JUDGMENT Uday Sinha, J. – These two applications have been heard together and will be disposed of by this common judgment. For the sake of clarity I shall refer to the facts of C.W.J.C. No. 1895 of 1986. The decision on questions of law in this case will determine the result of C.W.J.C. No. 5803 of 1986. 2. The two applications are directed against levy of advertisement tax by State of Bihar. The petitioners are Cinema Exhibitors duly licensed under the Bihar Cinema Regulations Act. The second petitioners in both the applications are the Managing Directors of the licensees. In 1981 the State enacted Bihar Finance Act embracing the law on the subject of levy of sales tax, entertainment, advertisement tax etc. etc. Part I thereof related to law of sales (sic) in Bihar. Part II thereof dealt with the advertisement tax traversing sections 62 to 81. Part II of the aforesaid Finance Act, 1981 described what was included within the expression ‘advertisement’. The charging section was enshrined in section 63 originally read as follows: “63. Charge of Tax.–Subject to the provisions contained in section 64, every person, who makes an advertisement, whether for payment or any other valuable consideration otherwise, shall, pay on every advertisement a tax calculated at such rates and in such manner as laid down in the schedule to this part : Provided that no such tax shall be levied on any advertisement which is not a sky-sign and which– (a) is exhibited within the window of any building; or (b) relates to the trade or business carried on within the land or building upon or over which such advertisement is exhibited or to any sale or letting of such land or building or any effects therein or to any sale to be held upon or in the same; or (c) relates to the name of the land or building upon or over which the advertisement is exhibited, or to the name of owner or occupier of such land or building. Explanation.–The expression ‘sky-sign’ in this section means any advertisement, supported on or attached to any post, pole, standard framework or other support wholly or in part upon any land, building, wall or structure including any moveable board on which, or any part of which is visible against the sky from some point of any public place and includes all and every pan of any such post, pole, standard framework or other similar devise employed wholly or in part for the purposes of any advertisement upon or over any land, building or structure upon or over any public place, which is open to the use of public whether actually used or enjoyed or not as such by the public but shall not include – (a) any flagstaff, pole, vane or weathercock unless adopted, or used wholly or in part for the purpose of any advertisement, or (b) any advertisement relating to the name of the land or building upon or over which the advertisement is exhibited or to the name of the owner or occupier of such land or building; or (c) any notice of land or building to be sold, or let, placed upon such land or building.” The petitioners had no cause for grievance by the enactment of law in section 63. In 1985 Part II of Bihar Finance Act was amended. The significant amendment was introduced in the proviso to section 63. The proviso contained three clauses as quoted earlier. The real change which has irked the petitioners was in proviso (a). After the amendment clause (a) of the proviso reads as follows : “Provided that no such tax shall be levied on any advertisement which is not a sky-sign and which– (a) is exhibited within the show-window or show-case of a shop or building excluding an advertisement exhibited at any place of entertainment by means of a cinematography through slides, trailer of film or films ; or” The amended complexion of clause (a) came into effect from 1.8.1985. In terms of the amendment trailers and shorts and films which had the character of advertising goods or services became exigible to tax. By Annexure 1 dated 18.10.1985 the petitioners in C.W.J.C. No. 1895 of 1986 were asked to get themselves registered under the law relating to tax on advertisement incorporated in the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 as also to pay the tax on advertisement by 30.10.1985. By Annexure 1 dated 18.10.1985 the petitioners in C.W.J.C. No. 1895 of 1986 were asked to get themselves registered under the law relating to tax on advertisement incorporated in the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 as also to pay the tax on advertisement by 30.10.1985. The petitioners took no notice of Annexure-1. That was followed by another notice dated 1.11.1985 (Aunexure-2) from the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Special Circle, Patna by which the petitioners were asked to show cause why penalty should not be imposed upon them in terms of section 77 (a) for not complying with the order contained in Annexure 1. The notice (Annexure-2) having been ignored by the petitioner, the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes., Special Circle, Patna by order dated 20.11.1985 (Annexure-3) imposed fine of Rs. 300/- upon the petitioners for advertising without permission and without getting themselves registered for the purpose of advertising through slides and film trailers. By Annexure-4 dated 5.4.1986 the petitioners were asked to appear before the Assistant Commissioner for assessment in terms of section 71 of the Act. Hence, the present application by the petitioners for quashing Annexures-3 and 4. 3. In C.W.J.C. No. 5803 of 1986 no action has been taken by Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Purnia Circle, Purnia except issuing notice to the petitioners to show cause why legal action be not taken against them for not complying with the order dated 1.7.1986 by which they had been directed to produce papers relating to advertisement. By Annexure-2 dated 12.9.1986 of this application the petitioners were asked to deposit the advertisement tax in the treasury by chalan. The petitioners of this application have contended that no advertisement tax is payable under the law on advertisement by slides, shorts and trailers in a Cinema House. The sum and substance of the stand of the petitioners of both the applications is that there is no liability to pay advertisement tax. 4. The vires of any provision of the Bihar Finance Act has not been challenged. All that has been contended by learned Counsel for the petitioners is that no tax on advertisement which is not a sky sign is leviable. It has not been disputed that sky sign advertisement fell within the mischief of the provisions regarding levy of tax on advertisement. 5. All that has been contended by learned Counsel for the petitioners is that no tax on advertisement which is not a sky sign is leviable. It has not been disputed that sky sign advertisement fell within the mischief of the provisions regarding levy of tax on advertisement. 5. The submissions advanced on behalf of petitioners are the following : (1) The petitioners are not liable to pay any advertisement tax for display of cinema slide projections and exhibition of film trailers, shorts and advertisement films within their Cinema House/Auditorium: (i) because the act does not come within the definition of “Advertisement” under section 62 (a) of which any erection, fixation, display, exhibition, publication etc must be "with a view to attract public attentions.” (ii) because the levy is on the display of any “sky sign” “which is visible against the sky from some point in a public place” and so cinema slide projections, trailers, shorts etc. come within the exception to the proviso of section 63. (2) The petitioners cannot be said to have violated section 66 by not obtaining permission “because the manner of obtaining permission required by section 66 has not yet been prescribed”. (3) The petitioners cannot be held liable for having not got registered under rule 3 because the rules do not prescribe any penalty for non-registration. (4) The order imposing penalty being not in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no penatly can be imposed. 6. The first submission is based upon the definition of “advertisement”. The definition of “advertisement” in the Act is inclusive in nature. Section 62 (a) of the Bihar Finance Act. 1981 reads as follows: “62. Definitions.–In this part unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context : – (a) “advertisement” includes any erection, fixation, announcement, display, exhibition, publication or communication of an object, matter or thing, whether made temporarily or retained in any manner with a view to attract public attention, for furtherance of any trade, commerce or service offered, but excludes advertisements published in a “newspaper’, or broadcast by radio or television and any advertisements exhibited or broadcast by any political party;” The whole argument is concentrated on the expression “with a view to attract public attention”. The submission is that there is nothing to show that the cinema slides, shorts etc were exhibited to attract public attention. The submission is that there is nothing to show that the cinema slides, shorts etc were exhibited to attract public attention. There is not much substance in the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners. The petitioner are cinema exhibitors. Their main business is to exhibit films. To eulogise goods and services of others is not in their line of activity. The exhibiting of slides, shorts etc. it cannot be denied, is for furtherance of trade, commence or services offered. The showing of slides, shorts etc. is obviously for furtherance of trade and commerce. It is certainly exhibited for attracting public attention. When people have collected to see a film in an auditorium and something else is shown (sic) them; the idea is nothing but to focus the attention of the viewers towards those objects. In my view, the object of exhibiting the slides and shorts is nothing but to attract public attention. In showing them the goods and services are recommended to the people for their consumption. In my view, therefore, it does not require much effort to reject the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that a cinema hall is not a public place and, therefore, exhibiting the slides, shorts etc. to the viewers is not “with view to attract public attention”. Reliance for the proposition that the cinema house is not a public place was placed upon. The Corporation of Calcutta and others v. Sarat Chandra Ghatak and another : A.I.R. 1959 Calcutta, 704, and Russel (Inspector of Taxes) v. Scott, [1948] 2 All E.R. 1. 8. The submission advanced on behalf of the petitioners is entirely untenable. The entire approach to establish that the cinema house is not a public place is a futile endeavour. The word used in the Statute is “public attention”. We are concerned with that expression and not the expression “public place”. When a cinema exhibits films in its hall, it invites the whole world to come and witness it. The whole world is entitled to come and see it, of course, on purchase of tickets for which the public have to pay certain sums. It cannot be denied that the persons buying the tickets constitute “the public”. Out of the entire mass of people some enter the cinema hall of course on purchasing tickets. The whole world is entitled to come and see it, of course, on purchase of tickets for which the public have to pay certain sums. It cannot be denied that the persons buying the tickets constitute “the public”. Out of the entire mass of people some enter the cinema hall of course on purchasing tickets. That mass of public which was outside the hall buying a ticket, having entered the hall do they cease to become public merely because it has purchased a ticket? Having entered the hall can the cinema owner throw him out? Certainly not except for unruly or rowdy behaviour. A person indulging in unruly behaviour is liable to be, thrown out or reprimanded from any public place. The question is whether the persons witnessing are the public or not. In my view, it is patent that they constitute the public. When they see the cinema slides, shorts etc., their attention is focused towards these trade articles and services. The meaning of “public” as given in Webster Universal Dictionary (Unabridged International Edition) at page 1146 is as follows : “Public 1. Pertaining to, affecting, the people at large generally contrasted with private; appertaining to the people as a community, nation, or state. Public : 1. The general body of the people. 2. a specific, particular portion of the people : the theatrical, musical, public: an author's, actors, favorite public.” In the shorter Oxford English Dictionary the meaning of “public” is given as follows: “Usually opposite to PRIVATE. 1 Pertaining to the people of a country or locality, 3. That is open to, may be used by, or mayor must be shared by, all members of the community; generally accessible or available; generally levied (as a rate or tax). The community as an aggregate, but not as organised; hence, the members of the community. A particular section, group, or portion of a community, or of mankind.” From the above it is obvious that public is an indeterminate mass without any definite nomenclature as opposed to private persons, relations, friends etc. I have not the least doubt that cinema viewers constitute public. They are not invitees. The payment of entry fee could not convert a cinema house into private house. The case of Elkins v. Cartlidge : (1947) I All E.R., page 829 (K.B. Div) throws interesting light on the subject. That case related to Road Traffic Act. I have not the least doubt that cinema viewers constitute public. They are not invitees. The payment of entry fee could not convert a cinema house into private house. The case of Elkins v. Cartlidge : (1947) I All E.R., page 829 (K.B. Div) throws interesting light on the subject. That case related to Road Traffic Act. The respondent Cartridge was charged with being incharge of motor vehicle in a public place when under the influence of drink. The Justices found that the respondent while under the influence of drink, put his car, in an enclosure at the rear of an inn at the side of which was an open gateway giving access to the enclosure, and the car had access to the enclosure and was actually parked there. The respondent was run down for having committed offence under the Road Traffic Act. The Justice dismissed the information preferred against him, charging him when incharge of a motor vehicle Inn a public place called the Fox and Hounds in Car Park being under the influence of drink which constituted violation of section 15 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930. The enclosure in that Case was Car Park. The licensee invited people to go there and people did go and park there. Lord Goddard, C.J. sitting in appeal observed as follows : “The case is however, concluded by R. v. Collinson; 23 Cr. Appl. Rep. 49; Digest Supp. which is indistinguishable in principle, though it may be distinguishable in detail, from the present case. There a man who was charged with being in charge of a car while under the influence of drink was in a car which was in a field to which at the relevant time the public were invited to watch some point-to-point races. It was a private field, and no doubt it could have been closed in at any time, and I have no doubt that the proprietor of the field could have objected to any particular person going into it. The public had not a legal right which they could enforce of access to the field but it was a public place for the purposes of this section because at the relevant time the public were being invited to use it.” In those circumstances, a Car Park was held to be a public place, although the proprietor could exclude anyone from the field. In R.V. Kane and Others: (1965) All E.R. 705 the question raised was whether a club was a public place. The situation in that case was that some persons on a particular day unlawfully fought and made an affray in the club known as the Stage and Press Club. There was evidence to show that persons presenting themselves at the door of the club would be signed in without previous acquaintance with the doorman or proprietor. On the fateful day there was no doorman on duty, but the: proprietor was exercising general supervision. The club was a proprietary club. The accused were charged of having made affray. At the trial the question arose whether the club was a public place. On that depended the conclusion whether the accused had indulged in affray or not. BARRY, J observed in his charge to the jury that if the ordinary members of the public were to be allowed to come in to the club whether on payment or otherwise, It would be a public place. According to BARRY, J, in all common law a public place was a place to which the public can and do have access. His Lordship observed at page 709 as follows : “I direct you as a matter of law that it matters not whether they come to that place at the invitation of the occupier or whether they come to it merely with his permission; also, that it matters not whether some payment, or, indeed, the performance of some small formality such as the signing of a visitors; bock, is required before they are allowed access.” The jury found that the club was the public place. If the club were to confine admissions only to its members or their guests, then it would be a private place and not a public place. In Hurst v. Picture Theatres, Limited : (1915) 1 King's Bench Division, page 1 a theatre to which the public were admitted on payment was held to be a place of public resort. At page 11 BUCKLEY L. J. observed as follows : “Under the circumstances it was for the jury to give him such a sum as was right for the assault which was committed upon him, and for the serious indignity to a gentleman of being seized and treated in this way in a place of public resort.” 9. At page 11 BUCKLEY L. J. observed as follows : “Under the circumstances it was for the jury to give him such a sum as was right for the assault which was committed upon him, and for the serious indignity to a gentleman of being seized and treated in this way in a place of public resort.” 9. Reliance placed by learned Counsel for the petitioners on Cooper and others v. Shield : (1971) 2 Q.B. page 334 is misplaced. In that case a Railway platform was held not to be a public place. The decision turned upon the definition of “public place” in section 9 of the Public Order Act, 1936 which defined “public place” as follows : “public place” means any highway, public park or garden, any sea beach, and any public bridge, road, lane, footway, square, court, alley or passage, whether a thoroughfare or not and includes any open space to which for the time being, the public have or are permitted to have access, whether on payment or otherwise.” The question posed precisely was whether a platform of a railway station was a footway or any open space to which the public had or were permitted to have access. C.J. Lord Parker with whom Widgery L. J. and Bridge J. agreed held that a footway is entirely different from a platform, which was more commonly understood as a pavement. The question then agitated was that a railway platform is a public place to which the public have or are permitted to have access. It was contended on behalf of the appellants there that any space was an open space within the definition of the Public Order Act, 1936, if it was not completely enclosed and if anyone side was open to the air or if the roof was open to air, it would be an open space for the purpose of the law. Their Lordships observed that in terms of section 9 it seemed that the words “includes any open space” referred to a place which did not constitute a building or was not an integral part of a building. Since a Railway platform formed an integral part of the station which was a building it was not an open space. Therefore, in terms of the definition of public place a Railway platform was held not to be a public place. Since a Railway platform formed an integral part of the station which was a building it was not an open space. Therefore, in terms of the definition of public place a Railway platform was held not to be a public place. The reliance placed on this decision is misplaced for the simple reason that the words “public place” Lad been given an artificial definition in the Statute. In common law, however, a public place is a place where the public is invited, whether on payment or otherwise. The decision in Cooper and others v. Shield (supra) must thus be confined to the facts of that specific case. It does not lay down any general interpretation of the words “public place”. I cannot skip over the subject without referring to a decision of Calcutta High Court in The Corporation of Calcutta and others v. Sarat Chandra Ghatak and another : A.I.R. 1959 Calcutta, 704. That case also related to imposition of advertisement tax by Calcutta Municipal Corporation upon Purna Theatre in terms of section 229 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act. That provision laid down that every person who exhibited any advertisement or displayed any advertisement to public view in any manner whatsoever, visible from a public street or other place would be liable to pay for every advertisement which is so exhibited. The cinema owner contested the assertion of the Corporation that every cinema indulging in advertisement was bound to get itself registered and to pay tax in terms of section 229 of the said Act. In the suit filed by the assessee, i.e., the cinema owner, the trial court rejected the plea that cinema house is not a public place. It held that the words "public place" had been used in section 229 in the larger sense that is to mean and include all places where the public are permitted to go and habitually go even without legal right or access. C. J. K. C. Das Gupta in paragraph 22 agreed that it was difficult from the decided cases to conclude one way or the other whether the words “public place” have been used in the section in the restricted sense of a place where the public have a legal right of access or in the wider sense of a place where the public are permitted to go or habitually go. In their Lordship's view, the matter had to be decided on a consideration of the purpose of the legislation as also with the help of whatever light is available to other portions of the Statute. Upon a interpretation of the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, it was held that a cinema house is not a public place. I am unable to treat that the Calcutta decision has laid down a broad proposition that a cinema is not a public place for the reason that tickets have to be bought and paid for entering a cinema house. 10. On a review of cases on the subject, I am definitely of the view that a cinema house is a public place. The fact that they have to purchase their entrance does not convert them into guests. A guest is one who does not have to pay for his entrance. The cinema invites the entire community, all and sundry, “the community as an aggregate”, to come and witness the show. In Words and Phrases at page 273 it has been stated : “A roller skating rink to which the public are invited on the sole condition of paying a fixed charge is a ‘public place of amusement’. Similarly a ‘Ferryboat’ is a public place. A show to which public is invited and expected to come is a public place. The people frequenting the cinema houses are indeterminate mass and, therefore, I have not the least doubt that the visitors constitute “public”. The slides, shorts, films etc, exposed before them is exposure to public attention. That exposure is certainly not accidental. It is designed to attract the attention of the public. I have therefore, not the least doubt that exhibition of trailers, shorts, films etc, is advertisement within the meaning of section 62(a) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981. The submission advanced on behalf of the petitioners is rejected squarely. It is idle to contend that a cinema house is not a public place and the viewers are not public or that the exhibition does not constitute “advertisement”. 11. The next submission relates to interpretation of the ambit of section 63 of the Act quoted earlier at paragraph 2 of this judgment. The submission is that the proviso to section 63 created a niche for matters or exposures which were not liable to the levy of advertisement tax. 11. The next submission relates to interpretation of the ambit of section 63 of the Act quoted earlier at paragraph 2 of this judgment. The submission is that the proviso to section 63 created a niche for matters or exposures which were not liable to the levy of advertisement tax. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that in terms of the proviso only such an advertisement was liable to tax which was (i) a sky sign and (ii) which is exhibited within the show-window or show case of a shop or building. The submission was that the proviso contains two negatives, i.e., “no such tax” and “not a sky-sign”. Thus the effect of the proviso, according to learned Counsel for the petitioners, was that anything contained in provisos (a), (b) and (c) which is not a sky-sign is not liable to tax. The sub-mission is justified so far as provisos (b) and (c) are concerned. Part of proviso (a) also excludes some advertisement from the sweep of the tax. The proviso appears to give the impression that the whole of it is not liable to tax. In my view, however, that is not the proper rendering of proviso (a). Section 63 must be seen in this backdrop that the main section lays down that every person making advertisement shall pay on every advertisement a tax calculated in terms of Schedule to the Act. Out of that is taken out by the proviso, something ‘which is not a sky-sign’. That means sky-signs are exigible. Proviso further means that something which is not a sky-sign and something which is exhibited within show case of a shop or a building is not exigible to tax. Proviso (a) itself contains another proviso, if that expression can be used. Thus there is a proviso within a proviso. If there is such a provision, the proviso within the proviso must be read as not falling within the main proviso. That is to say that would be exigible to tax. Under that category falls advertisement at any place by means of cinematography through slides, trailer of film or films. The first step is the charge of tax. The second step is exclusion therefrom. The third is exclusion from the earlier exclusion. That is to say that would be exigible to tax. Under that category falls advertisement at any place by means of cinematography through slides, trailer of film or films. The first step is the charge of tax. The second step is exclusion therefrom. The third is exclusion from the earlier exclusion. If we read section 63 in that manner, it will become obvious that the proviso which lays down that some advertisement will not be exigible to tax, has a proviso added to it which means that the second proviso contains list of exigible matters. Clause (a) originally read as follows : “is exhibited within the window of any building”. That was amended in 1985. The expression “window” was substituted by the “show window” or “show case” of a shop. Added to it was another rider “excluding an advertisement exhibited at any place of entertainment by means of a Cinematography through slides, trailer of film or films”. As the law stood prior to amendment in 1985, it was obvious that trailer of film or films, slides etc, were not exigible to tax. They were introduced in 1985. The pattern of law clearly is that something which was not taxable was intended to be made taxable. If the idea was not to tax it, there was no point in introducing the exclusion from proviso in clause (a). In my view, in terms of the first rule of interpretation of Statute, that a Statute must be given its ordinary grammatical meaning, it is obvious that it was intended to levy tax on advertisement, In terms of the second rule of interpretation that intention of the Statute may be looked into, it is absolutely clear that the Legislature intended to impose tax on advertisement. It has not been contended that there is no power to levy tax on advertisement. The only question is whether the Statute does create that liability on cinema exhibitors. In my view, the meaning is absolutely clear, without any shred of doubt, that trailer of film or films were intended to be brought in the bag of tax, It is not necessary to refer to the catena of decisions in which it has been laid down that there is no place for intention in interpreting Taxation Law. If the meaning is clear or if there is an ambiguity in the words, intention may be considered. If the meaning is clear or if there is an ambiguity in the words, intention may be considered. The ordinary grammatical meaning is against the assessee. In my view, therefore, it is idle to contend that only such slides, shorts etc. which are sky-signs are exigible to tax. That would be an untenable interpretation. Projections, trailers etc. are always inside a hall. The submission advanced on behalf of the petitioners is, therefore, squarely rejected. Courts are bound to presume that the law makers have ordinary common understanding. 12. The next submission urged on behalf of the petitioners is that the imposition of penalty upon them by Annexure 3 in terms of section 77 of the Finance Act for advertising without the permission of the prescribed authority was invalid. The submission is that no authority has been prescribed for granting permission and no rules have been framed for the purpose of obtaining written permission to advertise. Section 66 prohibits advertisement in terms of section 63 without obtaining written permission of the prescribed authority and in a prescribed manner. The manner and the authority not having been prescribed, the advertisement does not constitute any offence in terms of section 77 of the Act. Section 77 creates offences and penalty and provides that whoever while being liable to pay tax under section 63 contravenes the provisions of section 66 shall be punishable with fine. The expression “in the manner prescribed" means prescribed by rules and that is what has been stated in section 62 (1) of the Act. It is patent, therefore, that unless the manner of obtaining permission is prescribed by rules, there cannot be any punishment for advertising without permission. 13. Rules have been made for carrying out the purpose of the Act. No rule has, however, been made prescribing the manner in which the permission to advertise has to be obtained. Learned Advocate General tried to get over this difficulty by contending that registration must be read as permission to exhibit. He submitted that rule 3 prescribes for registration of advertising agents. Once registered, the advertising agent shall be deemed to have obtained permission to advertise. Rule 3 which is the rule in regard to registration of advertising agents reads as follows : “3. Registration of advertising agents. He submitted that rule 3 prescribes for registration of advertising agents. Once registered, the advertising agent shall be deemed to have obtained permission to advertise. Rule 3 which is the rule in regard to registration of advertising agents reads as follows : “3. Registration of advertising agents. – (i) An advertising agent doing business of advertisement from a period prior to the commencement of this Act or who has started such business after the commencement of the Act but before the making of these rules shall apply within 30 days of the publication of these rules in the official Gazette for the grant of a registration certificate. (ii) An advertising agent who starts his business after the publication of these rules in the official Gazette shall apply within 30 days of the commencement of his business for grant of the registration certificate. (iii) Application for the grant of the registration certificate shall be filed in Form I to the Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner or Commercial Taxes Officer Incharge of the Circle if the place of business is within the local limits of a Circle, and to the Commercial Taxes Officer Incharge of the sub-circle, if the place of business lies within the local limits of a Sub-circle. (iv) Where an advertising agent has more places of business than one situated in different Circles or Sub-circles, the Commissioner may, on an application by the advertising agent, declare any particular Circle or Sub-Circle to be the appropriate Circle or Sub Circle in relation to him for the purposes of registration : Provided that such a declaration shall not divert the authorities appointed under section 65 and exercising jurisdiction within the area in which the place of advertisement is situated of their powers under section 76 of the Act. (v) The authority mentioned in sub-rule (iii) shall, on being satisfied that an application made in sub-rule (i) or (ii) is correct and complete, grant a registration certificate in Form II." Apparently, the submission advanced by learned Advocate General appeared attractive. The provisions of other sections, however, create difficulty in reading “registration” as “permission”. There is no provision in the Act or the Rules providing the period for which registration would remain valid and in fact learned Advocate General conceded that once registered, the registration would remain valid for all times. The provisions of other sections, however, create difficulty in reading “registration” as “permission”. There is no provision in the Act or the Rules providing the period for which registration would remain valid and in fact learned Advocate General conceded that once registered, the registration would remain valid for all times. The first difficulty is experienced when we look at sub-section (3) of section 66 which lays down that the prescribed authority shall grant permission for the period to which the payment of tax relates. If registration is for all times, the question of period to which the payment of tax relates” ceases to have any meaning. The assessment of tax will come at the end of the assessable period. It can have no relevance to the period of registration. That is the first difficulty in reading registration as permission. The second hurdle is by section 67. This section lays down that the permission of the prescribed authority would cease to be in force in certain cases. It is obvious that permission may cease, if the building or structure be demolished or destroyed or advertisement or any portion thereof falls otherwise through accident or for any material change is made in the advertisement or any portion thereof, but the registration will not be cancelled on that score. Thus once again permission cannot be read as registration and vice-versa. Proceeding further we find that section 68 lays down that where an advertisement is made after expiry of the period of written permission of the prescribed authority under section 66 or after such permission has ceased to be in force under section 67, the owner or person in occupation shall be assessed to tax under section 71. Once again the concept of cessation of permission is introduced by section 68. There is no provision laying down the period for which registration of an advertising agent may be effected. Natural conclusion therefore, would be that once registered, it would hold good for all times, until registration is cancelled. Permission to advertise, however, may be interrupted for various reasons contained in section 67. It is thus obvious that registration of and permission to advertise are entirely two different concepts. Natural conclusion therefore, would be that once registered, it would hold good for all times, until registration is cancelled. Permission to advertise, however, may be interrupted for various reasons contained in section 67. It is thus obvious that registration of and permission to advertise are entirely two different concepts. The two being different in the absence of any rule prescribing the manner in which permission has to be obtained, advertising cannot be an offence in terms of section 77 (a) read with section 66 of the Act. The manner of obtaining permission not having been prescribed by rules, the petitioners could not obtain permission. The petitioners, therefore, would not be liable under section 77 to the fine mentioned in that section. On that footing the imposition of fine of Rs. 77 must be held to be invalid and liable to be set aside. Annexure 2 and 3 must, therefore be quashed. 14. Since I have held earlier that exhibition of slides, shorts etc. in cinema hall is liable to be taxed as advertisement, the liability to pay the tax cannot be disputed. There is therefore, no substance in the prayer for quashing Annexure-4. The application to that extent is rejected. 15. The last submission urged on behalf of the petitioners was that the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Special Circle, Patna had no jurisdiction to convict and punish the petitioners in terms of section 77, as he did by Annexure-3. The submission has substance and must be accepted. Section 72 creates offences and penalties. The provisions for imposition of penalty in respect of assessment is to be found in section 71.The penalty referred to in section 77 has relation to commission of offences. Since 77 creates offences, there should be a forum and procedure for trial. The Finance Act itself does not create any forum or procedure. In the absence of any such provision, the Code of Criminal Procedure will take care of the forum and procedure in terms of section 44(2) and (5) (sic) read with Schedule 2 thereof. In terms of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is only a Judicial Magistrate, who can punish for commission of offences. - The Assistant Commissioner is not authority who can punish. Annexure-3 must be quashed for that reason as well. 16. In terms of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is only a Judicial Magistrate, who can punish for commission of offences. - The Assistant Commissioner is not authority who can punish. Annexure-3 must be quashed for that reason as well. 16. In the view that I have taken in regard to other questions, it is not necessary to dwell upon the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioners that they cannot be held liable for having not got registered under rule 3 because the rules do not prescribe any penalty for no registration. 17. My conclusions thus are : (i) Exhibition of slides, shorts, films, trailers etc. in cinema hall are liable to be taxed in terms of Part II of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 as amended by the Bihar Finance Act, 1985 (Act 4 of 1985). (ii) The manner of obtaining permission not having been prescribed, no offence was committed by the petitioners. (iii) Registration is not the same as grant of permission. (iv) The authorities prescribed in section 65 in the Finance Act have no jurisdiction to punish and impose finance for commission of offences under section 77 of the Act. 18. Upon these findings C.W.J.C. No. 1895 of 1986 is hereby allowed leaving the authorities to proceed with the assessment of the assessee the Veena Theatre Private Limited. 19. In C.W.J.C. No. 5803 of 1986 no penal action has been taken against the exhibitor. It has only been called upon by Annexure 1 why action be not taken against it for not producing materials in regard to imposition of advertisement tax. By Annexure 2 it has been called upon to show cause why it be not ordered to deposit the advertisement tax. The liability to pay tax cannot be doubted. Since no penal action has been initiated against M/s Four Star Picture Palace, there is no merit in this application. It must be dismissed accordingly. 20. In fine, C.W.J.C. No. 1895 of 1980 is hereby allowed. C.W.J.C. No. 5803 of 1986 is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. B.N. Agrawal, J, – I agree.