Leila Seth,j. ( 1 ) THIS is a civil revision challenging the order passed bymr. D. K. Saini, Additional Rent Controller, on 2. 4th February, 1986, rejectingthe prayer for condonation of delay and dismissing the application for leaveto defend as time barred. ( 2 ) THE facts are set out in brief. Mr Trilok Chand and others, therespondent, purchased the property at No. 41ub, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi, fromone Mr. 0m Prakash on 3/03/1975. Mr. Chaman Lal Talwar, thepetitioner, was already a tenant in a portion of the second floor of the saidproperty. ( 3 ) ON 28 the May, 1985, the respondents-landlords filed a petition undersection 14 (l) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to asthe "act" ). The prescribed summons was served in the ordinary way onmr. Chaman Lal Talwar on 3/06/1985. A summons was also sent byregistered post acknowledgment due and this was served on the petitioner on 7/06/1985. ( 4 ) ON 20/07/1985, the petitioner filed an application for leave todefend along with an application for condonation of delay. In the said application for condonation of delay, the petitioner asserted that he received thesummons of the case on 7/06/1985, along with summons of two othercases. Being 72 years of age and a "heart patient", "he got a mild heart attack"and remained confined to bed, on receiving all three summons "at one timeand on one day". The doctor advised complete rest and his family memberswere asked not to allow him to strain himself as the shock of receiving thesummons might have been too much for him. Consequently, his son tookaway the summons and kept them out of his reach "so that he may not thinkabout the cases". When he was a bit better, he enquired about the dates ofthe three cases. He was informed by his son, that two of the cases were fixedin August, 1985 and there was no date indicated in the third summons i. e. theone pertaining to the present case. He was also informed that the courts wereclosed for the summer vacations and he "should not think about the cases". ( 5 ) THE petitioner has mentioned that he suffered a heart attack on 30thnovember, 1984 and was in the Hindu Rao Hospital for eight to nine days. On 27/03/1985, he suffered another heart attack and was againhospitalised but was released soon after. ( 5 ) THE petitioner has mentioned that he suffered a heart attack on 30thnovember, 1984 and was in the Hindu Rao Hospital for eight to nine days. On 27/03/1985, he suffered another heart attack and was againhospitalised but was released soon after. ( 6 ) AT the end of June, 1985, he was advised complete rest, once again,as he had some pain in his chest. ( 7 ) SINCE, he was a chronic heart patient, his son did not want him toundergo any tension, and took the summons away and kept them in his officein the printing press. He told him that he would be consulting an advocate"on the opening of the courts", but forgot to do so. In July, 1985, thepetitioner enquired once again from his son about the cases and, thereafter, hisson contacted the advocate on 19/07/1985. The advocate informed himabout the seriousness of not filing an application for leave to defend withinfifteen days. Consequently, the application was, filed immediately thereafter on 20/07/1985, along with the application for condonation of delay. Itwas prayed in the said application that the delay from 1/07/1985 (whenthe court reopened) to 19/07/1985 be condoned. It was also assertedthat the petitioner had a good case and there were sufficient grounds for graning him leave to defend, as the respondents had "more than 12 rooms besidesother accommodation", as they had rebuilt and remodelled their property. ( 8 ) MR. D. K. Saini, Additional Rent Contoller, who heard the matterdismissed the application for condonation of delay. He was of the view thatsufficient cause had not been made out for not. filing the application for leaveto defend within time. He came to the conclusion that the plea of thepetitioner that he suffered a mild heart attack, because he received thesummons in three cases on one and, the same day, was not believeable,especially as, the summons in the present case had already been served, in theordinary manner, four days earlier on the petitioner. He also observed thatthere was nothing on the record to indicate that the petitioner was not well on 3/06/1985 when he first receive the summons in this case, though he hadsuffered a heart attack on 27/03/1985 and again on 7/06/1985. ( 9 ) HE further noted that the petitioner could have filed an applicationfor leave to defend during the summer vacations as an Additional Rentcontroller is on duty in Delhi. ( 9 ) HE further noted that the petitioner could have filed an applicationfor leave to defend during the summer vacations as an Additional Rentcontroller is on duty in Delhi. He felt that the plea of the petitioner s son sforgetfulness in contacting the advocate was not a good ground for condonationof delay. Consequently, he rejected the application for leave to defend, astime barred. ( 10 ) AFTER perusing the petition of the respondents, and being satisfiedthat they bonafide needed the premises he passed an order undersection 14 (l) (e)of the Act on 24/02/1986 and granted the petitioner six months timeto vacate the premises. ( 11 ) ON 26/05/1986, the petitioner filed this civil revision. As theregistry raised certain objections, the petition was returned and refiled, anumber of times. Finally on 27/08/1986, the petition was admittedand dispossession of the petitioner was stayed. ( 12 ) MR. Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, urges,that the non-mentioning of the receipt of the summons on 3/06/1985 isirrelevant as the courts were closed for the summer vacations and, if thepetition had been filed on 1/07/1985, when the courts reopened, instead of 20/07/1985, it would clearly have been in time, even though it was hiedafter fifteen days from the date of receipt of the summons, taking either 3/06/1985, or 7th June, 1985. He alalso contends that there is no lackof bona-fides on the part of the petitioner and the delay of 19 days should he beencondoned as it was patently due to the petitioner s illness and the consequenttension and forgetfulness of his son. ( 13 ) MR. Arunkumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents,onthe other hand, contends that the provisions of section 14 (l) (e) of the Act readwith section 25b provide for a summary procedure and brook no dealy. He,therefore, submits that the scope of the petition is very limited, and since eachday s delay, from 1st to 19/07/1985 has not been explained, the learnedadditional Rent Controller was justified in rejecting the application for condonation. ( 14 ) HE also submits, that apart from the assertion of the petitioner, thathis son forgot to meet the advocate when the courts reopened, there is nothingelse to substantiate it, not even an affidavit by the petitioner s son. ( 14 ) HE also submits, that apart from the assertion of the petitioner, thathis son forgot to meet the advocate when the courts reopened, there is nothingelse to substantiate it, not even an affidavit by the petitioner s son. ( 15 ) HE further submits that the court should not exercise its discretionin favour of the petitioner as he did not disclose the receipt of the summons on 3/06/1985. He says that this fact was intentionally suppressed by thepetitioner as otherwise he could not make out the story of getting a mild heartattack receiving three summons on the same day. ( 16 ) LASTLY, he submits that the petitioner s conduct is not bona fide ashe refiled for, the fourth time, the revision petition, after removing the objections, as laste as 19/08/1986, when the period of six months granted tothe petitioner to vacate the premises was about to expire. ( 17 ) TAKING the last point first, it is no dout true, that though the petition was filed on 26/05/1986, it was finally refiled only on 19/08/1986. It appears that the registry raised certain objections and the petitionwas returned and after removing the objections, it was refiled; but as theobjections were not fully removed, the papers were again returned. Eventuallyall the objections were removed and it was refiled. This refiling, a number oftimes, in itself is not relevant for the purpose of deciding whether the delay infiling the application for leave to defend should have been condoned. ( 18 ) IT would appear to me that the fact an Additional Rent Controllerwas available during the summer vacations is not really relevant and theadditional Rent Controller was not justified in holding this fact against thepetitioner. Since the courts were closed, the petitioner was entitled to presumethat limitation would start only after the courts reopened. Therefore, the onlyquestion to be examined, is, was there sufficient cause for the delay from 1st to 19/07/1985. ( 19 ) IT would appear to me that there was. The petitioner was 72 years oldand a chronic patient of heart trouble. He was not well. The photocopy ofthe certificate dated 17/07/1985 of Dr. Y. C. Arora, which was annexed tothe application for condonation of delay, indicates that he had a myocardialinfraction and had developed antero septe angina since 28/06/1985. Thecertificate further indicates that he was advised to take rest and avoid exertionand tension. He was not well. The photocopy ofthe certificate dated 17/07/1985 of Dr. Y. C. Arora, which was annexed tothe application for condonation of delay, indicates that he had a myocardialinfraction and had developed antero septe angina since 28/06/1985. Thecertificate further indicates that he was advised to take rest and avoid exertionand tension. The original certificate has been produced in court today by Mr. Sharma and is taken on record, without objection, ( 20 ) THE Additional Rent Controller has not disbelieved the certificate ofthe doctor. Though, it is apparent from the certificate, that the petitioner wasnot in such a condition that he could not have communicated with his son andasked him to go and see the advocate, yet, it is quite possible, that the familymembers and the son of the petitioner, who were worried about his health,avoided discussing the matter with him as they wanted him to be free fromtension. It is also possible that the son who was worried about his father, forgot to go to the advocate as promised and did so only when the petitionerraised the matter again. However, thereafter, he went to the advocate, whotook action immediately. ( 21 ) THE Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that "sufficient cause"must be liberally construed and the discretion exercised to advance substantialjustice (See :ramlal and others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 361and The State ofwest Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality andothers, A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 749), Though the delay from 1st to 19/07/1985has not been explained day by day, the certificate of Dr. Arora, refers to illnessover a period from 28/06/1985 to 17/07/1985, the date of the certificate The story of the son s forgetfulness during the illness of the lather isplausible and should not have been rejected outright. The fact that there is noaffidavit by the son is not of serious consequence, if the petitioner s story isbelieved. ( 22 ) THE criticism regarding the non-mentioning of the receipt of thesummons on 3/06/1985, the consequent mild heart-attack, pertains to aperiod prior to 1/07/1985, when limitation started to run. The period alter 1/07/1985 is covered by the certificate of Dr. Arora. There does not appearto be any ulterior motive for not filing the application for leave to defendbefore 20/07/1985. ( 22 ) THE criticism regarding the non-mentioning of the receipt of thesummons on 3/06/1985, the consequent mild heart-attack, pertains to aperiod prior to 1/07/1985, when limitation started to run. The period alter 1/07/1985 is covered by the certificate of Dr. Arora. There does not appearto be any ulterior motive for not filing the application for leave to defendbefore 20/07/1985. ( 23 ) PROCEDURAL law is for the purpose of advancing justice, a servant andnot a tyrant, and it seems to me that the Rent Controller who bad power tocondone the delay, should have condoned the delay in the facts and circumstances of the case. (See: Gurditta Mal and others v. Bal sarup and others,17 (1980) DLT 321=1980r. L. R. 136, Jagdish Pershad v. Phoolwatl Devi,17 (1980) DLT (DB)446=1980r. L. R. 367 and Lacchiman Das v. Shri Surajparkash, 21 (1982) DLT 277=1980 R. L. R. 525 ). ( 24 ) IN the present case, there is no want of bonafides imputable of thepetitioner. The inaction has been explained, because of the petitioner s illnessand his son s forgetfulness. In Udyan-Chinubhai v. R. C. Ball, A. IR. 1977s C 2319 the Supreme Court observed that they were inclined to condone thedelay of twelve days caused by the negligence of the advocate as there were nolaches on the part of the appellant. ( 25 ) CONSEQUENTLY, in the facts and circumstances of this case, it seems tome that the application for condonation of delay should not have been reactedand the application for leave to defend has to be considered on merits and notdismissed as time barred. As such, the order dated 24/02/1986 is setaside and the learned Additional Rent Controller is directed to consider theapplication for leave to defend on merits. ( 26 ) IN view of the fact that the application under section 14 (l) (e) of theact was filed as far back as 28/05/1985, the Additional Rent Controllershould try and deal with the matter expeditiously. There will be no order as to costs. ( 27 ) PARTIES are directed to appear before the trial court on 30/03/1987. ( 28 ) THE record should be sent back forthwith.