Judgment : The above appeal by the State is directed against the judgment of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Vellore, in C.C.No. 199 of 1982 acquitting the respondents tried by him for an offence under Sec.7 (1) read with Sec.16(1)(a)(i) read with Sec.2(ia) and (m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. 2. The respondents were tried by the above Court on the allegation that the sample of the groundnut oil taken from the shop of the first respondent in which the second respondent was a salesman, was found not to conform to standards for groundnut oil in respect of turbidity temperature (Bellier Test). P.W.1, the Food Inspector attached to Vellore Municipality took the sample of groundnut oil from the second respondent from the shop belonging to the first respondent. The necessary formalities were observed and one sample was sent to the Public Analyst which, on analysis, showed the infirmity pointed out above. The other formalities required under the Act were also observed and a complaint was filed against the respondents for the above offence. During trial, on behalf of the prosecution, P.Ws.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.P1 to P8 were marked. The two respondents denied the allegations made against them and had no evidence to offer, oral or documentary. 3. On the evidence placed before the trial Court, both the respondents were acquitted on the following grounds: (1) there was violation of Rules 7(1), 17(a) and 18 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’); (2) There was violation of Rule 16 (e) of the rules; (3) Neither the report of the Public Analyst marked as Ex.P5 nor the evidence of P. W.3 showed that the Public Analyst had tested the sample using acetic acid method in order to ascertain the turbidity temperature and that, therefore, the proper test had not been conducted on the sample. Aggrieved with the acquittal, the State has preferred the present appeal. 4. Aggrieved with the acquittal, the State has preferred the present appeal. 4. The learned Public Prosecutor contended (1) that all official acts required to be done under Rule 7 and Rules 17(a) and 16 are presumed to have been properly done and that, therefore, the finding of the trial Court that there was violation of the above rules were erroneous; (2) that there was evidence that the sample had been properly packed and in the absence of anything to show that any minor infraction of the rules relating to packing had resulted in prejudice, the prosecution could not fail; and (3) that the Supreme Court in Mangaldas v. Maharashtra State, 1966 M.L.J. (Crl.) 508: 1966 Crl.L.J. 106: A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 128, had laid down that when the report of the Public Analyst contains the necessary data in support of the conclusion and sets out the result of analysis and the tests performed in the Public Health Laboratory, the same could be perused by the Court to arrive at a finding. 5. Per contra, Thiru Krishnan, learned counsel for the respondents contended that in the absence of evidence that a specimen impression of the seal had been separately sent by registered post to the Public Analyst the compliance of Rule 7 could not be presumed; (2) that several details regarding the exact way in which the sample had been packed had not been spoken to by P.W.1; and (3) that the evidence of P.W.3 that the turbidity test was done by him would render Ex.P5 valueless and that, therefore, the trial Court was right in accepting the above contentions submitted on behalf of the respondents and in acquitting them. 6. The question that arises for consideration is whether the acquittal of the respondents could be sustained. 7. Rule 18 requires that a specimen impression of the seal and also a copy of Form VII should be sent separately, to the Public Analyst to enable him to compare the seal found on the sample to rule out any tampering. In the instant case, no doubt, P.W.1 has referred only to the railway receipt and a copy of Form VII being sent separately to the Public Analyst. Ex.P4 is the acknowledgement for the receipt of the above communication. In the instant case, no doubt, P.W.1 has referred only to the railway receipt and a copy of Form VII being sent separately to the Public Analyst. Ex.P4 is the acknowledgement for the receipt of the above communication. However, in Ex.P3, which is a copy of Form VII that has been forwarded to the Public Analyst, it is mentioned that a specimen impression of the seal used to seal the packet of samples is also sent and in Ex.P3 we find two specimen impressions of the seal. It, therefore, follows that the specimen impressions of the seal are affixed in Form VII itself copy of which has been marked as Ex.P3. The trial Court has obviously overlooked this fact and therefore was in error when it found that there is violation of Rule 18. The evidence of P.W.1 and Ex.P3 which contains the specimen impressions of the seal clearly show that Rule 18 has been complied with. Regarding the observance of Rule 7 by the Public Analyst, this Court in Public Prosecutor v. Loganathan, C.A.No.814 of 1978, judgment dated 17.9.1980, following an unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Kassim Kunju Poojunju and another v. K.K.Ramakrishna Pillai and another, C.A.No.29 of 1968 decided on 2.12.1968, has held that comparison of seals by the Public Analyst under Rule 7 could be presumed under Sec.114 of the Evidence Act to have been properly done as part of official act. The trial Court, therefore, was in error in holding that there was violation of Rules 18 and 7(1). 8. Regarding the finding that there has been violation of Rule 16(e) in the mode of packing in not affixing the seals by the knots at the outer cover, it is found that in the absence of any prejudice being caused to the respondents and in the absence of any indication that as a result of the failure to affix the seals to knots of the outer cover, any damage was done to the sample which had changed the quality of the sample, it could not be held that the violation would really affect the case. P.W.1 has given some details regarding the way in which the samples were packed. The mere fact that he had omitted to give certain other details would not affect the prosecution case in the absence of any prejudice having been caused to the accused. 9. P.W.1 has given some details regarding the way in which the samples were packed. The mere fact that he had omitted to give certain other details would not affect the prosecution case in the absence of any prejudice having been caused to the accused. 9. Regarding the third finding that the acetic acid method had not been used to test the turbidity temperature and that, therefore, the Public Analyst has not properly tested the sample, it is seen that Ex.P5 indicates that the sample has been tested for free fatty acid and that Butyro-refractometer reading at 40 C. has been taken that Bellier test has been conducted in order to ascertain the turbidity temperature, that Baudoin test and Halphai’s test have also been performed and that Iodine value has also been ascertained by using Wiji’s method. The Bellier test has been performed in order to find out the turbidity temperature. The sample has been tested for all the standards laid down in Clause 17.03 of Appendix B to the Act. Ex.P5 is to be taken in conjunction with the evidence of P.W.3, who is the Public Analyst himself. It is he who has issued Ex.P5. On the basis of the findings given in Ex.P5 he has stated that the turbidity temperature was less than the minimum and it would be so, if a foreign oil was mixed with the sample. There is no evidence that the Acetic acid method was not followed for conducting Bellier test. The trial Court could not hold that the Acetic acid method was not followed and that therefore, the analysis has not been properly done. As rightly contended by the learned Public Prosecutor, the Supreme Court in Mangaldas v. Maharahstra State, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 128, has indicated that when the report sets out the result of the analysis and the test performed in the Public Health Laboratory, the Court if satisfied could consider the tests adequate. The mere fact that the test was performed by an Assistant of P.W.3 would not render the analysis valueless, since even in Ex.P5, P.W.3 has certified that he had caused the sample to be analysed and he was declaring the result of the analysis. The third reason given by the trial Court also is unaccable. The acquittal, therefore, cannot be sustained. 10. The third reason given by the trial Court also is unaccable. The acquittal, therefore, cannot be sustained. 10. However, in view of the fact that the occurrence had taken place in 1982 and this is an appeal against acquittal, I feel that it is not necessary to convict the appellants and sentence them to the minimum sentence prescribed under the statute. Having clarified the legal position, I refrain from passing any further order in the appeal. With these observations, the appeal is dismissed.