J. P. DESAI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner who was in the year 1968 appointed as Honorary Assistant Professor of Orthopaedic Surgery at the K. M School of Post Graduate Medicine and Research was subsequently appointed as Professor in the same Institute and was working as such when he came to be suspended by an order dated 24-9-1987 pending departmental inquiry on the charge of prescribing mainly the drugs of Om Pharmaceutical Company to the patients taking treatment in Orthopedic Unit III of which the petitioner was the Head. The petitioner has challenged the said order of suspension on various grounds ( 2 ) THE facts leading to the filing of this petition may be briefly stated. The petitioner was working as Honorary Professor in the month of September 1987. He was on leave upto 30-9-1987. On 22-9-1987 Dr. Surendra Patel Shri Anilbhai Chinai and Dr. Vora who are members of the Board of Management of this institution took a round of Wards Nos. 5 and 9 of the V. S. Hospital to which the petitioner was attached in his capacity of Honorary Professor. They found during their visit that so far as Unit-III of which the petitioner is the Head is concerned medicines of Om Pharmaceuticals alone were prescribed at the instance of the petitioner who has got financial interest in that Om Pharmaceutical Company. They found on inquiry from the staff that these medicines were not prescribed when they were working in the other hospitals but they started prescribing these medicines after coming to Unit-III. The said members of the Board inferred that this was not possible unless the petitioner who was Head of the Unit must be insisting to prescribe these medicines. They felt that the petitioner had misused his position and given directions to the resident staff to prescribe medicines of only Om Pharmaceutical Company which was serious matter. They wrote a letter dated 24-9-1987 to the Mayor Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation who also happens to be the (Chairman of the Board of Management of the V. S. Hospital Ahmedabad. They felt that the petitioner had misused his position and given directions to the resident staff to prescribe medicines of only Om Pharmaceutical Company which was serious matter. They wrote a letter dated 24-9-1987 to the Mayor Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation who also happens to be the (Chairman of the Board of Management of the V. S. Hospital Ahmedabad. On receiving that letter the Mayor in his capacity as the Chairman of the Board of Management of V. S. Hospital wrote a letter to the Superintendent V. S. Hospital bringing these facts to his notice and directed that in anticipation of the approval of the Board of Management departmental inquiry may be started against the petitioner and pending the inquiry the petitioner may be immediately suspended. This letter was received by the Superintendent on that day at 5-30 P. M as per the endorsement made by him below the said letter and on that very day at 6 P. M. the Superintendent V. S. Hospital in his capacity as the Director of the Institute and Superintendent of the V. S. Hospital passed an order placing the petitioner under suspension. It is stated in the said order that the order was being passed on the directions of the Chairman of the Board of Management of the institute and that the suspension was pending departmental inquiry on the charge of prescribing mainly the drugs of Om Pharmaceutical Company to the patients taking treatment in Orthopaedic Unit-III. The petitioner was on leave at that time and be filed this petition on 25-9-1987. ( 3 ) MR. M. A. Panchal learned Advocate who has filed caveat on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 viz. the Board of Management of V. S. Hospital and the Superintendent of V. S. Hospital appeared and after having heard Mr. Desai for the petitioner and Mr. M. A. Panchal for these two respondents ad-interim relief was granted and it was mentioned in that order that the petitioner shall continue on leave upto 30-9-1987 as per the statement made by Mr. Desai for the petitioner. That interim relief has been continued on the same terms pending hearing and final disposal of this petition. After the arguments of Mr. Desai were heard and before the arguments of Mr. Panchal for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and Mr. Desai for the petitioner. That interim relief has been continued on the same terms pending hearing and final disposal of this petition. After the arguments of Mr. Desai were heard and before the arguments of Mr. Panchal for respondents Nos. 1 and 2 and Mr. Sudhir Nanavati for respondent No. 3 were heard Rule was ordered to be issued with the consent of the learned Advocates and the matter was taken up for final hearing on 3 1987 Mr. Desai stated that he had already advanced his arguments 85 earlier and therefore he did not want to advance any further arguments after the issuance of the Rule. This is how the matter has now been finally heard instead of hearing only with regard to the interim relief. ( 4 ) THE first contention of Mr. Desai for the petitioner is that the petitioner being an honorary could not have been suspended. He submitted that there are no rules under which the petitioner could have been suspended. Mr. Panchal drew my attention to a Resolution passed by the Standing Committee of the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation on 28-6-1973 stating therein that the Rules which govern the Municipal Corporation employees will apply to even the Honorary Doctors and that the said Resolution of the Standing Committee of the Municipal Corporation has been adopted by this Institute by a Resolution dated 2-8-1973. These two documents which are at page 28 and 29 prima facie make out a case that the petitioner could have been suspended as per Regulation 20 (A) of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Regulations and Delegation of Powers Manual II. Regulation 20 (A) reads as follows:"an officer or servant may be suspended from service pending inquiry against him. "the order of appointment of the petitioner which is at page 105 also shows that the petitioner was subject to the Rules and Regulations of the Hospital that were in force at the time of this appointment and that may be made from lime to time. The petitioner has even entered into an agreement to that effect at the time of his appointment copy were of has been produced on record. In view of this I do not find any substance in the contention of Mr. Desai that the petitioner could not have been suspended pending inquiry. ( 5 ) THE next submission of Mr. The petitioner has even entered into an agreement to that effect at the time of his appointment copy were of has been produced on record. In view of this I do not find any substance in the contention of Mr. Desai that the petitioner could not have been suspended pending inquiry. ( 5 ) THE next submission of Mr. Desai is that no departmental inquiry was initiated against the petitioner and therefore as per Regulation 20 (A) the petitioner could not have been suspended. Mr. Panchal submitted that for suspending the petitioner by virtue of Regulation 20 (A) it is not necessary that an inquiry should stated. He submitted that even when an inquiry was contemplated the petitioner could have been suspended. It is difficult to accept this submission of Mr. Panchal. If the authority which has framed the regulation intended that even when an inquiry was contemplated suspension could be ordered the said authority would have expressed that intention specifically because it can be said that an inquiry is pending only when the inquiry has started. The words pending inquiry clearly show that the inquiry is in fact pending when the suspension is ordered. Mr. Panchal referred to Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 70 at page 421 wherein it is explained as to what is meant by pending. Mr. Panchal submitted relying upon the words also during the time intervening before used in the aforesaid book that this shows that even if an inquiry was contemplated it can be said that suspension before starting of the inquiry would mean pending inquiry. He also relied upon Blacks Law Dictionary Fifth Edition at [age 1021 where it is stated as to what is meant by pending. It will be proper to reproduce from the aforesaid book as to what is meant by pending. " Pending Began but not yet completed during before the conclusion of prior to the completion of unsettled undetermined in process of settlement or adjustment. Thus an action or suit is pending from its inception until the rendition of final judgment. Pending means awaiting an occurrence or conclusion of action period of continuance or indeterminancy. "it will appear from what has been reproduced above that pending means awaiting an occurrence and relying upon the said phrase Mr. Thus an action or suit is pending from its inception until the rendition of final judgment. Pending means awaiting an occurrence or conclusion of action period of continuance or indeterminancy. "it will appear from what has been reproduced above that pending means awaiting an occurrence and relying upon the said phrase Mr. Panchal submitted that pending inquiry means awaiting inquiry which would show that the petitioner could have been suspended even before the initiation of the inquiry. If we look at the dictionary meaning of the word pending in its isolation then Mr. Panchals submission may be accepted. But we cannot take the word spending in its isolation. We have to read the whole phrase pending inquiry. When a Legislature or rule-making authority intends to provide that even when an inquiry is contemplated suspension can be ordered then the authority will express its intention by laying down that suspension can be ordered pending inquiry or when inquiry is contemplated. In the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1971 there is a provision for suspension and it is provided therein that a Government Servant may be placed under suspension where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending. If the authority which has framed the Regulations so far as the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation is concerned intended that even when a departmental inquiry was contemplated an employee can be suspended then the said authority would have used the phraseology more or less similar to that used in the Gujarat Rules. Suspension adversely affects an employee though it is not punishment and therefore while interpreting the Regulations we cannot simply take the dictionary meaning of the word pending in its isolation. It may also be mentioned here that in the letter written by the Chairman of the Board to the Superintendent which is at page 24 of the compilation the Superintendent was directed to start the inquiry and immediately suspend the petitioner pending inquiry. Even in the order passed by the Superintendent at page 27 the words used are spending departmental inquiry. Even in the order passed by the Superintendent at page 27 the words used are spending departmental inquiry. Even in the Resolution passed by the Board on 29 which is at page 6r whereby the action of suspending the petitioner as per the directions of the Chairman in anticipation of the approval of the Board was approved the words used are that the departmental inquiry should be started and the petitioner should be suspended pending the inquiry. This clearly shows that even the concerned authorities very well knew that the petitioner could be suspended only pending inquiry and not when an inquiry was contemplated. The wordings of the order passed by the Superintendent on 24 would make it appear that the departmental inquiry was already started and it was pending and during the pendency of the inquiry the petitioner was being suspended. But apart from this it is difficult to accept the submission made by Mr. Panchal that the petitioner could have been suspended even before the initiation of the inquiry when inquiry was contemplated. If the petitioner could be suspended only after initiation of an inquiry and not prior to that it is clear that the order of suspension passed against the petitioner before initiation of the inquiry is on the face of it bad. ( 6 ) IN the case of P. R. Nayak v. Union of India AIR 1972 SC 554 the Supreme Court has held that if the Rules provide for suspension only after an inquiry is initiated suspension cannot be ordered before the inquiry is initiated. The Supreme Court has held that when an inquiry is contemplated suspension cannot be ordered unless the Rules provide to that effect. It is true that the Supreme Court was dealing with All India Services Rules but the ratio of this decision is that if the Rules do not provide for suspension when inquiry is contemplated then suspension cannot be ordered when inquiry is only contemplated and not initiated. The order of suspension which is passed by the Superintendent as per the directions of the Chairman and which is ex post facto ratified by the General Board on 29-9-1987 therefore can be said to be bad on the face of it and is required to be quashed. ( 7 ) MR. The order of suspension which is passed by the Superintendent as per the directions of the Chairman and which is ex post facto ratified by the General Board on 29-9-1987 therefore can be said to be bad on the face of it and is required to be quashed. ( 7 ) MR. Desai also contended that it was only the Board which could have suspended the petitioner if at all he could be suspended and that the Chairman could not have directed the suspension in anticipation of the sanction by the Board. Mr. M. A. Panchal was not in a position to support the order passed by the Superintendent on the direction of the Chairman. In fact it appears that because the respondents felt that the suspension order passed by the Superintendent on 24 as per the direction of the Chairman cannot be supported the Board passed a Resolution on 29-9-1987 ratifying the said decision of the Superintendent as per the direction of the Chairman. The order of suspension passed on 24/09/1987 by the Superintendent is also therefore on the face of it bad and is required to be quashed on that ground also. ( 8 ) MR. Panchal submitted that whatever defect was there in the order passed by the Superintendent on 24th September has been cured on account of the Board having passed a Resolution on 29/09/1987 and therefore the order cannot be struck down. It is difficult to accept this submission of Mr. Panchal. Neither the Chairman nor the Superintendent were competent to suspend the petitioner. It was only the Board of Management which had appointed the petitioner which could suspend the petitioner. The order passed by the Superintendent of the Hospital on the instructions of the Chairman of the Board being initially illegal invalid and in operative cannot be ratified by the Board later on. I am supported in this view of mine by a decision of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court resorted in Siten Bose v. Anand Bazar Patrika 1980 Labour and Industrial Cases 466. The Board was expected to take an independent decision whether to suspend the petitioner or not. The Superintendent having already suspended the petitioner as per the direction of the Chairman it is difficult to say that the Board independently took its decision to suspend the petitioner. The Board was expected to take an independent decision whether to suspend the petitioner or not. The Superintendent having already suspended the petitioner as per the direction of the Chairman it is difficult to say that the Board independently took its decision to suspend the petitioner. We may also have a look at the resolution passed by the Board on 29 The Resolution passed by the Board which is at page 62 shows that the Board of Management did not itself pass the Resolution to suspend the petitioner but approved the action taken by the Superintendent as per the direction of the Chairman in anticipation of the sanction by the Board. The subject which was placed for consideration before the Board was not whether the petitioner should be suspended but whether the order of suspension passed by the Superintendent should be approved or not. This shows that the members of the Board do not appear to have independently considered the question whether the petitioner should be suspended pending inquiry The Resolution at page 62 does not indicate that the members of the Board applied their mind to the question whether the petitioner should be suspended or not. It may also be mentioned at this stage that the petitioner was in fact suspended on 24-9-1987 and thereafter the Board passed the Resolution on 29-9-1987 when the petitioner was still on leave. It is the allegation made by the petitioner that before the meeting of the members of the Board was held on 29-9-1987 a meeting of the Board was held earlier on 23-9-1987 and it was resolved by the Board that no action should be taken against the petitioner as the same would be obviously vindictive and without authority of law. That allegation has been made by the petitioner at para 10 (d) introduced by way of amendment dated 30-9-1987. The Chairman of the Board respondent No. 1 has filed an affidavit-in-rejoinder with regard to the amendment and that is dated 12-10-1987. So far as the allegation made by the petitioner at para 10 (d) of the amendment is concerned the Chairman of the Board-respondent No. 1 has stated at para 4 page 55 that no formal meeting of the Board of Management was held on 23 much less was it resolved that no action should be taken against the petitioner as alleged. It is pertinent to note that it is not stated in the affidavit-in-rejoinder that no meeting of the Board of Management was held on 29-9-1987. If use read para 10 (d) of the amendment with para 4 of the affidavit-in-rejoinder dated 12-10-1987 at page 55 it appears that there is much substance in the say of the petitioner that a meeting of the Board of Management was probably held on 23-9-1987. Even if no formal meeting of the Board of Management was held on 23-9-1987 but an informal meeting was held on that date we do not know whether this subject was discussed at the informal meeting of the Board or not. It is pertinent to note that the Chairman does not say in the affidavit-in-rejoinder with regard to the amendment that the subject was not discussed at all. It is therefore not improbable that the members of the Board may not have been inclined on 23-9-1987 to suspend the petitioner and therefore directions were given on 24-9-1987 by the Chairman to the Superintendent to suspend the petitioner and the petitioner was within half an hour of receipt of the directions from the Chairman suspended on that very day. What was required to be done by the Board of Management was to independently consider the question of suspension and come to a decision whether the petitioner should be suspended and not only to consider the question of approving the action taken by the Superintendent. In the case of Mohd. Dilawar Ali v. Andhra Pradesh Muslim Wakf Board and Others AIR 1967 AP 291 services of an existing employee of the respondent-Board were terminated by a Committee consisting of the Board-member and some outsiders and it was ratified by the Board. The Andhra Pradesh High Court took the view that the Board had to show by some evidence that it considered the case of the employee before terminating his services and mere formal ratification by the Board will not cure the defect of termination by the Committee. The above decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court supports the view which I am inclined to take so far as the ratification by the Board is concerned. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 9 ) IT is alleged by the petitioner that there were political considerations in passing the order of suspension. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 9 ) IT is alleged by the petitioner that there were political considerations in passing the order of suspension. I do not propose to go into those allegations as I am inclined to quash the order of suspension for the reasons stated above. All that I would like to observe is that it was a very hasty step on the part of the Chairman of the Board of Management to have directed the Superintendent to pass the order of suspension. It was on the face of it over enthusiasm on the part of the Chairman that resulted in the passing of the order of suspension by the Superintendent. Such undue haste and over enthusiasm should not have been exhibited by the Chairman while taking a serious action of suspending the petitioner in the present case. [rest of the Judgment is not material for the Reports. ]rule made absolute. .