Judgment :- Viswanatha Iyer, J.- The first defendant has filed this appeal against a decree for removal of the goods, equipments and machinery belonging to it from the plaint schedule building and shed, and to give vacant possession of the same to the plaintiff. The question involved in this appeal is whether the transaction evidenced by Ext. A2 dated November 18,1975 is a licence, or whether it creates the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. 2. The building and the shed belong so the plaintiff. The first defendant had been permitted to use the same for its purposes during the period 1-7-1973 to 31-7-1973 on a licence fee of Rs 300/- per month. The parties agreed that after 1-8-1975, the first defendant may use the permises on an enhanced licence fee of Rs 400/-, and set forth the terms and conditions of the user in the agreement Ext. A2. 3. By and under the agreement the plaintiff permitted the first defendant to use the building and the shed as a licensee for a period of one year from 1-8-1975 to 31-7-1976 on a licence fee of Rs. 400/-, If the first defendant required the user of the building and the shed thereafter, it was agreed that they may do so for a further period of two years on licence fee to be fixed afresh. If however, the licence fee was not so fixed, and agreement entered into between the parties, the licence was to stand terminated on 31-7-1976, on which date the first defendant was to vacate and surrender the premises to the plaintiff. All the indicia of ownership were to vest in the plaintiff, but the first defendant was permitted to use the premises for purposes of manufacture of Ayurvedic medicine. Plaintiff should not obstruct such user in any manner whatsoever. The first defendant was also permitted to instal a disintegrator and 15 H. P. motor in the shed, which they should remove without causing damage to the shed at the expiry of the period of the licence. Clause 4 of the agreement expressly stated that the first defendant had only a limited right of user of the premises for the manufacture of Ayurvedic medicines and that the ownership and possessory rights continued to vest in the plaintiff. Clause 4 of the agreement expressly stated that the first defendant had only a limited right of user of the premises for the manufacture of Ayurvedic medicines and that the ownership and possessory rights continued to vest in the plaintiff. The said clause is extracted below: If there was any breach of the terms and conditions of the licence by the first defendant the plaintiff was entitled to evict the first defendant without notice and without waiting for the expiry period of tae permit of the licence. 3. The first defendant had filed a suit O. S. No. 303 of 1980 in the Munsiff's Court, Quilon for an injunction restraining the plaintiff from interfering with their business in the plaint schedule building. Tae said suit was transferred to the Sub Court and triad along with me suit, against the decree in which this appeal is filed. 4. The first defendant-appellant's contention was that the transaction Ext. A2 evidenced a lease and not a licence and that therefore, she plaintiff must seek his remedies under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The lower court found that the transaction was a licence and decreed the suit as prayed for. 5. The question that arise for consideration therefore is whether Ext. A2 evidences a lease or a licence. A perusal of the document Ext. A2 discloses the following salient features: (a) The first defendant has been permitted to use the premises. Ext. A2 was executed for the purpose of reducing to writing the terms and conditions subject to which the first defendant was to use the premises. The term employed by the parties is: (b) The document is styled as a licence agreement. (c) The periodical payment is termed licence fee. (d) The first defendant is allowed to use the premises only as a licensee (e) All rights of ownership and possession vest only in the plaintiff. Exclusive possession is nowhere stated to be given to the first defendant. Clasue A of the document expressly states that the first defendant's right is limited to user of the premises for manufacture of Ayurvedic medicines and that all ownership and possessory rights continue to vest only in the plaintiff. 6. Exclusive possession is nowhere stated to be given to the first defendant. Clasue A of the document expressly states that the first defendant's right is limited to user of the premises for manufacture of Ayurvedic medicines and that all ownership and possessory rights continue to vest only in the plaintiff. 6. We may refer here to the following observations of this court in Saheeda v. Hemalatha C. M. A. No.1 of 1981: "It is open to the parties to contemplate the relationship of a lessor and lessee, it Is equally open to them to enter into a relationship of licensor and licensee. It is evident from the terms of the document, Ext. B1, that they expressly purported to speak in terms of a relationship under a licence and not under a lease. A licensee gets no interest in the immoveable property. The licence is a personal right. He will not be entitled to transfer it. A licensee is entitled to the use and occupation and possession of the licensed premises to the extent required for the exercise of his right as a licensee. There may be possession, but it may not be exclusive possession. It appears to us that parties took particular care to agree upon express and explicit terms which reveal the character of a license in the transaction between the parties and not that of a lease. We have already adverted to the provision in para 12 of the agreement that 'permission' granted to the first respondent herein to conduct and carry on the said business, use the said theatre and the said machineries, projectors, etc. "was strictly personal and non-transferable". We also notice the provision In paragraph 13 of the agreement specifying that there was no creation of any tenancy and further that nothing therein shall be construed as creating any tenancy. In express terms parties agreed that Ext. B1 shall not be construed as creating a tenancy or lease. Repeated use of the term "permitted to use" is also indicative of a licence. What is paid monthly is termed as royalty and not rent. If a licence in regard to a cinema theatre and premises is possible then it is evident that the parties took care to define the relationship between them explicitly in a manner which makes it clear that a licence and not a lease was created". 7. What is paid monthly is termed as royalty and not rent. If a licence in regard to a cinema theatre and premises is possible then it is evident that the parties took care to define the relationship between them explicitly in a manner which makes it clear that a licence and not a lease was created". 7. In the interpretation of a document of this nature, to ascertain whether it creates the relationship of landlord and tenant or that of licensor and licensee, the decisive consideration is the intention of the parties, to be gathered on a true construction of the agreement and not merely from the description given by the parties. This is a matter of substance and not merely of words. The description given is a good indication of the intention of the parties. The parties can certainly be presumed to have reduced to writing what they had in their mind, in other words their intention. It is open to the parties to enter into a transaction of licence or to create a relationship of lessor and lessee. The parties are well aware nowadays of the distinction between lease and licence and the consequences that follow the creation of a licence in contra distinction to a lease, especially after the advent of the Rent Control legislations. When therefore it is the express term of the grant that the grantee was only permitted to use the property as licensee for a specific purpose and that only that limited right was being granted to him, it requires. cogent and convincing material to the contra by way of circumstances of the case or conduct of parties to hold that the transaction was nevertheless a lease. The indicia mentioned by us herein earlier are ail indicative of the transaction being only a licence and not a lease. 8. It is true that the building has been found by the lower court to be in the exclusive possession of the first defendant. That is not however conclusive of the matter. As stated by one of us (Paripoornan, J.) in the decision in Kalyani Amma v. Kunhambu Nair 1984 K.LT. (Short Notes) Page 62, Case No. 105 possession that is given to the licensee is only such as is necessary to effectively use the premises for the purposes for winch the licence was given. As stated by one of us (Paripoornan, J.) in the decision in Kalyani Amma v. Kunhambu Nair 1984 K.LT. (Short Notes) Page 62, Case No. 105 possession that is given to the licensee is only such as is necessary to effectively use the premises for the purposes for winch the licence was given. Even in cases where transfer of possession u exclusive, it need not necessarily be an indication of the creation of a lease for even in a licence there should be some transfer of possession. Possession is necessary even for a-licensee to do such acts in the land as he is permitted to do. As held in Errington v. Errington (1952 (1) All England Law Reports 149) exclusive possession is by no means decisive of lease. Again as held in Abbeyfield (Harpender) Society Ltd. v. Woods (1968) (i) All. E.R.352 a man may be a licensee, even though he has exclusive possession. It is the substance of the agreement that governs the matter. The court must look at the agreement as a whole and see whether a tenancy really was intended. 9. A conspectus of the facts in this case reveals that the parties intended only to create the relationship of licensor and licensee and not that of lessor and lessee. The terms of the agreement pointed out earlier are indicative only of this fact. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that the transaction in question is only a licence. 10. It is stated that the plaintiff has filed the suit for recovery of possession and paid court fee under S.43 of the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act (X of 1960) as for a suit between landlord and tenant. This is not however, material nor does it preclude the plaintiff from setting up the true nature of the agreement Ext. A2, that it is only a licence. Perhaps the plaintiff has taken the abundant caution of filing the suit for recovery of possession to avoid possible disputes in the execution of the decree or even about its maintainability. 11. No other points are raised in this appeal, there is no dispute that if the transaction is a licence, the decree passed by the lower court is valid. The appeal is therefore dismissed in limine.