities concerned, and the right of the Government of India by virtue of that control to give directions to the authority to function in a particular manner with respect to such functions..................It seems to us therefore that the control envisaged under Article 1 2 is control of the functions of the authorities and it is only when the Government of India can control the functions of an authority that it can be said that the authority is under the control of the Government of India. Such control is possible in the case of a purely executive or administrative authority; it is impossible in the case of a quasi-judicial or judicial authority, for in the very nature of things, where rule of law prevails, it is not open to the Government, be it the Government of India or the Government of a State, to direct a quasi-judicial or judicial authority to decide a particular matter before it in a particular manner. Therefore, this being the nature of the control which the Government of India must exercise in order that an authority functioning outside the territory of India may be said to be an authority under the control of the Government of India within the meaning of Article 12, a quasi-judicial or a judicial authority cannot be said to be an authority under the control of the Government of India within this meaning. We are therefore of opinion that the Appellate Authority being quasi-judicial could not be directed by the Government of India to decide a particular matter before it in a particular manner and therefore it cannot be said that it is an authority under the control of the Government of India." (Underlining supplied) In the context of clause (1) of Article 323-A, this decision has a two-fold relevance. It becomes clear, in the first place, that a local or other authority comprehended thereby includes all such authorities within the territory of India, whether or not under the control of the Government of India or the Governments of various States, and even autonomous bodies which may not be under the control of any Government at all. In the next place, a local or other authority, even if it is not within the territory of India but under the control of the Government of India, is covered by the said clause, provided the control which the Government of India exercises extends to the functions of such authority and embraces the power or right, by virtue of such control, to give directions to such authority to function in a particular manner with respect to the discharge of its functions, duties and obligations. It, therefore, takes within its sweep only those local or other authorities outside India which are purely executive or administrative in character and not quasi-judicial or judicial authorities. It, therefore, takes within its sweep only those local or other authorities outside India which are purely executive or administrative in character and not quasi-judicial or judicial authorities. Yet another aspect, the relevance of which cannot be overlooked, is that the same concept of "control" will apply also to a Corporation which too is covered by clause (1) of Article 323-A. It would thus appear that a law made under the said clause by Parliament can provide for the adjudication or trial by the Administrative Tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to posts in connections with the affairs of a statutory University within the territory of India even if it is, as it should be, an autonomous body. Since the Act is enacted in pursuance of clause (1) of Article 323 A, the interpretation of identical words and phrases occurring therein will necessarily be governed by the same considerations and they must bear the same meaning which is assigned to them while construing the said clause, 3. The Statutory Provisions.—The long preamble of the Act states that it was enacted in pursuance of Article 323-A to provide for the adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to "recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government" and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. It will be seen that the language of the preamble is substantially identical with the provisions of clause (1) of Article 323-A and that the reference therein is also to any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India and to any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government. The word "society" which finds place in the preamble is however, not to be found in clause (1) of Article 323-A. Section 1, which, inter alia, deals with the extent and commencement of the Act, provides in sub-section (2) that insofar as it relates to the Central Administrative Tribunal, the Act shall extend to the whole of India and that insofar as it relates to Administrative Tribunals for States, it shall extend to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Sub-section (3) provides that the provisions of the Act, insofar as they relate to the Central Administrative Tribunal as well as to an Administrative Tribunal for a State, shall come into force on such date as the Central Government may by notification appoint. It would be pertinent to mention here that the provisions of the Act, insofar as they relate to the Central Administrative Tribunal, were brought into force on and with effect from July 1, 1985 by a notification of even date and that by a notification, dated December 31, 1985, January 1, 1986 was appointed the day on which the provisions of the Act, insofar as they relate to the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, shall come into force. Section 2 excludes the application of the provisions of the Act to certain categories of employees. University employees are, however, not covered by such specific exclusion and we need not, therefore, dilate upon the provisions of the said section. Section 3 is the definition section. Clause (aa) defines "Administrative Tribunal", in relation to a State, to mean "the Administrative Tribunal for the State or, as the case may be, the Joint Administrative Tribunal for that State and any other State or States". Clause (c) defines the expression "appointed day" to mean, in relation to a Tribunal, "the date with effect from which it is established, by notification, under section 4”. Clause (f) defines the expression "Central Administrative Tribunal" to mean "the Administrative Tribunal established under sub-sec (1) of sec. 4". Clause (k) defines the word "post" to mean "a post within or outside India". Clause (p) defines the word "service" to mean "service within or outside India". Clause (f) defines the expression "Central Administrative Tribunal" to mean "the Administrative Tribunal established under sub-sec (1) of sec. 4". Clause (k) defines the word "post" to mean "a post within or outside India". Clause (p) defines the word "service" to mean "service within or outside India". Clause (q) defines "service matters", in relation to a person, to mean "all matters relating to the conditions of his service in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India, or, as the case may be, of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government, as respects : (i) remuneration (including allowances), pension and other retirement benefits ; (ii) tenure including confirmation, seniority, promotion, reversion, premature, retirement and superannuation ; (iii) leave of any kind ; (iv) disciplinary matters ; or (v) any other matter whatsoever". Clause (rr) defines the word "society" to mean "a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, or under any corresponding law for the time being in force in a State". Clause (t) defines "Tribunal" to mean "the Central Administrative Tribunal or a State Administrative Tribunal or a Joint Administrative Tribunal". Section 4 deals with the establishment of the Administrative Tribunals and provides in sub-section (1) for the establishment of the Central Administrative Tribunal by the Central Government by notification "to exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on the Central Administrative Tribunal by or under this Act." Sub-section (2) provides for the establishment, by notification by the Central Government, on receipt of a request in that behalf from any State Government, of an Administrative Tribunal for the State "to exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on the Administrative Tribunal for the State by or under this Act". It may be mentioned here that by a notification dated September 28, 1985, the Central Administrative Tribunal was established by the Central Government on and with effect from November 1, 1985 and the said day was also notified to be the appointed day within the meaning of clause (c) of section 3. It may be mentioned here that by a notification dated September 28, 1985, the Central Administrative Tribunal was established by the Central Government on and with effect from November 1, 1985 and the said day was also notified to be the appointed day within the meaning of clause (c) of section 3. Similarly, by a notification dated August 26, 1986, the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal was established by the Central Government on and with effect from September 1, 1986 and the said day was notified to be the appointed day within the meaning of clause (c) of section 3. Sections 14 and 15 have a direct bearing on the determination of the questions arising for decision herein. Section 14 deals with the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal. Subsection (1) thereof provides that save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act, the said Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to the matters set-out in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the said subjection. Sub-sections (2) and (3) have immediate relevance for the purpose of the present case and they read as follows : "(2) The Central Government may, by notification, apply with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification the provisions of sub-section (3) to local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India and to corporations or societies, owned or controlled by Government, not being a local or other authority or corporation or society, controlled or owned by a State Government: Provided that if the Central Government considers it expedient so to do for the purpose of facilitating transition to the scheme as envisaged by this Act, different dates may be so specified under this sub-section in respect of different classes of, or different categories under any class of, local or other authorities or corporations or societies. (3) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Central Administrative Tribunal shall also exercise, on and from the date with effect from which the provisions of this sub-section apply to any local or other authority or corporation or society, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that date by all courts except the Supreme Court in relation to— (a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any service or post in connection with the affairs of such local or other authority or corporation or society ; and (b) all service matters concerning a person other than a person referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) appointed to any service or post in connection with the affairs of such local or other authority or corporation or society and pertaining to the service of such person in connection with such affairs." Section 15 deals with the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the State Administrative Tribunals. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act, the Administrative Tribunal for a State shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to the matters set out in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the said sub-section. Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of this section are also of immediate relevance for the purposes of the present case and they are set-out in extenso hereinbelow : — "(2) The State Government may, by notification, apply with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification the provisions of sub-section (3) to local or other authorities and corporations or societies controlled or owned by the State Government: Provided if the State Government considers it expedient so to do for the purpose of facilitating transition to the scheme as envisaged by this Act, different dates may be specified under this sub-section in respect of different classes of, or different categories under any class of local or other authorities or corporations or societies. (3) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Administrative Tribunal for a State shall also exercise, on and from the date with effect from which the provisions of this sub-section apply to any local or other authority or corporation or society, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that date by all courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to: (a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment to any service or post In connection with the affairs of such local or other authority or corporation or society ; and (b) all service matters concerning a person other than a person referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of this section or a member, person or civilian referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 14 appointed to any service or post in connection with the affairs of such local or other authority or corporation or society and pertaining to the service of such person in connection with such affairs, (4) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Administrative Tribunal for a State shall not extend to, or be exercisable in relation to, any matter in relation to which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of Central Administrative Tribunal extends or is exercisable.” It would be pertinent to mention here that the Central Government has still not issued any notification under sub-section (2) of section 14 and that, therefore, the Central Administrative Tribunal has not commenced exercising the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable by the courts in relation, inter alia, to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any service or post in connection with the affairs of any local or other authority or corporation or society. However, by a notification, dated August 29, 1986 read with the corrigendum notification; dated September 3, 1986 issued by the Government of Himachal Pradesh in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act, September I, 1986 has been specified as the date on and from which the provisions of subsection (3) of section 15 of the Act shall apply to the local or other authorities and corporations or societies controlled or owned by the State Government. Section 28 provides that "on and from the date from which any jurisdiction, powers and authority becomes exercisable under this Act by a Tribunal in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any service or post or service matter concerning members of any service or persons appointed to any service or post”, no court except the Supreme Court or any Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other authority constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any other corresponding law for the time being in force shall exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to such recruitment or matters concerning such recruitment or such service matters. Section 29 deals with the transfer of pending cases. Under sub-section (1) of the said section, every suit or other proceeding pending before any court or other authority immediately before the date of establishment of a Tribunal under the Act, being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after such establishment, within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal, shall stand transferred on that date to such Tribunal The provision relating to the transfer of cases is, however, not to apply to any appeal pending before a High Court. Sub-section (2) of this section is material and it requires to be quoted verbatim: "(2) Every suit or other proceeding pending before a court or other authority immediately before the date with effect from which jurisdiction is conferred on a Tribunal in relation to any local or other authority or corporation or society, being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based is such that it would have been, if it had arisen after the said date, within the jurisdiction of such Tribunal, shall stand transferred on that date to such Tribunal. Provided that nothing in this subsection shall apply to any appeal pending as aforesaid before a High Court. Provided that nothing in this subsection shall apply to any appeal pending as aforesaid before a High Court. Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section date with effect from which jurisdiction is conferred on a Tribunal, in relation to any local or other authority or corporation or society, means the date with effect from which the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 14 or, as the case may be, sub-section (3) of section 15 are applied to such local or other authority or corporation or society." Section 33 provides for an overriding effect being given to the Act and enacts that the provisions thereof shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law other than the Act. 4. Undisputed facts.—It is not in dispute that the question raised for determination in the present petition relates to a service matter. It is also not in dispute that the respondent-University is an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution as well as of the relevant provisions of the Act and that its employees are entitled to the protection of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and to invoke, for the enforcement of the fundamental rights guaranteed by those Articles, the jurisdiction conferred by Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. It is further not in dispute that the University is an autonomous body and that it is neither controlled nor owned by Government. In our opinion, a dispute on these points has rightly not been raised having regard to the settled legal position. 5. Rival content ions.—The controversy before the Court covered a wide field but the dispute ultimately centred round the question whether the State Government has the power under sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act to apply by notification the provisions of subjection (3) of the said Section to the respondent-University. The arguments, pro and con, may be briefly set-out in order to comprehend the true nature and extent of the controversy. The arguments, pro and con, may be briefly set-out in order to comprehend the true nature and extent of the controversy. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that under sub-section (2) of section 15, the provisions of sub-section (3) thereof could be made applicable by the State Government only to those local or other authorities or corporations or societies which are controlled or owned by the State Government and that since the respondent-University is admittedly not an authority controlled or owned by the State Government the jurisdiction of this Court to determine the dispute raised in the petition is not ousted by virtue of the notification dated August 29, 1986 read with the corrigendum dated September 3, 1986 issued under sub-section (2) of section 15 by the State Government and that such jurisdiction will be ousted and will stand vested in the Central Administrative Tribunal if and when the Central Government issues a notification under sub-section (2) of section 14 applying the provisions of sub-section (3) of the said Section to an authority such as the respondent-University which is neither owned nor controlled by the State Government. In support of the submission, the learned Counsel relied upon the language of Article 323-A, sub-Article (1), the preamble of the Act and, more particularly, upon the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 14 and of sub sections (2) and (4) of section 15. It was strenuously urged that if sub-section (2) of sections 14 and 15 of the Act are read side by side, it would become apparent that whereas the power to apply the provisions of the Act to any local or other authority within the territory of India, which is not controlled or owned by a State Government, vests in the Central Government under sub-section (2) of section 14, such power with respect to any of the said authorities controlled or owned by a State Government vests in the concerned State Government by virtue of subsection (2) of section 15. In this connection, the language of sub-section (2) of section 14, which authorises the Central Government to apply the provisions of sub-section (3) of the said Section "to local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India and corporations or societies, owned or controlled by Government, not being a local or other authority or corporation or society, controlled or owned by a State Government" was compared and contrasted with that of sub-section (2) of section 15 which empowers the State Government to apply the provisions of sub-section (3) of the said Section "to local or other authorities and corporations or societies controlled or owned by the State Government” and it was urged that the exclusionary clause occurring in subsection (2) of section 14, namely, "not being a local authority or a corporation or society, controlled or owned by a State Government” clearly indicates that the Central Government alone was the appropriate Government to apply the provisions of the Act to any local or other authority within the territory of India which is not owned or controlled by a State Government and that the State Government was the appropriate Government under sub-section (2) of section 15 to apply the provisions of the Act only to such local or other authority which is controlled or owned by such Government. It was submitted that the expression "local or other authorities and corporations and societies controlled or owned by the State Government" in sub-section (2) of section 1 :> was required to be read as "local or other authorities or corporations or societies controlled or owned by the State Government" so as to bring it in line with the exclusionary clause of sub-section (2) of section 14 and that the qualifying words, namely, "controlled or owned by the State Government" were required to be read as qualifying each one of the legal entities mentioned in the said phrase. Such modification of the language, urged the counsel, was a permissible exercise in the process of interpretation having regard to the context and object and intent and also in order to harmonise the different provisions of the Act for the purposes of ensuring a consistent legislative scheme. Such modification of the language, urged the counsel, was a permissible exercise in the process of interpretation having regard to the context and object and intent and also in order to harmonise the different provisions of the Act for the purposes of ensuring a consistent legislative scheme. Such a reading of sub-section (2) of sections 14 and 15, according to him, would make the entire enactment a consistent whole and help to carve out separate areas within which the Central Government and the State Governments would operate in the matter of the application of the provisions of the Act to any local or other authority within the territory of India. The learned Counsel for the respondent-University and some of the intervenes, including the learned Advocate General, urged on the other hand that the attention must be confined only to the statutory provision which directly falls for construction, namely, sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act, and that upon applying the rule of grammatical construction, it is apparent that in the said sub-section local or other authorities are classified as one group and corporations or societies as the other, and that the concluding words, namely, controlled or owned by the State Government, qualify only those legal entities which fall within the latter class, that is, corporations or societies, and not the former, that is, local or other authorities. It was vehemently urged that when the legislature has advisedly made such a classification and deliberately used the expression "and" in between, it would not be permissible to read the word "or" in place of "and" and to treat the legal entities forming part of the two separate groups as falling within a single class and on that basis to read the qualifying words as controlling each one of such entities. A further submission was also made that Entries 5 and 32 in List 11 of Schedule VII read with Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution confer exclusive powers upon the State Legislature to make laws for the whole or any part of the State in respect of local authorities and corporations and Universities and that, therefore, while interpreting the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 14 and section 15, the concept of legislative competence ought not to be overlooked and that, accordingly, it would not be permissible to read subsection (2) of section 14 as conferring power on the Central Government to make applicable the provisions of sub-section (3) of the said Section to local authorities or Universities functioning within the territory of a State. 6. The Interpretation.—Article 323-A, as found earlier, uses the same language in the material part of clause (1) which has been used in Article 12. The expression "local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India” is common to both. A law enacted by Parliament in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 323-A must, therefore, be construed bearing in mind the interpretation placed upon these words in K. S. Ramamurthy Reddiar’s case (supra). Against the said background, turning first to section 14, which deals with the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal, it will be seen that the Central Government is empowered under sub-section (2) thereof to apply the provisions of sub-section (3) to : (a) local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India and (b) Corporations or societies, owned or controlled by Government, provided, however, such local or other authority or corporation or society is not controlled or owned by a State Government. In the present case, we are concerned with the University which is admittedly an autonomous body functioning within the State and which is neither controlled nor owned by Government. We need not, therefore, pause to consider and dilate upon that part of sub-section (2) which refers to : (a) local or other-authority which is not situate within the territory of India or which is under the control of the Government of India or (b) corporation or society owned or controlled by Government. We need not, therefore, pause to consider and dilate upon that part of sub-section (2) which refers to : (a) local or other-authority which is not situate within the territory of India or which is under the control of the Government of India or (b) corporation or society owned or controlled by Government. We shall confine our attention only to that part which empowers the Central Government to apply the provisions of sub-section (3) to local or other authorities within the territory of India. The power so conferred is expressly subject to the limitation imposed by the aforesaid exclusionary words (underlined) contained in the concluding portion of sub-section (2). In the absence of such limitation, the Central Government could have applied the provisions of sub-section (3) to all or any of the local or other authorities within the territory of India, even if they are under the control of or owned by the Governments of various States. The exclusionary clause, however, restricts the exercise of such power and confines it to such local or other authorities which are not controlled or owned by a State Government. The aforesaid analysis of the relevant portion of sub-section (2) clearly manifests the legislative intention that in respect of a local or other authority within the territory of India, which is not controlled or owned by a State Government, the Central Government is the appropriate Government to apply the relevant provisions of the Act which would confer upon the Central Administrative Tribunal, the jurisdiction, powers and authority in relation to recruitment or matters concerning recruitment or service matters. The power accordingly conferred upon the Central Government will cover even autonomous bodies like Universities which answer the description of local or other authorities, although they may not at all be subject to any G3v-ernment control. Turning next to section 15, which deals with the jurisdiction, powers and authority of State Administrative Tribunals, it will be noticed that sub-section (2) thereof empowers the State Government to apply the provisions of sub-section (3) to "local or other authorities and corporations or societies controlled or owned by the State Government". There is a slight departure in the language used in the last part of sub-section (2) of section 15 from that used in the exclusionary clause contained in the concluding part of sub-section (2) of section 14. There is a slight departure in the language used in the last part of sub-section (2) of section 15 from that used in the exclusionary clause contained in the concluding part of sub-section (2) of section 14. The word "and" is used as a conjunctive between the two expressions, namely, "local or other authorities" and "corporations or societies" in the last part of sub-section (2) of section 15, whereas in the exclusionary phrase used in sub-section (2) of section 14, the word "or is used as a disjunctive between all the four words. Prima facie, applying the rule of grammatical construction, it may appear that sub-section (2) of section 15 deals with two distinct groups of legal entities each forming a separate class or category, the first comprising "local or other authorities" and the second "corporations or societies". Relying upon the rule of last antecedent, an argument can, therefore, be conceivably advanced that the qualifying words "controlled or owned by the State Government" apply only to "corporations or societies, which is the immediate or proximate antecedent, and that they cannot reach back and qualify the words "local or other authorities", and that, consequently, the State Government is empowered by sub-section (2) to apply the provisions of sub-section (3) to any local or other authority wit! in the State, whether under the control of or owned by the State Government, and even to autonomous bodies like a University, which may not be under the control of Government at all I he question, therefore, is whether there are circumstances present in the case which require the rule of grammatical construction being eschewed and the rule of contextual or harmonious interpretation being invoked so as to read the conjunctive word "and" as "or" and the qualifying words "controlled or owned by the State Government" as applicable to each of the four legal entities mentioned ia sub-section (2) of section 15. Before we consider this question, it would be convenient at this stage to notice some of the well established rules of construction which would help in answering the query. It is a settled rule of statutory interpretation that sometimes the word "or" has to be read as "and" and vice versa if some other part of the same statute or the clear intention of it requires that to be done. It is a settled rule of statutory interpretation that sometimes the word "or" has to be read as "and" and vice versa if some other part of the same statute or the clear intention of it requires that to be done. (See : Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v Henderson Bros , (1888) 13 AC 595 (HL) at page 603 and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Tek Chand Bhatia, AIR 1980 SC 360 at page 363), It is equally well-settled that the rule of last antecedent, namely, the relative and qualifying words, phrases and clauses must be read as applicable to the antecedent immediately preceding, is subordinate to the context and that if the context suggests or indicates otherwise, then, the requirement of the context must prevail over the rule of grammer. (See: Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay v. Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co., Bhandara, AIR 19^2 SC 1536 at page 1540). Yet another rule of statutory construction, which has been aptly described as an "elementary" or "compelling" rule, is ex visceribus actus, that is, every statute has to be construed as a whole and every clause thereof should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute relating to the subject-matter. (See : Canada Sugar Refining Co. v, R,9 (1898) AC 735 : referred to in M. Pentiah v, Veeramailappa Muddala, AIR 1961 SC 1107 at page 1111 and Commissioner of Income-tax v. National Taj Traders, AIR 1980 5C 485 at page 489. The court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clause to be construed but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with the other parts of the law, and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs. (See: State of West Bengal v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1241 at page 1265). Such an approach in the construction of a statute has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency or repugnancy either within a section or between a section and other parts of the statute. If a reading together of the different parts of a section or the different sections of a statute reveals an inconsistency, then, the relevant provisions should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. If a reading together of the different parts of a section or the different sections of a statute reveals an inconsistency, then, the relevant provisions should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. It is the duty of the Court to so construe the provisions which appear to occupy the same field as to avoid a conflict between them and in a manner that they harmonise. (See: Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255 at page 268), Now, in light of the aforesaid rules governing the construction of statutes and reading the provisions of section 14 and those of section 15 together, the true ambit and scope of sub-section (2) of section 15 has to be ascertained. As pointed out in the course of the foregoing discussion, subsection (2) of section 14 empowers the Central Government to apply the provisions of sub-section (3) thereof, inter alia, to local or other authorities within the territory of India, which are not controlled or owned by a State Government, including autonomous bodies like Universities, and, upon such application, the Central Administrative Tribunal will exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority in relation to matters specified in subsection (3). Section 15, sub-section (1), on the other hand, empowers the State Government to apply the provisions of sub-section (3) thereof to local or other authorities and corporations or societies controlled or owned by the State Government and, once those provisions are so applied, the State Administrative Tribunal will exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority in relation to matters specified in sub-section (3). It is apparent, keeping in view the provisions of subsection (4) of section 15, that both these subsections, which seem to deal with the same subject-matter and to occupy the same field, in the sense that they prescribe the authority who will exercise the power to apply the relevant provisions of the Act, inter alia, to local or other authorities, so that the concerned Administrative Tribunal will thereupon exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority in relation to the specified matters which are similar, are intended to designate two different authorities to exercise such power in relation to distinct kinds of local or other authorities. Having regard to this scheme of the statute and the context, collocation and intendment, sub-section (2) of section 15 should be interpreted so as to avoid any inconsistency or repugnancy with subsection (2) of section 14 and, at the same time, by giving effect to both. The best manner in which this result can be achieved is to read and construe subjection (/) of section 14 and sub-section (2) of section 15 as carving out two distinct fields of operation for two different authorities for the applicability of the relevant provisions to different classes or categories of local or other authorities. Accordingly, since the Central Government is the appropriate Government under sub-section (2) of section 14 to apply the relevant provisions of the Act to local or other authorities within the territory of India, which are not controlled or owned by a State Government, sub-section (2) of section 15 should be construed as designating the State Governments as the appropriate Governments to apply those provisions to local or other authorities controlled or owned by them. In other words, the qualifying words "controlled or owned by the State Government" occurring in the concluding part of sub-section (2) of section 15 must be read as reaching back and qualifying not only "corporations or societies", which is the immediate or proximate antecedent, but also "local or other authorities", even if the word "and" occurring between those two expressions is required to be read as "or" in such interpretative process. A modification of the word in that manner in the process of construction is permissible against the aforesaid background and to achieve the legislative object which is otherwise quite clear. Such a construction would also avoid an apparent conflict, if any, between the two sub-sections and enable their harmonization and would be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating It is also pertinent to point out in this connection that the legislature itself has not used the words "and" or "or” discriminatingly or in a consistent manner in section 15. This is evident from the fact that in sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 15, the words "or" and "and" have been used in an interchangeable fashion and without any specific meaning intended to be attached to them. The same is the position in sub-section (2) of section 29. This is evident from the fact that in sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 15, the words "or" and "and" have been used in an interchangeable fashion and without any specific meaning intended to be attached to them. The same is the position in sub-section (2) of section 29. The matter can be looked at from yet another angle. Unless the power relating to the applicability of the relevant provisions of the Act to only such of the local or other authorities as are controlled or owned by the State Governments is taken to be conferred upon those Governments, considerable difficulties in the working of the Act may surface. Take, for example, the Cantonment Boards constituted under the Cantonment Act, 1924. Is it conceivable that a State Government was intended to be empowered to apply the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 15 to such of those Boards which may be functioning within its territory and thereby to confer upon the concerned State Administrative Tribunal the jurisdiction, powers and authority to adjudicate or try disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment to any service or post and conditions of service of persons appointed to any service or post in connection with the affairs of such local authority ? Would such an interpretation not only create difficulties in the operation of the Act but also empower the State Government to extend the provisions of the Act to a local authority over which it has otherwise no control? The same considerations hold good also with respect to a nationalised bank which is indubitably an authority not controlled or owned by a State Government. Is it conceivable that the power to apply the relevant provisions of the Act to such an authority, which may have its branches within the territory of a State, could have been intended to be invested in the concerned State Government? Would not the conferment of such power on the State Governments create uncertainty and friction in the system which the statute intends to regulate and also anomaly, and even absurdity, since different State Governments may take different views with respect to the extension of the relevant provisions of the Act to such banks operating through their branches within their respective territories? And in case they decide to apply those provisions to such banks, if the State Administrative Tribunals have been set-up in those States, they will acquire the jurisdiction, powers and authority to deal with the specified categories of cases and, in that event, can the distinct probability of conflict of decisions be ruled out in the process of adjudication or trial of disputes and complaints of their employees posted in different States ? The legislative intention as manifested by the exclusionary phrase of sub-section (2) of section 14 appears clearly to be that local or other authorities situate within the territory of India but not under the control of or owned by any of the State Governments should be treated uniformly in regard to the applicability of the relevant provisions of the Act and that the power in that regard should, therefore, be conferred upon the Central Government. The conferment of such power upon the Central Government ensures that disputes or complaints with respect to recruitment to any service or post and conditions of service of persons appointed to any service or post in connection with the affairs of such local or other authorities would continue to be dealt with by the High Courts as heretofore or by the Central Administrative Tribunal, as the case may be, depending upon the policy decision which the Central Government may take with respect to the applicability of the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 14 to such local or other authorities. The foregoing discussion yields the result, upon a contextual interpretation of sections 14 and 15 of light of the legislative object and intendment, that the Central Government is the appropriate Government to apply the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 14, inter alia, to local or other authorities within the territory of India which are not controlled or owned by a State Government and that the State Governments are the appropriate Governments to apply the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 15, inter alia, to local or other authorities controlled or owned by them. As to the character, nature and extent of the control which is required to be exercised by the State Governments over such local or other authorities, the decision in K S Ramamurthy Reddiars case (supra) furnishes the precise guidelines in Para 1 2 of the judgment. As to the character, nature and extent of the control which is required to be exercised by the State Governments over such local or other authorities, the decision in K S Ramamurthy Reddiars case (supra) furnishes the precise guidelines in Para 1 2 of the judgment. The control envisaged by the statute is not the control which arises out of mere appointment, payment and the right to take disciplinary action; the control must be over the functions of the authorities concerned and it must comprehend the right of the State Governments by virtue of that control to give directions to those authorities to function in a particular manner with respect to such functions. The only question which then requires consideration is whether Articles 245 and 246 have any bearing on the interpretation placed as aforesaid upon the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 14 and subjection (2) of section 15 of the Act, In other words, whether such construction of the relevant provisions should be eschewed on considerations of constitutionality and in light of the legislative competence of the respective Legislatures. In our opinion, the argument based on Articles 245 and 246 is thoroughly misconceived so far as the question under consideration is concerned. True it is that the provisions contained in Part XI of the Constitution regulate the relations between the Union and the States and that Chapter I thereof prescribes and regulates the distribution of legislative powers between Parliament and the Legislatures of the States. However, it is erroneous to assume that as a result of the distribution of Legislative powers accordingly made, Parliament is incompetent to legislate with respect to Universities. Entry 63 of List I of Schedule-VII specifically empowers Parliament to legislate with respect to Benaras Hindu University, the Aligarh Muslim University, the Delhi University and the Universities established in pursuance of Article 371-E. That apart, Entry 25 of List III of Schedule-VII (Concurrent List) also empowers Parliament to legislate with respect to Universities. The power to legislate with respect to local Government and local authorities for the purposes of local-self Government is undoubtedly vested in the Legislatures of States under Entry 5 of List II of Schedule-VII. However, it is fallacious to assume that Articles 245 and 246 are the only source of legislative power or the only provisions regulating the legislative powers. The power to legislate with respect to local Government and local authorities for the purposes of local-self Government is undoubtedly vested in the Legislatures of States under Entry 5 of List II of Schedule-VII. However, it is fallacious to assume that Articles 245 and 246 are the only source of legislative power or the only provisions regulating the legislative powers. There are a few other provisions of the Constitution which confer plenary power on Parliament to enact laws with respect to certain matters although no reference to them is to be found in List-I or List-Ill of the Seventh Schedule. Take, for example, Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the Constitution as also Articles 119. There are also certain provisions of exceptional nature governing the legislative relations between the Union and the States and which give to Parliament powers to enact laws under certain situations even in respect of matters which may fall exclusively within the domain of the State Legislatures. Such exceptional powers could be traced back to what may be regarded as special situations and examples thereof are to be found in Articles 353 and 357 read with Articles 250 and 252, A more appropriate and comparable example is to be found, however, in Part-XXI which contains temporary, transitional and special provisions. Such exceptional powers could be traced back to what may be regarded as special situations and examples thereof are to be found in Articles 353 and 357 read with Articles 250 and 252, A more appropriate and comparable example is to be found, however, in Part-XXI which contains temporary, transitional and special provisions. In this Part is contained Articles 371-D and Clause (3) thereof empowers the President, by an order, to provide for the constitution of an Administrative Tribunal for the State of Andhra Pradesh to exercise such jurisdiction, powers and authority, including any jurisdiction, power and authority which immediately before the commencement of the Constitution Thirty-second Amendment) Act, 1973, was exercisable by any court (other than the Supreme Court) or by any Tribunal or other authority as may be specified in the order with respect to : "(a) appointment, allotment or promotion to such class or classes of posts in any civil service of the State, or to such class or classes of civil posts under the State, or to such class or classes of post under the control of any local authority within the State, as may be specified in the order ; (b) seniority of persons appointed, allotted or promoted to such class or classes of posts in any civil service of the State, or to such class or classes of civil posts under the State, or to such class or classes of posts under the control of any local authority within the State, as may be specified in the order ; (c) such other conditions of service of persons appointed, allotted or promoted to such class or classes » of posts in any civil service of the State or to such class or classes of civil posts under the State or to such class or classes of posts under the control of any local authority within the State, as may be specified in the order.* Clause (7) provides that the High Court of the State of Andhra Pradesh shall not have any powers of superintendence over the Administrative Tribunal and no court (other than the Supreme Court) or Tribunal shall exercise any jurisdction, power or authority in respect of any matter subject to the jurisdiction, power or authority of, or in relation to, the Administrative Tribunal. Clause (19) provides that the provisions of the said Article and of any order made by the President thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any other provision of the Constitution or in any other law for the time being in force. It would thus appear that the legislative powers of Parliament are to be found not only in the concerned Lists but sometimes also in other Articles of the Constitution. These various provisions of the Constitution confer plenary power either on Parliament or on the President to enact laws even in respect of some matters which fall exclusively within the legislative power of the State under the Constitution. They are provisions which over-ride, as it were, to the extent therein indicated, the provisions of Articles 245 and 246 read with the respective Lists of Schedule VII. If we examine the provisions of Articles 323-A and 323-B against this background, it will be appreciated that Parliament has been specially empowered by Article 323-A to provide by law for the adjudication or trial by the Administrative Tribunals of disputes and com-plaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation owned or controlled by the Government. The Act has been enacted by Parliament in pursuance of the powers so conferred. Be it noted that the establishment and composition of even a State Administrative Tribunal is under the Act and that the provisions of the Act, insofar as they relate to the State Administrative Tribunals, are to come into force in a State on such date as the Central Government may by notification appoint. Be it noted that the establishment and composition of even a State Administrative Tribunal is under the Act and that the provisions of the Act, insofar as they relate to the State Administrative Tribunals, are to come into force in a State on such date as the Central Government may by notification appoint. To urge therefore, that to read sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act as empowering the Central Government to apply the relevant statutory provisions to all local and other authorities within the territory of India, which are not controlled or owned by the State Government, would cut across the constitutional scheme of distribution of executive and legislative powers between the Union and the States is to ignore the whole constitutional scheme and the source of power under which the law in question has been enacted It would be pertinent to mention here that like clause (10) of Article 371-D Article 323-A also contains a provision in clause (3) to the effect that the provisions of the article shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any other provision of the Constitution and in any other law for the time being in force. 7. 7. Conclusions: In light of the foregoing discussion, the following conclusions emerge: (1) Under sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Act, the Central Government is the appropriate Government to apply, by notification, with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification, the provisions of sub-section (3), inter alia, to all local or other authorities within the territory of India, not being a local or other authority controlled or owned by a State Government ; the power so conferred is exercisable even with respect to autonomous authorities like Universities which may not be under the control of the Government at all ; (2) Under sub-section (2) of section 15, the State Government is the appropriate Government to apply, by notification, with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification, the provisions of sub section (3) of the said section to local or other authorities (or corporations or societies) controlled or owned by the State Government ; (3) Since the Himachal Pradesh University is an autonomous body which is neither owned nor controlled by the State Government and is an authority within the territory of India, the relevant provisions of the Act can be made applicable thereto only by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 14 ; and (4) The notification dated August 29, 1986 issued by the Chief Secretary to the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act, as modified by the notification dated September 3, 1986, must be read as making the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 15 applicable only to such local or other authorities (or Corporations or societies) which are controlled or owned by the State Government and the said notification cannot be read as making applicable the relevant provisions to the Himachal Pradesh University. 8. Final Order: In view of the conclusions aforesaid, the writ petition is not required to be transferred to the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, since this Court is competent to try and decide the same. Order accordingly.